

The Struggle after Combat

The Role of NGOs
in DDR Processes:
DR Congo
Case Study

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Cordaid



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2008

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Part of the study 'The struggle after combat'
Commissioned by Cordaid

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This study was commissioned by Cordaid and executed by five researchers. The views and analysis put forward in this report are entirely those of the authors in their private or professional capacity and should not be attributed to Cordaid, the involved research institutions or any agencies or persons interviewed during this study.

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Acknowledgements

The authors explicitly want to thank the Cordaid team in the Democratic Republic of Congo, notably Léocadie Lushombe (interim head liaison office Kinshasa), Michel Kapamba (logistic support), Philippe Kasweka (head Bukavu office) and Aimé Jules (programme assistant Bukavu office). Thanks are also due to Eveline Rooijmans (Oxfam Novib) and Gilbert Leya (CRONGD, Kindu). In Ituri district, Eric Mongo from ACIAR and Désiré Nkoy Elela from Pax Christi provided valuable support for the research. Finally, without the kind assistance of various interpreters, fieldwork in Maniema, South Kivu and Ituri would have been impossible.

The authors also thank the members of the reference group – Henny van der Graaf, Irma Specht, Kees van den Broek (Cordaid), Lia van Broekhoven (Cordaid) and Bert van Ruitenbeek (Cordaid) – for their feedback on the draft report. We are grateful to Carol Stennes who was responsible for textual editing.

1 Scope and objectives of the study, with emphasis on the case study of the DRC

Research objective and main question

As has been specified in the Terms of Reference (ToR), Cordaid views the reorganisation of armed forces of states as a critical condition to help rebuild states in war-torn societies. Rebuilding states can only be done successfully when civil society is involved. The process of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) is crucial in this regard. The purpose of this research¹ is to assist Cordaid in developing its views and policy in relation to DDR by informing the organisation about the theoretical underpinnings of DDR and about the role of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) – and Cordaid’s partners in particular – in DDR processes in the field. More specifically, it aims to examine how NGOs can complement parties that normally play a leading role in DDR processes, such as the military and United Nations (UN) agencies. For this purpose, three case studies have been selected, including the present study on the DRC.

The main research question of this study is thus:

What is the role of NGOs – and Cordaid’s partners in particular – in DDR processes in relation to military and other actors involved in such processes?

Analytical perspective

Formal DDR programmes try to influence the behaviour of ex-combatants so that they disarm and demobilise and reintegrate in foreseeable and controllable ways (either into the armed forces or into society). Essentially, it can be considered as a pacification strategy. This certainly has been the case in the DRC, where donors implemented a regional DDR programme covering one of the hotspots of the African continent: the Great Lakes area.

DDR programmes can also be described as an exercise in socio-political engineering for a specific category of actors. Clearly, however, combatants and their societies are independent actors: the formal DDR programme is only one of the factors influencing their decisions. As a result, formal and non-formal processes operate simultaneously because a substantial number of ex-fighters choose not to enter formal DDR programmes – for example, for reasons of social stigmatisation, a lack of trust in the institutions that have been mandated to implement DDR, general insecurity, the pursuit of alternative livelihood strategies and a lack of adequate and timely follow-up activities in formal DDR programmes. A substantial number of ex-combatants thus may follow alternative strategies. They may complete the formal DDR cycle only to rejoin a rebel group afterwards. Others may migrate to adjoining war theatres as mercenaries. Some may simply disappear and return to their places of origin, while others may become footloose as they face severe repercussions for the human rights abuses they committed during their life as a rebel or soldier.

Alternatively, a large number of ex-combatants have been excluded from the formal DDR process because they did not fit the criteria applied. In the DRC a large number of such ex-combatants and the entire category designated as ‘dependents’, i.e. individuals who lived with armed actors and provided services (mostly women), disappeared from the formal DDR radar screen.

¹ The present case study is part of a larger study also comprising case studies in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan.

DRC case study

There are a multitude of actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): existing armed factions including the newly formed national army *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC), the remnants of the former army *Forces Armées de Zaïre* (FAZ), Kabila's coalition forces, Mayi-Mayi, ethnic militia forces, local warlords and foreign rebel groups operating from DRC soil (Rwandese, Burundi and Ugandan rebel groups). All of these actors have had their own power base both geographically and ethnically, and some maintain these bases even today. In some cases armed groups only had an urban power base and foreign support (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*, RCDGoma); in other cases militia represent one ethnic group or one region only. Hence, the Democratic Republic of Congo, a country the size of a continent, represents a micro-cosmos of all existing types of armed actors and a large variety of different cultural, ethnic and natural environments. This proliferation of armed actors has important consequences for the study of the DDR process, and of NGO involvement. For the duration of the internal war, NGOs could scarcely operate in the eastern parts of the DRC, and those that did worked under strenuous conditions with high security risks.

The selection of case study areas was therefore far from simple. The eastern part of the country stood out as the most important conflict zone in which the proliferation of armed actors was the largest and in which most of the war was waged. Even now, instability still prevails in parts of the east, and in fact the majority of ex-combatants are located in the various constituent provinces of eastern DRC. Ituri was selected because it represents the salient issues of inter-ethnic competition and warfare. Moreover, Ituri was the first area to experience large-scale DDR. Secondly, Maniema was retained because in this region Mayi-Mayi militia had played a predominant role (local self-defence militia groups). In Maniema it was possible to study the demobilisation and reintegration of this specific group, an interesting issue, without having to take into account other armed factions. Finally, South Kivu was selected as it represents one of the pivotal areas where the DRC quagmire originated. In this region, as in North Kivu, the entire gamut of armed actors is present: Mayi-Mayi, ethnic militia groups, Combatants on Foreign Soil (COFs) (Interahamwe of Rwandese origin and remnants of Burundi militia group Front National de Libération, FNL) and finally *brigades brassées* and *non-brassées* of the national army FARDC.

To start, a number of relevant publications on the DDR process in the DRC were studied. Then a number of key players were approached at the Kinshasa level in order to gain insight into the overall DDR process at the level of the entire country. Thirdly, limited fieldwork studies were executed in three regions: Maniema and South Kivu province and Ituri district in the Province Oriental.

The fieldwork took up the entire month of August 2007, and three researchers participated: Pyt Douma interviewed key players in the various headquarters in Kinshasa, in Bukavu (the capital of South Kivu) and in Bunia (the capital of Ituri district); Stefan van Laar did fieldwork in Kindu (the capital of Maniema) and interviewed ex-combatants in some outlying villages in that province, as well as in Uvira and surroundings (South Kivu); Bart Klem visited some villages in Djugu district as well as conducting follow-up interviews with ex-combatants in and around Bunia (all in Ituri district).

The fieldwork thus focused by and large on the major players in the formal DDR process and on beneficiary groups, both ex-combatants and so-called dependents as well as some former child soldiers associated with armed groups, referred to as *Enfants Associés aux Forces et Groupes Armées* (EAFGAs). A number of people were interviewed who did not benefit from any DDR programme, even though they were eligible. Finally, throughout the research, opinions and information about spontaneous demobilisation and reintegration processes were gathered from random interviews with some individuals.

Limitations of the study

It is hardly surprising that in a country the size of Western Europe one month is a short period of time. Many relevant regions and cases are not covered by this study, North Kivu and Northern Katanga being the most salient ones.

It was difficult to cover the various DDR processes as they materialised in reality. Although a limited number of key institutions organised the formal DDR process, in many cases the actual process deviated from the blueprint approach adopted. Furthermore, due to time constraints it was impossible to cover all NGOs or to give a comprehensive overview of all the different programmes and projects implemented. NGOs have therefore been included mostly to the extent that they participated in the formal DDR process or if they carried out such activities with their dedicated funds.

It has been widely asserted that indirect assistance through NGO programmes may well constitute an important positive contribution to DDR programmes. However, it must be borne in mind that in immediate post-conflict situations such as in the DRC, back donors are reluctant to invest in 'regular' development projects. Such funding is more likely to materialise after the formal closure of a transitional period. Consequently, not many examples of such programmes can now be found. Moreover, in practice it may be hard to determine precisely how effective such indirect support has been for ex-combatants and their communities. However, some examples of such indirect contributions have been included as they may reveal important spill-over effects of programmes that were not primarily designed or intended to assist ex-combatants or recipient societies. Such examples may assist NGOs in planning adequate exit strategies from war-torn regions.

Finally, it proved impossible to find a representative number of ex-fighters who had demobilised spontaneously, and only those few individuals were interviewed who could be approached by a researcher while travelling in a given area. However, all NGOs and agencies involved participated voluntarily in this research and generously made time available for interviews as well as sometimes providing planning and logistical assistance. Finally, the research benefited from the voluntary participation of a substantial number of ex-combatants in the various research areas.

2 Political context of DRC: a brief overview of the conflict history and major armed actors

Political context

A succession of violent internal conflicts in the DRC has lasted for almost twelve years, drawing in some seven African states at various stages of the conflict period² and causing an estimated three and a half million deaths. The conflict dynamics, i.e. the first and second rebellions which took place in 1996 and 1998 respectively, have popularly been referred to as the first and second African World Wars. Although these two distinct conflicts are important in view of their impact and size, it must be remembered that ever since the first incursions of Laurent Kabila's *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération* (AFDL) the eastern parts of the DRC have remained unstable. Even after the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement in Sun City (South Africa) in 2002, renewed hostilities broke out between armed factions, notably in the east. Violent inter-ethnic warfare broke out in Ituri district (Province Oriental) in May 2003. To date, although the civil war generally has ended, parts of eastern DRC remain profoundly unstable and are not under the control of the national army FARDC. Recent clashes (October 2007) between troops loyal to dissident general Laurent Nkunda and the national army in parts of north Kivu underline the salience of this argument. In Ituri, some so-called 'residual militias' remain active, although their leaders have agreed to disarm and currently a DDR follow-up programme is attempting to help disband them (DDR phase three).

The *Acte Global et Inclusive* initially provided for a two-year transitional period. The transitional government was installed in July 2003 and lasted for almost three and a half years instead of the two which had been agreed. The second round of elections held in November 2006, which resulted in the election of Joseph Kabila as president, formally ended this transitional period.

The main objective of the transitional government was to help unite the country. However, this interim government was beset by factionalism and a series of political and military crises (Amnesty International 2007:2). Until the end of 2006, unification had been fairly fragmented, leaving the major factions and their leaders in control of the territories they had occupied during the course of the civil war. Another major objective of the Sun City and Pretoria Peace Agreement was to integrate fighters from the main warring parties³ into a single new national army while simultaneously another large group of fighters were expected to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate into civilian life. The process of army reintegration was very slow, and the unity of the FARDC remains frail, as was amply demonstrated by fighting in Kinshasa after the first round of general elections in August 2006, between forces loyal to Jean Pierre Bemba and Kabila's Republican Guard.

Nevertheless, gradually a national army has been formed uniting soldiers and rebels from various former armed factions and Mayi-Mayi groups. This process of blending various fighters into the mould of new army brigades is commonly referred to in French as *brassage*⁴. With the exception of one or two of these *brigades brassées*, most of this process has not yielded the expected results. The *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) remains an army composed of poorly trained, poorly motivated and poorly paid foot soldiers. They are arguably one of the top causes of insecurity and humanitarian problems in the entire country. The inability of the state to control its own security forces casts doubts on the entire post-war recovery process.

² Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi opposing Kabila's DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia supporting the Kabila regime, with Sudan an indirect player harbouring Ugandan anti-government militia groups.

³ The total number of fighters at the end of 2002 was estimated at around 300,000. These figures were partly based on the estimates provided by the leaders of the main factions.

⁴ Which literally means brewing.

Conflict history

Geographical proximity, mineral wealth and institutional weakness have made the DRC vulnerable to the dynamics of regional power politics in the Great Lakes area. The genocide in Rwanda (1994) and the massive refugee crises that spilled over to eastern DRC compromised the position of former dictator Mobutu. Mobutu had always been a staunch supporter of General Habyarimana, Rwanda's Hutu President, whose assassination triggered the genocide. After the genocide and the massive displacement of some two million Rwandans to the Kivus, tacit support to the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) and the militias in exile, which continued to threaten Rwanda's fragile stability, eventually sparked off the so-called first rebellion. Laurent Kabila headed the rebellion in 1996, with massive support from Rwanda's RPF army. After the first rebellion in 1996, when the AFDL forces led by Laurent Kabila overran Mobutu's armed forces (*Forces Armées Zaïroises*, FAZ), and successfully disposed of the late dictator, Marechal Mobutu Sese Seko, state institutions in many parts of the country had already become weak to the point of collapse.

In 1998, when Laurent Kabila fell out with his erstwhile foreign supporters Uganda and Rwanda, the remaining fragile state institutions collapsed totally, primarily in the east of the DRC. The Rwandans were eventually chased from Kinshasa by Kabila, but they retaliated with a counterattack and nearly succeeded in taking Kinshasa. Only a last-minute intervention by Angola's armed forces saved Laurent Kabila from military defeat. The Rwandans were ousted from Bas Congo and from Kinshasa but they managed to occupy most of eastern Congo.

Both Rwanda and Uganda supported proxy forces in the east, each of them taking control of a specific area. However, relations between the Rwandan and Ugandan leadership were far from peaceful as they did not specify the boundaries of their respective spheres of influence. In 1999 in Kisangani, Ugandan and Rwandese proxies fought out a three-day battle for control of the city and its hinterland. Eventually, the Rwandese proxies were victorious and Uganda's sphere of influence was limited to the eastern parts of the Province Oriental, notably to Ituri, whereas Rwanda took control over a vast area in the east, ranging from the capital of Province Oriental Kisangani in the north to Pweto on the shores of Lake Mweru in the south and from Goma and Bukavu in the east to the Kasai Oriental in the west, close to the diamond centre Mbuji-Mayi.

Kabila's government did not have the military means to contain this military opposition and relied heavily on support by both Angolan and Zimbabwean armed forces (Dos Santos and Mugabe were opposed to Rwandan control of the DRC)⁵. Also, due to the virtual absence of state institutions, Kabila's government created ethnic vigilante groups, nominally to protect local communities but in reality as a proxy to fight Rwandan influence. Kabila's government supported these irregular forces with small arms shipments, which lead to a proliferation of small arms in vast parts of DRC's rural hinterland. By then, government propaganda had spread the message that the Rwandans were out to take the land from the DRC citizens and that communities should rise in self-defence.

Throughout the conflict, the Rwanda-supported proxy force RCD-Goma, which merely remained in control of urban centres and resource exploitation sites as an occupying force, was strongly associated with its protectors and incapable of controlling much of the rural areas. The virtual partition of the DRC resulted from the proliferation of armed actors both in the east (in Ituri as well as in the North and South Kivu provinces) and north (in control of Jean Pierre Bemba's *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo*, MLC), and finally resulted in a split-up of the country into four constituent parts controlled by different armed actors.

5 At the time, Angola's president Dos Santos was the head of the South African Development Committee security council, and he used this forum to legitimize the military intervention of Zimbabwe and Angola.

Resource plunder remained an important incentive for the various military factions. Much of the eastern and southern parts of the DRC are rich in mineral wealth and its natural resources have provoked much interest from actors who seek to profit from their exploitation. This has resulted in the emergence of a war economy, in which all armed actors use the resources under their control to finance the war effort. Clearly, the Rwandan and Ugandan economies and commanding elite profited from the rich spoils of Congolese resources, but in Kabila-controlled areas similar practices were used, as the support from Angola and Zimbabwe came at a price.

By the end of 1999 the country was controlled by basically four different actors, each of them in control of mineral resources, none of them legitimate and all of them seeking to maximise profit margins. At local levels, the war economic system resulted in an economy in which local semi-enslaved labour was exploited by armed militia and armed factions, who in turn traded gold, coltan and diamonds for weapons and consumer goods with neighbouring states (Koen Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, Tim 2005).

In the east the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie* (RCD-Goma headed by Azarias Ruberwa) controlled most urban and trading areas in eastern DRC under Rwandan patronage. At its peak this movement controlled around 40% of the entire DRC territory. The *Mouvement de Liberation du Congo* (MLC - Jean Pierre Bemba) controlled much of the north and north-east (a vast area of around 25% of the DRC, most of it tropical forest). The Ugandan sphere of influence extended from Ituri to parts of Haut Uele district. Finally, Joseph Kabila presided over Kinshasa, Bas Congo, parts of central Congo (Bandundu, Kasai Occidental and nearly half of Kasai Oriental) and the south-western parts of Katanga province.

By the end of 1999 the war entered the quagmire stage: none of the factions was able to inflict military defeat on any of the others, despite some land-grabbing and ongoing games of changing sides by smaller militia leaders during the course of the civil war. RCD-Goma experienced a number of defections and split off, leading to the creation of small dissident factions in control of a district or a particular ethnic area. The major actors began negotiations under South African supervision (Sun City and Pretoria). A comprehensive peace agreement was signed in Pretoria in 2002 between most of the armed factions that operated in the DRC.

Overview of the most important armed actors

Apart from the main warring factions mentioned above, there were a host of local militia groups known as Mayi-Mayi, mostly operating in Maniema, South and North Kivu and Northern Katanga. These Mayi-Mayi mainly were local militia, initiated by Kabila to fight against the Rwandans and their proxy RCD-Goma. The Mayi-Mayi were organised at community level by local commanders, using whatever weapons they could mobilise or capture from their enemies. Over time, these militia became de facto rulers of rural districts and townships. Ethnic militia were active in North and South Kivu as well as in Ituri: these areas are home to a long-standing practice by political leaders of using ethnicity in their quest for power. In Ituri, the power vacuum left by the retreating Ugandan Army (UPDF) in May 2003, which had already been agreed in 1999 in the Lusaka agreement, led to large-scale fighting between rival militia groups. In Ituri, fighting broke out between Hema and Lendu ethnic groups reminiscent of the Hutu-Tutsi divide in neighbouring Rwanda and Burundi. In fact, the cleavage between Nilotics and Bantus (between Hema/Tutsi and Lendu/Hutu) remains intact to date. This ethnic conflict thrives on an explosive cocktail of many root causes of conflict to be found in the Great Lakes Area generally⁶. However, specific ethnic militia groups, organised to ensure group security and even survival, deserve to be mentioned as an important separate category of armed actors in the DRC.

