

‘Will the  
21st century  
be more  
peaceful?’

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Jan Tinbergen's wetenschappelijke werk stond centraal tijdens de grote herdenking van zijn geboortedag vorig jaar aan de Erasmus Universiteit. Dit jaar is het tien jaar geleden dat Jan Tinbergen overleed, op 9 juni 1994. De Stichting Oikos en de Vereniging voor Economie en Vrede, ondersteund door de Stichting Kerk en Wereld en de Universiteit van Amsterdam willen daarom de schijnwerper op Tinbergen richten, maar met een wat andere focus, namelijk Tinbergen's ideeën over vrede en veiligheid. Jan Tinbergen vroeg zich meer dan vele tijdgenoten af wat de noodzakelijke structuur zou zijn van een meer vreedzame wereldsamenleving. Hij formuleerde daarover heldere gedachten, die de aandacht verdienen.



Natuurlijk geven dergelijke gedachten op zich geen antwoord op de brandende politieke vragen rond oorlog en vrede, waarmee wij worden geconfronteerd. Grote verwachtingen die Tinbergen koesterde van de Verenigde Naties lijken gelogenstraft. Maar zijn ze dat echt? Op zijn minst verheldert zijn visie een kernprobleem, namelijk het onverkort vasthouden aan nationale soevereiniteit.

Maar hoe wordt bepaald welk land welk stukje soevereiniteit dient af te staan? Wat komt ervoor in de plaats? De recentelijk uitgebreide EU, zelf bezig met een procesmatige relativering van nationale soevereiniteit, zou in de komende jaren wel eens een belangrijke rol kunnen gaan spelen bij het vinden van een politieke uitweg. Wat doet Nederland?

In dit boekje vindt u enkele documenten voor het Tinbergensymposium. Allereerst treft u aan een schets van het leven en werk van Jan Tinbergen van de hand van Janine Huisman, onderzoekster bij Oikos.

Als tweede stuk is opgenomen de rede die Prof Hans Singer hield op 17 december 1994, tijdens het herdenkingssymposium rond Tinbergen aan de Erasmus Universiteit. Hans Singer geeft twee voorbeelden van Tinbergen's werk aan een beter internationaal

bestel, zijn voorstel voor een grondstoffen-reserve valuta, en zijn werk als voorzitter van het United Nations Committee for Development Planning.

Als derde stuk is opgenomen een artikel van Peter van Ham van Instituut Clingendael, dat verscheen in de Internationale Spectator (jrg 58 nr 7/8 juli/augustus 2004), onder de titel "Nieuwe regels voor een nieuw bestel?". Het is een inleiding op een viertal andere artikelen in hetzelfde nummer over het thema "Naar een multilateraal wereldbestel". Peter van Ham laat duidelijk zien hoeveel er thans op het spel staat in de ideeënvorming over de internationale rechtsorde.

Dan volgt een korte Nederlandse tekst van Tinbergen zelf, uitgesproken bij een symposium over de VN in 1989, georganiseerd door de Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Verenigde Naties. Dit geeft in heel kort bestek zijn ideeën over de VN weer.

Vervolgens vindt u in dit boekje een korte samenvatting van het essay van de jonge Amerikaanse onderzoeker Moses Shayo, dat door een internationale jury werd geselecteerd als beste inzending voor de Isaac Roetprijz 2004.

Tenslotte, de tekst "Entering the Third Millennium: Some Suggestions". Deze werd door Tinbergen vlak voor zijn overlijden geschreven en was bestemd voor zijn kleinkinderen, achterkleinkinderen en hun leeftijdgenoten, al degenen, die de drempel van het Derde Millennium gingen overschrijden. Tinbergen's bedoeling ermee is "to encourage all these younger people to meet the challenges of the Third Millennium with positive plans".

Hoe maken we in de 21ste eeuw deze aarde tot een vreedzame en dus leefbare plek voor 10 miljard mensen? Kort gezegd is Tinbergen's antwoord: het best houdbare bestel is er een van solidariteit en efficiënte verdeling van arbeid en verantwoordelijkheid, consequent toegepast op alle niveaus, van de werkvloer en het huishouden tot aan de wereldeconomie en de internationale rechtsorde. "Entering the Third Millennium" eindigt als volgt:

"Democratic socialism is the optimum order if it can be applied the world over. The duty of democratic socialism is to show solidarity with the masses of the underdeveloped world and give it high priority. This is not naive, but long-term enlightened self-interest".

*Piet Terhal,*

*Dagvoorzitter Tinbergensymposium 22 september 2004*

'Het meest nodige is nu het organiseren van de vrede', vond Tinbergen. Hoewel hij algemeen wordt beschouwd als de meest vooraanstaande econoom die Nederland ooit heeft voortgebracht, heeft zijn gedachtegoed zich niet tot dat terrein beperkt. begonnen als natuurkundige ontwikkelde hij zich tot iemand die zich tot doel stelde een leefbare wereld na te streven. Een leefbare wereld was voor Tinbergen een vreedzame wereld zonder grote ongelijkheid.



Dit jaar is het tien jaar geleden dat Jan Tinbergen (1903–1994) overleed, algemeen gezien als de belangrijkste econoom die Nederland heeft voortgebracht. Hij begon zijn academische carrière echter niet als econoom. Van 1921 tot 1925 studeerde hij natuurkunde in Leiden, de discipline waarop hij in 1929 ook promoveerde. Tijdens zijn studententijd schrok Tinbergen van de armoede en werkloosheid die hij in de achterbuurten van Leiden zag. Tinbergen wilde bijdragen aan de oplossing van deze problemen. Na zijn promotie verlegde hij daarom zijn werkterrein naar de economie. Een stap die hij in een artikel in 'Scientists at Work' uit 1970 als volgt verklaarde: 'Ik ervoer de bestaande ongelijkheid in welvaart tussen mensen als onrechtvaardig; maar men verzekerde mij dat er weinig aan te doen was, zonder een beter inzicht in het maatschappelijk leven. [...] Een paar jaar later kwam de Grote Depressie; deze versterkte mijn overtuiging dat economisch onderzoek waarschijnlijk meer waarde had dan research in de fysica.' Tinbergen ging daarbij innoverend te werk. Tot dan toe was de economische wetenschap nog vooral een praatvak. Voortdurend en nauwkeurig meten, zoals dat in de natuurwetenschap gebruikelijk was en wat tot grote vooruitgang had geleid, was in de economie nog nauwelijks doorgedrongen. Komend uit de natuurkunde hechtte Tinbergen vooral betekenis aan meting als de methode bij uitstek om vast te stellen of een theorie klopt. Meten bevordert de objectiviteit. En dit was precies wat volgens Tinbergen de taak van de wetenschap was: het terugdringen van de subjectiviteit ten gunste van de objectiviteit.

In zijn toespraak bij de uitreiking van de Erasmusprijs in 1967 zei Tinbergen: 'Er is een waaier van wetenschappen van de meest ontwikkelde, waartoe ik de natuurwetenschappen reken, tot aan de minst ontwikkelde, waaronder de jongere gebieden van de sociologie, inbegrepen de politieke wetenschap, en ook veel oudere gebieden der geesteswetenschappen. In het onderontwikkelde stadium overheersten de beschrijving, de zuivere nieuwsgierigheid en de intuïtie. In het meer ontwikkelde stadium overheersen de analyse, gecontroleerd door meting, en de daardoor mogelijke concrete toepassing, gericht op een te verwezenlijken doel. Meting maakt confrontatie van theorie en werkelijkheid mogelijk en daardoor verbetering van de theorie. Het is verheugend dat ook in de minder ontwikkelde gebieden van wetenschap het meten telkens verder doordringt en aldus het front tussen wetenschap en intuïtie verschoven wordt. Daardoor wordt het mogelijk om over een toenemend aantal onderwerpen op meer objectieve wijze van gedachten te wisselen. Overigens blijft, wat ik korthedshalve intuïtie noemde, een kostbare bron van inspiratie. Mijn opmerkingen zouden al te onvolledig zijn als ik er niet tevens aan herinnerde, dat ten dele de minder ontwikkelde wetenschappen diegene zijn, die de moeilijkste objecten hebben (Internationale spectator, nr. 15, 1967).'

Met de economische modellen van Tinbergen was het mogelijk ontwikkelingen in de tijd te bestuderen. De wiskundige, dynamische modellen waren een belangrijke vooruitgang ten opzichte van de statische modellen die tot de jaren 30 in de economie gebruikelijk waren. Met name om deze bijdrage aan de economie ontving Jan Tinbergen in 1969, samen met de Noor Ragnar Frisch, de eerste Nobelprijs voor de Economie.

Van 1929 tot 1945 was Tinbergen werkzaam bij het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Hij was daar na het afronden van zijn studie natuurkunde in 1925 als dienstweigeraar begonnen. Dienstweigeren vereiste in die tijd de nodige moed, maar een afkeer van militair geweld maakte dit voor hem een vanzelfsprekende zaak. Die afkeer van militair geweld werd niet ingegeven door godsdienstige overtuiging, maar door zijn afkeer van nationalisme, een belangrijke factor die tot de Eerste Wereldoorlog leidde. De eerste vijftien maanden van zijn vervangende dienstplicht bracht hij door op de administratie van de gevangenis in Rotterdam. Hoewel dit werk onder zijn niveau als afgestudeerd natuurkundige was, prees Tinbergen zich gelukkig dat hij door een nieuwe wet uit 1923 vervangende dienst mocht doen. Buiten Tinbergen's medeweten om, regelde zijn vader dat hij de laatste negen maanden van zijn vervangende dienst bij het CBS mocht werken, iets wat meer bij zijn interesse aansloot. Na zijn promotie in 1929 besloot hij daar te blijven.

Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog werd Tinbergen de eerste directeur van het net opgerichte Centraal Planbureau. Tot een jaar of tien na de oorlog richtte hij zijn aandacht voornamelijk op Nederland, maar een strikte scheiding tussen nationale en internationale problemen heeft hij nooit gemaakt. In de loop van de tijd verschoof zijn aandacht dan ook steeds meer naar internationale vraagstukken. Net zoals het zien van de armoede in Leiden in de jaren 20, speelde ook hierbij zijn eigen ervaring een rol. Bekend is zijn bezoek aan een congres van statistici in India in 1951. Het zien van de grote armoede in de sloppenwijken van Calcutta leidde zoals Tinbergen dat zelf zei 'tot een verandering in mijn denken en activiteiten'. Tinbergen kwam diep onder de indruk terug en in 1955 nam hij afscheid van het CPB en werd zijn part-time hoogleraarschap aan de Nederlandse Economische Hogeschool (de latere Erasmus Universiteit) omgezet in een

full-time positie als hoogleraar 'ontwikkelingsprogrammering' om bij te kunnen dragen aan de economische ontwikkeling in de arme landen. Naast zijn werk als wetenschapper werd Tinbergen veel gevraagd als adviseur door ontwikkelingslanden.

### TINBERGEN'S IDEEËN

Tinbergen stelde dat enerzijds de arme wereld lijdt onder problemen die veroorzaakt worden door een tekort, terwijl anderzijds de rijke landen lijden aan problemen die veroorzaakt worden door een teveel. De arme landen moeten zich dan ook niet ten doel stellen het westerse levenspatroon te imiteren. Het doel van het ontwikkelingsproces is niet 'in te halen', noch economisch, sociaal of politiek, noch cultureel. Veel aspecten van het westerse leven zijn namelijk verkwistend en zinloos en dragen niet bij tot het werkelijke geluk van de mensen. 'De poging van de mensheid om een nieuwe wereld op te bouwen kan niet worden gebaseerd op de exclusieve filosofie van economische groei en materiële welvaart. De ervaring van de welvarende landen leert dat zelfs een ongekende economische groei niet noodzakelijk leidt tot een grotere maatschappelijke gelijkheid en een grotere gelijkheid in de machtsuitoefening.'

Zoals Tinbergen in 'Naar een Rechvaardiger Internationale Orde' beschrijft, zijn voor het bereiken van 'een menswaardig bestaan voor alle wereldburgers', het fundamentele doel van de wereldgemeenschap, zes elementen van belang. Ten eerste culturele diversiteit. De erkenning dat culturele diversiteit positief is, in plaats van dat het een bedreiging vormt, en een selectief beleid om de culturele integriteit te handhaven zullen in belangrijke mate bijdragen tot een vermindering van de sociale spanningen, zowel binnen als tussen de landen. Vervolgens milieubehoud omdat dat nodig is voor een menselijk leefmilieu. Ten derde rechtvaardigheid. Er moet gestreefd worden naar minder ongelijkheid tussen individuen, zowel binnen als tussen landen. Tevens moet bij de verdeling van toekomstige hulpbronnen rekening gehouden worden met de behoeften van zowel toekomstige als huidige generaties. Ten vierde vrijheid, waarbij bedacht moet worden dat vergroting van de vrijheid van een individu of een land kan leiden tot een beperking van de vrijheid van een ander op hetzelfde of een ander terrein. Vrijheid moet dan ook worden gezien als de maximale vrijheid die verenigbaar is met de vrijheid van anderen. Ten vijfde solidariteit wat een voorwaarde is voor het scheppen van maatschappelijke rechten, sociale zekerheid en participatie. En tenslotte democratie en participatie. Het doel van een menswaardig bestaan voor alle wereldburgers kan alleen bereikt worden als individuen en groepen het fundamentele recht hebben om invloed uit te oefenen.

Deze zes elementen moesten volgens Tinbergen dienen als richtlijnen voor de internationale orde. Centraal thema in die internationale orde is dus het verminderen van de tegenstellingen tussen mensen. Zoals professor Harry de Lange daarover in Internationale Samenwerking van september 1994 zei: 'Als die tegenstellingen te groot worden, dan breekt er iets in de samenleving. Al zijn [Tinbergen's] wetenschappelijk werk stond in dienst van dat motief. Daarbij hield hij niet van utopische blauwdrukken. Hij wilde stap voor stap naar een rechtvaardiger wereld.'

### VREDE EN VEILIGHEID

Strijd tegen armoede en strijd tegen oorlog waren vanuit Tinbergen's gezichtspunt daarbij nauw met elkaar verweven. Het tegengaan van de vicieuze cirkel van gebrek en



geweld is een grondthema van zijn werk. Tinbergen wilde de economie, de wetenschap van het verlichte eigenbelang, inzetten voor het realiseren van wat hij een 'leefbare aarde' noemde. Alleen een leefbare aarde kan een vreedzame aarde zijn.

Tinbergen achtte het oorlogsgevaar zo groot dat het organiseren van vrede voor hem een bijna absolute prioriteit kreeg. Het organiseren van de vrede was ook het onderwerp van zijn rede bij het aanvaarden van de Erasmusprijs in 1967. Bij die gelegenheid zei hij: 'Ik ben tot geen andere slotsom gekomen dan dat de enige organisatie van de vrede die is, waarbij een wereldregering en één mondiale gewapende macht worden aanvaard, met een eveneens aanvaarde stemprocedure over het gebruik van die gewapende macht (Internationale Spectator, juli/augustus 2003).

