

# **More than a battle of words**

**An explorative analysis of CIMIC and Civil-Military  
Interaction in the Dutch humanitarian context**

**Judith Zweers  
PSO, The Hague, September 2004**



**Aren't we lucky, not to be in their shoes ...**

(Cartoon by Mark de Koning, made during the PSO study day on CIMIC and Civil-Military Relations, June 2004. Another cartoon can be found on page 23)

## Preface

During the 1990s humanitarian aid has clearly come of age. The scope, size and variety of humanitarian interventions associated with armed conflict and struggle has expanded. The changing nature and especially the prolonged period of conflict seem to have led to increasing contacts between the community of 'humanitarians' and uniformed forces. Clearly such relations are not new; the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement illustrates this as not other. What is new is that in the various crisis settings of the late eighties and nineties the relations between civil and military actors have changed and will continue to evolve. Partly this appears to be due to the mechanised nature of international crisis and conflict, partly because the actors involved have begun to assume different responsibilities for a host of different reasons. The inevitable outcome of this is that the relations between civil and military actors are changing.

This development and the humanitarian tradition of several Dutch organisations, such as Cordaid, ICCO, ZOA, Care and Novib suggested that it would be useful to analyse the current trends and positions in this field. Informal discussions with a range of members, experienced development practitioners, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirmed the time had come to undertake a low profile initiative. The fact that the international political debate appeared to be well advanced also indicated that the focussing on the relations between civil society organisations and the military would be useful.

The PSO Knowledge Centre asked Judith Zweers to undertake an investigative study of the Dutch civil society experience. This study was undertaken during April – June. In June, we organised a study day on CIMIC and civil-military relations. The broad nature of the participants from PSO-member organisations showed that the topic is of interest well beyond the 'traditional' humanitarian organisations. The three key note speakers, including Judith Zweers, highlighted the changing nature of these relations and that dialogue between the main actors needed to be encouraged. The day ended with a call for mutual learning. Joint action or coordination of activities was identified as not being the aim to follow. The full report including a series of worthwhile cartoons is available on the PSO website.

This paper shows the different perceptions of CIMIC and civil military relations, important dilemmas are identified. We encouraged Judith to take her analysis beyond the descriptive; she has finished the paper with a set of worthwhile issues that need to be taken up. The PSO Knowledge Centre looks forward to continued collaboration with our members to foster broader understanding of the issues and positions at stake.

During the development of the study proposal and the writing of the paper the following people provided valuable input: Dubravka Zarkov (Institute of Social Studies), Cornélie van Waegeningh (Equip Worldwide), Mireille Hector (Netherlands Red Cross), Kees van de Broek (Cordaid) and Myriame Bollen (Royal Military Academy).

Russell Kerkhoven, *Head of the PSO Knowledge Center*, The Hague, September 2004

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## An explorative analysis of CIMIC and Civil-Military Interaction in the Dutch humanitarian context

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Judith Zweers, PSO  
The Hague, September 2004

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### 1. Introduction

*'Looking for a change of environment and some adventure? Have you built enough bridges and roads in the Netherlands and are now looking for a new challenge, e.g. in the Balkan States? The Army's CIMIC project (Civil-Military Co-operation) can offer you a temporary job in an environment where, as an extension of your civil duties, you can do useful work for a population that needs all the help it can get.'* (Translated from a CIMIC Group North recruitment folder.)

Armed forces are recruiting civilian specialists for rehabilitation activities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is financing activities carried out by military officers from humanitarian assistance or development cooperation funds. The Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV)<sup>1</sup> points out the need for more cooperation between development cooperation and defence. There are a lot of signs that humanitarian assistance and the military forces are less separate worlds than one would think. This has created confusion and concern among many humanitarian organisations in the Netherlands about the rapidly changing realities in which they are working, sometimes placing them in dilemmas. How could (or should) they relate to military forces that are an increasingly inseparable part of these realities? Concepts such as Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) and civil-military interaction seem difficult to grasp and therefore add to the confusion. Developments can no longer be ignored and action is needed. But what kind of action?<sup>2</sup>

This paper aims to contribute to finding answers to this question. It is based on a literature study and interviews with different military and humanitarian stakeholders in The Netherlands from April to June 2004. The paper provides an overview of concepts, interpretations and the various positions taken by humanitarian aid and military organisations. The findings of a workshop on 'CIMIC and Civil Military Relations', organised by PSO<sup>3</sup> for its member organisations end of June 2004 are also taken into account.

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<sup>1</sup> The AIV is an advisory body to the Dutch Government and parliament on issues concerning human rights, peace and security, development cooperation and European integration.

<sup>2</sup> In this paper, the terms 'humanitarian organisation', 'NGO', and 'humanitarian NGO' are used interchangeably. They all refer to an international NGO that either has a solely humanitarian mandate or a combined humanitarian and rehabilitation (and development) mandate. The Red Cross is also included in this category, even though it is not an NGO.

<sup>3</sup> PSO is an umbrella organisation for over 40 Dutch development organisations that contribute to capacity building of civil society organisations in the south. Although eleven member organisations are involved in humanitarian assistance, most members work (through local organisations) in post-conflict situations.

The paper starts with a bit of history: it briefly explores contextual changes in post-conflict situations and the responses by various actors over the past 15 years. Section 2 aims to disentangle the various concepts and practices of CIMIC and civil-military interaction, both nationally and internationally. Sections 3 and 4 discuss opinions and concerns regarding CIMIC and explore the scope for cooperation between humanitarian actors and military forces respectively. The final section contains some concluding remarks.

## **2. Changing conflicts, changing responses**

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is symbolic for the beginning of a new era in which the nature of conflicts in many developing countries changed radically. Inter-state 'frozen' conflicts developed into intra-state 'hot' wars in which ethnic differences increasingly played an important role, thus further complicating the nature of the conflict and often fragmenting sovereign states. Large-scale displacements of people, failing economic, political and social institutions, lawlessness and violence against non-combatants are just some of the characteristics of complex emergencies. The number of regions in conflict and the number of conflicts has also increased. Again, the world changed significantly after 11 September 2001. Global interdependence links complex conflicts and 'failing states' located far away, to issues of security in Western countries, thus leading to new methods of warfare and new political agendas.<sup>4</sup> The war against terror; the statement 'if you're not with us, you're against us' which denies the existence of neutral ground; and recent developments in Afghanistan and Iraq are all important elements of these new realities.