6 *The most important causes of conflict revolve around land ownership, demographic pressure, poor governance, widespread impunity, unequal access to natural resources, a biased distribution of important political and military posts in the administration and broad socio-economic issues related to widespread poverty and the apparent inability of national and regional elite groups to promote a more equitable distribution of wealth.*

The Congo war was largely one without large battles or clearly defined front lines. The vast area of Congo dwarfs the armed groups, so military units were based around strategically important strongholds such as major market centres, ports and airfields, mining centres and the few passable roads, rather than guarding strictly defined areas of control (Michael Nest with François Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani 2006). At present, state authority has been nominally restored in most of the DRC, acknowledging the legitimacy of Kabila as president, but the security setting remains fragile in the Kivus and in Ituri.

3 DDR in the DRC

The Multi Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP)

Although DDR for the continent-sized Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) could have easily warranted a country-specific programme, the main programme that addressed DDR in the DRC was regional in scope: the Multi Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). The logic of the donor choice for a regional approach stemmed from the fact that the DRC war had been truly regional in scope, drawing in almost all neighbouring states. The group of countries selected to benefit from MDRP funding reflects this reality to a large extent; Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Uganda and Rwanda⁸.

DDR had been a top priority for the DRC throughout the peace negotiations and during the transitional period. Prior experiences with DDR in Rwanda and in Angola had not been very successful, however, and military defeat rather than DDR heralded a transition to peace. Nevertheless, it was felt that peace in the region remained rather fragile and that the presence of various armed groups, notably in the Great Lakes Region, destabilised the entire region and that a carefully planned regional DDR approach might make a difference. Isolated DDR processes, it was felt, probably would fail as they would be unable to adequately address interregional migration of fighters from one war theatre to another. More generally, even where DDR programmes had been implemented in the region, they had not been sufficiently integrated into the larger post-conflict reconstruction effort. In many cases rather attempts at security system reform, as well as the existence of outstanding case-loads of refugees and internally displaced people remained problematic, largely due to continued political infighting between power elite groups.

The MDRP programme was meant to initiate a different approach as it was meant to be multi-year and multi-donor aid to DDR in the entire sub-region. At the core of the MDRP a trust fund was set up to which individual donors donated funds. The World Bank was designated to coordinate the trust fund and to oversee the procedures governing resource allocation, project proposal selection, tendering procedures and (timely) disbursement. The World Bank was chosen because many donors thought it would not be realistic to expect a UN force to enforce DDR in all the countries of the region: they were absent in some countries, such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Congo Brazzaville and Uganda, and merely had a token presence in others (Rwanda, Angola). Local ownership therefore was strongly emphasised as a prerequisite for national DDR chapters falling under the regional MDRP scheme. As a result, the financial coordination was handled by the MDRP secretariat of the WB, whereas the planning and operational capacity was relegated to national entities. UN organisations could come in to help implement parts of these national programmes, together with bilateral implementing agencies, NGOs and INGOs. Additionally, it was thought that peace-keeping operations such as MONUC in the DRC would play an important role in helping provide security, as the MDRP was neither mandated nor equipped to handle the military security aspect of the DDR. Conceptually, the MDRP was never considered a substitute for the more encompassing peace processes in the various countries, but merely a complementary initiative, one that actively contributed to such larger processes.

Although the MDRP programme raised high expectations because the trust fund was endowed with a substantial amount in the way of funding, in reality it failed to make significant headway with DDR, notably in its most important programme country: the DRC. Procedures were cumbersome, disbursement slow

7 *The section on the MDRP draws upon and has been translated from Bart Klem & Georg Frerks, March 2007. Evaluatie Stabiliteitsfonds, 5 Het MDRP: Demobilisatie en reintegratie van ex strijders in de Grote Meren, pp. 62-74.*

8 *Zimbabwe, Namibia and Sudan are missing from this list, Sudan being the only absent neighbour together with Zambia, which did not interfere in the DRC wars. Congo Brazzaville is somewhat an exception as internal conflict dynamics were taken into account for this country to be included.*

and many foreseeable constraints (such as the logistics in countries without a functioning infrastructure) had not been addressed, leading to very fragmented progress and stalled DDR. The 2005 mid-term review summarised the major shortcomings of the MDRP in the DRC as follows: the World Bank did not have enough presence at field level, the WB had confounded ownership by government elites with national ownership, and reintegration performance by the WB amounted to little more than payment of reintegration fees or the distribution of material perks to ex-combatants. More importantly, the WB was said to have focused narrowly on demobilisation and reintegration only, without taking into account wider issues such as effective disarmament of armed fighters as a necessary prerequisite, and the overall condition of the so-called national army. Increasingly, it also became apparent that political support for DDR in the DRC was marginal, as the main protagonist forces in the DRC stalled for time during much of the transitional period, making it almost impossible to begin demobilising the armed factions.

Finally, despite promises that the MDRP was going to give more attention to specific target groups within DDR such as women and child soldiers, the MDRP had only just barely been able to help demobilise and reintegrate these groups in accordance with their relative importance within the various armed groups. A gender-sensitive response proved to be an illusion.

Meanwhile, follow-up DDR programmes in Angola and in Rwanda had been more successful precisely because in those countries the leading political elites had more political clout as a direct result of the military defeat of their main protagonists.

Institutional framework

The Congolese institutional framework for DDR consisted of three main bodies: the *Comité Interministériel chargé de la conception et de l'orientation en matière de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration* (CI-DDR), the *Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration* (CONADER), and the *Comité de Gestion des Fonds de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration* (CGFDDR).

One of the guiding principles of the *Programme National pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et de la Réintégration* (PN-DDR) was that the national government had to take responsibility for the programme and ensure institutional coherency. As a result, the donor community agreed to the institutional design proposed by the transitional government. Consequently, the donor community and the government agreed to the initiation of three national institutions to guide and implement the DDR process.

The CI-DDR had the mandate to elaborate a master plan for DDR, to ensure adequate implementation of the process and to coordinate the activities of the Technical Planning and Coordination Committee (CTPC/DDR). CONADER, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, was the executive body mandated to elaborate criteria for DDR, to propose mechanisms for intervention, to plan activities and to implement the National Programme for DDR (*Programme National DDR- PN-DDR*). Thirdly, the CGFDR was to supervise the management of financial resources allocated to the PN-DDR. The CGFDR was mandated to mobilise funds from the donor community, analyse the amount of funds required for the implementation of the PN-DDR, make funds available for CONADER, ensure financial control and facilitate external financial control by an external auditing firm nominated by the international donor community (Gouvernement de la République du Congo 2004: 32-34).

The institutional set-up, its breakdown into three institutions and a clear division of labour seemed the appropriate way to implement the PN-DDR. The meetings of the CI-DDR at the highest level as well as regular meetings of the CTPC/DDR took place as planned, but setting up the most important institutions took time. CONADER, the crucial implementing agency for the DDR process, should have been operational within a few months after its inception, but only at the end of 2004 did CONADER manage to deploy operations nationwide.

The entire institutional set-up responsible for the execution of the PN-DDR proved top-down, bureaucratic and from its inception became a battle field for infighting between agencies, mainly between CONADER and the CFGDR. As a result of its internal set-up, CONADER became a top-heavy bureaucratic organisation. CONADER had its headquarters in Kinshasa and field offices in all regional capitals, as well as antenna posts in important district headquarter towns. This structure did not take into account the regional diversity of the country in its real needs for DDR, as some central and western provinces had hardly any ex-combatants to deal with (Bas Congo, Bandundu and Kasai Occidental being cases in point). At the conceptual level it was decided that the PN-DDR was to develop a decentralised implementation system (Gouvernement de la République du Congo 2004: 13,14), but in practice all decision-making was monopolised at the Kinshasa level.

CONADER

All CONADER regional offices started to operate on 7 November 2004⁹. Before CONADER became operational, the bulk of the demobilisation work had been done by MONUC and UNDP. This meant that, when CONADER started working, it first had to deal with people who had already been processed and were awaiting civilian reintegration.

CONADER's main activities were the sensitisation and coordination of the national DDR programme. Sensitisation of ex-combatants, however, is an ongoing activity: one cannot simply stop providing information to ex-combatants; they are a diverse group and some require almost continuous guidance¹⁰. It was decided by the World Bank that CONADER should work with so-called strategic partners, i.e. large multilateral and bilateral organisations and INGOs with a significant implementing, logistical and financial capacity (*Gemeinschaftliche Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ), Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Caritas, Save the Children, International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the *Institut National de Préparation Professionnelle* were the most prominent ones). The World Bank feared that otherwise CONADER would be swamped by small contractors working with tiny groups of ex-combatants, which would be disastrous for programme management. These strategic partners were supposed to contract out to local NGOs. They all implemented 'classical' reintegration programs, i.e. vocational training with kits containing tools adapted to do the job the fighters had been taught. Obtaining the support of various civil society groups was never considered¹¹. As a result and despite extensive advice from local civil society to the contrary, reintegration was wrongly approached; it became a market that had to be won.

CONADER thus worked with a limited number of strategic partners, as had been more or less proscribed by the WB. These partners were selected on the basis of tenders: project proposals specifying activities, areas of intervention, numbers of estimated demobilised or reintegrated individuals, costs per phase or activity and finally their own contribution. CONADER demanded a 10% contribution from each strategic partner. This rule was also applied to local NGOs seeking contracts with CONADER. Since the latter rarely had money, they offered services or buildings as their own contribution. On the average amount available for the reintegration component per ex combatant, US\$400¹², CONADER had decreed a maximum of 25% for organisational overhead.

⁹ With the notable exception of the Maniema office due to its peripheral location, see interview with CONADER official.

¹⁰ Interview with CONADER official in Ituri district.

¹¹ This view was expressed by almost all interviewees, irrespective of whether they were expatriate or national, including many of the regional CONADER staff.

¹² On top of the US\$400, US\$310 had already been disbursed during the demobilisation phase, totalling US\$710 for the entire DDR process per ex-combatant.

DDR process: the formal set-up

The process was set up as a joint endeavour by CONADER in conjunction with military authorities supported by MONUC forces. The PN-DDR was based on a so-called *Tronc commun* approach, which meant that demobilisation, reintegration and reinsertion into the army were to be executed by military and non-military organisations working together, primarily on aspects of sensitisation, regrouping of combatants and identification procedures (Gouvernement de la République du Congo 2004: 14). This implied that after the initial screening by the *Structure Militaire d'Intégration* (SMI), ex-combatants would be sent to Orientation Centres (CO)¹³ coordinated by CONADER but operated by implementing agencies contracted by CONADER. The army and CONADER worked together in these Orientation Centres. All ex-combatants were to be properly demobilised, meaning stripped of their military fatigues and any signs that indicated their rank, after which civilian clothes were distributed to them and US\$50 to cover first necessities (the entry kit for the COs). The ex-fighters then went through an identification process and were asked to state their initial preference whether to be reintegrated into civilian life or to rejoin the army. After this the ex-combatants were medically screened and installed in a temporary shelter at the CO. Ideally, they would stay for around seven days to receive some information about their status as ex-combatants, as well as some initial training in basic social skills. At the end of the week the ex-fighters were asked to give their final preference and personal motivation, after which they were either sent back their places of origin or they had to await transportation to one of the *Centres de Brassage* (CBR). If they opted for civilian life they would receive a so-called exit kit containing some kitchen utensils, some food, a blanket, a roof cover sheet and a sum of US\$60 to allow them to travel back home. They were expected to stay at home awaiting their turn to join the reintegration course of their choice. If they opted for the army they would be sent directly to a CBO, retrained and placed in a newly formed *brigade brassée* of the reformed national army FARDC.

The army, supported by MONUC, was responsible for identifying those eligible for demobilisation. The SMI coordinated these activities. The SMI did not always promptly transmit the numbers of demobilised troops to be expected for the various follow-up phases. This was partly because the SMI was often unaware of the actual number of militia troops, as the latter tended to inflate their numbers for obvious reasons¹⁴.

Regional diversity in DDR

As was highlighted in the overview of the conflict history, DRC is a vast geographical entity encompassing a variety of hugely different geographical zones both in respect of nature and culture. The conflict history clearly shows that armed conflict has been most prominent in the north-east and the east. Entire provinces have not experienced large-scale violence and therefore do not require specific DDR components other than programmes that deal with small groups of militia in those rather marginal areas from a conflict point of view. This image is reflected in the reintegration figures for numbers of ex-combatants per province. (Annex 1, Geographical pattern of reintegrated ex-combatants).

Looking at the various regions of the DDR, the main differences can be observed between the eastern provinces and districts (Ituri, North and South Kivu), the adjoining provinces and districts (Province Oriental without Ituri, the province of Maniema, the eastern part of Kasai Oriental, northern Katanga and parts of Equateur province) and the remainder of the DRC (Kinshasa, Kasai Occidental and part of Kasai Oriental, Bas Congo, Bandundu and southern Katanga).

¹³ During the initial phases these centres were called *Centres de Transit et d'Orientation* but this has been changed to *Centres d'Orientation*. Children and women were kept in separate barracks or tents during their stay in these CTOs/COs. Gradually, children were placed in independent centres confusingly called '*Centres de Transit et d'Orientation*'.

¹⁴ During the transition, faction leaders would receive money to pay their foot soldiers and more soldiers meant more money. Secondly, militia leaders often used inflated figures to negotiate higher ranks in the FARDC for themselves.

The political military profile of the eastern provinces is characterised by a proliferation of armed actors: they were occupied by one the *composantes* or foreign armies (RCD-Goma, RCD K/ML, Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces, UPDF) in combination with the existence of ethnic militias and Mayi-Mayi groups. The adjoining regions can be broadly characterised as intermediary zones where Mayi-Mayi (civil defence militia groups) fought occupying forces which were chiefly concentrated in urban centres, e.g. against RCD-Goma forces in Maniema Province, or where Mayi-Mayi became the sole rulers of semi-independent areas (as was the case in northern Katanga). Finally, the remaining areas were under control of forces loyal to Laurent and later Joseph Kabila, where no competing armed actors were active.

Demobilisation statistics (see Table 1 in text next page)

Initially, the entire contingent of fighters for the DRC had been estimated at around 330,000 fighters and soldiers. During the early stages of the DDR process many observers already doubted the accuracy of these figures. The general assessment was that these figures probably were somewhat inflated since the leaders of the *composantes* received money from the central bank based upon numbers of fighters declared, i.e. it was in their interests to inflate numbers so as to receive more funds. The various war lords therefore had a strategic interest in keeping secret the actual figures¹⁵.

Initially, the intention was to demobilise and reintegrate half of the armed fighters into civilian life: around 150,000, thirty thousand of whom were child soldiers. The remaining 150,000 were to be reintegrated into the FARDC.

So far, the SMI have reinserted 60,000 fighters into various *brigades brassées* of the new army FARDC. CONADER claims that they have managed to help demobilise some 102,000 adult fighters. An additional 30,000 child soldiers have been processed for reintegration by various child care agencies. A fair number of the children were identified by child protection agencies before CONADER became operational. Finally, an unknown number of adult fighters (male and female) and child soldiers were demobilised spontaneously. Based on these statistics, around 190,000 ex-combatants have been accounted for, with an additional number who were spontaneously demobilised. Some 40,000 ex-combatants await disarmament and demobilisation (22,000 regular troops and around 17,000 Mayi-Mayi). It is unlikely that the final total of demobilised troops, spontaneous and official, will ever be known accurately, but a reasoned guess puts this total at 250,000 at most, implying that the original estimates inflated actual figures by around 80,000 ghost combatants.

¹⁵ This assertion was confirmed to the author by a majority of respondents questioned about this particular issue in Kinshasa, 5-14 August 2007.

Table 1 Demobilised ex-combatants: initial estimates and CONADER statistics

<i>Estimated total to be demobilised</i> 330,000	<i>Estimated number to be reintegrated into the army</i> 150,000	<i>Estimated number to be reintegrated into civilian life</i> 150,000 and 30,000 children
<i>Approximate total number of demobilised ex-combatants</i> 192,000	<i>Number of ex-combatants selected for the army</i> 60,000	<i>Number of ex-combatants who will be reintegrated into civilian life</i> 102,000 + 30,000 children
<i>Number of auto-demobilised combatants</i> Unknown <i>Estimate final total</i> Approx 250,000 (= 192,000 + 22,000 + 17,000 + estimate auto-demobilised)		<i>Outstanding to be reintegrated into civilian life</i> 22,000 armed forces 17,000 Mayi-Mayi

Reintegration statistics (see Table 2 in text below)

Of the group of 102,000 adult fighters demobilised to date by CONADER, 55,000 either have completed their training or are in the process of reintegration within projects for which funding has already been allocated, and some 40,000 still await insertion in some type of reintegration programme¹⁶. These figures have been confirmed by the World Bank, which estimates that a total of 85,000 adults have been demobilised, have physically regained their places of repatriation or have officially registered for reintegration. Of this number, some 27,000 ex-combatants have finished their reintegration courses, and an additional 20,000 are in the process of being trained (see annex 2, World Bank, *Répartition des démobilisées en fonction de leur formation au 27 Juin 2007*). Additionally, some 8,000 await training, for a total of 55,000.

Outstanding caseload for reintegration

However, there is a difference of opinion between the WB and the *Unité d'Execution Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration* (UE PNDDR) with regard to the outstanding contingent of demobilised fighters not taken into account by the PNDDR. The WB asserts that once all demobilised troops have regained their places of origin, a total of 40,000 demobilised ex-combatants will still be awaiting reintegration. The UE-PNDDR deduces from the same figures that 47,000 ex-combatants are awaiting reintegration (102,000 – 55,000), with an expected additional number of around 22,000 ex-soldiers who are expected to opt for civilian life. Those are soldiers from units that have not yet been demobilised. Finally, an estimated 17,000 Mayi-Mayi fighters will have to be reintegrated. This implies that a total of around 86,000 ex-combatants are in some way or other eligible for reintegration processes but for whom no funding presently is available. It also implies that if no additional funding is forthcoming, the majority of ex-combatants (around 60%) may not benefit from some form of reintegration support.

16 Interview with director Mumba Luaba Lumu of the Unité d'Execution PNDDR, Kinshasa.

Table 2 Reintegration of demobilised ex-combatants: numbers of ex-combatants reintegrated, on waiting list for training and outstanding contingents

Total DDR'ed	Reintegrated	Outstanding caseload
<i>CONADER statistics 102,000 have been DDR'ed</i>	<i>CONADER statistics 55,000 trained /waiting list</i>	<i>CONADER estimate 47,000 outstanding, no financial means available</i>
		<i>CONADER 22,000 expected to be redundant from army and 17,000 Mayi-Mayi outstanding</i>
		<i>CONADER estimates a total of 86,000 outstanding</i>
<i>World Bank statistics 85,000 physically rejoined region of origin after DDR</i>	<i>World Bank statistics 27,000 finished training 20,000 in training process 8,000 await training</i>	<i>WB estimate that 40,000 remain outstanding caseload</i>

4 The role of NGOs and INGOs in the formal DDR process

Generally, international NGOs were reluctant to engage in activities within the DDR process, as these organisations feared being accused of partiality and targeted by parties to the conflict if they were to engage in DDR-related activities¹⁷. So during the first DDR programme in Ituri (the DRC programme) most INGOs declined the UNDP request to help implement initial activities. During the early stages of the DDR, insecurity prevailed in much of eastern DRC, which explains the fact that only a limited number of INGOs and local NGOs engaged in the formal DDR process.