Om tegenstellingen tussen mensen te verminderen was het volgens Tinbergen belangrijk om de VN te versterken. Hij zag de VN het liefst omgebouwd van machteloos apparaat naar wereldregering. De VN neemt wel resoluties aan, maar het ontbreekt haar aan middelen om die dwingend op te kunnen leggen aan regeringen. Conflicten moeten worden voorkomen; er moet niet gewacht worden tot conflicten er zijn, maar mogelijke oorzaken van conflicten moeten worden opgezocht om zo te proberen conflicten te voorkomen. 'De VN zou een wereldwijde hiërarchie moeten opzetten, met dezelfde bouwstenen als elk deugdelijk bestuurd land. Het IMF zou omgevormd moeten worden tot Centrale Bank van de wereld. Daarnaast zou er een wereldministerie van Financiën (een Wereldschatkist) moeten worden opgezet om middelen in te zamelen voor de financiering van VN-operaties. De Voedsel- en Landbouworganisatie (FAO) zou moeten worden veranderd in een wereldministerie van Landbouw, de VN-ontwikkelingsorganisatie voor de Industrie (Unido) in een wereldministerie van Industrie en de Internationale Arbeidsorganisatie (ILO) in een wereldministerie van Sociale Zaken. Verder zijn onder andere nodig een Wereldpolitie, een Oceanenbureau en een Ruimtebureau. De Wereldschatkist zou als centraal punt dienen voor het innen van financiële bijdragen van alle lidstaten, iets wat nu door alle VN-onderdelen apart wordt gedaan. Zo zou een dubbele belasting worden voorkomen, zouden administratiekosten omlaag kunnen en zou het veel eenvoudiger worden het geld daar te krijgen waar er urgente behoefte aan is. De Wereldpolitie zou de activiteiten van de blauwhelmen op een permanente basis voortzetten. Hierdoor kan sneller worden opgetreden, zodat landen of politieke groeperingen minder makkelijk overgaan tot agressie. Het Oceanenbureau zou toezicht houden op de exploitatie van de natuurlijke bronnen van de wereldzeeën, zoals visserij en mijnactiviteiten in de oceaan, en zou de vervuiling van de zeeën in de gaten houden. Op eenzelfde wijze zou het Ruimtebureau toezicht houden op gebruik en misbruik van de ruimte: luchtvaart, luchtvervuiling, satellieten, de verdeling van de ether voor radio en televisie, en militaire activiteiten in het luchtruim.'

Tinbergen pleitte dus voor een wereldregering om vrede te bewerkstelligen: 'het voornaamste is dat we vast blijven houden aan ons geloof in de mogelijkheid van een wereldregering. Daarzonder zijn we kansloos.' Dit betekent dat de nationale soevereiniteit geherinterpreteerd moet worden. Enerzijds moet een groot aantal beslissingen worden genomen op een zo laag mogelijk niveau. Anderzijds moeten beslissingen met externe effecten, dat wil zeggen beslissingen die consequenties hebben voor anderen dan diegenen die de beslissing nemen, genomen worden op een zodanig niveau dat deze anderen inspraak kunnen hebben en met hun belangen rekening gehouden kan worden.

Daarnaast vond Tinbergen het noodzakelijk om de financiële hulp van rijke aan arme landen te verhogen omdat armoede een rol speelt in bijna alle conflicten. Op dit punt stond Tinbergen er om bekend dat hij het liefst een veel hogere ontwikkelingshulp zou zien dan de internationaal afgesproken, maar niet nageleefde 0,7 procent van het BNP. Voor ontwikkeling is kapitaal nodig. Tinbergen verwelkomde dan ook de hulp die de Amerikanen aan arme landen boden, ondanks het feit dat het doel van de Amerikanen daarbij politiek was, namelijk een dam op te werpen tegen het communisme. Overdracht van kapitaal vanuit de rijke landen was een uitkomst voor de arme landen, die zo de kans kregen hun ontwikkeling te financieren. Ook legde Tinbergen nadruk op het belang van menselijk kapitaal, scholing.

Volgens Tinbergen zou verhoging van de ontwikkelingshulp niet alleen in het belang zijn van arme landen, maar ook van de rijke landen. Net zoals het Marshallplan bijvoorbeeld, daar zat weliswaar eigenbelang bij, 'namelijk versterking van een anti-communistische politiek, maar het was ook een wijze politiek. De politiek van ontwikkelingssamenwerking moet ook zo wijs zijn te begrijpen dat het niet in het belang van de rijke landen is om een steeds bredere stroom van immigranten aan te trekken ('Tijd en taak', april 1993).'

#### SYMPOSIUM

Tinbergen's ideeën over vrede en veiligheid hebben weinig gehoor gevonden. Toch hebben zijn ideeën nog niets aan actualiteit verloren. Daarom willen de Vereniging voor Economie en Vrede, Stichting Oikos, de Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie van de Universiteit van Amsterdam en Stichting Kerk en Wereld in het jaar dat het tien jaar geleden is dat Tinbergen overleed een symposium organiseren over Tinbergen's ideeën over vrede en veiligheid. Het symposium zal plaatsvinden op 22 september van dit jaar in de aula van de Universiteit van Amsterdam onder de titel 'Will the 21st century be more peaceful?'

Janine Huisman is werkzaam bij de afdeling Onderzoek van Stichting Oikos.

Dit artikel is verschenen in het tijdschrift *De Linker Wang* van september 2004.

Meer informatie [www.linkerwang.nl](http://www.linkerwang.nl)

Jan Tinbergen was one of the first economists to approach the issue of global governance from a development perspective and the issue of development from a peace perspective. As H.C. Bos has pointed out in his perspective biographical article in the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, the Nobel Prize in Economics could equally have been the Peace Prize. A straight line led him from cycles to trends, from trends to technical progress, from technical progress to development, from development to the contours of a more humane global society.



In what follows, we concentrate on only two aspects of this awe-inspiring contribution, his contribution to international monetary reform embodied in his 1964 proposal (with A.G. Hart and N. Kaldor) for a commodity-based world currency; and his contribution to the work of the United Nations, centred upon his chairmanship from 1965–1975 of the UN Committee for Development Planning.

#### 1 THE TINBERGEN PROPOSAL FOR A COMMODITY-BASED CURRENCY RESERVE

Even before assuming the chairmanship of the Committee for Development Planning, Jan Tinbergen, jointly with Nicholas Kaldor and A.G. Hart, had submitted a paper to the first UNCTAD Conference in 1964 advocating an international commodity reserve currency. This idea was not without its precedents, going back to Jevons, Benjamin Graham, Frank Graham, Alfred Marshall, and above all Tinbergen's countryman Jan Goudriaan. Jan Goudriaan's book, 'How to stop deflation', published in 1932 was a direct influence both on Tinbergen as well as on Keynes. Before and during his preparatory work for the Bretton Woods Conference, Keynes had advocated stabilisation of primary commodity prices by means of international buffer stocks as well as the possibility of a world currency based on the average price of 30 primary commodities. The idea of stabilising primary commodity prices was accepted at Bretton Woods but left to the International Trade Organisation (ITO) which was visualised as the third pillar of the

Bretton Woods system. Although embodied in the Havana Charter, it died with the stillborn ITO, at least as far as multi-commodity buffer stocks and links with the currency and monetary system were concerned.

The proposal which Tinbergen, with A.G. Hart and Nicholas Kaldor, submitted to the newly-established UNCTAD was a brilliant combination to achieve three major objectives at one and the same time.

The first was to create additional international liquidity for the needs of an expanding world economy. Tinbergen and his colleagues argued that gold alone or even bi-metalism as advocated by Alfred Marshall - gold plus silver - did not provide sufficient liquidity because new gold production was too small relatively to existing stocks. This weakness could be remedied and the inherent deflationary bias corrected by widening the reserves beyond gold and beyond metals to include cereals, sugar, beverages, tobacco, animal fats, vegetable oils, fibres, rubber, and metals (the latter excluding gold and silver). Tinbergen and his colleagues argued that the production of these 30 commodities was sufficiently large and prospectively expanding to provide all the liquidity needed for economic growth, full employment, and expanded trade. In this respect, the proposal was part of the expansionist outlook of the Golden Age – the 25 years after Bretton Woods which saw unprecedented growth and full employment without inflation. With considerable foresight THK argued that without sufficient increase in reserves the dollar would not be able alone to carry the burden of the world's reserve currency and the system would collapse. This forecast was fulfilled 7 years later, on 15 August 1971 when President Nixon had to suspend the convertibility of the US dollar into gold at the fixed exchange rate of \$ 35 per ounce.

The second objective to be achieved simultaneously by the THK proposal was to stabilise and improve the terms of trade of primary exporting countries. It should be remembered that the proposal was submitted to Raul Prebisch, in his capacity as first Secretary-General of UNCTAD. Prebisch had since 1950 forecast a tendency towards deterioration of terms of trade of countries exporting primary commodities and importing manufactures. The THK proposal would both improve terms of trade by the additional demand for primary commodities for the stocks forming the new commodity-based currency reserves. It would also stabilise terms of trade and reduce the volatility of primary commodity prices since the average price of the 30 commodities would be fixed in terms of international currency. While this would leave individual commodity prices to fluctuate against the average in line with market conditions, the additional volatility due to the tendency towards co-movement of commodity prices would be eliminated. THK argued that volatility of commodity prices and terms of trade would be detrimental to confidence, investment, and dependability of planning projections (the latter point being especially close to Tinbergen's heart). Recent research has confirmed that Tinbergen and his colleagues were right in this respect. Over the period 1970–88 in 79 non-oil countries, the 20 countries with the most stable terms of trade showed GNP growth of 3.98% per annum compared with only 3.21% per annum for the 20 countries with the most volatile terms of trade. In fact the difference in growth rates between the most stable and the most volatile countries was greater than the difference between the countries with the best terms of trade trend and those with the worst trend<sup>1</sup>.

The third objective of the THK proposal was a more equal world income distribution in favour of the generally poorer primary-producing and primary-exporting countries. This again was a cause to which Jan Tinbergen would devote much attention during the remaining years of his life. The year after the submission of the THK proposal Jan Tinbergen became chairman of the UN Committee for Development Planning and set about using his econometric expertise to calculate how much additional aid or other forms of income transfer would be needed to achieve given targets of greater convergence in world income either between countries or between people.

In line with Jan Tinbergen's famous demonstration that a multiplicity of objectives also requires a multiplicity - in fact an equal number - of policy instruments, the THK proposal carefully and realistically lists the various instruments needed for the simultaneous achievement of these three major objectives. Far from being Utopian, and saying to the politicians 'here is the big idea, we must leave it to you to work out the details', the proposal in fact goes into considerable realistic and administrative detail regarding the concrete steps to be taken. Many possible objections were anticipated and answered. The proposal was also carefully costed. Today we know that, in spite of such careful concrete explanations and defences, this remained a Utopian idea to the politicians. It still remains an idea for which the time has not yet come. The new World Trade Organisation (WTO) – assuming that it is established – does not include the functions of commodity price stabilisation originally allocated to the ITO under the Havana Charter. At the same time, the basic idea of linking commodity prices to international monetary arrangements has at least on paper been accepted in the establishment of the Compensatory Financing Facility in the IMF (although in practice negated by the conditions surrounding drawings on this Facility).

The proposal for a multi-commodity international currency showed considerable political finesse, as compared with individual commodity stabilisation. The latter inevitably raises a confrontation between producers and consumers, the producers wanting high prices and the consumer lower prices. Even though economists might explain – as the THK proposal does – that indirectly and in the long run the consuming countries would also benefit from the higher incomes of primary producing countries leading to higher imports and accelerated growth, this conflict presents a difficult obstacle as shown by the chequered history of individual commodity agreements. The multi-commodity approach of the THK paper subdues this conflict and instead emphasizes the common interest of all countries in an expanding world economy and sufficient international liquidity to underwrite the growth of trade and conditions of full employment. In the light of this it is surprising that so far at least such international action as there has been in the direction of single-commodity agreements rather than a multi-commodity approach. The present weakness of developing countries arising from their debt situation has for the time being buried both approaches. In connection with the debt problem, it may be emphasized that the THK proposal would have resulted in international liquidity creation without new debt creation – which cannot be said of today's stabilisation and structural adjustment lending.

The THK proposal cites the 1954 UN Report on 'Commodity trade and economic development' as one of its forerunners. It is true that the multi-commodity approach is seriously and sympathetically discussed in the 1954 report. However, it is not an entirely

independent source. As the author of the 1954 Report, I can testify to the fact that inclusion of the discussion of the multi-commodity approach owed a great deal to the advice of Jan Tinbergen. By that time, in the UN Secretariat, we were already in the habit of consulting him and listening carefully to his advice.

The expansionist nature of the THK proposal is well-illustrated by their insistence that their multi-commodity reserves would not supersede gold but supplement it. THK emphasize that gold and commodities are 'two separate media of exchange, convertible into one another at fixed rates'. Similarly, the multi-commodity reserves would not in any way take the place of liquidity creation through IMF issues of world currency Bancor which the THK paper also advocates. Their choice of the name for the world currency was designed to show the link with Keynes's original proposals for the Bretton Woods Conference. Far from superseding Bancor, countries would be able to buy Bancor for warehouse certificates of their currently-declared bundle of multi-commodity reserves – an ingenious link. But the commodity reserves would form the major source of world liquidity: B20 billion as against \$5 billion of gold and \$5 billion for Bancor, in THK's illustrative quantification.

The objectives of the THK proposal might have been reached through the SDR route – the weakened and distorted realisation of Bancor - if the issue of SDRs had been approved in the necessary amounts after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods dollar/gold-based system, so as to underwrite continued growth and avoid the debt trap into which the developing countries have fallen. The lack of any kind of automatic trigger mechanism has proved to be a fatal handicap for the SDR route. By contrast, the multi-commodity reserve approach as outlined by THK, would have provided exactly such an automatic trigger mechanism, using the movement of commodity prices as an index of pressure of world demand leading to automatic countercyclical action. In the grand macroeconomic balance, the advantages in terms of higher levels of growth and employment and greater stability would have outweighed the costs of the scheme (admitted, but perhaps underestimated<sup>2</sup> in the THK proposal).

Tinbergen and his two fellow-authors were clearly impressed and influenced by Arthur Lewis' two-sector rural-urban model with unlimited labour supplies in the rural sector. They share the view presented by Arthur Lewis as well as his classic predecessors that the limits to industrialisation and hence economic growth, widening division of labour and widening markets are set by the availability of food (and by extension of raw materials) produced in the rural sector and generating incomes there, essential to providing a market for industrial goods. Their proposal was specifically designed to help to create this additional production and additional income in the developing countries – the rural areas of the world economy. In their view there is a presently unused and largely wasted potential supply capacity of primary commodities in the developing countries. Their proposal is designed to utilise these wasted resources and thus provide a world 'dividend' for economic growth and expansion. The balance between the two sectors was to be restored by accelerated industrialisation rather than through deflationary cuts. The THK proposal is a symbol of the development theories of the 1960s, in the full bloom of the 'Golden Age'. In all this we can clearly perceive Jan Tinbergen's model of the world economy as enunciated years later in his World Security and Equity<sup>3</sup>. In the words of the THK report, 'the world as a whole is a vast underdeveloped economy'. In this picture of a

potential world 'dividend' we may also see the forerunner of the emphasis in World Security and Equity on the potential of a peace dividend from a reduction of military expenditures which occupied Jan Tinbergen's thoughts during the last years of his life and led him to found the Group of Economists for a Peace Dividend.

Perhaps one day an enterprising young economist will write a PhD dissertation modelling what the course of economic history since 1964 would have been if the THK proposal had been implemented – almost certainly an improvement over the actual course. Pity that Jan Tinbergen himself did not feel tempted to model this!

Today we may welcome – openly or secretly – low commodity prices and what from our viewpoint are improving terms of trade as helping us to control inflation. But we would be well advised to think of the increased income disparities, increased poverty and reduced growth which is the price the world pays for this method of controlling inflation. We would be well advised to go back to THK for wiser counsel. He told us that there is no need for such no-win games; the world is full of opportunities for positive sum games.

If the politicians have failed to respond to the THK proposal, this is more a comment on the politicians than on Tinbergen and his two fellow-authors.

## 2 JAN TINBERGEN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Jan Tinbergen's association with the United Nations goes back a long way – in fact to its predecessor, the League of Nations, where in 1937 he published his pioneering work *Statistical Testing of Business Cycle Theories*. At the time model-building of the kind which Jan Tinbergen pioneered was ahead of its time. It was only in the 1950s that his work became not only respectable but highly influential. Together with P.C. Mahalanobis (the father of the early Indian Five Year Plans), Jan became the guru of the then prevailing consensus on planned government direction of the economy. His econometric techniques and the framework of his models were applied to numerous underdeveloped countries (as they were then known), and the UN was swamped with requests to send him as adviser and consultant. The model-builder had himself become a model.