The number of external forces and actors operating in complex humanitarian emergencies has grown and the nature of the work has diversified. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all the actors involved, as the intention is to explore relationships between military forces and international humanitarian organisations. However, political actors and private business companies are also important players in the discussion on civil-military cooperation in the Netherlands, and thus will be briefly discussed.<sup>5</sup> Apart from this, the paper is limited to the two main groups of actors.

### **Military forces: from peacekeeping, to peace enforcing, to peace building**

The end of the Cold War called for major reforms in Western armed forces. They had to redefine their political rationale for existence, changing from territorial defence towards peace-support missions. Military mandates of individual Member States broadened, as well as those of the United Nations. NATO and the EU also became involved in peace-support operations and so the UN is no longer the only multilateral provider of military missions.

The UN agenda for peace and security expanded its mandate of peacekeeping missions from monitoring and observation towards a more active engagement. Peacekeeping with demonstrated consent of all

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<sup>4</sup> A 'failing state' can be defined as a state that has no monopoly on the use of force (and thus is unable to control its territory and guarantee the security of its citizens), is no longer able to uphold its internal legal order, and is no longer able (or willing) to provide public services to its population. The absence of state authority is usually exploited by non-state actors (rebels, protest movements, terrorists, criminals) from inside and outside the state (AIV, [www.aiv-advies.nl](http://www.aiv-advies.nl)).

<sup>5</sup> Of course this does not deny the importance of other actors, such as the local population, local and national authorities, local or regional armed forces, the media, back donors, etc.

parties involved (also called 'first generation peacekeeping'), evolved into peace enforcing with the right to intervene on humanitarian grounds to settle and resolve conflicts ('second generation peacekeeping'). UN-supported military forces became increasingly involved in humanitarian activities, sometimes at the request of humanitarian organisations.

With the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995, NATO now entered the scene. Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) were involved in both the bombing of Yugoslavia and in helping refugees. In the Balkan States, NATO military forces became increasingly involved in humanitarian and rehabilitation activities. Such activities were no longer primarily aimed at supporting humanitarian organisations: they became directly involved in rebuilding state and social structures, such as police forces, administrative structures, etc. Such interactions between military forces and the civil environment in which they operated, were called 'CIMIC', or Civil-Military Co-operation. Consequently, the Balkan area has been called a 'laboratory for civil-military relations'.<sup>6</sup> Peace enforcing evolved into peace building, or 'third generation peacekeeping'.

The EU entered the scene during the late 1990s: its new Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) became operational in 2003. The RRF's mandate includes humanitarian missions, peacekeeping missions, crisis management and peace enforcing.<sup>7</sup> The RRF started its first mission in Macedonia in March 2003.

## International civil organisations in post-conflict situations

The second group of actors consists of a very diverse group of international organisations providing emergency relief, supporting rehabilitation and development, supporting peace initiatives and monitoring human rights situations. They can be grouped as follows:<sup>8</sup>

**- Organisations that provide immediate relief.** Humanitarian organisations that provide immediate relief to save lives and relieve suffering caused by conflict try to stay away from taking sides in the conflict. Their work is founded on the principle of humanity (i.e. the recognition that all human beings have the right to protection), with impartiality (relief is given solely on the basis of need) as its guiding principle. Neutrality (not taking sides, nor being seen to take sides in a conflict) and independence (from politics and governments) are the core principles that allow these organisations to reach all people in need.<sup>9</sup> Examples of such organisations include MSF (Médecins San Frontrières) and ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross).

**- Double-mandated organisations.** Rehabilitation/development-oriented organisations may also provide humanitarian assistance. However, their mandates differ from 'relief-only' organisations: their longer-term involvement makes them focus more on rehabilitation, capacity development and sustainable results. Their poverty programmes could be more politically informed. Though not addressing the conflict in the short term, their programmes may reduce a country's predisposition to conflict in the long term. Many of these

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<sup>6</sup> Studer 2001

<sup>7</sup> Barry/Jefferys (2002) and NGO Voice (2004).

<sup>8</sup> This distinction is partly based on Goodhand, who distinguishes between organisations working 'around conflict', 'in conflict' and 'on conflict'. (Goodhand 2001)

<sup>9</sup> MSF 2002-2005 and Barry/Jefferys 2002.

organisations also adhere to the principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality, although the principle of neutrality is increasingly under debate. Many development-oriented NGOs also have divisions for humanitarian assistance. Examples include: NOVIB/Oxfam, Cordaid, Care, ZOA Refugee Care and HealthNet International.

**- Organisations working on conflict.** The peace movement and human rights groups support local peace initiatives and peace dialogues. Furthermore, they may be involved in conflict-mediating and in monitoring human rights situations. Examples include Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) and Pax Christi.

Following recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq, many NGOs belonging to the first two groups express fear that humanitarian support is becoming an integral element of political and military intervention strategies, intended to 'support, flank or legitimise' military operations.<sup>10</sup> In response, the aid organisations themselves are being criticised for not responding adequately to the many changes in the external environment.<sup>11</sup>

## **Business organisations**

The past decade has shown an increased interest by the business community in reconstruction activities and other activities in post-conflict situations. The Ministry of Defence and the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (known as VNO-NCW) have established a platform to explore possibilities for cooperation, such as the deployment of business experts to (post)-conflict areas. The experts follow a short military training to ensure their safety, and work in a post-conflict area wearing a military uniform.

## **Changing political climates: an integrated approach**

In recognition of the increased complexity of conflicts and its relations with (feelings of) unsafe situations in Western countries, the Dutch Government has developed an integrated security policy. This policy advocates a comprehensive, multifunctional, multidisciplinary (post-conflict) peace-building approach.<sup>12</sup> Central to this approach is the recognition of linkages between different phases in a conflict (pre-conflict, conflict, post-conflict) between security, stability and development, and the fact that different actors are involved in finding solutions, using both military and civil means. It becomes increasingly difficult to keep lines between different government departments separated, as has long been the case. The AIV recently pointed to a number of activities that fall in between the fields of operation of military forces and humanitarian aid. Examples of such activities include: support to a civilian controlled police, judiciary and military, support in developing regional peacekeeping capacities, and CIMIC activities by Western military in peacekeeping operations. International intervention therefore not only requires attention to political aspects, but also to humanitarian, socioeconomic, human rights and police aspects. These are not isolated insights: similar developments occur within institutions such as the UN, NATO and the EU, as previously explained.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> VENRO 2003

<sup>11</sup> Minear 2002

<sup>12</sup> AIV 2004

<sup>13</sup> As for the United Nations, reference can be made to the Brahimi Report (2000). This report called for a more comprehensive approach to peacekeeping, suggesting the UN establish an overarching command-and-control structure that uses humanitarian aid as a 'tool in the toolbox' of conflict management (Barry/Jefferys, 2002).