NGO focus on child soldier integration

Initially, INGOs almost exclusively intervened on behalf of child soldiers, as helping such children was generally perceived as solely humanitarian, without concomitant political risks. Local NGOs, UNICEF and some INGOs first engaged in providing assistance to child soldiers as early as 1999-2000, when the negative effects of mass recruitments in 1996 and 1998 became apparent. Something had to be done, as many children were involved in the use of drugs and sexual abuse of children was rampant. This was the result of the exploitation of children by adult combatants (as servants, fighters and sexual slaves). In January 2000 a large-scale meeting was held of the various NGOs engaged in child protection: *la coalition pour mettre fin à l'utilisation des enfants soldats en République Démocratique du Congo*.

When CONADER became operational it selected a number of strategic partners to service the various regions of the DRC. This meant that individual INGOs came to cover a specific area, sometimes including more than one province for the reintegration of demobilised child soldiers: Save the Children covered North and South Kivu and to some extent Ituri, ICRC was active in parts of the Province Oriental, the *Croix rouge de Belgique* worked in Kinshasa and in Equateur, Cordaid partner BICE was active in both Kasai provinces (Oriental and Occidental), whereas other NGOs covered Katanga, Bandundu and parts of Equateur. UNICEF played an important intermediary role, as an advisory body but also as a donor, subcontracting programmes to INGOs and NGOs.

Gradual involvement in DDR for adults

Gradually, multilateral and bilateral organisations and some INGOs became involved in activities related to adult ex-combatants.

GTZ, the German bilateral technical development assistance agency, became a strategic partner of CONADER in 2004, when they started reception centres for demobilisation of militias in Ituri district. GTZ operated three centres: Mahagi, Kandroma and Aru. In these centres GTZ provided all services needed to the demobilised persons, ranging from psycho-social services and food to clothing. UNICEF operated a separate children's zone in the centres. In all, GTZ processed roughly two-thirds of all militia fighters¹⁸ in Ituri during the first phase of DDR in the period July 2004 to July 2005.

Before entering into a relationship with CONADER, GTZ had been an implementing agency for the UNDP. GTZ's main motive to engage in a strategic partnership with CONADER was to be able to execute socio-economic reintegration programmes for the ex-combatants at a later stage¹⁹. After the initial

17 This has been confirmed by most INGO representatives interviewed.

18 Some 12,000 fighters among whom were an estimated 2,000 children

19 Interview with GTZ national programme manager in Kinshasa.

disarmament phase, GTZ became involved in the follow-up phase which involved managing reception camps for demobilised ex-combatants, the *Centres de Transit et d'Orientation* (CTO), later renamed *Centres d'Orientation* (CO). UNDP was meant to construct these centres but in reality GTZ had to almost completely refurbish them after poor delivery of these centres. GTZ managed five CTOs out of a total of twelve countrywide: in Kalemi (at Lake Tanganyika-Katanga), Mtuale (Katanga), Lufungi (South Kivu-Uvira), Mangango (North Kivu-Beni) and in Isiro (Province Oriental). CONADER and UNDP fell out with each other at the end of 2005, and CONADER continued to coordinate these centres alone. GTZ had to renegotiate the existing contracts with CONADER.

The subcontracting chain

UN agencies FAO and ILO played an important role in the reception and reintegration phases of ex-combatants. Typically, the FAO and ILO would be contracted by CONADER for a specific province or region and subsequently these UN agencies would subcontract local NGOs such as Caritas, or INGOS with local branches such as ADRA, to implement the reintegration projects on their behalf. Another strategic partner was Memisa (Belgium), which subcontracted CARITAS to run two *Centres d'Orientation* (COs) in Ituri. These NGOs in turn would approach local training centres, individual craftsmen or small enterprises to train the individual ex-combatants in specific skills they had opted for. This 'chain approach' is not uncommon in the daily practice of development assistance generally and can be observed as well in the reintegration component of the DDR programme in the DRC. In principle longer implementation chains do not have to be problematic; everything depends on the quality of work done in relation to costs²⁰.

Marginal position of national and local NGOs

Both UNDP and CONADER were hesitant to engage local NGOs directly. Generally, the main problems facing local NGOs were a lack of financial capacity, insufficient logistical capacity and a lack of expertise. The choice to contract INGOS was based on the fact that most local NGOs required extensive supervision and capacity building. Although INGOS may be expensive in terms of overhead, they generally perform well and deliver a certain quality of work²¹.

Even larger local NGOs such as Caritas were sidelined in this process. By way of example we highlight the case of Caritas Bukavu (in the province South Kivu). Caritas Bukavu was dealing directly with CONADER, but suddenly ongoing contract negotiations were suspended and Caritas was approached by the ILO, with which CONADER had since reached agreement. ILO eventually subcontracted Caritas for the reintegration processes. From the initial US\$410, only US\$270 per ex-combatant was made available to Caritas, ILO taking the balance for unspecified overhead (US\$140, around 35%). ILO did not maintain a field office in Bukavu, nor did they employ staff: irregular visits by Kinshasa staff were the only proof of their existence at field level²².

INGO involvement in DDR for female ex-combatants

Some INGOS became involved in the demobilisation and reintegration of female ex-fighters. In many cases, women were dealt with as a residual category. Although it was estimated that women represented around 20% of all combatants, UE-PNDDR statistics reveal that so far officially only around 3,000 women have been demobilised and have rejoined their places of origin out of a total of 88,000 (around 3.5 %, see Annex 3, UE-PNDDR: *Rapport Mensuel Juillet 2007*). The fact that the figures of demobilised women

²⁰ Interview with UNDP official in Bunia.

²¹ Interview with UNICEF official.

²² Interview with Caritas official in Bukavu.

fighters remained low is due to massive auto-demobilisation of women fighters. Many of these women feared social stigmatisation and wanted to return to their communities anonymously. Most of the women were so-called dependents, sometimes also referred to as 'bush wives' (this group was estimated at 60-70% of the numbers of men involved). Within this category, single mothers with offspring from ex-combatants seemed to be worst off. Such girl mothers were often refused by their families and had to cater for their own needs and that of their children on their own.

Some examples of female-oriented projects include a reception centre run by Italian INGO COOPI in Bunia (Ituri district) exclusively for girls, with an estimated capacity of 100 persons per project cycle. Each cycle lasted an average of three months, during which the women received many different types of support and training.

In South Kivu, Caritas had specific projects for female ex-combatants, but generally such efforts were few and far between. Local NGOs initiated small-scale credit schemes and agricultural projects for women who had demobilised or had been associated with armed groups.

5 The practice of Disarmament and Demobilisation: limited NGO involvement

Child soldiers

DDR activities were initiated before CONADER was up and running. Initially, activities focused on child soldiers. UNDP, UNICEF and a number of NGOs (local and international) engaged in child soldier demobilisation projects, as it was broadly felt that the issue of child combatants needed urgent redress. From 1996 onward the successive waves of rebellion had recruited large numbers of youths from villages and towns in the eastern and central parts of the DRC. After the 2002 All Inclusive Peace Agreement reached in Pretoria, the Kabila government decreed a law on the removal of vulnerable groups from the National Army (Decret/Loi 006). The government subsequently set up regional organisations²³ to help implement this decree and ensure its rapid implementation.

By way of illustration it is worth mentioning that some local NGOs had already initiated child soldier projects before the peace accords of 2003. In 1999-2000 the *Bureau International Catholique de l'Enfance* (BICE), a current Cordaid partner, for example, initiated research on the profile of child soldiers in government controlled areas (Bas Congo, Kinshasa, Bandundu, Equateur, Kasai and Katanga) funded by UNICEF. The reintegration cycle of these children was intended to last three months but eventually took around a full year as it proved to be impossible to reunite these children with their families due to continued fighting in the east, where most of these children were from. Many EAFGAs²⁴ had auto-demobilised, were abandoned by militia groups, or had deserted and found their way back home. Many of these children disappeared without a trace, although a number of INGOs tried to identify them. Some INGOs, such as the *Croix rouge de Belgique* (CRB), organised special missions to target these auto-demobilised children who were not identified by the formal DDR process and tried to provide them with a perspective on reintegration. Agents from these INGOs went to rural areas and villages to try and identify child soldiers. Therefore, a number of INGOs and local NGOs engaged in early demobilisation of child soldiers and later continued these activities under the auspices of CONADER, once it had become operational.

When the MDRP became operational some INGOs constructed so-called Transit and Orientation Centres (CTOs)²⁵ for the released children. The field agents of the INGOs verified the age of the soldiers while the national army disarmed and demobilised them. These children received a certificate attesting to their official release from the army or the recognised armed forces (RCD-Goma or MLC). This *certificat de sortie* was signed by the military commander of the region. After having received this certificate the children were sent to the various CTOs, where they received a wide variety of assistance (health, trauma healing, skills training, basic education).

23 The Kabila government set up the *Bureau National pour le Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration* (BNDDR) in the government-controlled areas while simultaneously a separate *Bureau Interdépartementale pour le Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration* (BIDDR) was set up for the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country. Later both entities fused to form the *Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration* (CONADER).

24 *Enfants Associées aux Forces et Groupes Armées*

25 *Centres de Transit et d'Orientation*, not to be confused with the *Centres d'Orientation-COs* for the adult ex-combatants.

D&D for adult fighters

When the MDRP came into effect the Ituri crisis had just exploded in May 2003, and consequently priority was given to the disarmament of armed militia members in that district. Before CONADER became operational, UNDP and MONUC initiated a first DDR project in Ituri which lasted from 1 September 2004 until the end of July 2005. The *Plan Opérationnel de Désarmement et Réinsertion Communautaire* (confusingly referred to as DRC project during the first phase of DDR) emerged in September 2004. Initially there were five 'sites' – Aru, Mahagi, Kpandroma, Kasenji and Aveba – but later Bunia and Nizi were added. By mid-2005 some 19,000 militiamen had been disarmed and demobilised (see annex 4, Statistics *Antenne Provinciale de Bunia/UE-PNDDR*).

In Ituri, the second phase of DDR lasted from June 2006 until August 2006 and resulted in the disarmament and demobilisation of around 6,700 fighters, around 1,200 of whom were EAFGAs. During phase two there only were two major centres for transit, in Bunia and in Mahagi, with a small assembly centre at Nizi. Most of the work was done by mobile teams, consisting of some CONADER agents (5-7), a few representatives from the *Structure Militaire d'Intégration* (SMI) and a substantial number of MONUC forces (one platoon) and additional support staff. They succeeded in recovering around 3,400 weapons (during the first phase an estimated 8,000 weapons had been recovered). In fact, disarmament was handled by government bodies with UN assistance and remained almost exclusively a military affair.

With the partial exception of Ituri district, nationwide demobilisation stagnated in 2004 and the first half of 2005. The national army, due to the four plus one transitional government structure, was highly politicised between the various *composantes* and there was enormous distrust among them. Many demobilised militia were awaiting reintegration without any support, living in difficult circumstances and fearing reprisal by disgruntled colleagues who resented their demobilisation. CONADER was erected amid these difficult circumstances and tried to make headway with the DDR programme. This meant that, in other parts of the DRC, demobilisation only started after the first phase of DDR in Ituri had ended, i.e. after July 2005.

Moreover, there was a problem upstream in the DDR system as the military organisation SMI proved incapable of ensuring a constant flow of ex-combatants for the COs for a number of reasons. Communication between the UNDP, CONADER and the FARDC was problematic. Finally, there was no clear articulation between CONADER and the SMI. Although there was a joint unit for coordination (*Centre de Coordination des Operations Conjoint*) and many such sessions took place, coordination on the ground failed to materialise. This was due to a lack of command and control in the army, as orders were simply ignored or not followed up, and due to a lack of political will amongst the protagonist leadership. DDR in the DRC was implemented before political agreements had been reached: "We tried to do DDR while making peace at the same time"²⁶. Invariably, for the implementing agencies, multilateral, bilateral and NGOs involved, it proved impossible to get reliable information about numbers and timing of demobilising fighters prior to their reception in the demobilisation camps. In one case this led to a stressful situation for GTZ in Ituri district, when a group of 500 fighters and dependents arrived unannounced at Bunia airport at nightfall²⁷. With mounting pressure from the donors due to the upcoming elections in 2006, the SMI did not demobilise all fighters but simply passed on a substantial number of ex-combatants directly to the *Centres de Brassage* (CBR), without transiting them through the COs²⁸.

As a result, the process of disarmament and demobilisation was flawed (numbers were overestimated, there were logistic problems, the issue of dependents, direct selection for reinsertion in the army) and CONADER spent a great deal of money on keeping COs functional even if there were no people to be

26 Several expatriate staff members interviewed during the course of this research mission expressed this view.

27 Interview with GTZ official in Kinshasa.

28 Anonymous sources within CONADER.

processed²⁹. Each CO cost around US\$100,000 per month and there were 18 centres in the DRC. CONADER had subcontracted the operation of the COs to partner organisations, initially via the UNDP, later mostly via large multilateral, bilateral agencies or INGOs capable of pre-financing running costs.

During much of 2004 and 2005, when UNDP nominally ran most of the COs, in reality local counterparts subcontracted by UNDP effectively ran these centres (implying double overhead costs, also resulting in unforeseen additional costs). Although already at an early stage regional collaboration partners of CONADER became aware of the deficiencies of the CO system, the problems only came into clear focus when a second evaluation was held in early 2006³⁰. The central management in Kinshasa took action, and by the end of June 2006 the COs were closed.

A so-called *Plan de Relance* was adopted, on the basis of which mobile teams would replace the COs and visit the demobilisation sites to determine who would rejoin the army and who would be reintegrated. This meant that CONADER cut costs substantially, as operational costs for running the COs ceased, and it only had to provide the demobilisation premium of US\$110 and an exit kit. Although this approach was highly effective and much more efficient, it came too late to turn things around³¹.

Unfortunately, a large part of the funds for reintegration had been used for disarmament and demobilisation, and only a fraction remained for the countrywide reintegration of the 102,000 ex-combatants who had then been demobilised by CONADER. Much money was spent on transporting soldiers to the various *Centres de Brassage*. This operation cost around twenty million US dollars, which was one-tenth of the entire MDRP budget³². By the time that reintegration programmes finally took off, most of the remaining funds had been spent on setting up and maintaining expensive DDR infrastructures such as the CO reception centres. As a result the MDRP programme was a partial failure. However, the dismal failure of the CO approach cannot be attributed to CONADER alone. Both the transitional government and the donors had been involved in the conceptualisation of this approach. They could have learned from the Ituri experience and organised the demobilisation process differently. But CONADER had centralised all decision-making as well as procurement for all regional agencies at the Kinshasa level. This approach led to protracted bureaucratic procedures and a loss of funds.

What is more, many ex-combatants had been waiting for more than one year before their training programmes started, and roughly half of them are still waiting for such programmes to be made available to them.

The various implementing agencies involved in running the *Centres d'Orientation* thus had become mere service providers which were largely dependent on the dynamics of the national DDR process, and this in turn was largely determined by the national agencies SMI and CONADER. The unscheduled delivery of ex-combatants, logistics problems, and the lack of coordination and long delays in funding procurement impacted on the effectiveness of CO management. The implementers, responsible for an important part of the demobilisation process, thus became passive bystanders, as they had no leverage on how the process was organised. Also, lengthy negotiations for reintegration projects resulted in time gaps between exit from demobilisation camps and entry into reintegration projects.

29 Interview with UE-PNDDR official in Kinshasa.

30 Interview with CONADER official.

31 Also, instead of flying in representatives of various organisations from Kinshasa to make up these mobile units, CONADER could have recruited capable individuals locally, reducing costs further.

32 Interview with USAID official in Kinshasa.

Ituri DDR phase three: lessons learned?

Recently, a third phase of DDR was initiated in Ituri and implemented between August to October 2007, to help demobilise a number of militia troops from so-called residual militia groups³³ with which the government has signed treaties in December 2006. UNDP was involved in sensitisation for phase three; they distributed leaflets, broadcast radio messages and held extensive rounds of talks with community leaders, administrators and local authorities.

UNDP was in charge of phase three, which was financed by some bilateral donors³⁴. UNDP was then running two demobilisation centres in Bunia and Mahagi with former Conader staff (who at that stage were on technical leave as CONADER officially ceased to exist at the end of June 2007- see Annex 5 A new entity; *Unité d'Exécution PN-DDR*).

The reintegration process consisted of four distinct phases:

- 1- sensitisation of communities where the fighters come from (this phase had already been completed)
- 2- transitional reintegration through *Haut Intensité de Main d'Œuvre* projects (HIMO) (thirteen projects with a total absorption capacity of 2,000 ex-fighters were identified; HIMOs will last for three months)
- 3- sustainable reintegration projects (so far projects with an absorption capacity of 2,500 have been identified)
- 4- community reconstruction activities for the areas and villages with a high percentage of ex-combatants from the residual militia groups targeted by phase three (now being carried out)

The difference with the previous phases of DDR is that in phase three the local communities are engaged in all activities, with a 30% presence of civilians and 70% ex-combatants. In view of the fact that there were a substantial number of people carrying weapons who did not figure on the lists provided by the commanders of the residual militia, UNDP asked donors to accept such individuals into the programme if the upper limit of 4,500 foreseen for phase three had not been reached by 13 December 2007.

It seems that UNDP has learned from phase one as they have prepared projects to follow up the demobilisation process. This means that projects await the demobilised ex-fighters when they leave the demobilisation centres. The chronology between demobilisation and reintegration has been improved³⁵. Also, UNDP now has firmly insisted on the principle of one man-one weapon to be eligible for demobilisation. In phases one and two people without weapons were sometimes allowed to join the demobilisation programs.

The major problem with phase three, however, was that the principle of arms reduction through demobilisation was not applied properly. The signatories to the treaties were meant to have given the names of all the remaining fighters, but they did not know them all by name. As a result, a large number of people who did not figure on the list but who carried a gun were not taken into consideration by the disarmament programme. This compromised the entire endeavour: out of the 600 demobilised to date, some 200 were refused access to the benefits of the programme³⁶. Consequently, word has spread and fighters who do not figure on the various lists refuse to demobilise. By contrast, some people who figured

on the list but presented themselves without a gun were taken in by UNDP.