Today the UN has been more or less superseded in the development business by the World Bank and IMF. The 'Washington Consensus' of today is very different from the 'Tinbergen Consensus' of the 1950s. Where in the 1950s we emphasized market failures and scope for government action, so now we emphasize government failures and scope for market action. But have we really improved? Where in the 1950s we went in too rashly in three-week missions to come up with Five Year Plans for economies we really knew little about, so today we rush in with three-week missions to come up with stabilisation programmes or structural adjustment programmes for economies that we know very little about. There are now signs that the pendulum is swinging back in the direction of the Tinbergen Consensus. Just as in the 1930s in his work for the League of Nations Jan Tinbergen was ahead of his time by two decades or so, so it may prove again with his emphasis on precise definition of objectives and means in macroeconomic planning, combined with normative values for income distribution and microeconomic equity. Certainly, if we judge by results, the Tinbergen Consensus did rather better than the Washington Consensus.

However, it was in the framework of the UN Development Decades that Jan



Tinbergen made his most conspicuous contribution to the work of the UN. Halfway through the first Development Decade of the 1960s he was appointed – the obvious choice – to the chairmanship of the UN Committee for Development Planning. There he became the acknowledged leader of a brilliant group of people including Gamani Corea from Sri Lanka (later Secretary-General of UNCTAD), Saburo Okita (to become highly influential in Japanese economic policy), Josef Pajestka of Poland, K.N. Raj from India, M.L. Qureshi from Pakistan, et al. This group, during Jan Tinbergen's chairmanship 1965–1975 came closer than we have ever been before or since to fulfilling the function foreseen for the UN at the Bretton Woods and San Francisco Conferences to be the focus of what we now call global macroeconomic governance. The framework of a decade suited Jan Tinbergen to the ground: it provided the precise setting in which his quantitative approach found its full scope. Much of the contribution that follows will therefore centre on the Second Development Decade.

## 2A THE FIRST DEVELOPMENT DECADE

John F. Kennedy was elected President of the US in 1960. The day after his inaugural speech in January 1961 he came up to New York to address the UN General Assembly which met in special session for this purpose. There he proclaimed the 1960s as the United Nations Development Decade. A set of objectives and proposals for action were duly worked out by the Secretariat and adopted by the General Assembly under the title 'United Nations Development Decade – A Programme for International Economic Co-operation'<sup>4</sup>.

Jan Tinbergen assumed the chairmanship of the UN Committee for Development Planning in 1965. So in 1961 he was not yet directly or officially involved in the drafting of proposals for the first UN Development Decade. But it will be clear to any reader of the Proposals for Action that they were strongly influenced by his thinking. In particular, the proposal – not implemented in the event – to establish an Economic Projections and Programming Centre with sub-centres in the regions was included specifically with Jan Tinbergen's work on the importance of projections and modelling in mind. The task of this proposed Centre 'to improve techniques of planning and to provide technicians and administrators trained in these techniques' was directly derived from a study of Jan's books and articles and the new techniques of development programming which they had opened up.<sup>5</sup> To the UN he was already a well-trusted adviser and frequent consultant. As the UN Secretariat member charged with the responsibility of drafting the Proposals for Action, I can testify from direct knowledge that much of the document was written under his influence and in consultation with him.

In 1961 the belief in national planning was still very strong, further strengthened by Jan's demonstration that planning could be divorced from ideology and treated as a question of rational choice of objectives and instruments capable of quantification and empirical testing. Largely with his work in mind the Proposals for Action stated: 'Former objections to planning, based largely on a misunderstanding of the role envisaged for the private sector in most development plans, have died away. It is now generally appreciated that the purpose of a development plan is to provide a programme of action for the achievement of targets based on realistic studies of the resources available.'<sup>6</sup>

With the benefit of hindsight, that was not a very prophetic statement: Objections to planning, far from fading away, have subsequently played a powerful role and dominated the thinking of influential countries and institutions. But the work of Jan Tinbergen remains as a reminder that the pendulum has swung too far.

The Development Decade of the 1960s was on the whole a success story. It was still part of the 'Golden Age' – the 25 years of growth, full employment, and low inflation which the original Bretton Woods system gave us. The basic target of 5% GNP growth in developing countries was fully achieved overall. The breakdown of the system – on 15 August 1971 when President Nixon abolished the convertibility of the dollar into gold at a fixed rate and subsequently by the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC in 1973 – was still to come. When Jan Tinbergen assumed the chairmanship of the UN Committee for Development Planning in 1965, the First Development Decade seemed to be firmly on course and the 'Golden Age' was still in full glitter.

## 2B THE SECOND DEVELOPMENT DECADE

It was the preparation of the programme for the Second Development Decade of the 1970s with which Jan Tinbergen was directly involved in his capacity as Chairman of the UN Committee for Development Planning. The final version as approved by the UN General Assembly bears all the hallmarks of his approach and indeed of his style. This is apparent in the strong and detailed quantification of goals and objectives, much more than was the case in the programme for the first Development Decade. The basic target was for the gross product of developing countries as a whole to increase during the decade by at least 6%.

This high target was justified as a result of 'convergent efforts to be made during the Decade at the national and international levels'.<sup>7</sup> The reference to convergence reflects Jan Tinbergen's consistent emphasis in his writings at the time and subsequently on the importance of domestic income distribution, and above all on greater equality of international incomes, including international income transfers from rich to poor countries. In one of his last contributions before his death for the UNDP Human Development Report 1994 he returned to this theme of redistribution at the international level. With characteristic precision, he advocated aid equivalent to 1.3% of GDP of the OECD countries – a figure which he had determined would prevent the gap between developing and industrial countries from widening. Beyond this he foresaw a target of reducing the inequality in the distribution of world income to that obtaining 'within well-governed nations'. As a European Social Democrat, a 'well-governed nation' to him was a social welfare state on the Dutch model or on the model of the Beveridge Report<sup>8</sup>.

In the event, the 6% overall target was in fact reached or nearly reached. But it was the middle-income countries which reached and exceeded the target figure with an increase of 6.6% while the low-income countries fell short with an increase of 4.8%.<sup>9</sup> Thus, while the overall target was reached, to Jan Tinbergen's dissatisfaction there was divergence rather than convergence among the developing countries in the sense that the poorer developing countries fell further behind. The even sharper divergence was between the oil exporters and the rest of the developing countries.

Turning from growth of gross product to the more meaningful target of gross product per head, the projection for the Second Development Decade was 3.5%,

implying a rate of population increase of 2.5%. Characteristically Jan Tinbergen was explicit about aiming at a rate of population increase in developing countries less than the actual demographic situation in 1970 and he stated specifically that each developing country should have 'demographic objectives within the framework of its national development'<sup>10</sup>. In the event the projection of 2.5%, with its assumption of a modest decline in growth rates of population, turned out to be correct, in fact slightly over-cautious. The actual growth rate for low-income countries turned out to be 2.3% and for middle-income countries 2.4% (2.5% for lower-middle-income countries). Equally characteristically, just as in the case of the aid target of 1.3% of GDP mentioned above, the population target was also tied to the overriding international objective of narrowing the gap in living standards between developed and developing countries. It was specifically provided that the per capita growth rate of 3.5% per annum should be accelerated during the second half of the Decade 'in order at least to make a modest beginning towards narrowing the gap in living standards between developed and developing countries'<sup>11</sup>.

The precision of these targets and their link with an overall objective of narrowing international gaps in living standards contrasts with a much lower degree of precision and greater woolliness in the proposals for the first Development Decade; this clearly shows the Tinbergen touch. This difference is further strengthened by the careful breakdown of the 6% growth target into 4% for agricultural output and 8% in manufacturing output, 7% increase in imports, and somewhat higher than that for exports, with an increase in the savings ratio to gross product from 15% in 1970 to 20% in 1980 – by steps of 0.5% each year. All this was clearly based on the results of modelling the world economy derived from Tinbergen's writings and research.

Again we may compare these targets or projection with actual developments. The projected 4% increase in agricultural output was not in fact reached. The growth rate was only 2.7% in low-income countries and 3.4% in middle-income countries (with identical figures for lower-middle-income and higher-middle-income countries). In this divergence we find the roots of increasing food dependency and recurrent food crises which the Second Development Decade did not foresee. On the other hand, the increase in manufacturing output was very nearly achieved. Compared with the target of 8%, the actual rate in low-income countries was 7.5% and in middle-income countries 7.0%. In the lower-middle-income countries the target was in fact exceeded with 8.4%. Thus the structure of production shifted faster from agriculture to industry than Jan Tinbergen had foreseen – but unfortunately not because of an overshooting in manufacturing but because of under-achievement in agriculture.

The timing of the projections for the Second Development Decade was unfortunate. As mentioned above, within a few months the system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates based on the fixed value rate of the dollar in terms of gold established at Bretton Woods had broken down. A few years further into the Development Decade the quadrupling of oil prices by the OPEC countries threw the world economy into turmoil and recession, further intensified by the second oil price shock of 1979. While none of this could have been foreseen in 1970, it is remarkable that the projections in 1970 turned out to be so broadly accurate, at least as far as developing countries as a whole were concerned. Elsewhere, the present author has commented on this

phenomenon of continued growth in the midst of international crisis and turmoil –but he also explained that this continued growth was on an unsustainable basis at the expense of a rapidly increasing debt burden– it was a period of 'illusionary growth'<sup>12</sup>. The day of reckoning had still to come. In this sense the accuracy of the projections was more accidental than real, as Jan Tinbergen was the first to acknowledge<sup>13</sup>.

The feature of the Second Development Decade with which Jan Tinbergen is most often associated is the 0.7% aid target. The exact origin of this target is to some extent shrouded in mystery since it emerged from informal discussions between the UN Committee of Development Planning, headed by Tinbergen, and the UN Secretariat. In one sense the 0.7% target is the direct progeny of the target contained in the proposals for the first Development Decade. This was a 1% target, but for total financial flows rather than aid (which often led to confusion in the subsequent debate). This 1% target had already been influenced by Jan Tinbergen –he published his calculations of the 'savings gap' at about the same time in *Shaping the World Economy*. His approach was based on a Harrod-Domar-type calculation, assuming a target rate of growth of 2% per capita and a capital/output ratio of 3:1. If the target for financial flows for the first Development Decade had been reformulated in terms of aid rather than total flows, it would in fact have come pretty close to the 0.7% target– around 1961–62 aid did in fact constitute about 70% of total financial flows. Thus the Tinbergen target for the Second Development Decade in fact represented a high degree of continuity from the target for the first decade in which his calculations had already played a major part. Such continuity is not surprising, not only because of Jan Tinbergen's association with both exercises but also because during the first decade of the 1960s things had gone pretty well according to plans and there seemed no need for quantitative changes.

More recently, in 1990, Jan Tinbergen in his ripe old age did some further sophisticated work on the aid target. He proposed three new criteria which had in common that they resulted in considerably higher amounts<sup>14</sup>. Characteristically, he was not afraid of being branded as utopian for proposing higher targets when the lower targets were not being reached or even approached. As he wrote in the last sentence of his contribution to the Human Development Report 1994: 'The idealists of today often turn out to be the realists of tomorrow'<sup>15</sup>.

In a recent analysis Tinbergen's attempt in the 1960s and 1970s to link aid levels to Third World needs has been described as 'heroic if highly questionable'<sup>16</sup>. Today we know that the 0.7% target did not exercise the degree of moral and political compulsion that Tinbergen expected from it (perhaps over-generalising from his own moral position and that of The Netherlands). Although the target has been repeatedly accepted and confirmed by all countries and in theory represents a legal obligation, in fact overall it has never been reached and we have been moving away from it rather than towards it. There are some honourable exceptions, including the Nordic countries and The Netherlands. Whether overall the target had any impact at all, is difficult to say. Would aid flows have been even lower than they were without the target? This is one of the pieces of counterfactual history where answers are impossible to prove or to disprove.

## 2c REFORM OF UN VOTING SYSTEMS

There was another aspect of the work of the United Nations to which Jan Tinbergen,

with prophetic foresight, devoted attention. This concerns the voting system in the UN. At present the UN and its specialised agencies are controlled by the system of one-country-one-vote. By contrast, the Bretton Woods system is controlled by voting on the basis of one-dollar-one-vote (dollar in terms of contributions). It is this difference in voting systems which currently deprives the UN of the resources and support of the financially powerful countries and accounts for the unbalanced concentration of support and resources on the Bretton Woods system. Jan, as early as 1962, in his already-mentioned book *Shaping the World Economy*, had devoted a special section to the ‘revision of voting systems’<sup>17</sup>. He realised that neither of these two voting systems is fully democratic. He therefore suggested a combined voting system which would take into account size of population, number of member countries, financial contributions, balance between West, East and South and would perhaps even give voting rights to experts<sup>18</sup>. (With characteristic modesty he wrote: ‘these experts have played their part on several occasions in the past’ – this was true of himself perhaps more than anybody else.)

Something like the combination proposed by Jan Tinbergen over 30 years ago is now very much on the international agenda. The voting systems developed for the new Global Environmental Facility (GEF), jointly administered by the World Bank, UNDP, and the UN Environmental Programme, or the similar combination foreseen for the proposed new World Trade Organisation, both closely follow the lines suggested by Jan Tinbergen. This writer, in a recent presentation to the UN Hearings on World Development, has put forward similar ideas for uniform voting rules in the UN and Bretton Woods systems, with Jan Tinbergen’s 1962 proposals very much in mind.

Jan Tinbergen’s contribution to the work of the United Nations was such that the UN flag in front of the New York headquarters should have been lowered to half-mast when he died.

### 3 A CONCLUDING APPRECIATION

It is often the fate of great thinkers to see their vision come true in a distorted way of which they would have disapproved. That I think was the fate of Keynes with the Bretton Woods system – and that is the fate of Jan Tinbergen. His vision of a world government superseding national sovereignties – the WHO as a World Ministry of Health, the FAO as a World Ministry of Agriculture, the ILO as a World Ministry of Social Affairs. We now have in fact supranational government but it is not the kind Jan Tinbergen wanted. As Susan George has written in her recent book *Faith and Credit – the World Bank’s Secular Empire*, ‘the IMF will press its claim to be the International Ministry of Finance, and the World Bank is the prime candidate for the Ministry of Everything Else’. But this system supersedes only the sovereignty of developing countries. It is not Tinbergen’s global governance. The supranational institutions on which Jan Tinbergen pinned so much hope, are in turn undemocratically controlled by the financially powerful contributors. These countries (more or less the G7), retaining their own sovereign power, control the supranational institutions which in turn control the poorer and indebted countries. Moreover, the economic philosophy by which supranational (not world) governance is exercised under the Washington Consensus is far removed from the humane philosophy and objectives of Jan Tinbergen. So his vision remains unfulfilled. But dissatisfaction with the present state of world government is

rising, and Keynes’s original vision of Bretton Woods and Jan Tinbergen’s vision of genuine ‘global governance’ remain as beacons for the 21st century.