The Dutch Government, in responding to a changing world, advocates an enhanced interaction between the actors in humanitarian support and military operations, as well as a repositioning of these actors' roles.

### 3. CIMIC: a confusing collection of definitions and practices

Civil-Military Co-operation, in its broadest sense, refers to the interface between the military on the one hand and civilians on the other. Civilians can be local authorities, the local population, local NGOs or international humanitarian aid organisations. Historically, CIMIC has essentially been a military concept, referring to regular contacts between the military and civil actors and authorities during a military operation. Such contacts could, for example, provide information on refugee movements, which could prevent supplies of military equipment being transported over the same road. It could also result in the military getting involved in small projects, such as the reconstruction of a road or a bridge. However, with the changing natures of conflicts and broadened mandates of military operations during the 1990s, CIMIC gained importance. Today, CIMIC seems to have many different manifestations, which causes a lot of confusion.

#### The Dutch 'confusion'

The Dutch Government has an official CIMIC policy (approved by Parliament) that closely follows the NATO policy. It is quite clear on what CIMIC *is* and what it is *not*. However, in practice, things look different and this makes it a rather confusing concept. Thus, one could distinguish between the 'official' CIMIC and a range of activities that is often called 'CIMIC', but which is not in agreement with the official policy. Finally, interaction exists between humanitarian organisations and military forces, which can be (but is not necessarily) part of CIMIC. The various 'types' of CIMIC and the forms of interaction between humanitarian organisations and military forces are described below.

#### - CIMIC for the Dutch Government

In 2001, NATO defined CIMIC as:<sup>14</sup>

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the military mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

This means that CIMIC is a military concept. Even though the term 'Civil-Military Co-operation' seems to point to a cooperation between civilians and the military, it really refers to the opposite as the cooperation is initiated by the military. Secondly, this means that CIMIC has a military goal (and not a development or reconstruction goal) as indicated by 'in support of the mission'. The two main rationales behind CIMIC are force protection and force acceptance, which make CIMIC activities a means to an end (i.e. reaching the

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<sup>14</sup> NATO 2003

'end state' of the military mission).<sup>15</sup> Force protection refers to information gathering and information sharing through consultation with local, national and international actors in order to spot potential problems and take necessary measures to ensure the safety of our own troops. Force acceptance refers to winning the goodwill of the local population by carrying out reconstruction activities (popularly called 'hearts and minds campaigns').<sup>16</sup> Thus, CIMIC is as much about liaison, interaction and information gathering, as it is about carrying out activities.

Though based on the NATO policy, the CIMIC policy defined by the Netherlands is a bit more outspoken on a few issues.<sup>17</sup> This Dutch policy is based on the statement: 'as civil as possible, and as military as necessary'.<sup>18</sup> The precise meaning of this statement remains unclear, as no further explanations are given. However, structural rehabilitation activities are considered to be the task of international and national development organisations rather than the military. Therefore, CIMIC activities are not to be included in the field of structural rehabilitation and are to be handed over to civilian agencies as soon as possible. The activities are funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from humanitarian assistance funds. A budget of € 50,000 is directly available for each (peace-) operation to which the Netherlands make a 'substantial' contribution.<sup>19</sup> Additional funding requires that a project proposal by the Ministry of Defence be discussed and assessed in interdepartmental consultations ('interdepartementaal overleg') on CIMIC.<sup>20</sup> CIMIC activities are small-scale and directly visible for the community. Examples include the reconstruction of small-scale essential infrastructure (a road, a bridge), the rehabilitation of a sports centre, or the initial setting up of police and local government structures. Such activities can be carried out by military personnel and by CIMIC units from CIMIC Group North.<sup>21</sup>

#### - **Other manifestations: CIMIC or not?**

Even though CIMIC seems to be rather narrowly and well defined, in practice things look different. There is a broad range of activities that do not seem to qualify for the 'CIMIC' label. These tasks entail structural rehabilitation and reconstruction activities that have no immediate function in protecting and supporting the armed forces. Even though funds for CIMIC activities seem limited, commanders often receive additional funding from other countries for related activities. For example, the Dutch contingent in Al Muthanna, Iraq, received several million dollars from the Coalition Forces to engage in larger scale projects, such as the structural rehabilitation of irrigation systems, factories, schools, the private sector etc. These activities are carried out by military staff or reservists who specialise in business, banking, etc. They are deployed by the Ministry of Defence to work in the field of civil administration, civil infrastructure, economy and commerce, or in cultural affairs. Many humanitarian organisations also consider deploying reservists through CIMIC Group

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<sup>15</sup> Even though the Netherlands policy document on CIMIC clearly states that CIMIC activities are not - by definition - relevant for development, they also may not interfere with Dutch foreign policy.

<sup>16</sup> MinBuza/MinDef (Foreign Affairs/Defence) May 2003 and NATO 2003.

<sup>17</sup> MinBuza/MinDef, May 2003.

<sup>18</sup> Besides force protection and force acceptance, CIMIC also has a limited reconstruction role in former conflict areas. Moreover, CIMIC is to point out to the international community that peace operations are prerequisites for processes of reconstruction.

<sup>19</sup> The term 'substantial' is not further explained.


<sup>20</sup> These consultations represent the Security Policy Department (DVB) and the Human Rights and Peace-building Department (DMV) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Defence staff and the General Policy Matters Department of the Ministry of Defence.

<sup>21</sup> The Netherlands is among six countries that take part in CIMIC Group North, based in Budel. CIMIC Group North is part of NATO and maintains a database of experts that can be deployed to post-conflict areas to carry out CIMIC activities.

North as being part of this unclear area of activities. The pool of CIMIC Group North reservists also includes civilians who have received a short military training. The Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Activities (IDEA) Project, which started in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a pilot project in 2001, is another well-known example. Experts from the Dutch business community were deployed as military reservists to advise Bosnian small and medium-sized businesses. The project is expected to expand to other countries, also to Iraq.<sup>22</sup>

A wide range of activities are called ‘CIMIC’. Opinions in politics, at ministry levels and among military staff differ considerably as to what is, or is not, CIMIC. There are various lines of thinking within the Dutch Ministry of Defence. Some prefer the military to concentrate on its core business, others welcome a limited CIMIC function or would like to move into structural rehabilitation activities. Again others prefer the Netherlands to move towards a UK model, where CIMIC is more about dialogue between different actors and less about the military carrying out projects (the differences between international interpretations will be briefly discussed in one of the following sections). These differences are caused by various interests. Some focus on a new role for reservists, whereas others prefer to limit CIMIC to military staff. Others feel that CIMIC should mainly play a role in helping to reinstate and rehabilitate the local authority, fire department, police, etc. This may all seem confusing, but it also is a sign that CIMIC is still in development. The Dutch policy of today may not be the policy of tomorrow.