33 *The FNI led by Peter Karim, the MCR controlled by Ngudjuru and the FRPI led by Cobra Matata*

34 *United States, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Spain.*

35 *Interview with director of local NGO ACIAR, Bunia.*

36 *Interview with Commissaire de District Adjoint Ituri, Bunia.*

Demobilisation of Combatants on Foreign Soil (COFS)

The issue of COFS is quite important for peace and stability in eastern DRC. Political pressure is needed to help resolve this issue. The Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration programme (DDRRR) of the UN attempts to do so. Crucially, however, they are not mandated to use force, and demobilisation of COFS remains strictly voluntary. Therefore, DDRRR is involved in the voluntary repatriation of foreign fighters on DRC soil. An estimated 4,000 Interahamwe presently remain in North Kivu and around 2,000 in South Kivu. The DDRRR teams are deployed in areas where the Interahamwe are located³⁷. They use mobile radio senders to broadcast eye witness accounts of ex-Interahamwe who have been repatriated and resettled in Rwanda. Rwanda has a reception structure for these ex-fighters which reorients them and ensures they are reintegrated in their villages of origin. Young COFS have nothing to worry about as they did not participate in the genocide or are considered innocent. The senior officers, however, invariably fear repatriation as some may have been directly involved in the Rwandan genocide. These officers from the former *Forces Armées Rwandaises* are well-trained. They try to keep their soldiers with them and view demobilisation as treason. As a consequence many young Interahamwe secretly defect and deliver their weapons to the nearest MONUC outpost.

The Interahamwe mingle very well with the local population. They were accused of human rights abuse in the period March-May of 2007 but this was hard to verify and substantiate. The UN verification missions which were sent out nevertheless found weak command and control structure among the Interahamwe. The numbers of voluntary candidates for repatriation went up substantively after the FARDC launched attacks against them in the summer of 2007. However, both Interahamwe and FARDC jointly exploit local villagers; there is a tacit agreement between them and they generally adhere to an implicit mutual non-aggression pact. There is much criticism of the UN as many civilians deplore the fact that Interahamwe still roam the countryside, posing a security threat to ordinary people³⁸.

Conclusions on the role of NGOs in Disarmament and Demobilisation

In conclusion, it can be inferred that NGO involvement in disarmament has been very limited, because the SMI does not want civilian interference with what they consider to be a purely military operation. The exception to the rule was the project by Oxfam Novib and CRONGD, as will be further discussed in Box 1 (6). Within the process of demobilisation, however, multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies and NGOs provided essential services to ex-combatants (medical services in reception centres, provision of entry and exit kits). They also engaged actively in child soldier demobilisation before the government became active. Additionally, they engaged in tracing auto-demobilised child soldiers, in order to be able to provide them with some perspective on reintegration. Therefore, the participation of NGOs in demobilisation can be considered important, if not vital, ensuring the day-to-day management and operation of a number of orientation centres nationwide. They even advanced funding which was forthcoming at a piecemeal rate and ensured continuity where national agencies failed. Without their involvement the reception and processing capacity of the entire DDR process would have collapsed. However, these implementing agencies did not capitalise on their potential leverage as they proved unable to impact on the process upstream. As a result they were condemned to be mere executors without influence on how things should be organised.

37 Interview with DDRRR specialist of MONUC in Bukavu.

38 Interview with Provincial Government officials in Bukavu.

6 Reintegration of ex-combatants

This initially deals with the issue of child soldier reintegration. Subsequently, adult reintegration is discussed at length, focusing mostly on the complicated sequence of different DDR phases in Ituri district, where the bulk of reintegration has taken place to date. Subsequently, a text-box illustrates issues regarding the reintegration of Mayi-Mayi in Maniema province. Furthermore, a few projects that deal with female ex-combatants are highlighted. Finally, the concludes with some findings from a World Bank survey on the impact and effectiveness of reintegration projects.

Reintegration of child soldiers

As has been already reiterated, many INGOs and local NGOs were active in the field of child soldier reintegration. During the early stages of child reintegration most local NGOs involved (Caritas in Ituri, BVES in South Kivu, Caritas in South Kivu, BICE in the Kasais, CRB in Equateur) encountered difficulties with child soldiers as there was a lack of reintegration activities centred on these children. During that period there had been no reintegration perspective whatsoever and children were simply sent home with an exit kit, containing a few clothes, a bag, shoes and a blanket. Later funds were negotiated with the donors so that a reintegration package could be offered to these children. Consequently, at first a fair number of child soldiers were not reintegrated properly. This negligence was the cause of re-recruitment of child soldiers in the early stages of the process.

It was not always easy to reunite child soldiers with their families, as they had participated in atrocities against civilians. In many cases NGOs had to negotiate with parents and receiving communities because the child soldiers had a very bad reputation (“this child has already killed and is no good”³⁹). In many cases children had engaged in punitive expeditions against villagers. They had taken revenge on families with which they had disputes prior to the rebellion. This often made it necessary for NGOs to engage in reconciliation ceremonies.

In September 2002 a large group of national and international agencies met in Bukavu to discuss the so-called *Cadre intermediaire*, which determined the rules of child soldier demobilisation and how to help reintegrate them. This framework was endorsed by CONADER and all partners had to subscribe to it. One of the major rules was that children should be reintegrated in their own communities. But this resulted in considerable logistics problems: how to reintegrate a child who lives in a small isolated village far from training facilities and where there is virtually no local labour market? Most organisations complied with this arrangement, but in some cases NGOs followed their own strategy, as they feared losing the momentum they had gained by having the demobilised children in their care. Moreover, follow-up activities proved difficult to enforce, and handover from one agency to another remained pretty much a virtual exercise.

Not all NGOs adhered to the *Cadre intermediaire*. For example, the *Bureau International Catholique de l'Enfance* (BICE) and CONADER did not agree on the timing and place of the children's socio-economic integration. BICE preferred to train the children in the centres and provide them with tool kits prior to unification with their families. CONADER wanted the children to be trained in the setting where they belonged. The International Committee of the Red Cross, responsible for the logistics of reunification, complained about the extra weight of the tool kits provided by BICE prior to reunification and sometimes refused to take them. Both CONADER and the ICRC complained that the different approaches lead to frustration amongst groups of children when they eventually met up at transit points on their return

39 Quoted from interview with a Caritas official, referring to comments made by villagers from South Kivu, Walengu territory, where the Mudundu forty militia was active.

flights. Some of them had kits whereas others had nothing. After this, greater pressure was put on NGOs to adhere strictly to the framework adopted. However, as BICE was financially independent from CONADER and the latter was rather slow in disbursing the required funds for the socio-economic integration of child soldiers, in practice BICE could act at its own discretion.

There was a kind of cold war between BICE and CONADER, as BICE merely gave accounts of its activities at the coordination meetings and nominally subscribed to the operational framework imposed by CONADER⁴⁰. The approach of CONADER was to identify local organisations to implement the socio-economic integration of these children, but in reality there was little local capacity and funding was slow. BICE transferred the files of their children to other NGOs in the areas of origin with the request to ensure a proper follow-up, but BICE's National Coordinator admitted that BICE received no information about these children after their departure for reunification⁴¹. Despite the efforts of some NGOs, at the end of the various programmes involving the child soldiers a large proportion of the children had not benefited from any socio-economic reintegration process.

Some examples of NGOs involved in child soldier reintegration

One of the most formidable constraints in the DRC is the remoteness of many rural areas and a general lack of infrastructure. The case of Croix rouge de Belgique's (CRB) intervention in the province of Equateur is probably exemplary for the many remote areas in the DRC. In total, CRB accompanied some 700 children in Kinshasa and several thousand in Mbandaka and surroundings (mostly in the southern parts of Equateur). In Kinshasa the implementation of the programme was quite straightforward, but the process of child soldier reintegration in Equateur had to be implemented in an incremental manner as the distances in southern Equateur are enormous and the homes of many children were spread over a huge territory. CRB sent out teams of trainers on extensive missions along major population axes in the district around the provincial capital Mbandaka. The entire reintegration process for the former child soldiers was funded for a one-year period, including a six-month training process and follow-up activities. In practice, this was too short a period as more time is needed to ensure that children have managed to integrate properly. According to the assessment of the Kinshasa staff, phase one (family tracing and reunification) was generally implemented satisfactorily, phase two (vocational training) proved to be too short to properly train the children and phase three (monitoring and evaluation) was only implemented in areas to which the CRB had access, and only for one follow-up visit within the funding period. However, the CRB had an extensive network of volunteers and focal points equipped with short-wave radios, with which volunteers were somehow able to provide news about the children. Presently, funding has stopped and the CRB has dismissed the mobile training teams.

Not all the INGOs organized CTOs for the reception of demobilised child soldiers. Save the Children Fund (SCF) wanted to avoid having to put children in camps, so once received by SCF, children were placed in temporary foster families. These foster families were trained and received small token sums of money but were mainly volunteers. SCF had mobile teams that checked on these families regularly and on average, only a small proportion of the children needed to be placed with other families due to conflicts and tensions with foster parents. SCF engaged in child identification, family tracing, transportation and reunification. SCF worked through local organisations to do the tracing on the ground (called *Réseaux Communautaires pour la Protection de l'Enfant*).

Save the Children Fund was one of CONADER's strategic partners. They helped integrate some 2,500 children in a total of around 7,000 for the areas in which they became operational. SCF worked in eastern DRC: ***Ituri, North and South Kivu and northern Katanga.***

40 Interview with BICE official in Kinshasa.

41 Interview with BICE official in Kinshasa.

SCF provided non-formal education and vocational training programmes to those who could not be reinserted into the formal educational system. On average some 70% went through vocational training (including some non-formal education involving civic behaviour and basic literacy and counting skills), whereas some 30% are now enrolled in accelerated learning programmes to help them catch up with the formal learning system. The limited scope of the MDRP programme did not allow for a more long-term perspective on the integration of children. The standard approach adopted by the WB did not allow for a flexible approach.

BICE constructed two transition centres (*centres de transit et d'orientation*) for the released children, one in Mbuji-mai (**Kasai Oriental**) and one in Kananga (**Kasai Occidental**). After having received the *certificat de sortie* the demobilised child soldiers were sent to the BICE centres, where they received a variety of assistance (health, trauma healing, skills training, basic education). The activities of BICE were largely funded by international development aid from Belgium (90 %). A first cycle was implemented from May 2003 to September 2005, during which a total of 597 child soldiers and an additional 1,061 war-affected children were processed (for a total of 1,658 children). However, children from other armed groups such as the Mayi-Mayi and militia groups were not taken into consideration at that time.

At present BICE is again training children in both Kasai provinces, this time focusing on the child soldiers from the militia and Mayi-Mayi groups. Some 450 child soldiers are being trained and an additional 1,000 war-affected children have also been taken on by the project.

In **South Kivu** local NGO *Bureau pour le Volontariat au service de l'Enfance et de la Santé* (BVES) played a dominant role in the demobilisation of child soldiers. BVES has a track record that goes back the mid-1990s when it helped Hutu children who had been associated with the Rwandan militia during the genocide to return to Rwanda. The focus of BVES is on psycho-social assistance, after which family tracing is started. The parents and local communities are sensitised to the particular needs of the child soldiers and BVES, and other local NGOs supervised by BVES, help them to accept the children. In the end local committees for child protection are formed to help follow these ex-child soldiers during their reintegration process (*Les noyaux communautaires pour la protection des enfants*). However, foreign donor support only started in earnest in October 2005, when BVES received funding from UNICEF and Amnesty International to run two local CTOs. CONADER did not consider BVES as a potential strategic partner for direct funding despite its track record and proven expertise.

Finally, from BVES's point of view it seems that the entire reintegration effort for children has become compromised, as only children who have been officially demobilised transit via the BVES CTOs, whereas there is no control over children who pass through CTOs operated by other INGOs on independent foreign funding⁴². Although there is an operational framework for the reintegration for children, neither CONADER nor the international community are able to enforce these regulations. As a result many NGOs just do as they please, and follow their own ideas and procedures. For example, some INGOs have opted for 'generic reintegration', which implies that they build a school in a community that receives a number of child soldiers. However, they do not provide these ex-child soldiers with money for school fees, resulting in their dismissal from such local schools.

Furthermore, Cordaid partner ADED was active in child soldier reintegration. ADED worked around Uvira in South Kivu and operated and coordinated two COs for child soldiers. Their involvement was far from unproblematic: ADED was accused of partisan behaviour. They allegedly favoured children from the Tutsi minority in this province to the detriment of children from other ethnic groups. This example demonstrates the highly politicised context in which NGOs must operate.

⁴² Interview with BVES official in Bukavu

Conclusions

Although conclusive and reliable statistics on the numbers of child soldiers that have been reintegrated by various international and national NGOs are lacking, it is fair to say that a large proportion of those who have been officially demobilised passed through their hands. From the above examples a total of around 6,000 child soldiers can be calculated. Quite a number of other NGOs were active in this field but have not been dealt with in this section. Without the assistance of these various organisations, the entire child soldier reintegration component would not have materialised at all. Nevertheless, in the beginning there were serious conceptual flaws such as a lack of a specific reintegration programme for children, but eventually the programmes improved and many child soldiers received some form of support.

Reintegration of adult ex-combatants

In the MDRP programme a standard fee of US\$400 had been made available for the reintegration per individual ex-combatant (this amount remains after demobilisation costs and fees are deduced from the initial overall budget). The WB insisted that organisational overheads were included in the US\$400 per head. Whereas some organisations worked with modest overhead fees, others used up to half the available money for their own overhead costs, i.e. implying that only US\$200 per head remained. Globally, from this amount around US\$150 was spent on an exit kit and on average around US\$50 on a training course.

First phase reintegration programs in Ituri: SECA's private enterprise intervention in DDR

Reintegration started in Ituri, where the first disarmament and demobilisation phase had resulted in the demobilisation of around 15,000 ex-militia troops. UNDP could not reintegrate all these combatants as many INGOs were reluctant to participate in reintegration projects. There was a lot of infighting between CONADER, the World Bank and UNDP. It was basically a fight for ex-combatants, because they represented a market and money.

Finally an American consultancy firm called Chemonix won the tender. Chemonix is an American company with headquarters in Washington, DC. SECA is their Congolese incarnation and it stands for *Synergie d'Éducation Communautaire et Appui à la Transition*. The SECA intervention is important as it remains by far the largest reintegration intervention to date in the DRC. Chemonix ran reintegration for 16,000 people (11,000 ex-combatants and 5,000 community members) in Ituri during a seven-month period, from December 2005 to July 2006⁴³. The total budget for the Ituri programme was some seven million dollars. Five million dollars was provided through CONADER with MDRP money and was intended for the kits and the things provided to ex-combatants as agreed in the national framework. USAID paid two million dollars for the running costs of Chemonix. The programme was to have lasted ten months, but the first three months were lost getting contracts signed. So there was a rush and Chemonix used the next three months to get on the ground in Ituri. It was a quick and dirty job and Chemonix eventually pulled out from one day to the next.

During the tender negotiations, UNDP did not want Chemonix to get involved as it had done the transit camps and counted on doing the rest of the process as well. But USAID beat UNDP to the tender⁴⁴, and the MDRP/CONADER money went to Chemonix. "We would have regular CONADER meetings and they were

43 *Chemonix worked with 14 teams of two people (one man, one woman, all Congolese) who drove around on motorcycles. They trained some 300 other people to do the actual training: any people with some decent education they could find around the district. In addition, Ron Miminger and six other people were in Bunia managing the entire operation.*

44 *Although UNDP does not implement programmes, it competes with other organisations for back donor funding, as UNDP subcontracts others to get the programmes implemented.*

always fights between us and the UNDP. They were arguing about errors in the lists of ex-combatants and about how things were to be done. We simply wanted to get the job done”.⁴⁵ UNDP was used to working through NGOs and small-scale artisans, whereas Chemonix did not work with NGOs. Chemonix saw themselves as a contractor and it felt that working with local agencies would take too much time. UNDP is known to be a bureaucratic and slow organisation. Meanwhile, Chemonix just went on, even though there were unresolved issues. One reason Chemonix could keep going was that they were taking a lot of risks. “We had a guy carry US\$250,000 in a backpack to get it here. UNDP staff can’t even carry ten bucks without all kinds of security measures.”⁴⁶ Clearly, circumstances were difficult and it took a ‘cowboy’ mentality to get the job done. For CONADER the Chemonix intervention came like a breath of fresh air in an environment stifled by inter-communal hatred, militia proliferation and a lack of intervention capacity and willingness of all actors involved. Gradually, during the Chemonix intervention the security situation improved markedly, merely due to the deployment of MONUC forces which in the process provided support for the return of state authority allowing for deployment of the new national army FARDC as well as the installation of offices for the National Police.

The programme has been a success in the sense that Ituri, which was one the biggest trouble spots, has been fairly quiet since, while other parts of the country, like the Kivus, have been much less calm. One big problem was the great expectations of ex-combatants. It was hard to meet all of them. Although SECA/Chemonix did not adhere to the criteria, it did prevent massive re-enrolment in the various militia groups. The work may have been rushed through, the training too short and the end result not sustainable, it did help to ease down the situation in Ituri as it gave an impression that something was going on and something was being done. Presently, CONADER estimates a success rate of around fifty percent.

UNDP Phase one interventions in Ituri

Finally, during phase one of DDR in Ituri, UNDP reintegrated the remainder of the first batch, a group of some 900 ex-combatants, through a number of local cooperatives of ex-combatants. UNDP helped to set up small cooperative fisheries, small commercial enterprises and hairdressers’ salons for groups of ex-combatants in various sectors. For example, they grouped ten fighters in the fisheries sector for a total investment of US\$6,000 (for each individual UNDP had a reintegration budget of US\$600). They then assisted these emerging local cooperatives to draw up project proposals for the materials to be bought, such as an outboard engine, fishing nets, a boat and so on. These proposals were then submitted to a local committee that had been installed to oversee these projects (*Comite Locale d’Approbation des Projets*, CLAP). But the World Bank only provided US\$400 under its MDRP scheme and resented UNDPs practice of beefing this up to US\$600 per head and asked them to comply with WB regulations⁴⁷. However, UNDP considered that realistically, US\$400 was insufficient to reintegrate an ex-fighter.