It is however the other great Cambridge economist A.C. Pigou with whom Jan Tinbergen had much in common and with whom he felt a special relationship. So I would like to conclude with words by Pigou which seem to me perfectly to describe Jan Tinbergen’s work:

*‘The complicated analyses which economists endeavour to carry through are not merely gymnastic. They are instruments for the bettering of human life. The misery and squalor that surround us, the injurious luxury of some wealthy families, the terrible uncertainty overshadowing many families of the poor – these are evils too plain to be ignored. By the knowledge that our science seeks it is possible that they may be restrained! Out of the darkness light!’*

Uit: *‘Out of darkness light!’* Proceedings of the memorial symposium for Jan Tinbergen, december 1994 (eds. Piet Terhal, Thijs de Ruyter van Steveninck)

#### NOTEN

- 1 See H.W. Singer and Matthias Lutz, “Trend and Volatility in the Terms of Trade: Consequences for Growth”, in *The Economics of Primary Commodities – Models, Analysis and Policy*, edited by David Sapsford and Wyn Morgan, Edward Elgar, 1994, p. 94.
- 2 On this point see Stephany Griffith-Jones: “Nicholas Kaldor’s contribution to the analysis of international monetary reform”, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 1989 (13), p. 231.
- 3 Jan Tinbergen, *World Security and Equity*, Edward Elgar, 1990.
- 4 Resolution 1710 (XVI) and The United Nations Development Decade – Proposals for Action, United Nations 1962 Sales No: 62.II.B.2.
- 5 See The United Nations Development Decade – Proposals for Action, *ibid.* pp. 16–17.
- 6 *Ibid.* pp. vi–vii.
- 7 See International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, United Nations Centre for Economic and Social Information, New York, 1970 para (13).
- 8 Human Development Report 1994, UNDP, New York and Oxford, OUP 1994, page 88 – a box on Global governance for the 21st century representing a ‘Special Contribution’ from Jan Tinbergen.
- 9 The figures quoted here and subsequently for actual growth are for 1965–80 rather than the decade of the 1970s, but the latter figures would be virtually identical. The 1965–80 figures have been used for convenience and are directly taken from the statistical tables of the World Bank’s World Development Report.
- 10 International Development Strategy, *loc. cit.*
- 11 *Ibid.*, para (14).
- 12 H.W. Singer and Sumit Roy *Economic Progress and Prospects in the Third World – Lessons of Development Experience Since 1945* Edward Elgar, 1993, pp. 28–39.
- 13 Based on personal discussions.
- 14 See Jan Tinbergen *World Security and Equity*, Edward Elgar, 1990, *passim*.
- 15 Human Development Report 1994, UN Development Programme, Oxford University Press, p. 88.
- 16 Roger C. Riddell, *Foreign Aid Reconsidered*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, and James Currey, London, 1987, a publication of the Overseas Development Institute, p. 270.

Slavoj Žižek verklaarde onlangs dat de Amerikaanse oorlog tegen Irak de toekomst van de internationale gemeenschap op het spel heeft gezet, 'raising fundamental questions about the "new world order" and what rules will regulate it.'<sup>1</sup> De spelregels van het Westfaalse statenstelsel zijn in verval nu de heilige drie-eenheid 'soevereiniteit, non-interventie, gelijkwaardigheid' aan geldigheid heeft ingeboet. Zoals de militaire acties in Kosovo en Irak hebben aangetoond, moet soevereiniteit door landen dank zij goed gedrag worden verdiend, en interventie wordt steeds meer gezien als legitiem, zij het (nog) niet altijd gewettigd.



Ook het principe dat alle landen gelijkwaardig zijn, staat ter discussie nu zg. 'mislukte staten' of landen waar narcoterreur floreert (zoals Afghanistan) zich *de facto* buiten de internationale wet hebben gesteld. Het is duidelijk dat de bestaande internationale rechtsorde toe is aan een *upgrade*, met nieuwe regels en betere instituties die deze regels controleren en ten uitvoerbrengen.

Maar nieuw is niet altijd beter. En vernieuwing vergt niet alleen volharding en doortastendheid, maar brengt ook de nodige risico's mee. Diverse artikelen in het themanummer van de *Internationale Spectator* (Juli/Augustus 2004) werpen daarom een kritische blik op de toekomst van het multilaterale bestel. Een aantal vragen staat centraal. Welke veranderingen zijn onmiskenbaar en welke nieuwe normen en richtsnoeren zullen het aankomende wereldstelsel bijeenhouden? Is het eigenlijk wel verantwoord bestaande regels te doorbreken zonder tevoren de consequenties ten volle te bevroeden, laat staan in de hand te houden? Hoe veerkrachtig is het minutieus gewoven netwerk van internationale organisaties, verdragen en regimes, nu de dynamiek van het internationale bestel verandert? Ten slotte, moet Nederland – in de traditie van Hugo de Groot immers een beschermheer van het internationaal recht – in deze heikele periode van verandering een eigen, zelfstandige lijn trekken (als dit al mogelijk is), en hoe staat het in dit verband met de Nederlandse nationale belangen?

<sup>17</sup> Jan Tinbergen, *Shaping the World Economy – Suggestions for an International Economic Policy*, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962, pp. 190–192.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* p. 192.



**NORMEN EN WAARDEN**

Soevereiniteit, het heilige huisje van de moderne wereld, staat op gespannen voet met het inzicht dat handhaving van mensenrechten niet alleen moreel, maar ook politiek noodzakelijk is geworden. Internationale media volgen conflicten op de voet, en we weten dat burgeroorlogen in Afrika uiteindelijk ook de westerse veiligheid ondermijnen. De massamoorden in Rwanda en (op veel kleinere schaal) in Kosovo hebben duidelijk gemaakt dat soevereiniteit geen beletsel mag zijn voor de 'internationale gemeenschap' (veelal de Verenigde Naties, maar soms ook de Verenigde Staten *cum suis*) tijdig in te grijpen, waardoor erger kan worden voorkomen.

Teneinde meer duidelijkheid te krijgen in deze dilemma's besloot de secretaris-generaal van de VN, Kofi Annan, de randvoorwaarden van interventie in kaart te laten brengen door een internationale commissie. In december 2001 publiceerde de International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, onder voorzitterschap van Gareth Evans en Mohamed Sahnoun) het rapport *The Responsibility to Protect*. Dit rapport concludeert dat elke staat de verplichting heeft de eigen burgers onnodig leed te besparen en dat wanneer mensenrechten op grove wijze worden geschonden, deze verantwoordelijkheid op de 'internationale gemeenschap' overgaat. Dit betekent dat staten niet langer over een onherroepelijke soevereiniteit beschikken, maar dat deze status door behoorlijk gedrag moet worden verdiend. Het rapport presenteert zes voorwaarden waaraan (humanitaire) interventie moet voldoen, en zet daarmee een eerste stap richting codificatie van het collectieve mondiale geweten.

Kofi Annan hield in september 2003 een krachtig pleidooi voor vërreikende hervorming van het huidige multilaterale systeem, aangezien de hedendaagse bedreigingen (van terrorisme en massavernietigingswapens tot armoede, milieuvervuiling en ziekten) niet langer met traditionele methoden kunnen worden aangepakt en opgelost. Als aanzet tot het debat riep Annan een 'High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change' in het leven, dat in december van dit jaar in een rapport aanbevelingen zal doen over de manier waarop de VN op deze nieuwe uitdagingen een antwoord kunnen geven.<sup>2</sup>

Maar voorlopig blijft het ICISS-rapport van december 2001 het toonaangevend hervormingsdocument. Het opmerkelijke van dit rapport is dat het naadloos aansluit op de aanpak van de Amerikaanse regering- Bush, die na de terreuraanslagen van '9/11' over landen als Irak, Iran en Noord-Korea de banvloek heeft uitgesproken. Washington argumenteert immers ook dat landen die het internationaal terrorisme steunen, het recht op immuniteit verspelen. De moeilijke vraag is vervolgens op welke wijze deze 'schurkens-taten' moeten worden aangepakt, en wie daarvoor het initiatief mag (of moet) nemen. Het ICISS-rapport geeft duidelijk aan dat de VN-Veilighedsraad de instantie is om zo'n interventie te machtigen. Het suggereert enkele nuanceringen, maar het multilaterale kader van elke interventie blijft voorop staan. En daarin zit het grote verschil met de benadering van de Verenigde Staten die preventieve (militaire) interventie interpreteren als een principieel recht op zelfverdediging (conform art. 51 van het VN-Handvest). Amerika's nationale veiligheidsstrategie van 2002 geeft aan dat de Verenigde Staten bereid zijn 'schurkenstaten' met militair geweld aan te pakken, en de oorlog tegen Saddam Hoesseins Irak heeft uitgewezen dat dit geen holle frasen zijn. De Amerikaanse doctrine van preventieve oorlog is nog niet gecodificeerd, maar heeft natuurlijk wel een zekere precedentwerking. Autoritaire leiders mogen zich niet langer achter de veilige muur van

ationale soevereiniteit verschansen, maar zij moeten rekenschap afleggen van de mensenrechtensituatie in hun land en van de legitimiteit van hun bewapeningsprogramma's.

Lee Feinstein en Anne-Marie Slaughter hebben onlangs een poging gedaan de Bush-doctrine met het argument van *The Responsibility to Protect* te verenigen.<sup>3</sup> Ze zetten humanitaire rampspoed (zoals genocide) met nadruk op één lijn met de dreiging van massavernietigingswapens en suggereren dat beide afdoende redenen vormen de nationale soevereiniteit van een 'mislukte staat' of een 'schurkenstaat' terzijde te schuiven en militair in te grijpen. En, wanneer de VN niet bereid zijn dit te doen, is het aan de Verenigde Staten de rol van mondiale politiemacht op zich te nemen en deze noodzakelijke klus te klaren.

Dit is een vernieuwend inzicht dat nog lange tijd de gemoederen zal bezighouden. De discussie zal zich vooral toespitsen op de vragen *wanneer* interventie mogelijk (of zelfs noodzakelijk) is, en wie deze interventie ten uitvoer moet brengen? In Nederland wordt dit debat schoorvoetend gevoerd onder het motto 'effectief multilateralisme'. Van belang is echter dat zowel de oorlog in Kosovo als die in Irak door de Verenigde Staten als koevoet wordt gebruikt om het oude raamwerk van internationaal recht verder open te breken. Tot op zekere hoogte is dit gerechtvaardigd, vooral omdat een pro-actief beleid noodzakelijk is om humanitaire rampen te voorkomen en strategische bedreigingen tijdig te neutraliseren. Maar aangezien deze discussie raakt aan het fundament van het internationaal recht zonder een coherent alternatief aan te bieden, leidt dit niet alleen tot verwarring maar ook tot verontrusting.

**'SCHAU MER MAL, DANN SEH MER SCHO...'**

Met dit devies (conform de Beierse levensfilosofie) vindt de huidige veranderingsdrang plaats, waarbij improvisatie en optimisme naadloos overgaan in arrogantie en argeloosheid. Onder druk van '9/11' lijken alle internationale organisaties (IO's) en het internationale recht als het ware een APK-keuring te moeten ondergaan om hun relevantie voor Amerika's 'war on terror' onder bewijs te stellen. Dat de meeste IO's voor verbetering vatbaar zijn, wordt geenszins betwijfeld. En dat de basisprincipes van de internationale orde ter discussie staan, heeft ook het ICISS-rapport aangegeven. Maar ook hier staan tussen droom en daad juridische en praktische bezwaren, waarvan de consequenties nauwelijks te voorzien zijn.

In feite ontspint zich voor onze ogen een strijd tussen twee theoretische modellen. Het *realistische model* veronderstelt dat internationaal recht en IO's slechts bestaande machtsverhoudingen weerspiegelen en niet langer effectief zijn wanneer ze ophouden het belang van de dominante supermogendheid (in dit geval de Verenigde Staten) te dienen. Het *liberale model* veronderstelt daarentegen dat volgroeide IO's sterk genoeg zijn om ook zonder actieve ondersteuning van de Verenigde Staten relevant en effectief te blijven. Het gaat dus om de vraag of de bestaande internationale orde al dan niet overgaat in een onverbloemde *Pax Americana*. Kunnen de Verenigde Staten bestaande internationale verdragen, IO's, multilaterale regimes en bondgenootschappen naar hun hand zetten, of niet? Volgt het internationale bestel braaf de veiligheidsagenda van Washington, of legt het door de Amerikanen zelf gewoven netwerk van IO's ook aan de leidende supermogendheid beperkingen op? Veel Europese landen waarderen IO's vanwege hun veelal prijzenswaardige doelstellingen en het daaruit voortvloeiende proces van samen-

werking en consultatie. Daarentegen kijken de Verenigde Staten na '9/11' slechts naar één aspect: concreet resultaat in de 'war on terror'. En met deze maat gemeten doen de meeste IO's het in de ogen van de regering-Bush niet al te best. De Amerikaanse onderminister van buitenlandse zaken John Bolton verklaarde dat '[t]he idea that we could have a UN Security Council resolution or a nice international treaty is fine if you have unlimited time. We don't, not with the threats out there [...] We [don't] want to engage in an endless legal seminar.'<sup>4</sup> Befaamd is tevens de verklaring van de Amerikaanse onderminister van defensie Paul Wolfowitz dat 'the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission'.<sup>5</sup>

Al met al lijken de Verenigde Staten tot de conclusie te zijn gekomen dat ze zich de luxe van het onversneden multilateralisme niet langer kunnen veroorloven. De bestaande internationale orde werd opgezet om de Koude Oorlog te *managen*, niet om al-Qaida te grazen te nemen. De Verenigde Staten ambiëren daarom niet minder dan een internationale revolutie, waarbij in principe alle opties bespreekbaar zijn zolang ze de Amerikaanse veiligheidsagenda dienen. Maar evenals bij de oorlog tegen Irak is de planning voor de 'day after' belabberd, en blijft het onduidelijk hoe de nieuwe internationale orde eruit moet gaan zien. Een blauwdruk (of zelfs maar een schets) van de *Pax Americana* is er niet. Alleen de richting van het Amerikaanse denken is duidelijk: logge IO's worden vermeden en daarvoor in de plaats komen door de Verenigde Staten gedomineerde clubjes van gelijkgezinde landen. Washington vormt als het ware een eenkoppige ballotagecommissie die bepaalt of een land waardig is om tot de 'internationale gemeenschap' toe te treden.

Dit is zeker geen neoconservatief plot, maar heeft een brede steun in de Amerikaanse politieke elite. Zo stelden Ivo Daalder en James Lindsay (beiden Democraten) onlangs voor, naast de VN een nieuw Verbond van Democratische Landen te creëren, met als achterliggende gedachte dat dit 'verbond een machtig werktuig [moet] zijn ter bevordering van de democratie. Zoals het vooruitzicht van het lidmaatschap van de NAVO en de EU het aanzien van Europa heeft veranderd, zo zou ook het vooruitzicht lid te worden van het Verbond van Democratische Landen kunnen helpen de wereld te veranderen.'<sup>6</sup> Net als soevereiniteit door behoorlijk (democratisch) bestuur en gedrag moet worden verdiend, zo moeten de Verenigde Staten ook tussen partners differentiëren. Het motto van de nieuwe internationale orde wordt 'multilateralisme op uitnodiging', waarbij de Verenigde Staten als gastheer optreden.

#### NEDERLAND EN DE INTERNATIONALE IDEEËNSTRIJD

Premier Balkenende zal binnenkort zitting nemen in een nieuwe internationale studie-groep van wereldleiders die voorstellen zal doen voor hervormingen van de VN, in het bijzonder de Veiligheidsraad.<sup>7</sup> Op deze wijze kan Nederland een bijdrage leveren aan een belangrijk en noodzakelijk debat. Nederland heeft binnen de EU al eerder (succesvol) het idee van 'effectief multilateralisme' (met de VN als basis) tot één van de hoekstenen van de EU-Veiligheidsstrategie weten te verheffen. Dit document (dat in december 2003 werd aangenomen als tegenhanger van de Amerikaanse veiligheidsdoctrine) breekt een lans voor 'een internationale orde gebaseerd op doeltreffend multilateralisme'.<sup>8</sup>

Maar ook de EU-Veiligheidsstrategie laat doorschemeren dat een mondiale institutionele vernieuwing onvermijdelijk is. Het erkent dat 'een van de voorwaarden van een

op regels gebaseerde internationale orde is dat het recht mee evolueert met de ontwikkelingen', en landen die 'zichzelf buiten de internationale samenleving [plaatsen] moeten begrijpen dat daarvoor een prijs moet worden betaald'. Daarbij doelt de EU niet in de eerste plaats op een mogelijk militair ingrijpen. Maar, zoals de EU-beleidsnotitie omtrent de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens (van juni 2003) aangeeft, wanneer het om proliferatie gaat, moet de EU daadkrachtig handelen, 'using all instruments and policies at its disposal. Our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide.' Ook hier wordt militair ingrijpen niet expliciet overwogen, maar ook geenszins nadrukkelijk uitgesloten.