**Figure 1: Netherlands CIMIC policy and practice**




<sup>22</sup> The project in Bosnia-Herzegovina has recently been handed over to an American NGO.

### - **Civil-Military Interaction**

The next question is: where do humanitarian organisations 'fit in' to the CIMIC concept? It is particularly the CIMIC function of 'information sharing' where humanitarian NGOs may get involved. Military forces can provide security information (this usually takes place in CIMIC Centres) and NGOs can provide information on their whereabouts and on local situations. It could also take the form of sharing information on activities, with the aim of 'fine-tuning' them. However, this rarely seems to happen in practice. Relationships between military forces and humanitarian organisations are diverse and can take place at different levels.

Organisations such as the Netherlands Red Cross and Cordaid are involved in providing training sessions to CIMIC officers and other military staff to create greater understanding for the work and mandates of humanitarian organisations and improve knowledge on international humanitarian law. Military forces may also provide ad hoc short-term logistical support to a humanitarian organisation in the field. One example of such cooperation was the military support to Dorcas in Bosnia. Many Muslims initially fled to Albania. Aid (food, tents, blankets, etc.) was therefore sent straight to Albania. But once Kosovo was 'liberated', the refugees soon returned, although the supplies were still in Albania. The military arranged the transport of the aid to Kosovo. Dorcas: 'They were pleased to help. After Srebrenica they wanted to improve their image.' Other examples include: the transportation for security reasons of children in a War Child programme in Kosovo by the military; the construction of a refugee camp by the military that was taken over and run by the Netherlands Red Cross after construction; a military hospital in East-Timor providing medical equipment for TB-scanning to a hospital where Cordaid was working, etc. Such forms of cooperation have no relation to CIMIC, as they do not serve a military goal.

**Figure 2: Interaction between humanitarian organisations and military forces**



The grey area in Figure 2 shows the fields of interaction between humanitarian organisations and the military. Forms of interaction such as dialogue, information sharing, fine-tuning of activities etc. also belong

to this area but are not included in the figure because they could belong to both the area inside and outside the CIMIC circle. Figure 2 only deals with humanitarian organisations and the military. Other actors, such as businesses and local/national government agencies could also be added in order to make it complete.

## The international ‘confusion’: CIMIC still in development

Whereas NATO (and thus the Dutch Government) stresses the military identity of CIMIC, as explained above, the UN and the UK Government both stress its humanitarian identity.<sup>23</sup> The UN limits its civil military operations to supporting humanitarian organisations (although they do not call it CIMIC). The UK seems to consider the entire field of civil-military interaction as being part of CIMIC. In other words, as further explained below, as yet there is no international consensus on the meaning of CIMIC, and thus CIMIC means different things to different organisations and countries.

In 2003 the UN developed guidelines for humanitarian-military cooperation in complex emergencies, referred to as UN Humanitarian or Civil Military Coordination. ‘CMCoord’ is based upon principles of dialogue and interaction between parties and is defined as:<sup>24</sup>

The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and (when appropriate) pursue common goals.

According to these (non-binding) UN guidelines, CMCoord has a non-military character. It refers to support by the UN military to civilian humanitarian organisations in a humanitarian operation in which the civilian organisation takes the lead. The support respects all humanitarian principles and only takes place where there is no civilian alternative (the military assets being used as a last resort only).

The UK definition of CIMIC (2003), takes a more integrated, holistic position on civil-military relations. The UK definition of CIMIC is:<sup>25</sup>

The process whereby the relationship between military and civilian sectors is addressed, with the aim of enabling a more coherent military contribution to the achievement of UK and/or international objectives.

Though accepting the NATO definition, the UK focuses on a more coherent civil-military response to crises, to the *mutual benefit* of both military and civil actors. Recognising the longer-term political nature of conflict, the military component is seen as just one element in a multifunctional and multi-organisational approach to

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<sup>23</sup> Rietjens, 2002

<sup>24</sup> United Nations, 2003

<sup>25</sup> MoD/JDCC 2003 and e-mail communication with M. Riley, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Ministry of Defence, June 2004

solving a complex crisis. CIMIC aims to create better understanding and closer interaction between all actors involved. As such, it is more about dialogue and interaction than about activities.<sup>26</sup> British NGOs, the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign Office and military representatives meet regularly in an NGO-Military Contact Group. The group aims to facilitate their communication, as well as organise events and projects that build towards mutual understanding. Wherever and whenever UK forces are deployed, two humanitarian advisers are seconded to the British Military Commander.<sup>27</sup>

## 4. A wide array of opinions, feelings and interests

### ... about the political environment in general

- **shift in paradigm.** As pointed out earlier, CIMIC and the discussion on civil-military interaction are not isolated phenomena. They fit well into the current line of thinking, which advocates a more integrated approach to peace building and a greater involvement of military and business actors. These concepts receive a lot of political attention. Organisations providing humanitarian assistance perceive the political developments as an important change in paradigm. Most agree with the underlying analysis of the interconnectedness between conflict and development and agree with the need for more integration. However, concerns also exist: to what extent is this discussion led and shaped by political agendas that are based on Western security policies?

- **fear of exclusion.** 'NGO's are afraid that they'll lose control of the discussion', an NGO interviewee observes. Humanitarian organisations feel they are left out of the discussion. Having long been praised for doing good work in difficult circumstances, the tide is now turning. Military forces and businesses are new actors entering the scene. They are at the centre of political interest, at the cost of humanitarian NGOs who increasingly seem to evoke negative feelings in political circles. NGOs are being criticised for their competitiveness, their uncooperative behaviour and their lack of responsiveness to changing realities. This situation evokes feelings of uncertainty, confusion, indignation and fear within the humanitarian aid sector. Even though NGOs feel that it is time to get involved and make sure that they are listened to once again, little action has so far been undertaken. Or, as one NGO interviewee explained: 'They (the politicians and military) look right through us, but then we (NGOs) also do nothing to draw their attention.'

- **inflation of the term humanitarianism.** One such element that affects the work of humanitarian NGOs is the use of the term 'humanitarianism' in politics. International humanitarian law stresses the impartial character of humanitarianism. However, political interests are increasingly entering the humanitarian debate. The use of concepts such as 'military-humanitarianism', 'humanitarian war', and 'humanitarian bombing' have sparked off a lot of criticism among NGOs, who fear that the humanitarian label is being used by policy makers to justify political or military action. It seems that the term 'humanitarian' is subject to inflation.