INGO Phase one interventions in Ituri

Also in Ituri, after the first D&D phase, INGO ADRA implemented an additional programme in Aru territory. ADRA offered four options during phase one to ex-combatants; 1) masonry & construction, 2) fisheries and agriculture, 3) carpentry and furniture making, 4) brick and tile-making. From the first batch of around 1,000 ex-fighters, 40% opted for agriculture with the remainder split evenly over the other options (20% each). ADRA was assigned to the Aru territory, which is an administrative part of Ituri district located on the border with Uganda’s West Nile region, where they had built a model village in which these groups could be trained on the spot. They reckon that around 85% of the reintegrated ex-fighters are still catering for their own needs.

45 Quoted from an interview with the former coordinator SECA reintegration project in Ituri, Mongbwalu.

46 Quoted from an interview with the former coordinator of SECA project, Mongbwalu

47 Interview with UNDP official in Kinshasa.

Consequently, Chemonix, UNDP and ADRA together have provided reintegration to almost all demobilised ex-combatants from phase one in Ituri.

INGO Phase two interventions in Ituri

Only some of the ex-fighters demobilised during the second phase of DDR in Ituri entered reintegration programmes. Only ADRA managed to train a group of 750 ex-combatants. Caritas and FAO are still in the process of training groups of around 1,000 ex-combatants each, whereas UN Habitat has yet to initiate activities for another 2,000 people, for which they have been contracted by CONADER.

During phase two some 575 ex-combatants had been consigned to ADRA, this time in Bunia. The training was completed at the end of June 2007. These ex-fighters built a model village with a few houses, a dispensary and a school, from which it is hoped that outlying villages will benefit. The agricultural cycle takes two months of training and one month of practice; the other types of training last four months with two months of practice on the job. At present disbursements are extremely slow and ADRA still is waiting for funds to be able to purchase the exit kits for those who have completed the phase two training. This has led to tensions with ex-combatants, some of whom have threatened ADRA staff.

As a result of the ongoing third phase of DDR, ADRA is expecting to receive a group of a maximum of 300 fighters, as the UE-PNDDR wants to avoid lengthy bureaucratic procedures. UNDP has decided to adopt this same approach to keep the lines short and to improve expediency of the reintegration process.

Caritas Bunia had been contracted by CONADER to take on a caseload of 1,000 ex-combatants demobilised during DDR phase two in Ituri. The lists of prospective candidates for reintegration came from CONADER, but in practice it turned out to be extremely difficult to identify these people and Caritas spent months looking for them. The intervention area was Irumu/Djugu territories, which is the heartland area of Ituri district, the heart of the ethnic conflict zone. They managed to identify around 800⁴⁸. When Caritas Bunia started the reintegration programme in September 2006, they offered two options: ex-combatants could become furniture makers or engage in agriculture. The first instalment arrived in August 2006, about one-third of the total funds. Caritas has not received any further funding to date. Caritas started with a third of the number who had been programmed in line with the funding received in order to prevent disputes with demobilised ex-combatants. This approach had been discussed and approved by local CONADER staff prior to implementation. Caritas has completed the training of 120 woodworkers and 197 agriculturists. Presently, out of a total of 1,000 foreseen, 317 people have finished their training programme and received their exit kit.

In view of the fact that FAO had not yet initiated the reintegration course for their group, only around 900 ex-combatants originating from phase two have been trained to date (575 through ADRA and 317 through Caritas). This implies that only a small number of demobilised ex-fighters from phase two have been reintegrated, and an estimated 16% have been trained only (900 out of a total of 5,437 demobilised adults, see annex 4, Statistics Antenne Provinciale de Bunia/UE-PNDDR).

Adult reintegration programmes in other provinces

Other provinces followed in the wake of Ituri, but reintegration interventions became more modest as they concerned on average groups of up to 1,000 ex-combatants per intervening agency.

Caritas was one of the prominent local NGOs to engage in adult reintegration. Caritas worked in various regions in the DRC: Ituri, South Kivu and Kindu.

⁴⁸ Among which an estimated 5% are civilians who have been given a weapon by a relative to be able to join the programme.

In 2005, Caritas Bukavu submitted an adult reintegration proposal to CONADER which was granted a full year later, in October 2006. ILO subcontracted Caritas for the reintegration processes. At first Caritas refused to collaborate in view of earlier experiences with ILO but finally decided to accept the offer. Caritas is responsible for 820 ex-combatants (roughly 7% of the total of around 12,000 demobilised fighters in South Kivu; see annex 3, *UE-PNDDR: Rapport Mensuel Juillet 2007*). A total of some 2,200 ex-combatants (around 18% of ex-combatants in South Kivu) were taken in by the ILO programme in which local NGOs such as Caritas are involved. The limited sum available to Caritas Bukavu (US\$270 per ex combatant; see above: The role of INGOs in the formal DDR process, section entitled Marginal position of national and local NGOs, page 26 , first paragraph) is insufficient to execute the reintegration programme; this is further complicated by the fact that funding has been forthcoming at a piecemeal rate. With the programmes in full swing, only around one-sixth of the funding has been disbursed, creating huge problems for Caritas. They are unable to provide the exit kits on time.

Most ex-fighters want to engage in activities that generate money quickly, and so a large number enrol in so-called *Activités Génératrices de Revenues* (AGR). These AGRs are hairdressing, street vending and bread baking. Alternatively, they are sent to vocational training centres in Bukavu. This is problematic for many ex-combatants as they originate from outlying villages and cannot commute because they lack the financial means. During their training cycle they cannot cater for the needs of their families, which makes them eager to return home as soon as possible. In these centres they can learn bricklaying, tailoring, leatherwork, mechanics, welding and driving. Most training programmes were scheduled for three months but Caritas was able to negotiate six-month programmes.

Box 1: Reintegration of Mayi-Mayi in Kindu and surroundings

Context description

The provincial capital of Maniema, Kindu, was taken by RCD⁴⁹ rebels in 1998. Kindu has been the setting of fierce fighting between the RCD and pro-government Mayi-Mayi militia. Maniema, already an isolated province in terms of geographical location and poor accessibility, became even more isolated when the Mayi-Mayi blocked river and road routes to Kindu. The population has suffered tremendously from this and the war at large. Kindu still is a remote place. MONUC has done little to improve the infrastructure and not much is to be expected in this regard from the Congolese government either. On a more positive note, Kindu and the rest of the province is relatively calm, with no Rwandan forces on its soil any more and commercial activity on the increase.

A short history of Disarmament and Demobilisation in Kindu and surroundings

The Mayi-Mayi came under increasing pressure because they had been hiding in the bush for years under difficult conditions. After the signing of the Pretoria Agreement they responded by coming out of the bush and laying down their weapons spontaneously. Religious and civil society leaders called upon them to leave their posts and hiding places, while nobody knew the exact numbers of Mayi-Mayi. Furthermore, some Mayi-Mayi leaders, such as General Kabambe in the Mayi-Mayi stronghold of Lotange village, ordered their men to give up their arms after negotiations with MONUC and RCD leaders. The result was that hundreds of Mayi-Mayi combatants engulfed Kindu without a proper DDR plan being drawn up to facilitate their spontaneous demobilisation. The first groups of spontaneously demobilised Mayi-Mayi handed in their arms to the Bishop whereas they were meant to deliver the arms directly to MONUC. RCD troops were eager to respond and confiscated the weapons, which infuriated the Mayi-Mayi. Another complicating factor was that the spontaneously demobilised Mayi-Mayi were forced to join the RCD. Later the Governor of Maniema and RCD leaders decided that demobilised Mayi-Mayi could also opt for reintegration into civil life but that all arms should become property of the RCD. The role of MONUC in disarming and demobilising the Mayi-Mayi can best be labelled passive. MONUC strictly followed its mandate to assist only foreign combatants and not Congolese combatants.

49 In English, the Congolese Rally for Democracy, the Rwandan-backed rebel movement.

A number of interviewees in Kindu and surroundings consider the passive role of MONUC problematic because MONUC, as a neutral party, could have played a more proactive role.

Reintegration support to the Mayi-Mayi

When hundreds of ex-combatants came from the bush and entered Kindu, only a handful of NGOs and civil society organisations were operating in town. With no DDR plan at hand, this was not a good start for DDR in Kindu and surroundings. The proactive role of civil society in Kindu, including the NGOs, can be considered a brave act since the security situation was tense and no-one knew how many ex-combatants would come out of the bush. Moreover, the direct result was that road and water blockades were dismantled and Kindu became accessible again. The first response of NGOs and the ICRC was humanitarian relief to ex-combatants. ICRC, Merlin, COOPI and SOCIMA (Civil Society of Maniema, funded by OXFAM Novib) were among the major players in providing humanitarian assistance. After this phase reintegration support had to be started. NGOs saw this type of support as key in improving security.

While in other parts of the DRC CONADER had opened demobilisation centres some time ago, in Maniema CONADER opened a centre in January 2006, only to close it again a few months later. In the meanwhile CONADER's strategic partners ILO and FAO and its non-strategic partners Caritas Kindu and GTZ were assisting ex-combatants with reintegration support as best as they could. ILO, FAO and Caritas assisted adult combatants and GTZ provided for disadvantaged youth, including child soldiers. Over 3,000 demobilised former combatants have received reintegration support while 2,100 have not.⁵⁰ Not assisting demobilised ex-combatants might pose a threat to the future stability of the province. In the far south of the province, in Kabambare district, a rebellious group of Mayi-Mayi is still active. The group is estimated to consist of a few hundred armed men. In August 2007 this group wanted to demobilise and hand in their weapons but at the time not a single actor was able or willing to assist them, and so the group remained armed – and dissatisfied, with all possible consequences for the near future.

The ex-combatants who did receive reintegration support opted predominantly for agriculture, fishery or animal husbandry. Basic training and reinsertion kits were part of the assistance. If a person opted for animal husbandry, he would receive a few goats, for agriculture a bicycle and for fishery a canoe. As a rule the dependents of the ex-combatants were not included in the reintegration assistance.

Assessing reintegration on the ground

Moving around in Kindu and surroundings, one sees a large number of bicycles, goats and canoes in the streets and waters. Another observation: ex-combatants protesting in front of NGO offices and demanding a bicycle or any other type of assistance. One NGO director was besieged by a group of disgruntled ex-combatants and another group threw stones at the Caritas Kindu office. These are the more noticeable features when a DDR programme is implemented.

If you go to the former Mayi-Mayi strongholds in Kailo district, no bicycles, goats and canoes can be seen. Together with OXFAM Novib partner CRONGD, one such former stronghold was visited to conduct a series of interviews with ex-combatants. Lotange is one of the villages where ex-combatants received assistance, not from an implementing partner of CONADER but at the initiative of CRONGD. The organisation assisted both ex-combatants and host communities because in its view, reintegration cannot be accomplished by favouring ex-combatants only. Activities included: socio-economic recovery activities (e.g. building schools), direct support to victims of sexual violence and restoring traditional community mediation institutions (the *barzas*). Despite the assistance of CRONGD, the Lotange residents felt betrayed by MONUC, CONADER and even Lotange resident General Kabambe. The ex-combatants argued that they were not consulted when their own general

50 MONUC/MAC figures June 2007.

negotiated with MONUC to end the fighting. They had the desire to become part of the FARDC but this option was never offered to them. Ex-combatant – host community tensions could not be observed because the ex-combatants have always been part of their community and because tensions could be discussed in the (revitalised) *barza*. Some former Mayi-Mayi interviewed in this village thus could not understand the concept of being reintegrated in their own village. As one ex-combatant put it: “We used to sleep in the village and go out to fight the Rwandese. We never went further than Kindu because we had to protect our families. The fighting has resulted in peace but no further benefits. For me reintegration means to get a job in the new national army.”

Viewing the entire range of reintegration interventions for adult male ex-combatants, it becomes clear that there is a distinction between interventions by private companies such as SECA/Chemonix and those implemented by multilateral/bilateral agencies and NGOs. SECA/Chemonix managed to change the ‘intervention stalemate’ which was caused by bureaucratic slowness of national DDR operators and resulted in lengthy tendering procedures, as well as by organisational infighting between potential implementers at field level. However, the private company actors were not interested in working with local organisations and ‘just wanted the job done’, rushing through things in the process which resulted in a poor success rate and little sustainability. By contrast, other implementing agencies such as NGOs managed to ensure a better reintegration process for those they took on. In addition, it seems that they at least tried to make sure that ex-combatants and local residents alike benefited from the various reintegration projects. Tentatively, one could assert that private company actors can be used in situations where a multitude of actors more or less help sustain an intervention ‘quagmire’ and something needs to be done urgently. In most cases, other intervening actors such as NGOs should be involved as much as possible as they ideally look at such interventions from a developmental angle with long-term perspectives in mind.

NGO support to the reintegration of female ex-combatants

Female ex-combatants generally followed the same procedures as their male counterparts. However, women were lodged in separate tents in the *Centres d’Orientation*. The reintegration training programmes offered additional ‘female’ skill training, such as embroidery, knitting, sewing, hairdressing and cloth painting. Therefore, when women are registered for DDR, they are nominally entitled to the same benefits.

However, there has never been any attempt to distinguish between men’s and women’s needs in DDR. Part of the reason was that MDRP never bought in to the idea of female combatants. They just went for one person-one weapon, and even this criteria was not always applied strictly, because many people were allowed to demobilise without a weapon.

Few INGOs focused solely on women or girl ex-combatants or dependents. During the fieldwork in August 2007 *Cooperazione Internazionale* (COOPI, an Italian INGO) was operating two CTOs in Ituri. The *Centres of Transit and Orientation* (CTO) are part of COOPI and the staff is on their payroll. One CTO is in Bunia (girls only) and one in Kpandroma (boys and girls) in Djugu territory. In COOPI’s view, these centres do not cater for children’s DDR only, as they see them as part of a broader child protection programme. Some of the beneficiaries are children formerly associated with armed groups.

For girls to join a CTO, they must either have been with a militia or have been a victim of sexual violence. The CTO in Kpandroma also targets boys. All of them have been with an armed group. COOPI succeeds in attracting vulnerable groups, because less vulnerable individuals are not attracted by the food that is provided. Reasons not to join the CTO are the stigma of being seen as a naughty girl by some. Others, by contrast, refuse to join the centres as they are not allowed to see different men and have sex with them. They complain that the CTO does not understand that they are seeing different men partly as a coping strategy.

Forum des Mamans d'Ituri (FOMI), a local women's network in Ituri, wanted to assist vulnerable women as many dependents of militia did not benefit from the safety net payments or exit kits distributed to their so-called husbands. The group was able to start a micro credit scheme for a first group of 622 women. Each would receive a credit of US\$50 for five months. At the end of the period they would refund the loan (worth two and a half dollars a week) and they would save an additional two dollars a week. At the end the credits were reinvested in another group of women, while the first caseload would have saved US\$40 for their own investment.

Other projects focused on agricultural activities such as vegetables and goat breeding. A first group consisted of 300 women, 50% dependents, 25% sexually abused women and 25% war-related vulnerable women (widows, refugees). FOMI also engaged in another similar project, mostly aiming at sexually abused women (80% out of a total of 250 women). In the goat raising project, groups of twenty beneficiaries were formed and two goats distributed to every member, with three male breeders for fertilisation. The agricultural activities consisted of distributing five kilos of seed to every member. The women were supposed to use most of this for an individual plot of land but some had to be contributed to a communal plot. Time spent at the communal plot was meant to reinforce communal bonds and help restore inter-communal dialogue at the community level.

Although the above projects were successful, they are no more than a drop in the ocean and in many cases FOMI had to lobby hard to avoid jealousy between women. Single women are in a weaker position than married women, although the advantages of having a husband are not rated highly. "All the men in Ituri are idle and treat women badly, they just summon them around and treat them like objects. The weak position of women is due to prevailing cultural and customary values. The men are engaged in waya-way behaviour (meaning hanging out, drinking beer, running after other women)"⁵¹. Men contribute only marginally. They sometimes help with the roof, help to prepare fields or help correct children. During the implementation of the above activities FOMI agents had to make sure they intervened in the different communities in an equitable manner for fear of being accused of partisan behaviour.

WB internal assessment of the reintegration process in DRC

Very few studies have been done to assess the effects of the reintegration process. The World Bank conducted a study among some 600 ex-combatants countrywide. This is a sample of 4% from a total of some 15,000 ex-fighters who had been reintegrated at the time of the survey. Within this sample, the 11,000 ex-militia fighters reintegrated by American NGO SEMA/Chemonix in Ituri during phase one (70%) were by far the largest group. The survey showed that across the stratified sample⁵² some 75% declared having benefited from the reintegration process, although for the Chemonix group this figure was much lower (33%).

The demobilisation and integration expert of the World Bank thinks that the fact that these fighters had received some money and training in a context of generalized poverty explains this high 'success' rate. "The only difference with other people is that they got some money and some training".⁵³ The World Bank concludes that overall integration of those who benefited from reintegration has been positive. There also was a huge difference between urban and rural areas in the sample. Most ex-fighters who were reintegrated in the countryside did relatively well, and many ex-fighters left the urban centres to use their reintegration money to invest in rural economic activities.

51 *Quoted from the interview with representatives of the Forum des Mamans d'Ituri*

52 *In the survey each different group of reintegrated ex-combatants was 'weighted' equally, i.e. the 11,000 in the Chemonix group and a Caritas group of around 1,000 made up an equal share of the overall percentage*

53 *Quote from an interview with a World Bank official in Kinshasa*

7 NGO activities that had direct and indirect effects on DDR

In order to understand the scope and range of ‘regular’ development projects it is important to assess the local context in which NGOs operated. In the district of Ituri, for example, there are a number of local NGOs that already existed prior to the war. Although they had limited capacity, they were capable of engaging in specific activities which had been their mandate, i.e. specialised local NGOs could deal with specific issues. Unfortunately, among the local NGO leadership there has been and continues to be a tendency to recruit people with limited skills so that they will not become a threat to their power position. This phenomenon has stalled institutional growth and expansion of local NGOs. Also, many well-educated young people prefer to leave Ituri and go elsewhere.

After the war there was a proliferation of local NGOs based on external demand. This in turn led to many cases of funds being misused, stolen or illegally appropriated by individuals within such organisations. In fact, high civilian authorities, closely linked to the foreign players, used their contacts to favour the organisations of their choice, in many cases NGOs they helped set up with the sole purpose of accessing foreign funds⁵⁴. This strategy not only obtains for Ituri but for the DRC as a whole.