De EU heeft in het debat over VN-hervorming een leidende rol op zich genomen en enkele nieuwe voorstellen op tafel gelegd. Nederland heeft meermalen aangegeven voorstander te zijn van een EU-bijdrage ten behoeve van het *High Level Panel* waarin het inbrengen van vernieuwende elementen in de discussie over VN-hervormingen niet moet worden geschuwd. Tot nu toe zijn de Europese ideeën echter eerder behoudend van aard en richten zij zich op een versterkte rol van de VN met betrekking tot *early warning*, vredeshandhaving en vredesopbouw, en een goede sociale en economische *follow-up* van politieke crisissituaties. De EU-politiek is er tevens op gericht de Verenigde Staten zoveel mogelijk betrokken te houden bij het VN-hervormingsproces, omdat elke nieuwe internationale orde zonder actieve ondersteuning van de Verenigde Staten bij voorbaat onwerkbaar en nutteloos is. Het blijft afwachten (tot december dus), maar de hervormingsvoorstellen van het *High Level Panel* zullen waarschijnlijk niet voldoen aan de hoge eisen van Washington. Een eventuele Democratische regering-Kerry zal daaraan niet veel veranderen.

Het spanningsveld tussen 'effectiviteit' en 'multilateralisme' zal voorlopig blijven bestaan. De hoop moet daarom worden gevestigd op het gegeven dat multilateralisme vaak legitimiteit oplevert, hetgeen noodzakelijk is om effectief beleid te voeren. Dit ondervinden de Verenigde Staten vandaag in Irak. Zonder VN-fiat bleven de Verenigde Staten en het Verenigd Koninkrijk officieel 'bezettters', en zo werden ze door vele Irakezen dan ook behandeld. Multilateralisme is vaak stroperig en traag, maar genereert wel degelijk legitimiteit en een bereidheid tot samenwerking. Maar (zoals Bolton eerder al aangaf) deze traagheid en passiviteit kunnen na '9/11' niet langer op de koop toe worden genomen, omdat onmiddellijke actie (soms) dwingend noodzakelijk is.

Het eindresultaat van dit dialectisch proces wordt niet alleen weerspiegeld in nieuwe IO's en verdragen met nieuwe regels. Van belang is vooral de discursieve verschuiving die nu al waarneembaar is, en daarbij moet de kracht van ideeën en ideologie niet worden onderschat. Daniel Philpott toonde al eerder aan dat alle omwentelingen in de internationale orde door revoluties in denken op gang zijn gebracht.<sup>9</sup> Maar zolang de Algerijnse president Abdelaziz Bouteflika soevereiniteit nog ziet als 'our last defense in an unequal world',<sup>10</sup> is deze strijd nog niet gewonnen. De oorlogen met Kosovo en Irak zijn als betonrot dat uiteindelijk de steunpilaren van het internationale bestel doen wankelen. Wanneer er duidelijke regels komen die internationale interventie legitimeren, is dit een stap in de richting van een werkelijke internationale gemeenschap, waar de hobbessaanse anarchie door een nieuwe mondiale moraal wordt getemd.

De geboorte van een nieuw internationaal bestel met nieuwe regels is – zoals we

nu zien – zeker niet zonder risico's en trammelant. Dat de postmoderne internationale orde vele kinderziekten zal kennen, staat nu echter al vast.

NOTEN

- <sup>1</sup> Slavoj Zizek, 'Iraq's False Promises', in: *Foreign Policy*, januari/februari 2004, blz. 45.
- <sup>2</sup> Zie voor meer informatie de website <http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/index.asp> (27 mei 2004); en Dick A. Leurdijk, 'Kofi Annans pleidooi voor "radicale hervormingen" van de VN', in: *Internationale Spectator*, februari 2004, blz. 84–89.
- <sup>3</sup> Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'The Duty to Prevent', in: *Foreign Affairs*, jrg. 83, nr 1 (januari/februari 2004).
- <sup>4</sup> Geciteerd in Carla Anne Roberts, 'The U.N.: Searching For Relevance', in: *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 oktober 2003.
- <sup>5</sup> Paul D. Wolfowitz, lezing op de Munich Conference on Security Policy ('Wehrkunde Tagung'), 2 februari 2002.
- <sup>6</sup> Ivo H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, 'Democratische landen: verenigt U!', in: *NRC Handelsblad*, 24 mei 2004.
- <sup>7</sup> 'Balkenende met wereldleiders in VN-studiegroep', in: *NRC Handelsblad*, 1 juni 2004.
- <sup>8</sup> *Europese veiligheidsstrategie: Een veiliger Europa in een betere wereld*, Brussel, 12 december 2003.
- <sup>9</sup> Daniel Philpott, 'Ideas and the Evolution of Sovereignty', in: Sohail H. Hashmi (red.), *State Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in International Relations*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
- <sup>10</sup> Joelle Tanguy, 'Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention', in: *Ethics & International Affairs*, jrg. 17, nr 1 (voorjaar 2003), blz. 143.

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Het is formeel mogelijk de VN te hervormen. Daartoe bestaat een procedure die in het handvest is omschreven. Ik geloof echter dat de gewenste hervorming voorafgegaan zou moeten worden door een bespreking binnen een onafhankelijke internationale commissie zoals de commissie Brandt over het Noord-Zuid vraagstuk, de commissie Palme over het Oost-West vraagstuk en in zekere zin ook de commissie Brundtland over milieuproblemen.



Ik wil hier enkele gedachten aan U voorleggen die in een dergelijke commissie zouden kunnen worden besproken, want een wereldwijde discussie is noodzakelijk voordat tot besluitvorming wordt gekomen. Deze commissie zou moeten uitgaan van een principiële conceptie over de fundamentele bedoeling van het bestaan van de Verenigde Naties. Misschien was deze niet gewenst op het moment waarop de VN werd opgericht, maar nu wel door de ontwikkelingen van de afgelopen 40 jaar. We moeten er dan niet voor terugschrikken om een zeer grote lijn voor ogen te houden, namelijk dat die fundamentele conceptie moet zijn dat de VN tot een soort management van onze planeet moet worden. Uiteraard is het voorbereiden van een dergelijke hervorming het werk van vele deskundigen op verschillende gebieden met andere woorden het vraagstuk moet interdisciplinair behandeld worden. Wat ik daarover hier kan zeggen is slechts een bijdrage van een econoom met alle bescheidenheid betreffende mijn gebrek aan deskundigheid op tal van terreinen die ook hun plaats zouden moeten hebben.

De hier te ontwikkelen gedachten moeten geïnspireerd zijn door concrete voorbeelden. In de eerste plaats denk ik dan aan de wijze waarop een goed geregeerd land wordt beheerd, maar daarnaast ook aan hoe een internationale onderneming wordt geëxploiteerd. Men stelt immers vaak aan een landsregering ten voorbeeld de wijze waarop het bedrijfsleven bepaalde zaken aanpakt. Ik wil deze gedachte hier wat verder uitwerken. Om te beginnen kent een goed geregeerd land een parlement en een regeringshiërarchie en is er een apparaat dat verschillende niveaus kent: het nationale-

het provinciale-, en het gemeenschappelijke niveau. Daarnaast bestaat ook een horizontale structuur met een stelsel van aan elkaar verbonden instellingen als de ministeries, de Centrale Bank en het onderwijsstelsel. Een dergelijke structuur zou kunnen worden aangesproken voor een wereldregering maar daarbij moet men niet ten slachtoffer vallen aan een misverstand dat omtrent dit begrip bij velen bestaat. Een wereldregering is niet een regering die de taken van alle nationale regeringen zou moeten overnemen. Nee, een wereldregering is een kleine toevoeging aan datgene wat er bestaat aan nationale overheden, die speciaal verantwoordelijk is voor de oplossing van die vraagstukken die de belangen van meer dan één natie beïnvloeden. Als voorbeeld noem ik de handelspolitiek, maar er zijn er natuurlijk veel meer.

In de laatste tijd, en dat is met name in het rapport Brundtland goed uitgewerkt, hebben we in toenemende mate de behoefte gevoeld aan een milieupolitiek op boven-nationaal niveau. De VN hebben al het United Nations Environment Programme, gevestigd in de Keniase hoofdstad Nairobi. Daar wordt reeds goed werk gedaan op het gebied van gegevensverzameling, maar, evenals bijna alle gespecialiseerde organisaties van de Verenigde Naties, beschikt zij niet over voldoende bevoegdheden om datgene wat nu alleen maar als aanbevelingen in een rapport zijn plaats vindt onderdeel van een politiek te laten worden. Deze organisaties, die in zekere zin te vergelijken zijn met ministeries, moeten mijns inziens meer bevoegdheden krijgen. Wanneer we naar het begrip parlement kijken, dan is het duidelijk dat de bestaande toestand die aan elk land één stem geeft in de Algemene Vergadering een zeer onbevredigende is, met name voor belangrijke en invloedrijke landen. Deze worden daardoor op één lijn gesteld met St. Vincent, Luxemburg of soortgelijke kleine landen. Dat is een van de redenen waarom de grote landen allengs weinig belangstelling hebben getoond voor datgene wat als resolutie uit de Verenigde Naties komt en ik geloof dat we daar begrip voor moeten hebben. Onder hervormingen moeten we dus zeker tellen een herziening van de wijze waarop de leden-landen worden vertegenwoordigd. Ik heb zelf enig speciaal werk verricht op dit terrein dat ons, naar mijn mening, in de buurt van de realiteit brengt. Er is enig getallenmateriaal beschikbaar over 159 landen, die vrijwel allemaal leden van de VN zijn. Dit materiaal, dat door de Wereldbank is verzameld, maakt het mogelijk om te berekenen hoe een Algemene Vergadering van bijvoorbeeld 200 landen de stemmen van zijn leden zou moeten, of beter gezegd, kunnen, wegen. De invloed van belangrijke landen kan op die manier ook daadwerkelijk in de stemming tot uitdrukking komen.

In mijn ogen kunnen hierbij drie systemen gevolgd worden, nl. in de eerste plaats een stemrecht evenredig met de grootte van de bevolking. Dit systeem is het meest ver-gaand in democratische zin, en dan ook slechts op langere termijn te bereiken. In de tweede plaats -en dat komt dichtbij de situatie die in enkele gespecialiseerde organi-saties, zoals de Wereldbank en het IMF al bestaat -is de invloed evenredig met de finan-ciële bijdragen van de aangesloten landen. In het algemeen is die financiële bijdrage van een grotere ongelijkheid dan de nationale inkomens, omdat men terecht van de landen met een hoog nationaal inkomen per hoofd relatief een grotere bijdrage vraagt. In deze tweede mogelijkheid spiegelt zich dus ook iets uit de geschiedenis van ons eigen parle-ment -we kenden tenslotte vroeger belastingkiezers. In enkele instellingen van de VN is dit gegeven al verwezenlijkt. Tussen de twee reeds genoemde mogelijkheden in zou tenslotte een vertegenwoordiging gedacht kunnen worden die evenredig is met het

nationale inkomen. Als voorbeeld neem ik het aantal stemmen dat de Verenigde Staten zouden hebben in een vergadering van 200: in geval van het eerste, meest democratische systeem, gemeten naar bevolking zouden dat er 11 zijn; bij de minst democratische, met de financiële bijdrage evenredig 61, en bij de tussenvorm tenslotte 41. Voor de Sovjetunie, ook een groot land, maar minder rijk dan de Verenigde Staten zijn de getal-len 13, 29 en 23. Bij een land dat ook groot is, maar onderontwikkeld, namelijk India, krijgen we uiteraard weer een ander beeld met de respectieve cijfers 31, 0 à 1, omdat het inkomen per hoofd bijzonder laag is, en 7. Dit zijn een paar illustraties van hoe anders de uitkomsten van de stemmingen in de VN zouden kunnen zijn wanneer men werkelijk denkt aan een parlement dat enigermate op de manier is samengesteld die wij kennen in de meer ontwikkelde landen.

Verder zullen de hervormingen -zoals gezegd -vooral moeten betekenen dat de verschillende gespecialiseerde organisaties zodanige bevoegdheden krijgen dat zij als een soort ministeries kunnen uitvoeren wat nu alleen maar aanbevolen wordt -maar dan wel aanbevolen wordt aan een Algemene Vergadering die op een van de zojuist uiteen-gezette wijzen is samengesteld. Dat betekent dan dat bijvoorbeeld de FAO iets zal worden als het ministerie van landbouw, dat het IMF zich zal ontwikkelen in de richting van een centrale bank ( nu heeft het nog niet alle taken die een centrale bank heeft); de GATT en de UNCTAD zouden te vergelijken zijn met een ministerie van handel, de UNIDO met een ministerie van industrie en het internationaal arbeidsbureau iets als het ministerie van sociale zaken.

Deze lijst is nog verder uit te breiden, maar daarmee zijn we er nog niet. Naast wijzigingen in bestaande instellingen zullen we ook moeten denken aan het toevoegen van enkele organen die nog ontbreken bij de VN. Ten eerste zou er een mondiaal minist-erie van financiën moeten komen. Het is opvallend dat er wel reeds enige instellingen bestaan -ik noemde ze reeds, IMF en Wereldbank -, maar niets dat vergelijkbaar is met het ministerie van financiën in een nationale staat. Het bijeenbrengen van financiële middelen voor de VN zal moeten geschieden op een manier zoals dat nationaal door de ministers van financiën gedaan wordt, dat wil zeggen in hoofdzaak belasting heffen en dan de aldus verzamelde gelden op de meest efficiënte of rationele wijze verdelen over de verschillende ministeries.

Op het ogenblik is het zo dat elke gespecialiseerde organisatie een kleine treasury heeft en dat betekent dat er heel veel dubbel werk gedaan wordt bij het uitzoeken van de gewenste bijdragen van de leden. Bovendien komt het ook veel voor dat die bijdragen eenvoudig niet gegeven worden omdat we op wereldniveau het eigenaardige systeem hebben dat de belastingbetalers zelf bepalen hoeveel belasting ze betalen. De bijdragen die bijvoorbeeld van de VS verkregen worden, worden niet bepaald door de Wereldbank, maar door de regering van de VS. Dat moet dus mijns inziens bepaald anders worden. Naast de voordelen van een wereldministerie van financiën die ik al noemde is daar ook nog het feit dat uit een lopend budget de uitgaven voor ontwikkeling betaald zouden kunnen worden. Momenteel worden deze gefinancierd door kapitaaloverdrachten waarbij onderhandeld moet worden over de voorwaarden waaronder deze leningen verstrekt worden. Deze onderhandelingen over de rentestand, de afbetalingstijd enz. blijken achteraf vaak nutteloos te zijn geweest, omdat de voorwaarden herzien moeten worden wanneer blijkt dat het betrokken land zijn schulden niet kan betalen -een



probleem waar we op het ogenblik zeer duidelijk mee te maken hebben. Naast dat wereldministerie van financiën is het duidelijk dat ook de Veiligheidsraad een veranderde werkwijze moet hebben. Door de heer Weisglas is er al op gewezen hoezeer het veto-recht belemmerend werkt op de besluitvorming. Een mondiale politiemacht mag zeker niet ontbreken. De Verenigde Naties hebben op dit terrein ook enige ervaring. Waarbij we kunnen denken aan tijdelijke vredesmagt, zoals die nu in het Midden Oosten bestaan en vroeger op Cyprus en in Afrika. Deze waren echter tijdelijk en vervulden niet veel anders dan een bufferfunctie tussen de conflicterende partijen. Ik denk dat we nu moeten streven naar een permanente instelling die ten dele gebruik maakt van economische drukmiddelen, bijvoorbeeld op het terrein van de handelspolitiek, en ten dele ook het uitoefenen van geweld zal moeten kunnen toepassen wanneer er conflicten zijn tussen naties die niet in overeenstemming zijn met het handvest nieuwe stijl. Hoe groot die politie zou moeten zijn en hoe zij samengesteld zou moeten worden zijn natuurlijk belangrijke zaken. Het is duidelijk dat zo weinig mogelijk mensen ingezet moeten worden tegen hun eigen land, zodat bij ieder conflict desgewenst een ander onderdeel ingezet kan worden. Men zal ook rekening moeten houden met geheime bewapening van sommige leden-landen en de kracht moeten hebben om daar eventueel tegen op te kunnen treden. Omdat het succes van een eventuele aanval, een overwicht van 3 op 1 vereist, behoeft de kracht van de daar tegenover staande wereldpolitie niet meer dan 1/3 van de veronderstelde geheime macht te zijn.