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<sup>26</sup> UK MOD Civil-military (CIMIC Philosophy) Philosophy, JDCC ([www.mod.uk/jdcc/cimic.htm](http://www.mod.uk/jdcc/cimic.htm))

<sup>27</sup> Terms of Reference NGO-Military Contact Group, July 2003 and e-mail communication with Clare Harkin, DFID, April 2003

- **‘quicksand’ or new opportunities?** Some humanitarian organisations, such as ZOA and ICCO/Global Ministries-Protestant Church in The Netherlands (ICCO/Kerkinactie), perceive the broader developments as ‘quicksand’: something over which they have no control. The developments are also often represented as a fast-moving train that has already covered a large portion of its course. NGOs can jump on the bandwagon and try to influence its direction as much as possible or miss the train altogether and be presented with a *fait accompli*. Others, such as Cordaid and Care, see opportunities to experiment with new ways of cooperation. They argue that, as situations are getting more complicated and multi-layered, various actions may be needed to achieve goals, and different actors should seek synergy with one another.

### ... and about CIMIC in particular

- **an encroachment into ‘humanitarian space’?** Most criticism focuses on the visible aspects of CIMIC. A military interviewee: ‘Essentially, CIMIC is not about projects, but that’s the only thing that people see.’ Indeed, it are not so much the liaison function, the gathering of information, and trying to fine-tune activities that are being criticised by NGOs, but rather the civilian activities carried out by military forces. The involvement of military forces in civic action and the explicit linkages between the military, political aims and humanitarian action feels, for many humanitarian organisations, like an encroachment into ‘humanitarian space’. This criticism is mostly directed at the manifestations of CIMIC that do not fit in the CIMIC policy (i.e. the outer circle of Figure 1).

- **whose needs should be served?** Only a few people reject CIMIC altogether. Those who do so oppose CIMIC in all forms, and point at the principles behind it. They reason that it goes against humanitarian principles to let CIMIC be driven by the needs of the armed forces rather than the needs of the local people. ‘Is it ethical to use information gathered from the local people for intelligence purposes?’, they wonder. Others see no problem as they focus more on the higher goal of a peaceful and stable situation: humanitarian organisations and military forces share the same goal, but have different tasks and different means. In other words: in the end both serve the needs of the local people. However, many organisations feel that their goals differ from those of the military, as military interventions are usually politically motivated, serving particular political agendas.

- **the military as development experts?** It surprises many that longer-term structural rehabilitation and development projects such as IDEA can be carried out under the CIMIC flag. Also the diverse sub-sectors within CIMIC raises many eyebrows: CIMIC is not only working in infrastructure, but also in administration, economic and commercial activities, humanitarian assistance, and in cultural and religious affairs. Specialists, without experience of working in another culture and in complex emergencies, receive a CIMIC and military training and are then deployed in an area of operation. Even though the Dutch Government provides limited funding for CIMIC projects, the extra millions received from other coalition partners enable the military to do much more, i.e. start structural rehabilitation and developmental activities.

There seems to be a general acceptance of such projects within the Ministry of Defence, even though some state that such activities cannot be labelled ‘CIMIC’ as they do not fit in with the Dutch CIMIC policy. But they reason that they cannot wait for NGOs to start rehabilitation projects after a conflict is over, as expressed in the following: ‘You see a real need and if you don’t do something about it immediately then the atmosphere quickly deteriorates and you find yourself in an unsafe situation.’ A peaceful situation can

quickly destabilise when people are confronted with the reality of unemployment and lack of administrative structures. During this period it is particularly important to start structural rehabilitation quickly, they reason. A Ministry of Defence official: 'Why not? You're not treading on anybody's toes.'

According to the military, this work often involves activities for which no NGOs are available. NGOs are being reproached for having their own agendas, sometimes not wanting to work in an area because there is no media coverage or the area is too small. It is important to recognise that NGO motivations may be mixed and related to winning 'hearts and minds' as well.<sup>28</sup> However, Dutch humanitarian organisations for their part, reproach the military for having a blind spot for the many national NGOs that work in an area. International humanitarian organisations, especially the organisations that focus on rehabilitation and development (such as Cordaid, Novib and ICCO/Global Ministries – Protestant Church in The Netherlands) are often not physically present in an area, but work through their local partners. An interviewee from Novib: 'We told UNMEE in Eritrea about REST, one of the largest African NGOs. Everyone knows them, but the military didn't bother to contact them.'<sup>29</sup>

- **'Cross-dressing' and role-changing: a safety hazard for the relief worker?** Many NGOs wonder why civilian experts that are deployed by the Ministry of Defence, have to do their work while wearing a military uniform. Can they not complete their tasks in civilian clothing? The short answer is no, they cannot: the moment they receive a military training and are deployed as part of the armed forces, international humanitarian law prohibits them from dressing in civilian clothes. However, the question still remains why civilians need to be recruited by the army to do civilian activities.

There are also reports of soldiers wearing civilian clothes while carrying concealed weapons and driving unmarked vehicles. International humanitarian law is based on a clear distinction between combatants and civilians: they have a different status and different rights. 'Cross-dressing' is strictly prohibited.<sup>30</sup> In other words: soldiers wearing civilian clothes violate international law. Cross-dressing and role-changing among the military, thus mixing military and civilian identities, lead to a blurring of lines between military and civic action. The difference between a neutral relief worker and a soldier is difficult to see if the latter changes roles or pretends to be a civilian. Some humanitarian organisations have requested military staff to dress in civilian outfits when supporting a humanitarian organisation. For example, such requests were made by NGOs to military officers who came to an NGO hospital to bring specific equipment. Not only may such requests add to the confusion; they also go against the law. This suggests that many NGOs lack a thorough understanding of the international bodies of law that apply in conflict situations.

A blurring of these lines may also have repercussions for relief workers, who have increasingly come under attack lately. 'A direct consequence of the military changing identities', some humanitarian organisations reason. However, there is also a question of attribution: are the increasing attacks indeed related to a blurring of lines? It (also) seems related to the fact that more and more armed groups involved in conflicts see no problem in using violence against non-combatants and are purposely opposed to any Western influence, both armed and non-armed. The 'enemy' is defined very broadly.