ACIAR’s interventions in Ituri: including civilians and war-affected population groups in DDR-funded projects

After the war of 2003 the entire district of Ituri was in disarray; there were no functional local organisations left and everyone had taken refuge elsewhere. In October 2003 ACIAR came back to Bunia at the request of the *Groupe de Recherche Etudes Technologiques* (GRET), a Kinshasa-based organisation which had been contracted by UNDP to initiate some projects. As GRET had no implementing capacity on the ground, ACIAR was approached to start up some activities with the objective of improving inter-communal relations. ACIAR initiated a high-intensity labour project (*Haut Intensité de Main d’Œuvre*, HIMO) for some 220 persons (30% Lendu, 30% Hema and 40% other tribes) to start cleaning up the town. The project lasted for three months and the labourers received US\$1.50 a day. The project deliberately mixed militia and civilians. ACIAR simultaneously started a micro finance project for women to provide some 300 women with a credit ranging from US\$30-50 to help them generate revenue in the immediate post-war phase. They also provided some school equipment (*fournitures scolaires*) to affected schools in Bunia. The total budget of this project was around US\$100,000. ACIAR is therefore an example of an NGO that utilised DDR-funded projects to enable other affected groups to benefit.

The third phase of DDR which is presently ongoing has again resulted in ACIAR obtaining a HIMO project which was already approved. This time some 120 labourers will benefit, 30% of whom will be ordinary civilians. ACIAR also has filed a sustainable reintegration project proposal for Kpandroma, where they intend to help ex-combatants to reintegrate into farmers’ associations. The kits the former combatants receive are used to help the ex-fighters to establish themselves in local associations. The activities foreseen are agriculture, some cattle-raising activities, the production of coffee and reforestation of the area. Of the 208 beneficiaries, 30% will be local civilians who did not join the militia. This will help local communities to accept the programme and to accept the former militia members in their midst. The proposal has been accepted by UNDP but awaits final approval by the project approval committee (*Comité Local d’Approbation des Projets*, CLAP).

⁵⁴ Interview with director of Aciar in Bunia.

Human rights organisations

In the DRC, very few organisations are engaged in transitional justice with regard to the DDR process. In South Kivu, local human rights organisation *Héritiers de la Justice* (Hdlj) is one of them. They have sensitised local communities to ensure a more sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants. *Héritiers de la Justice* currently is working with an ex-combatant association (*Association des Démobilisés pour la Paix et le Développement*) to help them reintegrate better. *Hdlj* has emphasised that there should be some perspective on restorative justice; ex-combatants should be pressed into handing part of their HIMO-earned money to help support war-related orphaned children and single-parent families. Ex-combatants could also be enlisted for public works, perhaps as *cantonniers* (road workers) on the Bukavu-Walengu road (an important provincial road). Every stretch of around 200 metres could be maintained by one ex-combatant. This thirty-kilometre stretch could occupy 300 ex-combatants. Their presence would ensure security and they would also be able to cultivate crops at the roadside for their own sustenance.

Meanwhile, national human rights NGO ASADHO in Kinshasa is involved in projects against impunities perpetrated by civil servants. Although there are many laws setting forth the activities and mandate of civil servants, be it in administrative services, the army or the police, they are hardly ever applied. ASADHO works from a bottom-up perspective. Presently they have trained a number of *agents de police judiciaire* in the area of legislation on sexual violence. This was done on a voluntary basis and they have received requests from other officers for a follow-up course to train colleagues. The higher echelons of the police have not reacted to this initiative but ASADHO feels that in due time they will start interacting directly with one another. When Laurent Kabila was in power, ASADHO was banned between 1999 and 2001 as it was perceived as too critical of the regime.

Tentative remarks on direct and indirect NGO interventions

The above section only provides scant information on the matter of NGO projects outside the realm of the DDR process. Clearly, as was stressed in the section on methodology, this research was unable to cover, nor does it claim to cover, all NGO activities in this continent-sized country. Nevertheless, the general impression was that very few long-term regular development activities are being executed at present. As time goes by and provided the political situation in the DRC becomes more stable, more external intervention agencies will begin transitional and so-called 'regular' development activities. Only a few examples can be found in the current setting, obviously because of security and policy-related constraints.

The sequencing and labelling of distinct programme categories, such as post-conflict, transitional and longer-term developmental, reflects the existence of blueprint concepts on how to deal with fragile states coming out of long political and military crises. Such concepts are used and applied by many important multinational and bilateral agencies. NGOs generally have greater autonomy to decide whether or not to engage in specific activities and when. However, it is remarkable to observe that many such organisations follow the line of their main back donors. This is clearly true for the DRC, where many potential intervention agencies have been scared away by the diversity and complexity of the present situation, mainly conflict settings in both Kivu provinces. Each area will require a tailor-made intervention strategy, something which for the time being is clearly lacking in the vast majority of multilateral and bilateral agencies, including the bulk of NGOs.

8 Perspectives of ex-combatants

In this the opinions of the ex-combatants themselves are highlighted. A small selection of interviews has been used to illustrate reality as seen through the eyes of the beneficiaries. In fact, many perceptions on reality can be observed, as there are enormous differences between male, female and child combatants. Also, there is a sharp divide between those who actively participated in the fighting and others who, mostly against their will, provided ‘services’ to the combatant population.

Many ex-combatants were displeased with the reintegration process because benefits only came at a piecemeal rate and in some cases was considered ‘small money’. In many cases ex-combatants had high expectations and the US\$410⁵⁵ which nominally was distributed to them in the course of demobilisation did not suffice. In one case a female ex-combatant stated that she used to get more when she fought for UPC (a local militia group), because “people gave us willingly”⁵⁶. In a number of cases ex-combatants got either nothing, or only part of the sum, leading to frustration among them.

Many ex-combatants considered that the reintegration process was unsatisfactory: sometimes they could not engage in activities they had opted for (this was mainly the case for those who wanted to continue their studies). The only options on offer were vocational training or rejoining the army.

Finally, many of the ex-combatants complained about the exit kit. They were disappointed either with its contents, its market value or the fact that many simply did not get a kit at all. Most of them blamed the implementing agencies, although the cause of non-distribution often was corruption among the staff of intermediary agents, who signed for delivery but never distributed them. In fact, ex-combatants represented money not only for the NGOs but also for the local intermediary individuals who had been contracted to perform a variety of services in the reintegration process, from teaching to delivering kits. The DDR process, as any business, provided space for opportunistic profit seeking. This naturally became more evident if implementing agencies rushed through things, as was the case with the SECA/Chemonix exercise in Ituri. Ex-combatants, finally, rarely considered the option of doing something for the war-affected civilians, i.e. for those who had suffered most from the violence which they had inflicted on them. There seemed to be a profound lack of feelings of responsibility or even guilt. During an interview in Bukavu (capital of South Kivu), when asked explicitly if they had somehow shared some of the benefits of the DDR with victims, a group of around fifty ex-combatants were not able to give even one example⁵⁷.

Female perspectives

How girls wound up in a militia

One female combatant⁵⁸ explained how she joined the militia and how she eventually managed to escape and how she reintegrated. When the war came she wanted to flee to Bunia, but the road was insecure. Hema and Ugandan fighters came to the school and took the girls. She was imprisoned for four days. She was troubled, in shock and unconscious for part of it. They were liberated by Lendu fighters who took them with them. She had no alternative but to join them. It was a choice between dying or fighting. She stayed with the *Forces National Intégristes* (FNI) from 1999 to 2002. It was not her decision and not her destiny to be a combatant, but she was in shock at what had happened to her life. Her unit consisted of 540 fighters, 12 of whom were women. Eight of these women were educated (‘intellectuals’) and four were village women. In addition, there were women who were not fighting but were living as concubines

55 US\$50 on entering a CTO, US\$60 when leaving a CTO and during the first year a monthly amount of US\$25 in safety net money, totalling US\$410

56 Interview with two female ex-combatants (anonymous), Bunia.

57 Group interview during mechanics training workshop, Bukavu.

58 Interview with a female ex-combatant in Bunia.

with the male combatants. The 'unmarried' women had their own unit; they took turns cooking. The intellectuals in the militia started asking themselves what they were doing. They had missed out on schooling and wanted to get on with life. However, you cannot simply leave the militia. A strategy is needed. It is a case of life and death, because the militia will not let you go. The girls were afraid of what was awaiting them, since the war was not over yet. They feared normal civilians would condemn them. Nonetheless, the twelve women got together and took off. In 2001, they moved to the forest near Nyoka, a village in Djugu territory (Ituri). They told the people they were searching for their parents. They had nothing, not even proper clothes and no one to take care of them. They worked on the land for the people for one month and earned themselves some food and shelter. Then a priest from the white father congregation came by that village for a visit and took them with him. The Italian fathers helped her to come to Bunia, where she stayed with a family she knew. She studied in Bunia and finished secondary school and became a teacher in the primary school in her native village.

Some girls were captured when their parents were not there or when they had gone to the river to fetch water or even in the presence of their parents. The militiamen had sex with them. In an interview with ex-'bush wives' a group of girls explained that they were used by many different men. "We were not their wives. They passed us around. It was just to play with somebody else's body. When one had gone to fight, the others would take us. They raped us and made us do bad things".⁵⁹

Reintegration

The girls' opinion on the training course in the CTO

In Bunia, Ituri a group of girls attended the courses provided by COOPI in a CTO. They went there in the morning to study, had some lunch there and then had practice in the afternoon. The total programme lasted four months. The programme was intended for children who are sick, for victims of sexual violence, and for girls who were with combatants. It was free of charge. In the meantime they continued to live with their parents, who took care of them when they were not at the CTO. Upon completion, they received a \$15 kit and became an apprentice to a tailor to further improve their skills. They seemed to appreciate the training. "This is our life".⁶⁰ One of the problems was that they did not have a sewing machine after completing the course: there were not enough to go round. They took turns operating the one available sewing machine while the other six or so watched.

In Nizi⁶¹, two demobilised women told their reintegration stories. One of the women demobilised in 2004. At the end of the process, she opted for commerce and was expecting a kit and some credit to be able to start a business. That support never materialised. Instead, she had to participate in a *Haut Intensité de Main d'Œuvre* project (HIMO: literally, high-intensity labour project, a kind of community labour project), building the market in Nizi. She and the other participants got \$43 a month, which was paid somewhat irregularly. They had to work long hours for little money and felt they deserved it. "That was our own sweat". Nonetheless, participating in the HIMO was somehow a privilege, because people quarrelled about who was entitled to participate. The HIMO lasted for four months. Another woman chose computer training. She was demobilised in 2006. When the three-month training was finished, she wondered what CONADER was going to do for them next. She was sure she was going to get a job after the training and was disappointed that CONADER was not providing any.

By and large, women who had demobilised only rarely benefited from all the demobilisation and reintegration programs. In many cases, the female ex-combatants felt they had been cheated by their commanders or their fellow male combatants. Moreover, the women and girls who had been used as

59 Interview with a group of five girls who had been captured by militia in Bunia.

60 Interview with a group of five girls who had been captured by militia in Bunia.

61 Interview with two women among a group of six ex-combatants in Nizi.

concubines simply felt abused by the militia. Many of these women were traumatised by their experiences and had a hard time organising their own future. By and large, reintegration took place almost completely in the absence of women. Reintegration in the DRC, even if ramshackle and far from perfect, had been a male business.

However, some of the women interviewed turned out to be mere civilians who had been on good terms with local leaders and who had been able to enter reintegration programmes simply by handing in a gun. Many of the real female ex-combatants auto-demobilised and did everything possible to erase their tracks. Many started a new life in another town, refused to talk to anyone about their past and tried to make a new start in life.

Male perspectives

Demobilisation

Demobilisation was not as straightforward as it was commonly depicted. Ndjabu⁶² stayed in the bush until 2006, with a group of some two hundred fighters, none of whom were female. Some of them had wives and children with them. They did not want to stay in the bush, so he and his group approached the South Africans (there was a MONUC contingent based in Ituri) when they could. They disarmed with the South Africans and thought they would be brought to MONUC, but instead the fighters were taken separately to the FARDC camp. Their wives and children were taken to their villages and relatives by the South Africans. The fighters were told that all had to join the army except for the children. “But I was tired of fighting, so I ran away”. The South Africans had not given them any documents in proof of disarmament and the FARDC were chasing them. The army people told them that they had to pay US\$100 to be able to rejoin their families. That was not the official policy, but FARDC soldiers abusing their situation. If your family was rich, if you could afford it and if you paid and left, they might capture you again. One was captured again and killed when he refused to pay. Some 70% of his contingent joined the FARDC. “I came back for teaching. I had my undergraduate before the war. With DDR assistance I could have continued my studies, but we gave our weapons without getting anything in return.” Ndjabu is a headmaster now. Ex-combatants are vulnerable without a weapon. People may take revenge. The taxi men are an example. “They just want to earn a living, but FARDC extorts them and they are sometimes shot”.

Reintegration

Georg⁶³ had joined UPC to defend his community. He did not mind demobilising and while going through CONADER, his first choice was studies, but nothing ever happened. The army was his second choice but his family prevented him. One of his family members offered him a motorcycle. “As a distraction”. They forced him to become a taxi driver. He can earn a living now. He pays his university fees (law faculty), which are US\$157 a year, plus his books and his instructors. He has to pay US\$6 a day for the use of the motorbike. He has managed to save some money from his earnings. He put this aside to buy his own motorcycle. Two years ago, he bought his first one. Every six months, he buys a new one, to be sure his bike is in good condition.

John⁶⁴, another ex-combatant, used to be a hairdresser before the war. During the war he fought, but finally left the militia in 2005. He demobilised and received a start-up kit with a pair of clippers, a mirror, a generator, scissors and alcohol. Although he was pleased, the quality was poor. The clippers were from some imitation brand and are broken now. He was a facilitator in the SECA/Chemonix programme, and taught 300 people. After his own reintegration, he worked for SECA as a hairdressing trainer. John has

62 Interview with ex-combatant in Bunia.

63 Interview with a motor taxi driver in Bunia.

64 Interview with a hairdresser in Bunia.

a contract with Chemonix (dated 1 February 2006) which mentions two courses (four and five months respectively) to be given to two different groups, specifying his tasks. The contract also states that he should do follow-up and check on his students, but when he had finished, SECA was closed. He has a list of eleven people who were in the group under his care. They all got the SECA training, but not the kit. The non-delivery was due to facilitators, he explained. SECA gave the kits to them and they signed for it. They were to pass them out to the people in their group, but some of them did not. John was absent when SECA handed out the kits, so some other facilitator received them and diverted them. Now his group is angry with him. On his list of eleven, there are two people who have no DDR identity card numbers, only their election registration number. This proves that some people on the list attended the training even though they were not entitled to it.

Two other ex-combatants in the mining village of Mongbwalu⁶⁵ said that SECA's training (the Chemonix reintegration project) was good even though it was short, but the follow-up for economic reintegration was a failure. They only went for the money, without really wondering what would actually happen. Another problem was that the money was given too quickly. During or just after demobilisation, it is easy to waste money. Then people go back to their homes and try to restart their life, and then they need their money. The lesson is that reintegration should happen in the community. There should have been a broader framework and better follow-up. It is not only about money and assets, but about guiding a more complicated process.

Two child soldiers interviewed in the CTO of Lemera (Uvira, South Kivu), run by Cordaid partner ADED were happy to be demobilised and said they would never consider joining the army again. The two boys were among the last group to leave the CTO in Lemera. One of the boys is 14 years old and the other one 16. Both are happy to be reunited with their families. However, both of the boys think a lot about their fighting years. The Mayi-Mayi units they were in were not a substitute family to them. Both say they consider their time with the Mayi-Mayi as work. The elder one served under Colonel Kajamba, who had already gone through the process of *brassage*. The younger one served under Colonel Abdul, who is presently at the *Centre de Brassage* in Luberizi. The elder one says he still sees some of his Mayi-Mayi superiors but he does not need to listen to them anymore. According to the boy, they are all civilians now. The friends of the two boys who did not fight have no problems with them. They can be friends despite the different experiences they have had.

Box 2 : Centre de Brassage in Luberizi, South Kivu

Built on a hill facing Burundi, only a few kilometres away, the location of the *Centre de Brassage* (CBR) in Luberizi was strategically chosen. The shiny roofs of the military barracks are visible from far off. Once inside the camp, the idyllic picture changes. On a hot, dusty afternoon there is almost no activity. All FARDC 'recruits' seem to be hiding from the sun in their barracks, as there are no trees on this dusty hill. A CBR can accommodate 3,500-4,000 troops, but Luberizi houses 4,773 troops⁶⁶. The impression a visitor can have is that CBR staff and recruits are bored and lazy. That is not to say that discipline does not exist in the CBR, as high-ranking camp staff is firmly saluted by the soldiers and no serious incidents have yet occurred. MONUC is responsible for overseeing the control of weapons in the camp and for securing the area in the immediate vicinity of the camp. Although a visitor might encounter a few Pakistani peacekeepers in or around the camp, in the event of a riot – or worse – it seems likely that neither CBR staff nor MONUC will be able to control the situation.

The CBR in Luberizi is populated by various rebel groups, of which the Mayi-Mayi form the biggest group. The real troublemakers, Group 47 and the FDLR – both are still fighting each other – are not

65 Interview with two ex-combatants in Mongbwalu.

66 Figure provided by the CBR commander

in the *brassage* process as the two groups are not Congolese and are therefore considered to be the responsibility of MONUC. The various former rebel groups in the CBR have claimed their own barracks and places to hang out and sleep; there is no mixing. One might wonder why the camp is called a *Centre de Brassage*. The CBR commander: “It is every man for himself in this camp. Of course there are tensions between the groups, but thanks to the iron fist, soldiers are well-disciplined.” On average, people stay 45 days in a CBR but 56 days is the average in Luberizi. This period is short and at the same time long, depending on the perspective. Short because 56 days is not much for a former rebel to become a fully trained member of the FARDC. Long if one considers the living conditions of the people in the CBR.

Conditions in the CBR

Let us start with the good news: the soldiers in the CBR receive salaries⁶⁷ and there is accommodation and food. Having said that, the CBR lacks potable water and basic hygiene, there are almost no training facilities such as an assault course, the barracks for the soldiers and CBR staff alike are gaspingly hot, the camp clinic cannot perform basic medical treatments as there is almost no medication. The CBR has one old computer for the administration but since there is no electricity, the computer cannot be used. A cholera outbreak this year caused the death of two soldiers and 17 others had to be hospitalised. Cholera is again plaguing the CBR, in addition to malaria and TB. Clinic staff suspect that a number of soldiers are HIV positive but since no funding is available, tests cannot be done. Visiting the clinic might be a shock to the visitor because the patients lie on the bare ground or on thin mattresses in their own bodily fluids; the hot barrack makes life even more unbearable to them.