Dit is een zeer moeilijk vraagstuk en er zal nog zeer veel discussie nodig zijn voordat men tot wezenlijk aanvaardbare beginselen komt.

Ik wil besluiten met een opmerking over het zee-, en ruimterecht. Het nieuwe zeerecht dat we op het ogenblik hebben is mijns inziens een duidelijke prestatie van de Verenigde Naties. Dit zou een voorbeeld moeten zijn voor het nieuwe ruimterecht waarover momenteel voorstellen in behandeling zijn. Hieronder zullen zaken geregeld moeten en kunnen worden die zeer sterk de tegenstelling tussen de Verenigde Staten en de Sovjetunie bepalen. Ook hier ligt een taak voor de VN.

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This paper summarizes an empirical investigation of the link between poverty and the incidence of civil war. The thesis examined is a simple one: at the individual level, low living standards tend to enhance militaristic nationalism and confidence in the armed forces and therefore, on average, more support for attempting military solutions to social conflicts. At the national level this means that, assuming central governments need some popular support in order to start and sustain military campaigns, poorer countries will tend to attempt a military solution to a wider range of conflicts than would richer nations. Thus, the oft reported correlation between low GDP per-capita and civil war incidence is partly explained through the effects living standards have on the attitudes of the population and the resulting effect on the ability of governments to sustain a military-solution approach to conflicts. This claim involves a certain shift of emphasis. When thinking about the relation between income-distribution and war, one often thinks about the conditions under which the exploited poor rebel against the rich. But civil wars today often appear to be fought over other issues and moreover, it is often the poor who support the government in fighting the insurgents. Thus, while studying the rebels' motivations and decisions is obviously of major importance, the present paper sets these concerns aside in order to focus on the population from which the *government side* of the conflict must draw its support.



In recent years, several attempts have been made to empirically identify the sources of civil wars using cross-country data sets, mostly from the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The empirical studies typically attempt to estimate a model where the probability of the eruption of civil war in a given country at a given time interval is determined by various aggregate measures at the country level such as GDP, natural resources, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, education levels, civil liberties, democracy and inequality measures. The strongest and most robust finding in this literature seems to be that societies at low

levels of economic development have suffered much more from societal warfare than prosperous societies. This seems to suggest that higher national income significantly reduces the risk of civil war. But it is equally well argued that civil wars are detrimental to economic growth: causality probably runs both ways, and it seems hard to separate the effects in a cross-section of countries. Moreover, granted that low levels of economic development are conducive to civil war, it is not quite clear *why* this should be the case – and cross-country data seem insufficient to answer this question. Collier and Hoeffler (2001), for example, view income per-capita as a proxy for the cost of recruiting rebels: low per-capita income thus facilitates conflict by making rebellion cheaper. Fearon and Laitin (2003), on the other hand, while finding a similar relationship between GDP per-capita and civil wars, claim that low GDP per-capita is related to “weak states”, which in turn attract insurgency. But in general – since GDP per-capita is correlated with so many social, economic, political and international factors that are not easily controlled for – it is hard to point to any particular mechanism as driving the statistical relationship. In order to do that, the aggregate-level analysis probably needs to be complemented by a disaggregated one. A preliminary attempt is presented here.

Before summarizing the results I should emphasize that they may not apply to the civil wars afflicting Africa, as data on Sub-Sahara Africa is scant and save South Africa, none of the African countries that recently experienced civil war take part in the empirical analysis.

I start with the cross-country patterns. Figure 1 shows the mean national level of confidence in the armed forces plotted against GDP per capita. The level of confidence is taken from the World Values Surveys (Inglehart et al. 2000, henceforth WVS), performed in the early and mid 1990’s. Each point represents the estimated mean from one country at one year. The figure suggests that some of the observed correlation between GDP per-capita and civil wars might indeed be due to the former picking up the effect of confidence in the armed forces. This possibility was explored using three different measures of civil wars and civil conflicts, taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand, 2002. Confidence in the armed forces was measured by the proportion of the population professing the highest level of confidence in the armed forces, taken from the WVS. The two main results are as follows:

1. *The prevalence of confidence in the army is strongly and positively related to the risk of experiencing civil war, even after controlling for a host of other factors that are commonly held to account for civil war risk.<sup>1</sup>*
2. *Confidence in the army is found to be partly responsible for the relationship between GDP per-capita and civil war incidence.*

As in most cross-country regressions, a causal link between confidence in the army (or other covariates) and civil war risk cannot be established based on these regressions alone. An obvious reason is that in countries experiencing - or even expecting - war, support for the army may tend to rise, which may be reflected in the reported confidence in the army. If this is the case, it would be very hard to separate such effects from the effect these attitudes in turn have on the eruption or perpetuation of the war.

But the results do suggest that part of the observed relationship between GDP per-capita and civil war risk is due to widespread confidence in the army.

Still, the relationship between confidence in the army and national income levels may well be spurious. That is, it may be the case that in rich countries everyone has relatively low confidence in the army while in poor countries it is the reverse, and that this is due to some other factors affecting both GDP and attitudes. I therefore examine whether the relationship also holds at the *individual* level, both in rich and in poor countries. Are richer people less likely to have a high level of confidence in their country’s armed forces, regardless of whether they live in a poor or a rich country?

To answer this question I use WVS data from a reasonably diverse sample of 27 countries during the 1990’s, all using the same confidence-in-the-army question. To measure living standards in a comparable way, I use income per household member, converted to 1996 dollars using the PWT 6.1 consumption-purchasing-power-parities.<sup>2</sup> The proportion of the population with the highest level of confidence in the army ranges in these surveys from below 5% in Austria, Belgium, Latvia and the Netherlands to over 64% in Turkey. Income per household member in 1996 PPP dollars ranges from \$ 300 to \$ 40,000.

The results are rather striking in that in *almost all countries where data are available, the estimated effect of income on confidence in the army is negative*. There is no clear difference between richer and poorer countries with respect to the marginal effect of income. There appears to be a strong negative relationship between income and confidence in the army in countries as diverse as Austria, Brazil, Canada, Hungary, Portugal and Turkey. Further, the size of the effect appears to be large enough to account for half of the association between national income and confidence in the army illustrated in figure 1. This leaves plenty of room for other, national factors – such as recent conflicts – to simultaneously affect both average income and average support for the army. But the association at the *individual* level seems to suggest that the cross country association is not all due to such factors.

*A concluding remark.* Military and political leaders engaged in violent conflict often seem to devote considerable efforts to try to enhance popular confidence in their armed forces. It seems plausible to assume that such efforts are not unreasonable, in the sense that higher confidence in the armed forces can lead to higher popular support for the war being fought (or anticipated). As we have seen, the claim that widespread confidence in the army may facilitate the practice of civil war is consistent with the available data. Yet confidence in the army is not determined just by governmental propaganda. The present paper tried to point to the fact that the living standards of the population may also be related to the levels of confidence they have for the army. Could it be then that the extensive popular confidence that the army enjoys in countries like Turkey and India is not just a *result* of the long conflicts in which they have been involved, but also a factor that prolongs them – and that such confidence is partly due to the low income levels of much of the populations of these countries? I tried to show here that this possibility is not rejected by the available data, but to be able to say more we need to identify the mechanism underlying the association of income and confidence in the army. This is the subject of an ongoing research into the economics of nationalism.





FIGURE 1: MEAN CONFIDENCE IN ARMED FORCES AND GDP PER CAPITA

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NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The controls include measures of GDP per capita, population size, proportion of land mountainous, noncontiguous states, oil exporting, instability, democracy and ethnic fractionalization. The sample of countries with both WVS and civil war data available consists of only 71 to 74 country-years, depending on the specification. The results obtained from this sample appear to be reasonably comparable to the larger-sample results in the literature, as the effects of most variables (before controlling for confidence in the army) are generally similar to those reported in the literature.
- <sup>2</sup> Since information on the income categories used in the WVS is not available for all surveys and since for a few countries no reliable PPP exchange rates exist, we are left with 31 national surveys (four countries have two surveys at two points in time) and four surveys from Spanish regions.



PROF. DR. JAN TINBERGEN

# Entering the third millennium: some suggestions

*Eerder verschenen bij P.J. Fijan publications 1991*

The era of Gothic architecture coincided with the rise of many West European towns. Towns where citizens were in control and not -as had been the rule for a long time- the nobility and/or the clergy. In most of those old towns, the visitor will be struck by spires and towers crowning a town hall, church, trade centre, university, or other building. In such towers and spires, bells were hung. People in those times understood "the voice of the bell"<sup>1</sup>! For bells had many functions (to tell the time, to call people to their religious duties, to give warning of fire, of the dangers of war, etc.). When later the bells were completed, particularly in the Netherlands, to a chromatically rising series of notes connected by wires to a keyboard, a new musical instrument was "born": the carillon. That the carillon culture is not just something of times long past is proved by the many new carillons in Europe, North America and Japan. Nevertheless as a musical instrument it has remained typical of the Netherlands and Belgium (the Southern Netherlands).

Professor Jan Tinbergen, who for many years was a professor at Erasmus University in the Dutch harbour town of Rotterdam, and by his merits in the area of the economic sciences won a Nobel Prize, in this booklet calls up students (and others) "to meet the challenges of the Third Millennium with positive plans".

Returning to the "world" of towers and bells, we could say that Professor Tinbergen imagines himself a keeper climbing his tower and overlooking the past, the present and the future. When the weather was clear, a tower keeper could survey a wide area. Therefore, with his bells he held an important position in urban society. In his essay, Professor Tinbergen emphasises that "keeper's function" of science, although in our age of aviation and space travel, he rather speaks of a "helicopter view". A more appropriate term, actually, since a helicopter must soon get back to ground level. And are not scientists sometimes blamed for living in "ivory towers"?

We are rapidly approaching the Third Millennium of the Christian Era. Tower watchers are no longer in function. Modern means of communication have taken over the task of the chiming bells. The automatic clockwork assures that we -as one Dutch poet<sup>1</sup> has written somewhere- "hear the dark-bronze hours chime". But in Belgium and the Netherlands (and on a smaller scale elsewhere in the world), carilloneurs ("beiaardiers" in Dutch) are still making their towers "sing"! These professional musicians resemble somewhat their historical predecessors when for instance they adjust their repertoire to contemporary social conditions. The carillon has once been called "the world's most democratic musical instrument".

Perhaps, using another metaphor, we might also compare Professor Tinbergen's essay with a carillon concert attuned to today's social circumstances. His concert contains notes in a minor key which indicate his concern. Nevertheless Professor Tinbergen final chord is -most decidedly- in a major key!

The editor

<sup>1</sup> Ida Gerhardt

## 1. WHAT ARE THESE SUGGESTIONS ABOUT?

The history of humanity has almost reached the year 2000, two thousand years after Christ's birth. Less than ten years from now the gateway to the *Third Millennium* will open to admit that moment's humanity, among whom I hope will be all my children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. My suggestions are meant to encourage all these younger people to meet the challenges of the Third Millennium with positive plans.

That I shall be with them is not very likely. But, as so many of my contemporaries, and as a scientist, I have given quite some thought to that last year of the Second Millennium. I have tried to give some structure to what I could offer, as a message, to those who will pass the gateway. Because this is a message from one single person, it is bound to be onesided. It should be looked upon as a *supplement* to messages from others, especially from people with practical experience. This author has no business or political experience; his message is a scientist's advice. Now a scientist's task is to think; to think about the structure of the subject he has studied. As I am an economist, my task has been to think about economic structures, now, in the past, and in the future. Scientists are also committed to look ahead. That is useful, because *most human beings tend to be short-sighted*, which may have disastrous consequences.

## 2. OUR LIFE AS INDIVIDUALS SURROUNDED BY THE WORLD

Around each of us is the world: the dead world and the living world. The dead world consists of once living beings who have just died and left us in sorrow. But many more are those who left us longer ago, and an even greater part of the world consists of things that have never lived: the mountains in Switzerland, the flat landscape of my country, the river that Switzerland sends us, and the seas and oceans, always moving, but not living.

The living world consists of a great many other human beings, a great many animals and a great many plants. There are at present present over four thousand million human beings living on this earth. In my country there are almost as many pigs and six times as many chickens as there are people. But the flies and the birds haven't been counted...

There are many kinds of *relations among animals*, many of them very cruel: animals eat other animals, or fight with one another for the same prey. Human beings are no exception: they breed animals and then eat them; their way is just a little more civilised. Vegetarians, now, they are really civilised.

The forms and colours of animals offer many surprises: some pleasant, others frightening; varying from ants to elephants, from snakes to crocodiles, from whales to eagles, and so on.

Not moving yet living are plants and trees. Plants get eaten as well, but we don't know whether they suffer. Because they don't cry, we think they don't feel our cooking and eating them. Trees are useful in other ways: they supply us with timber and transform *carbon dioxide into oxygen*.

All those living and non-living things around us together form what is nowadays called the *environment* - sometimes impressive and beautiful, sometimes threatening, like deserts or the endless oceans covering more than half the earth's surface. The environment is the stage on which the epos of human society is performed.

For many centuries, we have profited from the environment and from the natu-



ral, automatic absorption and neutralisation of polluting matter. However, humanity has become so *numerous* and invented so many machines and chemicals as to have become a *danger* to the environment, and so, indirectly, to ourselves. Our automobiles are polluting the atmosphere; our increasing consumption is forcing us to fish more than we should if our children are still to have the stock of fish or whales they need to survive; our rivers contain chemicals that kill river fish; and so on and so forth. We are sawing off the branch of the tree we sit on.

Since 1972, when we met in Stockholm on a Swedish initiative to discuss environmental problems, a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has functioned in Nairobi (Kenya). Scientists are studying ways to maintain the size and quality of the environment; to avoid killing the forests; to stop polluting the air, the soil and the oceans, rivers and lakes. Already there are plans to reform and strengthen UNEP so that its resolutions will not remain mere recommendations but *become policy decisions*, to be carried out by governments on pain of sanctions.

Below (in sections 9 and 10) we shall see what other serious dangers are threatening the life of future generations.

### 3. OUR LIFE AS MEMBERS OF A FAMILY

As individuals, we are not facing the environment on our own. We are members of a *family*. Depending on our age we play different roles in the family to which we belong. Let us consider human beings according to their age.

As babies we are first of all protected, fed and surrounded with care by our *mother*. Soon father joins in, and both parents start the process of education. In many families the mother runs the household while the father goes out to earn the money needed. In view of the capabilities and preferences of either parent, they may switch their activities under joint responsibility. If there are older brothers and sisters, they participate in the process.

After some years, the education process is widened to the surroundings and the school. Harmonious cooperation is desirable, of course. As we advance in age, the contribution of schools, friends, and society at large to our education extends, and our own experiences come in as well. The type of school will vary with the youngsters' *innate capabilities*, and so does the moment they start looking for a *job*. That important moment comes much earlier to the less gifted than to gifted youngsters. Another important process of biological maturity determines when interest for the other sex awakes and the desire develops to leave the family and start one's own with a partner of the other sex (in some cases a partner of the same sex).

Married couples share responsibility for the family's welfare. Their aim is to be happy and bring happiness to their children. To that end, parents first have to find out what each child's innate capabilities are. Next comes the choice of a future job that fits those capabilities best. Some young people will be happiest as artists, others as scientists. Many will prefer some handicraft. Some will be happiest in the open air, others in a building that protects them against nature's vagaries. A type of school must be chosen to match the preferred job.