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<sup>28</sup> Caritas Internationalis 2003

<sup>29</sup> United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

<sup>30</sup> Hugo Slim introduced the term 'cross-dressing' to indicate soldiers wearing civilian clothes (Slim 2003)



**- a quick fix or sustainable approach?** Humanitarian organisations are also critical of the working methods and attitudes among the military who might lack sensitivity towards local cultures and customs and quickly get the job done in an overpowering way. They argue that the activities lack stakeholder analyses, and thus do not respond to the specific needs of the poor and other weaker sections of society, let alone be gender specific. A ZOA staff member: 'If you jump in feet first without assessing the local situation, then you run the risk of awakening old conflicts'. Another NGO worker commented on the manner in which the military helped in reconstructing houses for widows: 'They came with heavy military hardware to get the job done, but this undermines people's self-sufficiency.' Whereas the military aims for quick results, a humanitarian or development organisation aims for a process of sustainable rehabilitation, with the use of local materials and participation by local people. It seems that the military are starting all over again at the beginning of the same learning curve that NGOs have already been through over the past decades. The military, on the other hand, point to the immediate situation, which calls for a quick and concerted effort. Their image of NGOs is one of a passive debating club that lacks decisiveness.

**- why do criteria for humanitarian action not apply to CIMIC?** The mutual observations on the working methods of the military, the humanitarian actors and others rest on anecdotal evidence. CIMIC activities are usually not subject to evaluation.<sup>31</sup> An exception is the evaluation of the IDEA project in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the quality of this evaluation is highly questionable: the contribution this project made to the economic rehabilitation of Bosnia could not be assessed, as no indicators were developed to do so and no baseline information was available. Moreover, the group responsible for implementing the project also carried out the evaluation. 'If we (NGOs) were to deliver something that bad, we'd be shut down', one of the NGO interviewees commented. Another NGO interviewee: 'There are totally different quality standards: and that really hurts'. It bothers many NGOs that the activities carried out by military forces are rarely subject to any of the criteria that apply to the humanitarian and development sectors. The objective of CIMIC activities is a military one, and thus the 'rules of the game' for humanitarian action are not applied. Cost-effectiveness analyses seem to be totally lacking. One interviewee recalls the supply of tents by the army in Goma: 'The quality was excellent, but they cost four times the price of tents that a humanitarian organisation would have supplied.' NGOs would like to see more transparency in decision-making processes, the allocation of funds and quality/effects of CIMIC activities, particularly those that involve structural rehabilitation.

**- about mutual feelings.** Other problems are related to the lack of mutual trust and a (possibly perceived) lack of respect for the other party.<sup>32</sup> The use of different terminology reinforces biased opinions and feeds misunderstanding. A good example is the term 'doctrine' in military circles, which means the same as 'policy document' but which often evokes rather different feelings among NGOs; a doctrine is often seen as extremely directive. From the NGO point of view, the frequent turnover in staff within the military hampers the building of a trusting relationship. The military, however, refer to the large numbers of NGOs operating in complex emergencies, which are competitive and do not coordinate their activities among themselves. Distrust among NGOs about hidden agendas among the military is further aggravated by military staff

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<sup>31</sup> An exception is the evaluation of the IDEA project in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the quality of this evaluation is highly questionable: the contribution of the project to economic rehabilitation of Bosnia could not be assessed, as no indicators were developed to do so and no baseline information was available. Moreover, the group responsible for implementing the project also carried out the evaluation.

<sup>32</sup> Bollen 2002

carrying out substantial civic action without consulting civil actors. A similar, though opposite, problem also seems to exist. A military interviewee: 'One NGO is going here, another is going there ... they move around like loose canons.' Military forces complain that NGOs go wherever they want without consulting the military, but still hold the military responsible for their safety. 'They turn their noses up at us, but feel free to make demands if it suits them', a military interviewee complains. Both sides feel that they are not respected by the other. The list of mutual reproaches seems endless.

**- In conclusion** From the research it became evident that most organisations accept a limited practice of CIMIC: activities that are in line with the official CIMIC definition used by the Netherlands.<sup>33</sup> Most criticism focuses on other manifestations of CIMIC: there are concerns that such activities will do more harm than good, especially for the weaker segments of society and for the work of humanitarian organisations. However, NGOs feel that their concerns are not being heard in political circles. This forms part of a broader spectrum of concerns that are related to the increased politicisation of humanitarian aid. This evokes feelings of confusion and anger.

## 5. Scope for civil-military interaction: a world to win?

In order to better understand the scope for interaction between NGOs and Military forces, it is important to first take a number of constraints into account. There are also several issues that need further attention and action, if civil-military relations are to be expanded.

### Constraining issues

**- natural disasters versus conflict.** It is relevant that a distinction be made between various types of disaster. In the case of natural disasters, there are no cooperation problems whatsoever, on either side. Examples include the military assistance that was provided during the rescue and assistance operations following hurricane Mitch in Honduras, 1998, and during the flooding in Mozambique in 2001.

In the case of conflicts, the situation seems more complicated. In such cases, military forces also have another role, which complicates their relationship with humanitarian organisations. The scope for cooperation then depends on other factors, such as the mandate of the humanitarian organisation and the situation (type of conflict, type of military intervention, UN involvement, etc.). In reality however, distinctions between natural disasters and conflict are not always easy to make: they often go hand in hand.

**- a distinction in mandates.** Firstly, there are the strictly humanitarian mandated NGOs that focus on saving lives. Their core principles include humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality. In order to be able to reach all citizens on either side of the conflict, they act independently from, and avoid visible

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<sup>33</sup> See also the report on the PSO workshop on 'CIMIC and Civil-Military Relations (PSO 2004).

cooperation with the military, political authorities and other parties involved in the conflict.<sup>34</sup> Exceptional situations may break the rule: a rule that needs to be explicitly broken.

The situation is different for organisations that have both a humanitarian and a rehabilitation/development mandate (i.e. double mandate). Most Dutch organisations active in the humanitarian field belong to this second group. Their work often involves political choices, and the choices they make in the first stages of a humanitarian crisis have consequences for their work on poverty reduction in later stages. Their positions on cooperating with the military differ. The following sections mainly relate to double-mandated organisations.

**- neutrality under discussion.** Most organisations with a double mandate try to maintain the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, just like their relief-only counterparts. However, the principle of neutrality has recently come under discussion among this double-mandated group. Questions are being raised as to whether or not it is right to 'remain silent'. Moreover, can organisations remain neutral if not perceived as such by all parties? Some of these organisations support and work through non-neutral local organisations. They also make political statements and thus do not work on the basis of neutrality. An interviewee comments: 'You need to monitor the usefulness of the principle of neutrality: it shouldn't be applied too dogmatically'. Neutrality is often used as an argument against cooperation with military forces.<sup>35</sup> However, rejecting the principle of neutrality does not automatically lead to a positive attitude towards cooperating with the military. Though the principle of neutrality may be under discussion, the principles of impartiality and independence are still in use. The different principles are frequently mixed up and the relationship between the principles and the Code of Conduct seems to remain unclear for many NGOs. Recent discussions show that many NGOs lack a thorough understanding of the foundations of humanitarian action. Moreover, current complex emergencies appear to challenge these very foundations. One interviewee: 'People say that you can't change the foundations of humanitarian action, but some principles need to be revisited. For other NGOs this is an absolute no-go area.'