NGO (non-)involvement

The circumstances described above require action from the Congolese government and/or the aid community. The CBR in Luberizi is a shared responsibility of the Congolese government, the EU and MONUC, but CBR staff complains that only MONUC gives any support to the CBR. Representatives of other parties never come to the CBR. Once a World Bank representative visited the CBR but had to be evacuated by MONUC in order to avoid a lynch party. The poor conditions in the CBR have led to a fierce debate amongst the NGO community in Uvira. CBR staff asked NGO assistance with water and sanitation because latrines, potable water, and medicine were urgently needed. Some NGOs argued that the request was out of line because millions are available for SSR and NGOs are not responsible for assistance to CBRs. Among this group there were those who argued that integrated as well as non-integrated FARDC brigades were responsible for a high number of human rights violations so why assist the violators? Others argued that there was a humanitarian need because some soldiers were on the verge of dying in the CBR. It seems that the request for assistance has not led to anything other than debate, since potable water and medicine are still lacking. For staff and soldiers in the CBR the only option is to make the best of it and continue building the new Congolese army without the urgently needed basic infrastructure. One might well wonder, if camp facilities were decent and salaries were paid regularly, how this would impact on human rights violations committed by integrated FARDC brigades. On this end, many NGOs are involved: medical and psychological assistance to raped women, human rights promotion, etc. It makes sense for NGOs to get involved in tackling the causes of these violations as well. Service provision in a CBR could be a good entry point to make headway with demands to sift out and persecute human rights offenders among the candidate soldiers.

⁶⁷ However, salaries are not paid regularly and are certainly not sufficient to live on. It was difficult to obtain information on exact payments as some soldiers state that they receive nothing where others mention amounts of US\$2 – US\$10 per month.

9 Findings and conclusions on the DDR process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Institutional make-up: national implementing agencies

Conceptually, the three-tier set-up of the national institutions supposed to implement DDR in the DRC seemed appropriate to ensure independence of action while retaining some degree of control. In practice, however, the relations between CONADER and the CGFDR were tense from the start. Part of the problem has been and continues to be the fact that in the DRC the political culture is characterised by strong inbuilt centralisation tendencies combined with power struggles over who is in command. The result was a huge power struggle between the top brass of CONADER and CGFDR. An institutional stand-off ensued, forming an obstacle to timely funding and disbursement procedures.

From the very start CONADER became a top-down, overly centralised bureaucratic institution, governed by lengthy procedures. Although the staff at the various regional antenna posts made good efforts to try and reverse the impact of this institutional deficiency, they had neither the power nor the mandate to adapt central decision-making to fit local conditions. Moreover, at the central level CONADER tried to adhere strictly to regulations imposed by the World Bank. CONADER, already at a disadvantage because of its late arrival at field level, started to build large reception structures, COs, on sites where ex-combatants did not gather. CONADER generally lacked flexibility. Even when a so-called *plan de relance* was put into effect, and mobile teams replaced the cumbersome CO approach, experts from Kinshasa were flown in who had no expertise on the local situation. CONADER was plagued with numerous issues that characterise government institutions countrywide; political patronage, elite infighting, lack of expertise, lack of political will and a profound lack of knowledge about specific regional contexts. CONADER's operations were further hampered by the WB's 'chain approach', which meant that they had to contract large INGOs or UN agencies to coordinate reintegration in the various regions. The chain approach led to a duplication of tendering procedures and a loss of overhead costs to additional actors. Admittedly, however, it would have been a huge task to rely solely on local partners, which show great variation in quality and are beset by logistical and capacity problems. CONADER, finally, lacked the coordination and steering capacity to control the implementation process. The fact that their funding came at a slow pace did not help them acquire legitimacy and leverage in a complicated multi-actor environment.

Disarmament & demobilisation

The DDR programme started out within the context of the transitional government. The political leaders of the various armed groups were primarily interested in holding on to their power. The DDR programme should have been part of an integrated approach in which the various parts followed each other logically (programme sequencing). The composantes delayed the reform of the army, which was an important condition for the success of the DDR. The complicated governance structure of the transition (four vice-presidents representing the various armed composantes plus one provisional president as had been stipulated by the Sun City agreement) in fact ruled out a swift and smooth demobilisation process. Political infighting remained the most important obstacle to demobilisation.

D&D had already started with child soldiers at a time when the conflict had not yet been resolved. Many

child soldiers auto-demobilised before the MDRP programme came into effect. Some NGOs tried to trace such children so as to reintegrate them properly. To date it is unclear how many of these children were identified and how many remained anonymous. Most child combatants and EAFGAs who went through the formal demobilisation process were separated from adult fighters upon entering a *Centre d'Orientation*. Many of them were kept for some days in separate dwellings. Later, child protection agencies would try to trace their families and to reunite these children with their families. This did not always prove to be easy, as a number of children had committed human rights abuses against civilians and their families sometimes were reluctant to readopt them. For this specific target group, there was never much controversy about the necessity of getting them out of the armed forces or militia, nor about the fact that they should rejoin their families. However, some military and militia leaders were reluctant to accept the children in their outfits to be demobilised, as they were loyal and fierce fighters and performed all types of services without any complaints. This attitude reflects the perversion of moral values among a small group of adults who stood to gain from the enlistment of child soldiers in the conflict.

Disarmament and demobilisation of adult fighters was beset by numerous security constraints from the outset. In the beginning, ex-militia fighters found it hard to demobilise openly, as their superiors and associates feared treason or defection for material gains only. As a result, in the initial stages of demobilisation of ethnic militia in Ituri, many individuals were killed on their way to a demobilisation point, thus making individual security and secrecy around the identity of individual fighters an important issue. The disarmament process was at times highly untransparent, as many civilians came in with arms to be able to obtain reintegration perks, while the hard-core fighters remained anonymous. Many fighters preferred to wait it out and stay with their outfits in remote areas. Gradually it became clear that the standard formula – one individual one weapon – was not respected, as many demobilised without handing in weapons. Sometimes, groups of people were admitted to the COs with only a few obsolete handguns that did not even function properly any more⁶⁸. The pace of D&D therefore only gained momentum when the general elections approached and all participating actors increasingly felt external pressure to make progress towards proper demobilisation, failing which the donor community would lose interest and refuse to disburse additional funding. Around 10% of the entire MDRP budget was eventually used to transport ex-fighters to the various *Centres de Brassage* (CBR) where they were to be retrained before the formation of new army brigades. With time, the SMI responsible for processing ex-combatants eligible for D&D bypassed the formal procedure and simply passed many fighters directly to the CBR⁶⁹.

Finally, the disarmament of Combatants on Foreign Soil has not been completed. An estimated 6,000 Interahamwe still roam the countryside of North and South Kivu. The UN-led DDRRR programme, based on voluntary demobilisation, has not been able to remedy this situation. Nevertheless, demobilisation does continue, albeit at a piecemeal rate.

NGO involvement in disarmament has been very limited, because the SMI did not want civilian interference with what they considered to be a purely military operation. Within the process of demobilisation, however, multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies and NGOs provided essential services to ex-combatants (medical services in reception centres, provision of entry and exit kits). They also engaged actively in child soldier demobilisation before the government became active. The participation of NGOs in demobilisation can therefore be considered important, if not vital, to assuring the day-to-day management and operation of a number of orientation centres nationwide. Without their involvement, the reception and processing capacity of the entire DDR process would have collapsed. However, these implementing agencies failed to use their potential leverage to increase their own autonomy. Consequently, they remained mere executors and implementers of programmes designed by others.

68 Interview with UNAMSIL official in Bunia.

69 Various interviews with local CONADER staff in Bukavu and Bunia. The existence of this practice was corroborated by UN Political Affairs in Kinshasa

Reintegration

Presently, 102,000 adult fighters have been demobilised by CONADER. Fifty-five thousand either have completed their training or are in the process of reintegration within projects for which funding has already been allocated. Around 27,000 ex-combatants have finished their reintegration courses. Of this group of 27,000, around 11,000 have been reintegrated in one programme in Ituri district (Province Oriental) by American consultancy firm SECA/Chemonix.

The UE-PNDDR has calculated that 47,000 ex-combatants await reintegration (102,000 – 55,000), with an expected additional number of around 22,000 ex-soldiers and an estimated 17,000 Mayi-Mayi fighters. This means that a total caseload of around 86,000 ex-combatants is still outstanding for which no funding is now available. If no additional funding is forthcoming, a majority of ex-combatants (around 60%) may not benefit from any form of reintegration support, and potentially constitute a recruitment base for emerging militia.

Children

Initially, child soldier reintegration was conceptually flawed as no specific reintegration package for child soldiers had been planned for. Consequently, in the early stages many child soldiers, once they had been demobilised initially, ended up being recruited again locally after they had returned home as there was nothing to keep them occupied, and reintegration had only meant giving them an exit kit⁷⁰. It thus became increasingly apparent that it was crucial issue to integrate child combatants in their communities with dignity and self-respect, failing which they would constitute a major security problem at some point in time.

After due negotiations with donors, specific programmes were initiated which aimed to give children a proper reintegration perspective. Children could follow vocational training courses or choose to rejoin school. The various reintegration processes of EAFGAs differed enormously. Some programmes were quite successful, as the child protection agencies involved monitored these children and did some follow-up.

In many cases the very code of conduct that was to ensure sustainable reintegration for child soldiers proved to be a logistical nightmare and practically unfeasible. The vast majority of ex-child soldiers had been forcefully recruited in the rural hinterland of the eastern provinces of the DRC. After they were reunited with their families in remote areas, training and educational facilities were scarce or absent, and many organisations had a hard time ensuring tutelage with the limited funds available. However, the various child protection NGOs worked hard to make sure that children benefited from some of the reintegration perks on offer. A fair number of the demobilised ex-child combatants have in some form or another benefited from the limited socio-economic reintegration packages which targeted them within the various provinces. It seems fair to say that without NGO support, far less would have been provided in terms of assistance to child soldiers. Additionally, implementing agencies had more autonomy in the realm of child combatants.

Finally, child reintegration programs also need to become less gender-blind than they are at present, and must pay special attention to the needs of girls; whereas all children require education and training, programmes need to ensure that girls are provided with means to become economically independent, which will give them self-esteem and future prospects, and help them to become accepted into local society.

Additionally, one of the major conceptual problems with child soldier reintegration has been the definition

⁷⁰ Interview with country director Save the Children in Kinshasa.

of what precisely is a child. At present the criterion is that every person under the age of 19 during verification is considered a child. However, many years have passed since the start of the first rounds of conscription of children in the various armed forces: child soldiers were used by the army even before 1996. What to do with 28-year-olds who were conscripted as 15-year-olds in 1996?

On another front, there has been no evaluation or follow-up to the reintegration programmes: what has become of these children, what are they doing now and to what extent have they benefited from the skills and resources offered to them?

Adult fighters; male and female fighters

The MDRP programme was set up as a pacification programme to get the armed elements out of the bush. The last thing donors wanted to do was to organise them into small groups again during the reintegration process, because the chain of command had to be broken. The WB therefore adopted an individual approach, knowing that some would be smarter and more successful than others. Many people in the DRC saw the MDRP programme as a *baguette magique* that would solve most post-conflict problems⁷¹. The MDRP, however, was never meant for development programmes because the WB has other funds for those types of activities (social fund, among others).

With hindsight, the reintegration programmes were implemented belatedly after Disarmament and Demobilisation had already taken place. In practice, most ex-fighters were obliged to wait for the start of a reintegration course for over one year. Initially, the MDRP had not counted on such delays and the safety net disbursement was designed when it became clear that these ex-fighters had to be entertained somehow. However, such financial perks quickly came to be viewed as a right by the ex-combatants, and even as a sort of financial compensation for their 'war effort'. Therefore, rather than putting in place a programme that might have opened a perspective on transitional justice, ex-fighters became entitled to monthly instalments. The payment of these instalments became a logistical nightmare in itself, and in many towns CONADER staff were targeted when payments were late. The sequencing gap between Demobilisation and Reintegration caused a great many local security problems, as ex-combatants would stay in the towns where the instalments were paid out to them. After payment, many of them would waste the money on alcohol and women, after which they would wait for the next instalment. The timing of the safety net money was wrong; this money should have been given during the training period because that was when ex-combatants really needed it. CONADER might well have considered setting up public works for the ex-combatants and giving them the safety net money as a salary earned, because now many ex-combatants saw it as a war premium.

Meanwhile, neither CONADER nor UN agencies and INGOs proved able to quickly implement training programmes for the ex-fighters. Tendering procedures and contract negotiations took a long time, procurement was costly and demanded additional staff and time and lastly, the war had almost completely destroyed most of the training infrastructure of the DRC, so quick remedies failed to surface in a general context of post-war poverty and a fragile security setting. The first company to intervene was SECA/Chemonix in Ituri, which implemented a short-term programme for 11,000 ex-combatants in a seven-month period. Although their programme was rushed through, it did have a pacifying effect, but longer-term assessment of the programme clearly reveals its shortcomings. Speed came at a price, as many beneficiaries did not follow training programmes which allowed them to reintegrate properly, and many of them for a variety of reasons ended up without an exit kit. Other agencies were more thorough, such as UNDP, ADRA and Caritas, but they dealt with smaller numbers of combatants and in the case of UNDP added funds of their own to be able to initiate more sustainable reintegration programmes, mainly organising small cooperatives of ex-combatants in agriculture and fisheries.

It seems fair to conclude that in some situations private actors may prove to be able to 'get things done',

⁷¹ Interview with UNDP official in Kinshasa.

as other actors tend to lack their ‘hands-on’ mentality. Nevertheless, private actors care little about long-term effects of interventions, and the sustainability of their actions is often questionable.

CONADER had worked with so-called strategic partners, neglecting local NGOs. The list of required capacities and institutional capacities automatically excluded any local NGO from the tendering procedure. This led to the subcontracting chain, in which mainly large NGOs and UN agencies were contracted to do the reintegration, and which worked to the detriment of local NGOs. In the end, the reintegration programs were invariably implemented by local contractors, be it local vocational training centres, local businessmen who ran carpentry, masonry, welding, tailoring, mechanics or other crafts centres, or individual craftsmen who – upon request and payment of a small lump sum – each took on a limited number of apprentices. The entire reintegration process therefore can be viewed as a chain system, in which the lower echelons progressively end up with less money to get the job done, whereas the higher echelons gobble up most of the costs for expensive supervision and coordination overheads, which cannot be accounted for when looking at time and effort invested.

Furthermore, after training had been completed, many ex-combatants were unable to find work⁷². In fact, the various trades should have been inventoried prior to the training sequences, as it is imperative to know whether students will find a job once they have finished their training. No thorough analysis was made of the local labour market, nor of supply and demand in terms of services.

Female ex-combatants generally followed the same procedures as their male counterparts. The reintegration training programmes offered training in ‘female’ skills, such as embroidery, knitting, sewing, hairdressing and cloth painting. However, in terms both of the number of programmes offered and the number of women going through such training, it becomes evident that women were a residual category in the reintegration process in the DRC.

In conclusion, DDR was also bound to flounder because most infrastructure that could have been used for integration was destroyed by the war: professional training centres, schools for technical education, vocational training centres, major production centres, industrial companies and so on. The role of civil society in the reintegration component of the DDR programme was minimal and peripheral. Finally, there was no coherent national policy on DDR and no audit was done on the performance of the reinsertion programmes, so a real perspective for those demobilised was lacking.

DDR was also blocked by the numerous conditions imposed by donors and the incapacity of the government to deal with the process.

As a result, the reintegration programs had to rely on informal sector vocational training programmes in which tailors, carpenters, welders and other professionals took on limited numbers of demobilised people as trainees in exchange for minimal training fees.

Combatants on Foreign Soil

DDRRR, the UN demobilisation programme for COFS, is still going on but has not been able to achieve its objective. Although the numbers of voluntary candidates for DDRRR are increasing due to FARDC military pressure, hard-core elements, notably the former officers of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises*, are reluctant to demobilise for fear of being persecuted once they have been repatriated to Rwanda. In view of the fact that dissident forces of General Nkunda still control a part of northern Kivu, and also that there are Banyamulenge militia forces in South Kivu who defy central control, the COFS pose a continuing threat to stability in eastern DRC.

⁷² With the exception of some INGOs such as ADRA in Ituri, which acted as a contracting firm after having trained ex-combatants and provided intermediary services between the ex-fighters and potential clients.

Linkages of DDR with SSR

The DDR was set up jointly by CONADER with the *Structure Militaire d'Integration*. The PN-DDR was based on a so-called *Tronc commun* approach, which meant that demobilisation, reintegration and reinsertion into the army were to be executed by military and non-military groups working together, in order to facilitate army reform jointly with demobilisation of large numbers of militia and soldiers (Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo 2004: 14). This implied that after the initial screening by the *Structure Militaire d'Integration*, those who were to reintegrate into civilian life would be sent to Orientation Centres⁷³, coordinated by CONADER but operated by implementing agencies contracted by CONADER, whereas the remainder were sent to *Centres de Brassage* for retraining and reinsertion in the army. The fact that SMI bypassed the normal procedures and sent demobilised troops straight to the CBR directly impacted on the perspective of security system reform (SSR). The same inertia that characterised the DDR process as a whole also impacted on the restructuring of the army. SMI did not seize the opportunity of D&D to screen future soldiers of the new army adequately.

Civilian actors were not allowed to view the way in which SMI processed combatants as this was considered a national security issue, falling under the exclusive mandate of the Ministry of Defence. SMI was eager to attract funding to be able to address the issue of dependents of foot soldiers. The low salaries and poor living conditions of soldiers impacted on their families who follow soldiers around the country. The issue of dependents has become a nuisance factor for the national army as it has neither the means nor the capacity to solve it. Hence, the FARDC is willing to accept NGO (read civilian) assistance to improve army performance but is unwilling to allow any 'droit de regard' (monitoring) of the manner in which it runs the army⁷⁴.

Strengths and weaknesses of NGOs

Overall, NGOs have been reluctant to engage in the DDR process. They feared they would become associated with military actors and did not want to take political risks. A fair number of INGOs and local NGOs became involved in the demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers and EAFGAs. They became active before CONADER became operational.

The child protection NGOs involved in the reintegration of ex-child combatants contributed greatly to the repatriation, reunification and reintegration of a substantial number of children countrywide. They gave a wide variety of assistance to the children, such as trauma counselling, medical assistance and training. These efforts consisted largely of vocational training (including some non-formal education on civic behaviour, basic literacy and counting skills), and so-called accelerated learning programmes to help children catch up with the formal learning system. Although it is unclear how many ex-EAFGAs auto-demobilised without being traced later and consequently stayed out of reach of the various intervening organisations, those who were traced benefited from such assistance to some extent.