Other elements of education do not depend on the envisaged job, but are general qualities desired for all, such as honesty, reliability, or interest in other persons'

happiness. In that respect the *example of the parents* is of great importance. The general atmosphere in a family depends on their religious orientation or '*Weltanschauung*', but also simply on the parents' personalities. Many are good, others not-so-good or frankly bad educators. Apart from the parents' abilities, the teachers' personalities may exert a strong influence on their pupils. Generally, the function of parents and teachers is to 'pass on human knowledge and civilisation to the next generations'.

The different abilities of human beings have important consequences for their happiness. The cruelty of nature's physical aspects is reflected in its mental and spiritual aspects. Gifted individuals often derive great happiness from their jobs, while less gifted ones experience their work as a burden. That form of injustice, and other aspects, will be taken up in sections 4 and following.

Another injustice of societal traditions is, or was until recently, that women who would have loved a family remained single. They may have derived satisfaction from their work, and enjoyed art in museums, but because girls are, or were, not supposed to take the initiative to marry, they must forego the happiness that a family can give. 'It's not done', was the general view. But customs are changing...

### 4. LIFE IN HUMAN SOCIETY

Human society consists of a large number of men and women of all ages. The youngest and some of the oldest are 'protected against the hardships of society' by the family in which they live. Those active in society are *consumers* and *producers*; their position will be discussed in sections 5 and 6. The present section considers some more general aspects of human society.

Consumers enter society as individuals; they buy things in shops, take out money from banks or post offices, travel, and so on. They are loosely organised in consumer unions, which provide them with information and exert pressure on producers, governments and shops when they feel it is useful to consumers.

Producers may also act as individuals, running a shop or practising a craft, repairing household tools, wash clothes, etc. But in modern society the most important producers are organised in powerful *institutions*.

A *distinction may be made between free and imposed institutions*. By imposed institutions I understand those you belong to naturally or from obligation. You are a member of the municipality where you live, and you have to go to school as soon as you have reached a certain age. Not going to school is punished. Not paying taxes to the municipality –or the national government– can land you in jail. Examples of free institutions are sporting and music clubs, and schools falling outside the compulsory schooling period.

In their most active period, from age fifteen to sixty-five, almost all men and many women have a job, which means that they have accepted to fulfil the tasks described in an *employment contract*. To do our job well is an important task, claiming a large portion of our energy, understanding, and intuition. Evidently, that applies more to difficult than to easier jobs. Managers probably have the most difficult position, where many problems have to be solved or even discovered for the first time. Problems with people first of all, but also technical, organisational and informational ones. As the well-being of a large number of families is at stake, managers need a strong sense of *responsibility*. To attain the aim –to make the firm flourish– a whole array of features are needed:

intellect, creativeness, persuasiveness, and adaptability, to mention but a few. Only a few people possess the whole combination. What is also needed is a 'helicopter view' – the opposite of shortsightedness. Shortsightedness is a drag in all jobs, but worst of all in important functions. A good manager must be able to harmonise and integrate the diverging and opposed interests of his collaborators.

However important these characteristics of 'captains of industry' are, we – and they – must not underestimate the requirements for the simpler jobs. Such underestimation could jeopardise the cooperation needed. One way to avoid it is to recruit managers from the people who started out at a simple job and have gradually risen in the hierarchy.

Unlike consumers, producers, and in particular skilled workers, are *strongly organised*. Well aware of their dependent position, they created *trade unions* as a counterweight. Employers responded by in turn organising themselves in employers' associations. Trade unions, begun as local bodies, are now cooperating on the national and even the world level, keeping closely in touch with political parties. The first *socialist parties* were created in the last part of the nineteenth century. Their opponents were the existing conservative and liberal parties. A role of *reconciliation* was played by Christian parties, and confirmed by the Encyclical 'Rerum Novarum' (On new things) emitted by Pope Leo XIII in 1891.

One tool which trade unions use to exert pressure on employers are strikes, to which employers sometimes retaliate with lockouts.

Once the situation of the working class had been 'discovered', a series of *social-security acts* were passed by the parliaments of industrialised countries, prohibiting work by children, limiting work by women, limiting the working hours of all workers, insuring workers against occupational hazards, and so on. After World War I a further series of such measures were taken, including insurance against employment and the costs of illness, and the regulation of voting rights. Labour conditions came to be agreed upon collectively by the central organisations of employees and employers. Thus, an increasingly complete social structure of human society was drawn up.

Workers, workers' unions, and political parties have been strongly influenced by the ideas of *Karl Marx* and his friends. Marx's main contribution to history and sociology has been the concept of consecutive changes in the social order, with power shifting from one group in society to another. Medieval society was a *feudal* order with land-owners as the leading class. It was followed by *capitalism*, in which capital-owners and managers were most powerful. Marx's prognosis was that at some time in the future the working class, or proletariat, would take over power and create a classless society, with much more relative prosperity for workers.

As the socialists rose in number and power, discussions on the policy to follow intensified, and different opinions evolved. A *split of the labour movement* into a more radical and a more moderate wing ensued, and around 1910 there were in most countries two socialist parties, one radical, the other more moderate. The radical party called themselves communists, the moderates were known as social-democrats. The communist parties were in favour of a revolution followed by a dictatorship of the proletariat. In Russia two revolutions took place in 1917: in the February revolution the social-democrats took over from the Tsarist government, and in October the commu-

nists under Lenin seized power and created the Soviet Union with a dictatorial government. Their aim was to introduce their type of government everywhere, starting with the countries under their control in Eastern Europe. In some other countries outside Europe, communist governments also took over, notably China (the People's Republic of -), Cuba, and some African states.

By its adherence to violent change, the Soviet Union divided the world into two blocs, and started an *armament race*. This race became terribly dangerous as around the same time *nuclear power* had been discovered, and used by the United States to bomb two Japanese cities: Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For a long time the world lived in great suspense, negotiating in vain on armament reduction, until in 1985 *Mikhail Gorbachev* became secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The American economist Abram Bergson had shown that the productivity of the Soviet economic system was about one third less than the American and West-European systems. The implication was that the Soviet military forces were far less efficient, and the Soviet consumption level much lower than West-European standards. So, Mr Gorbachev argued that instead of threatening the West, the Soviet Union would do better to copy the Western 'market system', restructuring its own system on the base of maximum information.

After more than seventy years of rigid central planning, this courageous deviation from traditional ideology brought about a tremendous *détente* and opened much problems, which I shall discuss in sections 8, 9 and 10, but an enormous amount of pressure has been eliminated.

## 5. LIFE AS A CONSUMER

Human life has many aspects, each of which is the object of one or more sciences. Health is a matter of medical science, religion a matter of theology, spiritual problems can be dealt with by psychology, learning by pedagogics, and so on, and so forth. This author, being an economist, is interested in people's attitudes and activities as consumers and producers. In a sense everybody is, or must be, economists to their own households.

The present section discusses consumption as a human activity. The purpose of consumption is to satisfy human needs, which are many and manifold. We can group them as *physical* and *mental* or *spiritual needs*. To begin with the physical needs: we want to protect ourselves against the vagaries of the weather by living in a house, and wearing clothes. We need food and drink; we want to wash and stay clean. To go on with mental or spiritual needs: we are fond of music and other forms of art, so we visit concerts and museums or look at television. We want or have to learn; we want information; so we again call upon the television to help us, or read books, newspapers and weeklies. Many of the things we need can be bought in shops, which are plentiful and varied. But at home we butter our bread, prepare the dinner, wash the clothes, and so on. We also have holidays; some of us make long trips and see for ourselves what life is like in other countries.

Those are the things we can consume. But for a house, clothes, food, and everything else, we have to pay. And to do so, we must have an *income*. Our income sets a limit to what we can buy. The goods we buy carry a price tag. To get as much as possible for our money, we need to compare the prices various shopkeepers ask, and look for the best bargain.

How do we get our income? Most of us by working, that is, being a producer. We will come to that in section 6.

What I have briefly described above is consumption as it is practised now by people living in cities in developed countries. But remember it has not always been like that, nor is it so everywhere. When I was a schoolboy, television was unknown. In 1800 there were no trains; in 1900 aircrafts had not yet been developed. Going back in history we find ever greater differences with our own society. Paintings tell us about life as it was a few centuries ago. The people in the pictures wear different clothes from ours; tea and coffee were unknown but beer was the common drink. Their houses, some of which are still standing in our old city centres, lacked many of the comforts we are used to. But such magnificent buildings as the Gothic church of Ulm in Germany, or the churches of Canterbury in England and Reims in France still fill us with admiration. While these were built just a few centuries ago, archaeology shows us remainders from much earlier times, human beings as well as pots, plates and other household objects from thousands of years ago. Famous old books describe to us historical events and the ways of life long past.

Now moving in space, we find that farmers have different consumption patterns from city inhabitants. They need not go to shops for their own products. Consumption and production are practised at the same farm. Travelling farther, to developing countries, we find smaller shops and fewer goods. We see *hungry people*, some without a roof over their heads, some living in self-made dwellings of some description. The masses live on incomes far lower than those of our poor. A very few people in developing countries are rich; the ratios between the incomes of rich and poor people there are much higher than in our developed societies.

The social order in underdeveloped countries is *harsh* and *cruel*, and sometimes maintained by such traditions as the 'castes' in India or racial discrimination in South Africa. Although no longer legal, discriminating habits have not yet disappeared.

Back in the developed world, we observe that some consumers have organised themselves in a way by joining *consumer unions*, whose aim is to further consumer interests. They spread information about the quality of products, and discuss the possibility of eliminating poor-quality products from the market. Other consumers, while not members themselves, do read the weeklies or monthlies published by the unions.

Earlier on, groups of consumers wanting to get around shopkeepers' unduly high prices, had created *consumer cooperatives* to buy goods at wholesale prices and sell them directly to their members. In fact they competed with the shopkeepers in efficient purchasing, sorting out and repackaging the goods and organising the shops. However, in the end they lost the competition: there are hardly any consumer cooperatives left. But cooperation with governments still continues and occasionally protects consumers.

## 6. LIFE AS A PRODUCER

To satisfy the needs of consumers, consumer products and services have to be produced. That gives rise to another aspect of human life: production. Production is the heart of economic activity; it requires a variety of efforts and has given rise to huge institutions. To begin again close to home with present-day production in the cities of developed countries: typical are the large factories, large transportation systems, large government

institutions. In the present section we shall describe these institutions in some detail, because they are important to mankind and have an essential part in attempts to safeguard human life in the Third Millennium.

*Technology* is all-important in production. The human race has displayed amazing imagination and creativity in factories, transportation systems, and today's agriculture. A succession of inventions have enabled the managers of productive institutions to mechanise and organise the production processes and thus produce consumption goods cheaper than craftsmen can. More recently, *information* has been reshaped with the help of electronic devices. No doubt, further innovations will follow.

Present technology has raised consumption in developed countries to unhealthy levels. Another aspect of modern life is that the jobs to be fulfilled call for a wide variation of skills, rewarded by widely differing wages and salaries and requiring different *schooling*.

Manufacturing industry can be grouped in some 20 branches, within which companies cooperate to some degree. Textiles, leather products, food industries, metal working, chemical industries, are some of the more important sectors. They differ in capital intensity (quantity of capital per employee). Workers in capital-intensive activities tend to earn higher wages than workers in labour-intensive sectors.

The complicated nature of today's production process calls for great care in the execution of productive tasks. A minor error in the construction of an aircraft or high-speed train engine may cause a serious accident. Payment according to the quality of the work done may inspire workers to greater care.

Today's social order, with its *market systems*, where individuals are free to choose their jobs, automatically leads to the distribution of jobs according to the innate capabilities and schooling of individuals. If a worker has received part of his training on the job, the employer will preferably keep his trainee permanently, lest a rival company profits from the training he has provided. To stay with one's company is typical of the Japanese economy.

Production, like consumption, is regulated by the prices of the goods and services produces. A positive margin between the selling price and the *cost* of a good stimulates production; the quantity produced is in the end determined by the *production capacity*. The most successful producer is the one who lowers cost and raises capacity.

Now these characteristics apply in particular to today's production in the cities of developed countries. Let us again move in time and space to look at the history of production and production outside the developed cities.

Technology, the core of production, has advanced rapidly. In the previous section we have given examples of things that are common items in our present consumption pattern but were unknown in previous centuries. Similar examples can be given for production. Electricity and oil have succeeded the steam engine, as driving force, which around 1800 had replaced animals and human beings. Think of the difference this has made to urban traffic.

From simple electricity our factories have now advanced to electronics and robots. Another rapid development has taken place in chemical production, where, for instance, *plastics* can be ordered to any specification of strength, elasticity, etc. And what about the development from wooden railway coaches to steel and aluminium

ones. Plastics have been experimented with for that purpose as well.

The structures used for mechanisation display an unbelievable succession of ever more complicated forms. So far, human inventiveness has continually raised productivity. It may be exhausted some time, but so far, there has been no sign of deceleration.

Looking now at production in developing countries, we are at once struck by the *riksha* as a form of urban transportation with man as the moving power. Labour-intensive technology also prevails in innumerable other productive activities, for labour is cheap in underdeveloped countries. And while in developed countries the tractor has become quite normal for ploughing, farmers in the Third World are still employing animal power.

Producers far more than consumers are *organised*. Production itself, to begin with, is more organised than consumption. For one thing, the latter is an individual activity, whereas most production cannot proceed without cooperation. For another, the producing individual depends on productive activity for her or his well-being. Every consumer uses a variety of goods, but a producer often concentrates on just one or a few goods. The non-availability of, or lack of demand for, one particular good is but a partial problem to the consumer, but can endanger a producer's entire existence.

Production is organised *world-wide* –by markets, in commodity agreements, etc.–, and international or multinational companies are powerful, on a level with governments.

Today, producers are faced with the problem of the environment, a matter of grave concern for an increasing number of people. Decisions will be made which inevitably put additional burdens on producers: another reason for them to organise themselves.

Employees, producers themselves, have equally strong reasons to get organised for the defence of their position, especially in terms of income. Organised employees and employers are, in fact if not always formally, powerful non-governmental governing bodies.

## 7. LIFE AS A LOCAL CITIZEN

In sections 5 and 6 we have considered the economic aspects of human life. Economic policy –the economic aspect of policy– makes a great impact on our welfare. Since economic science deals with overall human welfare, it is concerned with human life as a whole and not, as most other sciences, particular aspects of it. That is why humanity, to solve the great problems of the Third Millennium, depends strongly on *economic policy*.

Having surveyed the past and the present, in the remaining part of this booklet we will try to formulate the message promised in section 1.

Policy makers are placed in a hierarchy, with local representatives and local authorities at the lowest tier, and members of parliament, the senate and the national government occupying the highest tier of national policy making. In most countries there is an intermediate level, called by various names. In the United States of America it is the state level, in Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands the level of provinces, in Germany that of *Länder*, in Switzerland that of cantons, and so on. People interested in a political career often start at the lowest level, from which the voters and political life itself recruit the politicians for the higher levels. In the selection process 'the fittest will survive'.

Within the hierarchy, there is *division of tasks* among the local, state or province, and national authorities. The division of tasks should be governed by two principles: (I) any decision to solve a problem should be made at the level representing all those whose welfare is at stake; and (II) the decision must be made at the lowest level admitted by (I), because that is democratic and at that level the problem is best known.

We shall call these two principles the *theory of the optimum level of decision making*.

A few examples may be illuminating. A non-polluting factory, which harms nobody, can be built in a city by consent of the city authorities. A polluting factory on the contrary, has an adverse effect on the atmosphere of surrounding cities and provinces as well, and therefore must not be decided on locally. To add one more traffic light to the local network does not harm any other city or province, and may be decided on autonomously by the city in question. But to change the meaning of the colours would cause confusion elsewhere and is therefore a matter to be decided at a higher level.