**- situations and UN mandates also determine the scope for cooperation.** The scope for cooperation in the field seems largely dependent on the situation and on the various mandates involved. A Congo situation cannot be compared with Afghanistan or Iraq. A UN-mandated mission that has the consent of all parties involved creates more scope for cooperation than an external occupying force without UN mandate. UN mandates are usually positively regarded in humanitarian circles, but what about missions by the European Union and NATO missions? There are also differences among the various national contingents of troops – even if deployed in a multinational force. Each contingent follows its national doctrine. Viewing the differences in national doctrines, this can result in different behaviours and thus different scopes for cooperation. It is common knowledge that US Army soldiers are usually dressed in full combat gear, which creates a barrier for contact, while Dutch troops, working more in consultation with local development actors, are dressed down. In other words, standard rules for cooperation are impossible and undesirable.

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<sup>34</sup> Cooperation between the ICRC and the military does take place, based on the Geneva Conventions. For example: visiting prisoners and facilitating their release, facilitating the search for missing persons, and providing information on humanitarian law, mine awareness etc.

<sup>35</sup> The debate focuses on the principle of neutrality, which is often used interchangeably with the other principles of impartiality, humanity and independence. Although different, the principles are partially overlapping (see also Rietjens, 2002).

## Issues that need further attention

**- appreciation for each others' work style: seeking complementarity.** In general, despite the criticism, most humanitarian organisations recognise the special ability of the military forces to do a lot of work in a short time period: they have excellent logistic resources, are good planners, have a high energy potential and are very decisive. Many humanitarian organisations are pragmatic in accepting support from the military, especially in the fields of logistics, transport, distribution and construction. 'NGOs can be rather bureaucratic, with all their consultations. Sometimes we need the decisiveness of the military', an interviewee says. Military forces also recognise the special knowledge and experience of humanitarian organisations. The professionalism of most humanitarian organisations impressed the military during Operation Allied Harbour in Albania in 1999, where the military assisted NGOs and UN organisations to construct refugee camps.<sup>36</sup> The knowledge, skills and means differ considerably between military forces on the one hand and humanitarian organisations on the other. This is what makes cooperation an interesting option. Even though scepticism rules, each organisation seems happy to explore small-scale opportunities for cooperation on an ad hoc basis. Some do not want to accept cooperation, to avoid being associated with the military by the local population. But others feel that agreements can be reached in order to reduce visibility of cooperation. One example of cooperation between the Red Cross and the military was based on an agreement that cooperation only covered the construction phase and not the running of the camp. A public handover made it clear to everyone that the Netherlands Red Cross operated the camp from that point onwards. Examples also exist of military forces 'accidentally' patrolling where a humanitarian organisation wants to pass: there were no mutual signs of recognition when passing. All organisations feel that cooperation should be based on recognising differences in skills, aims, and mandates: the military should not become relief workers.

Many speak in positive terms about cooperation that has actually taken place, although there are also accounts of problems. Operational problems, for example, emanate from differences in organisational structures (vertical command structures versus horizontal autonomy) and working methods (e.g. different planning processes). During Operation Allied Harbour in Albania and Operation Provide Care in Rwanda, military officers noted differences in working methods: NGOs generally work independently, while military units receive their orders from their particular commander. There are huge differences in autonomy and authority. NGOs are often more action-oriented and have a strong hands-on mentality, while the military prefers to plan and coordinate everything. NGOs said not to know who they should contact in the army, not understanding the various ranks and the relationships between the various military units.<sup>38</sup>

**- creating trust.** Referring back to what has been said earlier about mutual feelings, can trust and respect be built between the two partners? Earlier studies have pointed towards the importance of increasing mutual clarity. Clarity of each other's actions, missions etc. also increases the understanding and predictability of the other party's behaviour. An interviewee gave the example of a situation where armed American soldiers came to an NGO hospital to give blood. As an independent organisation, the NGO could not accept this and the soldiers were livid. The interviewee says: 'it was simply not acceptable; you have to respect each other's mandates.' Clarity of an NGO's mandate in a conflict situation could have avoided this

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<sup>36</sup> Bollen 2002

<sup>38</sup> Bollen 2002

problem. Knowing what can be expected from each other (and what not) can be one building block towards trust. Getting to know each other and openly discussing each other's interests, concerns, perceptions and expectations may be another building block.<sup>39</sup>

**- expanding relations beyond ad hoc field cooperation.** Besides involving NGOs in military training, most forms of interaction between civil and military organisations focus on cooperation in the field. Some basic field information is shared, although there is a general reluctance to do so out of fear that it may be misused for intelligence purposes. However, informing each other of their whereabouts is rather neutral information that may be helpful to both parties, while information provided by military forces on humanitarian situations can be helpful to NGOs.

During the 2004 PSO workshop, it became clear that most humanitarian organisations would be in favour of intensified consultations with the military forces, both during the preparation of military missions and in the course of operations, at field and headquarters levels. In return, NGOs are willing to offer their expertise and knowledge of local situations.<sup>40</sup>

**- scope for interaction.** The discussion on civil-military interaction thus entails more than just cooperation at field level. NGOs can be involved in training on specific mandates of humanitarian organisations and on international humanitarian law for military staff. They can provide information on local situations in preparation for military missions. The military can train NGOs on the command structures and operational issues of the military, inform them about peace operations and provide security information. At the field level, both military and NGOs can share basic information on their whereabouts and their activities and the military can inform NGOs about needs in certain areas. There are probably a lot more options. Dialogue in the Netherlands and discussing each other's concerns is also a form of civil-military interaction. It seems essential to build trust by getting to know each other. This should be based on discussing specific issues and concerns, and creating more clarity on both sides.

## 6. What next?

Development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and military forces all have something to do with one another. But what exactly? The discussion on civil-military interaction tends to focus on cooperation in the field, but this is just one form of interaction, as previously mentioned. Many concerns exist between the two main actors on both sides and each party has its own interests. It would be an important step forward if such concerns and interests were to be identified, acknowledged and openly discussed. Insight into each other's interests and accepting some of the differences will help to improve mutual understanding and decrease some of the concerns and feelings of fear and uncertainty that are currently present among many NGOs.