A general task of local authorities is to make the town an *attractive place to live in*. Small towns are mostly built around a central market with one or more churches crowned by a spire or tower. Many such towns were built in Europe during the Middle Ages, and abound in Italy, Germany, Flanders and Holland. In the twentieth century, active local authorities have improved their cities by building public baths and laying out playgrounds.

Most cities have grown and been modernised gradually, but recently some new cities have been built in a more planned way. Brazil and Pakistan built entirely new capitals, and in the Netherlands some planned towns were created in the new 'polders' of the former Zuiderzee. After wars or other disasters there have often been opportunities for such planned developments, which have not always been used to advantage.

Cities of some importance usually have several centres of culture: a music hall, a theatre, museums, a university,...

## 8. LIFE AS A NATIONAL CITIZEN

The national level of decision making is at present the most powerful. Higher levels are necessary but still rudimentary, and their nature and desirable tasks are still under discussion. We will discuss this, as a matter of the future, in section 9.

A citizen's nationality is of great importance to her or him. As a rule, citizens of one nation speak the same language; they feel helpless when they cannot communicate with their environment. That explains the emotional character of national feelings.

There are exceptions. Switzerland has four languages, Belgium three. The Swiss are tolerant about their language differences, the Belgians less so. For a long time the Dutch speaking part (Flanders) was mainly composed of the socially lower classes, a recognised source of intolerance. But that is history now.

Abstractly formulated, the task of the national government is to *promote and protect the nation's welfare*, a task it shares with the citizens and their private institutions. Many of these private institutions are of an economic nature, being concerned with business. But there are also religious, scientific, artistic and pedagogic institutions. In abstract terms again: the nation should strive for an optimum social order.



Government ministries and some institutions: the central bank, the railway system, the highway network, the school system, and the airport system, address more concrete targets. Originally the ministries' only task was to assure internal and external security (Justice, Internal Affairs, Defence, External Affairs, and Finance). Later, Education and such productive activities as Agriculture, Industry, and Transportation were added. To cope with social problems (compare sections 5 and 6) a Ministry of Social Affairs was created to *correct the income inequality ensuing from the market economy*. Hence legislation to prohibit work by children, limit the average working hours of adults, pay compensations to victims of occupational accidents, sick workers, and old people. An impressive number of such laws have been passed by the parliaments of all developed countries, but there are considerable differences among them. In the World Labour Report of 1984, the International Labour Office showed figures on the redistribution of income attained by social legislation. The highest percentage of national income transferred from higher to lower incomes was recorded for Sweden: 29.9; the lowest figure (among the developed countries) was 10 per cent, for Japan. For the United States the transfer amounted to 12.4 per cent. The figures registered for underdeveloped countries are much lower. Part of the discrepancy is due to differences in development, another part to political preferences. Sweden is well known for its advanced views, and the USA for its conservative attitude. Now that Eastern Europe needs advice, the question of the *optimum rate of redistribution* has become important. In section 9 we shall attempt to answer it.

The 'youngest' ministries are those for *town and country planning and for the environment*. They deal with the latest problems we are facing: the consequences of population increase and technological progress. The earth is becoming overcrowded and air, water and soil are polluted. World-wide biological diversity is threatened. We need to plan what territory to reserve for different uses: agriculture, transport, dwelling, industry, and recreation. And we need to cleanse our environment and keep it clean.

Ideas vary on the performance of these tasks. Political parties, representing various groups of population and responsible for social legislation, are now making up their minds about the new problems.

The need to defend the nation's territory is as old as humanity. We have never been closer to external security than since Mikhail Gorbachev launched his revolutionary ideas. The utmost caution remains necessary, however, until the security problem has been really and truly solved.

Applying the theory of the optimum level of decision making, we find that in particular the problems discussed in the last few paragraphs cannot be solved by today's highest ranking authorities: the national governments. So, we are compelled to look at the highest level now conceivable: the world level. As observed earlier: few attempts have been made, and still fewer succeeded, to create higher-than-national decision levels. In section 9 we take up that thread, trying to survey a wide space. Only to discover that we need to consider time as well. We must think beyond the present generation. Coming generations -hopefully an infinite number of them- also have their human rights. Our concern must not stop at our great-grandchildren. For haven't they the right to care for theirs? So, in section 10 we will study the duties of our generation. That accomplished, we are fully prepared to formulate our message to those about to enter the Third Millennium.

## 9. LIFE AS A WORLD CITIZEN

Our reconnaissance of the planet on which we live has shown that humanity has some great problems to solve, problems which cannot be solved by the highest authorities now in existence: national governments. The situation forces those feeling responsible for the future of humanity to regard themselves as *world citizens*. National societies have become so intertwined that we cannot restrict our thinking and political activity to a single country. Supranational thinking is necessary. Nor is it new. In Western Europe, we started to contemplate permanent cooperation soon after the end of World War II, mainly to be prepared against the threat of the Soviet Union, but also to raise our level of existence.

A contemplation of the world as a whole in 1991 reveals us that *four grave problems* need to be solved if we want a safe and prosperous life for all. To that end, a set of minimum conditions must be fulfilled. They are conditions of:

- (I) security
- (II) environment
- (III) development and distribution, and
- (IV) sustainability.

By 'security' I mean the elimination of war as a means to solve international conflicts. By 'environment' I understand the cleansing of our environment and the maintenance of a clean environment. By 'development and distribution' I mean the elimination of poverty in underdevelopment countries and in general. By 'sustainability' I understand maintenance of prosperity and well-being (including a clean environment) through time. Development can also be interpreted as a better distribution of welfare across 'space' (the world), and sustainability as a better distribution of welfare through 'time' (later generations). The need for sustainability has only recently come to be understood, and will be discussed in section 10, the other three conditions in the present section.

The necessity of *security* is fundamental and clear. Unless wars are banned, we may be annihilated by a nuclear war, and all other efforts become senseless. To *clean our environment* is perhaps somewhat less urgent, but the lack of progress in the cleansing process rightly bothers an increasing number of people and governments. In developing countries too little is done, and in developed countries only a start has been made. The urgency of a *faster development of backward countries* may be illustrated by a figure: if the donor countries go on at the present rate of development assistance, to close the income gap will take more than five centuries. This is unacceptable, and the rising numbers of immigrants from poor countries into Western Europe and the USA show what we must anticipate if we do not step up the development assistance: *we shall be flooded and our order might well be upset*.

Having thus formulated in general terms the aims, let us discuss the means to solve the four great problems.

Security has been the number one objective of the United Nations and its predecessor the League of Nations. Now that the two great powers -the United States and the Soviet Union- agree that the United Nations should be the institution through which the security problem is to be solved, we will follow that choice. The next step is

to specify which specialised agency is to undertake the solution of each major problem. But first we want to emphasise that agencies may have to be strengthened and reformed in ways to be detailed later on, and new ones created.

Security has to be assured by the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, and a new agency to be called *World Police Force*. This new agency is to be a permanent peace force of the type we have known so far only as ad hoc forces, such as the United Nations Force in Cyprus, or the United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon. The position of the agencies would be strengthened if countries could be forced, under penalty of sanctions, to accept their resolutions as lawful decisions. The sanctions could take the form of changed trade policies, or, in the case of persistence, police action. Agency reforms could take the form of a changed manner of voting in the Security Council.

Environmental policy should be taken care of by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and, if need be, by the Court and the Police Force. Strengthening here would mean that UNEP resolutions be changed into decisions.

Development policy is a matter for the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and a re-established International Trade Organisation (ITO, as conceived in Havana, 1947). Some development tasks are in the field of education, and may therefore fall to the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).

The tasks of the specialised agencies mentioned above need financing, which itself may also have to be reformed. So far, each agency has seen to its own funding. A cheaper and more coordinated system of financing would be possible with the aid of a *World Treasury*, a body with a similar function as national treasuries.

Alongside agencies in charge of relations between the United Nations and member countries, others are dealing with the internal coordination of UN-bodies.

So much for the means to solve the great world problems. Now let us look at the *quantitative aspects* of the policies. We will take the quantity of development assistance to be made available by the developed to the underdeveloped nations as an example. Quantitative solutions for the other problems must be found *mutatis mutandis*. The development cooperation between poor and rich countries is the analogue of efforts to solve the social problems besetting a single nation (compare section 8). In principle, the problem is one of optimality: how to maximise total welfare of the area considered (here the world). I think we must take the *ratio of redistribution* of incomes as the central yardstick of social policy, that is, the percentage of total income transferred from the high to the low incomes by social insurance and taxes. In section 8 some relevant figures were presented. Closer analysis shows that the final optimum ratio can be calculated, but that the annual contribution depends on the 'impatience' of the low-income recipients. If the low-income group is prepared to wait five hundred years, the present transfer of 0.35 per cent per annum is sufficient. If their patience stretches to 400 years – twelve generations –, the annual transfer should be 8.1 per cent, more than twenty times the present rate. The most cautious conclusion I can draw from these figures is that more development assistance must be given. There is a modicum of understanding: the new international independent commission, chaired by the Swedish prime minister Carlsson, is now discussing whether the norm for donor countries should not be raised from 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) to 1 per cent.

The figures of redistribution within nations mentioned in section 8 show that in Sweden almost 30 per cent is transferred every year. That corresponds to a patience of Swedish workers and employees of about seven generations. As could be expected, a nation's own workers are far less patient than those of developing countries: Sweden contributes 0.7 per cent to underdeveloped nations.

The activities discussed so far and those recommended for the future are part of international political decision making. Alternative solutions are evaluated differently by political parties. Conservative parties like to keep things as they are; liberal parties are interested in changes. In Britain and the Netherlands, for example, the liberals were the ones who took the initiative to forbid the employment of children in factories. In Europe, the liberal parties have grown more conservative and now consist mostly of managers and intellectuals.

The social democrats are the politicians who have proposed most of the social-insurance acts. They are also the ones to derive their inspiration from an *international network* of parties and from a worldwide goal. The independent international committees which dealt with some of the major problems were often chaired by social democrats (W. Brandt, O. Palme, Mrs G. Harlem Brundtland, I. Carlsson). The social order they stand for is the one the East Europeans (and the world at large) need.

Mrs Brundtland's Committee was the first to tackle the problem we will discuss now: the distribution of the natural resources of the earth among successive generations.

## 10. LIFE AS A GENERATION

So far, we have mainly discussed the problems of our world today. With the older among us we have talked about the future of their children, grandchildren, and even great-grandchildren. But do we think of their grandchildren? Do we think of the infinite number of generations that each new generation will want to live after we have gone? Some economists, Malthus for one, have wondered whether there would be enough food for them. Malthus warned, but suggested no solution, nor formulated policies to that end.

A solution is possible if the *efficiency of world production continues* increasing as it has so far, as we can show with a simplified model with some added features. Let us assume that world population remains constant, say at 5,000 million people, and that total annual consumption also remains constant at, say, 5,000 million kg. Assume further that in year 1, one kg of natural resources is needed to produce that one kg of product in year 1, but after one generation (some 33 years) only half a kg, after two generations  $1/2 \times 1/2 = 1/4$  kg, after three generations  $1/8$ , and so on. How much of resources will then be needed for all future generations? The answer is:

$$5,000 \text{ million} \times (1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + \dots) = 2 \times 5,000 \text{ million kg}$$

If there is a stock of 10,000 million kg of natural resources available at the beginning of year 1, an infinity of generations can live on it. The policies needed to make this happen are:

- (I) to keep population constant;
- (II) to double the efficiency of production with each generation;

- (III) to take care that each generation uses no more than half the stock of natural resources it has inherited.

This model is not the only option. Should the population go on growing, then efficiency must grow faster and each generation must use up less than half the stock of natural resources. That is clearly a less desirable alternative, and therefore humanity must keep three things in mind: to remain creative enough to keep up the growth of efficiency; to remain aware of family planning, and to remain modest in the use of natural resources.

The fourth condition for human survival is the hardest to fulfil, because more than the other three it clashes with our innate shortsightedness. 'We will cross that bridge when we come to it' is the usual answer given to people who want to think of future generations now.

The time has come to *formulate my suggestions* to those who, at New Year 2001, will enter the Third Millennium. Before that moment arrives, they must have taken a stand and made up their minds what to do. They must have listened to political and business leaders and philosophers. In this booklet one of the latter offers his suggestions.

Our principal aim must be to help make humanity, that is all human beings, happier than they have been; in fact, as happy as possible. Happy in their family, and happy as members of society. Those of us who are parents or teachers must keep in mind that they are models for their children and pupils.

Our *aims* must be to help fulfil the four great conditions: not to make war; to protect our environment; to raise welfare and distribute it fairly among people and countries; and finally, to distribute welfare better among our own and later generations.

The two ways of distribution must be based on a better understanding of society and on solidarity among nations as well as individuals.

What *means* have we to attain these aims? We *ourselves* can put in our bit, for instance by doing our work as well as possible, by being honest and behaving kindly to others in need of sympathy, or punishing those who misbehave; by not polluting the environment by our consumptive habits.

More powerful are the means available to *organisations* –from churches to political parties, including associations with goals related to ours. Both personal and organisational activities should be based on a sense of responsibility towards society.

One obvious contribution to peace has been and remains a positive attitude to European integration; another is a positive attitude to the United Nations. A less important but no less positive contribution is to spend part of our income on help for the victims of disasters or structural defects in society.

By far the most important task we have is to *strengthen and reform the organisation of the United Nations*. Its specialised agencies must be given power to impose policies on member nations. Reforms of two types are needed: changes in existing agencies, and new agencies. We made some suggestions in section 9.

Personally we can help by stimulating associations with congenial programmes to take an interest in the United Nations. Or we can join or create professional associations in favour of peace, of the kind pioneered by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and taken up later by other professions, among which economists (Economists Against the Arms Race (ECAAR)).

Single companies can support environmental policy by adopting non- or less-polluting technologies.

We can contribute to fair distribution and development by the *choice of the political party* we vote for or are members of. To make the right choice we must seek information about party programmes and the initiatives taken by party representatives. To read newspapers and weeklies or monthlies is a must for business and political leadership. Scientific leadership has its own heavy responsibility: to remain *creative*. In the technological sciences, to serve the interests of future generations; in the social sciences, to give concrete shape to the optimum social order. The other sciences' task is to serve as a base for the applied sciences.

Discussions will never stop; therefore, what has been suggested in this essay cannot be the last word; it is today's point of view. In today's situation, clarity about socialism is a central issue. Socialism is not dead. Dictatorship is dead. To go back to 'laissez-faire' would be an overreaction that could take us back to 1850. Democratic socialism is the optimum order if it can be applied the world over. The duty of democratic socialism is to show solidarity with the masses of the underdeveloped world and give it high priority. This is not naive, but long-term enlightened self-interest.

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KERK EN WERELD

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ECONOMEN VOOR VREDE

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UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM

Jan Tinbergen, Nobelprijswinnaar voor de economie, wordt alom gezien als Nederlands meest vooraanstaande econoom. Zijn interesse beperkte zich echter niet alleen tot de economische wetenschap, ook het vraagstuk van vrede en veiligheid had zijn belangstelling. Tinbergen's ideeën daarover waren in het algemeen hun tijd ver vooruit. Nu de internationale verhoudingen opnieuw op scherp staan, kunnen Tinbergen's heldere ideeën over "de organisatie van de vrede" ons wellicht helpen een uitweg te vinden.

Deze bundel bevat artikelen die aan deze thematiek gerelateerd zijn. Een aantal van deze artikelen is bij andere gelegenheid reeds eerder verschenen. Daarnaast is in deze brochure ook het totale document opgenomen dat Jan Tinbergen kort voor zijn dood in 1994 schreef voor zijn kinderen en kleinkinderen en hun generatie: 'Entering the third millennium: Some suggestions'. Dit essay is een uniek document waarin Tinbergen nog eenmaal duidelijk zijn ideeën voor een betere wereld uiteenzet.

De brochure 'Will the 21st century be more peaceful?' is verschenen ter gelegenheid van het symposium gehouden op 22 september 2004 in Amsterdam. Dit symposium stond in het teken van Tinbergen's ideeën over vrede en veiligheid.