A lot of the concerns by NGOs relate to the many different manifestations of CIMIC in practice, as illustrated by the outer circle in Figure 1. Though many perceive it as a fast-moving train, there may still be a reasonable amount of room for NGOs to influence the course of the train. Differences in definitions,

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<sup>39</sup> Bollen 2002

<sup>40</sup> Tauxe, 2000, and PSO, 2004

practices and opinions on CIMIC mean that the concept is still being developed. Many of these concerns are expressions of a broader concern of Western political agenda's entering and influencing humanitarian action. NGOs can try to influence the course of the CIMIC train and actively air their opinions on the broader agenda's. But they will have to react quickly, because there does not appear to be much time left.

What would they need to do? First of all, Dutch NGOs will have to recapture their position as experts and be consulted once again as serious partners in the discussion. This requires a basic recognition that the world is changing and that new actors are entering the scene. It also requires a clear, sound and unambiguous vision on interventions in post-conflict situations. NGOs are now confronted with new realities that, in view of the current debate on neutrality, are shaking the very foundations of their work. These foundations do not seem clear to all NGOs: there is frequent confusion between principles, such as neutrality and impartiality, and few NGOs seem to fully grasp the ins and outs of International Humanitarian Law.

Firstly, this calls for an improvement in the knowledge base of the fundamentals of humanitarian action. Secondly, a thorough reflection of mandates and roles of a diversified humanitarian sector in a changing environment is required. Such a reflection may also provide new insights into the question as to what the humanitarian sector has to do with the military forces (or other actors, for that matter). The discussion on CIMIC and civil-military interaction is not only a discussion about finding answers to the question of *what* kind of linkages to create (dialogue/discussing concerns, cooperation, fine-tuning activities, dialogue, information exchange, training etc.) and *how* to create such linkages. It is, first and foremost, a discussion on *why* we should create such linkages. Do we want to jump on the train because otherwise others will take our place? Or do we join in the dialogue and make sure that there will be something in it for humanitarian NGOs and, above all, for the envisaged beneficiaries as well?

Besides reflection, also specific action is required. What would all this imply for the PSO member organisations?

For individual NGOs working in (post-)conflict situations, this would imply:


- improving knowledge and understanding of the basis of humanitarian action, i.e. humanitarianism, principles such as neutrality, and international bodies of law in conflict and in post-conflict situations;
- a serious reflection of the own roles, mandates and relationships with other actors in present conflict/post-conflict situations and in present-day politics;
- making clear choices based on a thorough understanding of humanitarianism and a reflection of their own role and mandates, and clearly communicating the choices made;
- improving the knowledge and understanding of ongoing national, European and global political developments, so as to be able to adequately interpret such developments and (re-)act quickly and in an appropriate manner.

For the humanitarian and development sector as a whole, this would imply:

- the development of a shared, clear, unambiguous vision of interventions in post-conflict situations and of the roles played by the various actors (humanitarian, development, military, political) in such interventions.

- the recognition of a need for collective action, which means at least regularly sharing information and informing other organisations/sectors of actions undertaken relating to broader political issues in general and to the development of civil-military interaction in particular.
- the ability to recognise and accept that humanitarian NGOs have differences of opinion, but are still able to work amongst each other and vis-à-vis other sectors such as the military and private sector.
- joining established platforms, workshops, etc. on CIMIC/civil-military interaction, and making sure that the sector is kept informed of, and included in, discussions on the further development of these concepts, both in terms of theory and practical implications.
- initiating a discussion with the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on mutual roles, mandates, expectations, interests and concerns.

Or, as one interviewee from the Ministry of Development Cooperation put it: 'We must remain focused and keep an open mind.'



'Let's see, could we determine our position, do we join or not, or perhaps do we ... what do you think?'

## **Annex 1: List of Interviewees**

### ***BBO***

Rick van der Woud, Advisor  
Karen Mol, Advisor

### ***Care Netherlands***

Paul Meijs, Director

### ***Cordaid Emergency & Rehabilitation Department***

Kees van den Broek, Senior Programme Officer  
Hans Scheen, Senior Programme Officer

### ***Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Department for Development Cooperation***

Pim Kraan, Deputy Head Humanitarian Aid Division

### ***Department for International Development (DFID)/UK***

Matthijs Toot, Development Advisor (PRT) DFID, Kabul

### ***Dorcas Netherlands***

Cees Oosterhuis, Programme Co-ordinator

### ***HealthNet International***

Willem van de Put, General Director

### ***ICCO/Kerkinactie (Global Ministries – Protestant Church in The Netherlands)***

Evert van Bodegom, Acting Emergency Adviser

### ***Logistics Support Group***

Tom Herkemij, Chairman

### ***Medecins sans Frontieres Holland***

Austen Davis, General Director

### ***Ministry of Defence, Defence Staff***

Colonel C.J. Marselis, Head of Projects and Parliamentary Affairs

### ***Netherlands Red Cross***

Johanna van Sambeek, International Secretary

### ***Novib-Oxfam Netherlands***

Anne Pieter van Dijk, Africa Desk



***Pax Christi Netherlands***

Nico Plooijer, Human Rights Programme

***Platform Defensie-Bedrijfsleven (corporate sector - defence platform)***

Lieutenant-colonel J. van der Woerd (per 1-9-2004 head of operations CIMIC)

***Royal Association of Netherlands' Reserve Officers (KVNRO)***

Major Bert Meeuwse, Commissioner Army/CIMIC

***Royal Netherlands Army***

Lieutenant-Colonel A. van den Boogaard, Hoofd Logistieke Brigade (head of logistics) and Senior DART (Disaster Assistance Response Team)

***TEAR fund Netherlands***

Caspar Waalewijn, Overseas Personnel and Relief Officer (by telephone)

***TNO Physics and Electronics Laboratory***

Gerben D. Klein Baltink, Deputy Director

***War Child***

Stéphane Grégoire, Director of Operations

Danielle de Knocke van der Meulen, Project Manager Central/West Africa

***World Vision Netherlands***

Nel den Boer, Project Manager (by telephone)

***ZOA Refugee Care***

Rein Dekker, Cluster Manager

John Buijs, Relief Desk

**E-mail communication with:**

***UK Department for International Development (DFID) / Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs  
Department***

Steve Ray, Senior Programme Officer

Clare Harkin, Senior Civil/Military Affairs

***UK Ministry of Defence***

Mike Riley, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre

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