Gradually, a small number of INGOs (ADRA, AAA, Memisa) became engaged in adult demobilisation and reintegration. In some cases local NGOs were subcontracted to run the *Centres d'Orientation* (such as has been the case with Caritas on behalf of Memisa-Belgium in Ituri). By and large the few NGOs involved were committed throughout and managed to smoothen out systemic errors and lack of coordination. The larger INGOs advanced funds when money was not forthcoming and the operational costs to run the COs had to be disbursed, without which security problems would certainly have arisen with the

⁷³ During the initial phases these centres were called *Centres de Transit et d'Orientation* but this has been changed to *Centres d'Orientation*. Children and women were kept in separate barracks or tents during their stay in these CTOs/COs. Gradually, children were placed in independent centres confusingly called 'Centres de Transit et d'Orientation'.

⁷⁴ This opinion was voiced by the top brass of SMI during an interview held in Kinshasa, 10 August 2007

ex-combatants. Some INGOs were more successful in reintegrating ex-combatants than others, ADRA and AAA being cases in point.

Not a single NGO ventured much beyond the confines of running reintegration programmes or operating demobilisation centres. In rare cases, different programmes were initiated, such as a community disarmament pilot programme run by OXFAM/NOVIB and CRONGD in Maniema province, but this project was limited in scope and unsurprisingly, did not seem to have a major impact⁷⁵. However, this pilot project yielded interesting information about possibilities for community disarmament within the broader objective of post-war reconciliation and post-war reconstruction.

By and large, NGOs mainly became service providers in a DDR system that had been conceptualised without their contribution. The DDR was a market and ex-combatants represented money. Many larger INGOs, UN agencies and private consultancy firms fought hard to be able to win tenders for the MDRP money. American consultancy firm Chemonix beat UNDP to the largest tender in the reintegration process to date. Their intervention history in Ituri demonstrates that speed and ad-hoc interventionism do not lead to sustainable reintegration. Reintegration projects generally lacked funding and consequently, beneficiaries were sent off with minimal funds in a context of generalised post-conflict poverty. Reintegration had a better chance of success when NGOs managed to ensure a minimal training period, were able to place people in professional vocational training institutes or when there was some degree of monitoring after training had been completed and ex-combatants had to cater for themselves again.

To their credit it must be added that most intervening NGOs fought hard to include war-affected civilians in the various reintegration projects, mainly so as to make these projects more acceptable to local society but in the process distributing some of the perks to the victims of the conflict. For example, in many so-called *Haut Intensité de Main d'Œuvre* projects (HIMOs) a substantial proportion of beneficiaries were ordinary civilians⁷⁶. Nevertheless, these efforts did not make a difference for the majority of the population, who bore the brunt of the conflict but for whom so far nothing substantial has been organised.

WB directives made it almost impossible for local NGOs to compete with INGOs. Although nominally there was a level playing field, in practice tender requirements automatically excluded local NGOs⁷⁷. This created inequality among INGOs and NGOs. The ensuing system developed into a chain system, in which INGOs would subcontract local NGOs to do the job, and many would cream off a comfortable margin for overhead costs. This was strongly resented by representatives of local NGOs, who felt they were cheated and marginalised. However, UNDP and other agencies explained that such a procedure was inevitable due to a lack of logistical capacity and a lack of expertise among local NGOs. In reality, there are enormous differences between local NGOs in terms of expertise and logistical capacity. More generally, local NGOs lack the financial capacity to advance funding. In a context in which the national agencies were not able to run operations smoothly and did not always operate professionally (lack of coordination and extreme slowness of disbursement), external donors had imposed so-called strategic partners on CONADER, as it were in anticipation of domestic systemic flaws.

75 *Observations by the author during a field visit to Kindu and Maniema at the end of 2005. It was extremely difficult to convince villagers to give up arms in a context of continuing insecurity. Also, many ex-Mayi-Mayi felt that too little was offered in exchange for handing in their weapons. After some initial success, the process came to a halt. More recent fieldwork by fellow researcher Stefan van Laar in August 2007 revealed that many ex-combatants were rather disappointed by external interventions generally and felt marginalised.*

76 *Up to 30% in some projects, interview with local NGO ACIAR in Bunia.*

77 *Representatives of local NGOs in South Kivu declared that one of the requirements was to have a presence in a European country.*

This case study only provides scant information on the issue of NGO projects outside the realm of the DDR process. This is largely due to time constraints and the limited scope of the research. However, only few long-term regular development activities are being carried out at present. In the current security setting, few examples can be found for obvious security and policy-related reasons.

It seems that, at least for the time being, many NGOs are reluctant to initiate such projects. This may be due to the fact that donors generally see the DRC as a still fragile state with concomitant investment risks. The use of blueprint concepts may further obfuscate decision-making on strategic programme development in a country like the DRC. Once a country has been labelled 'transitional' or 'post-conflict', it becomes difficult to get the full range of development programmes approved and funded.

In conclusion, NGOs did not venture far beyond their mandates, and that while the immediate post-conflict setting of the DRC required creative and daring solutions so as to stabilise the country. INGOs mostly became gatekeepers for foreign funding, continuing to be organisations of tutelage in a society which does not lack expertise in itself, but suffers from the fall-out from a deficient system of governance. The real problem of local NGOs is that they replicate the systemic flaws characteristic of all institutions in the DRC. Hence, a few knowledgeable and willing local NGOs were left with the scraps from the table, trying with minimal funding and against all odds to help reintegrate a huge number of largely semi-illiterate ex-fighters who had become a threat to society and needed to be settled down and demobilised.

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Annex 1 Geographical pattern of reintegrated ex-combatants

The eastern part of the DRC contains the bulk of the group totalling 85,000 ex-combatants who have reintegrated in their places of origin and who have officially registered for reintegration. Province Oriental accounts for 24,000, North Kivu 14,000, South Kivu 12,000 and Maniema 4,500, totalling 55,000. Katanga accounts for an additional 11,000, Equateur for 7,500 and Kinshasa for 6,000 ex-combatants. The other provinces have only small numbers of ex-combatants, reflecting the geography of the conflict (Bas Congo, Bandundu, Kasai-Occidental and Kasai Oriental⁷⁸ having been affected less).

The Kinshasa figure also is somewhat of an anomaly, but it can partly be explained by the fact that a number of ex-combatants who joined Laurent Kabila during the first rebellion after having been recruited in the east stayed on when they had reached Kinshasa.

⁷⁸ Heavy fighting took place in Kasai Oriental, as the diamond resources were coveted by RCD Goma, but the fighting mainly took place between RCD-Goma forces with Rwandan support and Kabila's army supported by Angola and Zimbabwean forces.

Annex 2 World Bank:

Numbers of demobilised troops per training

27 June 2007

Annex 3 UE-PNDDR:

July monthly report/Rapport Mensuel

Juillet 2007

PROVINCE	démobilisés installés physiquement	Agence d'Exécution	Sites/Territoires	Capacité des AE	Effectif en cours de formation	Effectif ayant terminé leur formation	Effectif restant à encadrer par les AE	Dépassement des capacités de l'AE	Effectif non pris en charge (non financé)	Observations
BANDUNDU	1,498	FAO	Kikwit, Masimanimba	450	0	0	450			
		BIT *	Kiwit	650	650	0	0			
		TOTAL		1,100	650	0	450		398	
BAS CONGO	902	FAO	Boma, Matadi, Mbanza Ngungu	300	290	0	10			
		INPP	Boma, Matadi, Mbanza Ngungu	550	0	483	67			
		TOTAL		850	290	483	77		52	
EQUATEUR	7,586	ADRA	Lolifa	930	0	930	0			
		BAVDD	Gemena	225	0	225	0			
		COOPEQUA	Mbandaka	220	0	220	0			
		BIT *	Mbandaka, Gemena, Zongo, Budjala	1,700	1,495	0	205			
		FAO	Gemena, Basankusu, Boende, Mbandaka, Bumba, Lisala	2,500	2,401	0	99			
		TOTAL		5,575	3,896	1,375	304		2,011	
KASAI OCC.	1,938	CARITAS	Kananga, Dimbelenge,	1,000	0	1,040	0	40		
		TOTAL		1,000	0	1,040	0		938	
KASAI ORIENT.	1,893	ADEKOR	Mbuji M., Kabinda, Mwene Ditu, Ngandajika, Lubao	1,200	16	824	360			
		CARITAS KOLE	Kole	100	0	100	0			
		CARREFSANK	Lodja	270	0	164	106			
		LCFS	Lodja	35	0	11	24			
		TOTAL		1,605	0	1,099	490		288	
KATANGA	11,181	AASF	Lubumbashi, Likasi, Kolwezi	225	0	225	0			
		CFRK	Kalemie	42	0	45	0	3		Kits non distribués
		CRAIDI	Lubumbashi, Likasi, Bukama	225	0	225	0			
		Caritas DEV	Kongolo, Kabalo	550	0	640	0	90		
		FAO	Lubumbashi, Kipushi, Kasumbalesa, Likasi, Kamina, Kalemie, Mitwaba, Pweto, Kabalo, Kabongo, Malemba Nkulu.	2,500	2,342	0	158	0		
		INPP	Lubumbashi, Kambove, Kolwezi	1,100	800	0	300			
		USAID IFESH	Kalemie, Nyunzu	1,200	1,000	200	0			
		CARITAS KOLE	Kongolo, Kabalo	86	0	86	0	0		
		TOTAL		5,928	4,142	1,421	465		5,253	
KINSHASA	6,073	ADIE	Communes de Kin	100	0	100	0			
		AFEREJE	Communes de Kin	109	0	109	0	0		
		CCPS	Communes de Kin	147	0	147	0			
		FAO		400	290	0	110			
		GTZ	Communes de Kin	5,000	0	4,508	492			
		INPP	Communes de Kin	500	0	474	26			
		NEW LABO	Communes de Kin	100	10	90	0			
		SCSL	Communes de Kin	50	0	50	0			
		TOTAL		6,406	288	5,478	628		0	
MANIEMA	4,585	BIT *	Kindu, Kailo, Kasongo, Pangi	1,200	1,200	0	0			
		CARITAS DEV	Kindu	840	0	840	0			
		FAO		600	444	0	156			
TOTAL		2,640	1,644	840	156		1,945			
NORD KIVU	14,516	BIT *	Goma	1,350	1,014	0	336			
		CARITAS DEV	Butembo	480	0	480	0			
		FAO	Goma, Beni, Butembo, Lubero, Masisi, Rusthuru, Nyragongo, Walikale	2,500	1,575	0	925			
		HDW	Masisi, Rusthuru	1,660	0	1,660	0			
		USAID/DAI	Beni, Butembo	1,212	788	0	424			
		TOTAL		7,202	3,372	2,140	1,685		5,729	
P. ORIENTALE	23,480	ADRA	Aru, Bunia	930	0	768	162			
		CARITAS BUNIA	Bunia, Djugu, Irumu	1,000	253	30	717			
		CARITAS (KOLE)	Isiro	462	0	399	63			
		CARITAS (KOLE)	Buta	84	0	84	0			
		FAO	Bunia, Hinterland de Kisangani (100 Km)	2,000	1,170	0	830			
		INPP	Kisangani, Wanierukula, Bafwasende	1,000	0	849	151			
		USAID/OTI	Aru, Mahagi, Djugu, Irumu	11,200	0	10,431	769			
		TOTAL		16,676	2,100	12,561	2,692		6,804	
SUD KIVU	11,387	BIT *	Bukavu, Idjwi	2,120	1,579	0	541			
		CARITAS UVIRA	Uvira (Toute la Plaine de la Ruzizi)	265	0	305	0	40		
		CARITAS FIZI	Fizi, Baraka	1,080	0	792	288			
		FAO	Bukavu, Kalehe, Kabare, Walungu, Shabunda, Idjwi, Mwenga	2,250	2,038	0	212			
		TOTAL		5,715	3,616	1,097	1,041		6,172	
TOTAL	85,639			54,697	19,998	27,534	7,993	173	30,114	

Une fois l'ensemble des démobilisés installés dans les provinces respectives, ce total est estimé à 40,000.

Sous réserve des chiffres disponibles par l'Applicatif de Suivi de la Réinsertion

Le nombre de démobilisés installés physiquement dans les provinces est indicatif et basé sur les données récentes des Antennes

Annex 4 Provincial statistics Bunia EU-PNDDR unit

4.2 REPARTITION DES DEMOBILISES ENREGISTRES PAR PROVINCE DE REINSERTION ET ENCADRES DANS DES PROJETS

Au 30 juillet 07, la répartition des démobilisés à travers les provinces se présente de la manière suivante :

Tableau 2 : Répartition des démobilisés par province de réinsertion et par filière de réinsertion

PROVINCE	Nombre de Démobilisés installés physiquement		Nombre de démobilisés encadrés dans des projets opérationnels	Effectifs de démobilisés à encadrer par filières de réinsertion			
	HOMMES	FEMMES		Agriculture, élevage, pêche	Formation à l'emploi	AGR	HIMO et AUTRES
BANDUNDU	1484	11	650	80	287	283	0
BAS CONGO	891	11	773	290	433	50	0
EQUATEUR	7443	143	5271	3952	975	344	0
KASAÏ OC	2258	8	1040	505	235	300	0
KASAÏ OR	3114	7	1115	100	85	930	0
KATANGA	10928	253	5563	3738	500	1325	0
KINSHASA	6002	98	5782	340	2600	2842	0
MANIEMA	4193	432	2527	1717	374	436	0
NORD KIVU	14476	425	5517	3723	915	879	0
PROV. OR	22460	1555	13984	1643	980	9889	1472
SUD KIVU	11805	165	4821	2945	770	1106	0
TOTAL	84.947	3108	47043	19033	8154	18384	1472

4.3 PROJETS DE REINSERTION ECONOMIQUE

Il n'y a pas de changement par rapport aux données présentées dans le Rapport Mensuel Janvier 2007.

Projets de Réinsertion économique clôturés : 16

Tableau 3 : Projets clôturés

N°	PROVINCE	Agence d'exécution	Lieu	Nombre de démobilisés concernés	Budget CONADER (US\$)	Date de démarrage
1	PROV.OR	USAID/OTI	Ituri	11 200	4 748 273\$	12/12/2005
2	KINSHASA	New Labo Diesel	Kinshasa	100	39 933\$	05/12/2005
3	KINSHASA	CCPS	Kinshasa	147	62 820\$	02/12/2005
4	KINSHASA	ADIE	Kinshasa	100	39 921\$	07/12/2005
5	KINSHASA	AFEREJE	Kinshasa	109	39 600\$	15/12/2005
6	KINSHASA	Sœurs Curatrices St Luc	Kinshasa	50	19 697\$	11/01/2006
7	BAS CONGO	INPP BAS CONGO	Bas Congo	550	220 000\$	15/05/2006
8	NORD KIVU	Caritas BENI	Beni	480	191 743\$	29/04/2006
9	KATANGA	Caritas Kongolo	Kongolo	550	199 270\$	28/03/2006
10	KATANGA	CRAIDI	Sud Katanga	225	90 000\$	28/03/2006
11	SUD KIVU	Caritas Uvira	Uvira	265	105 977\$	22/04/2006
12	NORD KIVU	HDW 1	Masai, Rutshuru	580	231 478\$	22/03/2006
13	KATANGA	AASF	Sud-Katanga	225	90 000\$	28/03/2006
14	EQUATEUR	COPEQUA	Mbandaka	220	90 000\$	15/03/2006
15	EQUATEUR	BAVDD	Gemena	225	88 000\$	15/03/2006
16	KINSHASA	INPP	Kinshasa	500	243 890\$	04/04/2006
TOTAL				15 526	6 476 622\$	

Annex 5 A new entity: Unité d'Exécution pour le Programme National de Désarmement, la Démobilisation et de la Réintégration (EU-ORIENTATION GENERALE

Annex 4
Statistics Antenne Provinciale de Bunia/UE-PNDDR

CATEGORIE	ADULTES		EAFGA		AGES		HANDICAPES		FA RDC		TOTAL
	MA	FA	Garçon	Fille	MA	FA	MA	FA	MA	FA	
PHASE INITIALE 01/09/2004 - 27/07/2005	13931	251	3227	804	19	0	88	1	765	25	19111
PHASE ADD	5021	416	1101	174	0	0	13	3	1		6729
ARRIVES	2000	106	3413	541							6060
FARDC											0
TOTAL	20952	773	7741	1519	19	0	101	4	766	25	31900
	21849		9260								

ADULTE	21849
EAFGA	9260
FARDC	791
TOTAL	31900

Antenne Provinciale de Bunia/UE PNDDR

procedure for the new director was thoroughly undemocratic and therefore unacceptable. Consequently, the WB is waiting for signs that the Ministry of Defence is taking these issues seriously. Alternatively, the WB is considering direct contracts with implementing agencies to circumvent the operational blockage that prevails. From the perspective of DRC officials involved, the fact that President Kabila has personally intervened by means of presidential decrees should be interpreted as a strong commitment on the part of the new government to help resolve this issue⁸¹. It seems that a stalemate has been reached between the WB and the donors, who insist on transparent governance, and the incumbent government, which wants to assert its autonomy vis-à-vis the Western world.

Most of the funds for the reintegration of a total of 53,000 ex-fighters have been disbursed; some residual payments are still outstanding but the WB has blocked all disbursements until the CONADER reforms have been implemented. Furthermore, a substantial outstanding debt of around US\$7 million, incurred by CONADER, needs to be repaid by the government, failing which MDRP funding will not be resumed in the DRC.

All this means that the new UE-PNDDR unit has not yet become operational. The ex-CONADER staff are 'on technical leave', which means that although they continue to ensure office presence, they do not receive salaries or job benefits. Many staff members expect that the institutional changes will not affect their own status, and that things will continue as they used to be.

Today, as CONADER has ceased to exist, the army claims to have provisionally taken over its main tasks⁸². This would mean that the SMI now supervises the selection process ex-combatants undergo: SMI has

79 Unfortunately, at present there is a tendency to use the reorganisation of CONADER to place political protégés into the new unit EU-PNDDR. Many old hands within CONADER resent this as they were selected on the grounds of qualifications.

80 Interview with World Bank official in Kinshasa

81 Interview with various ex-CONADER officials in Kinshasa, Bukavu and Bunia, August 2007

82 Interview with SMI national coordinator and his team in Kinshasa

become responsible for reinsertion and reintegration selection. In some areas, demobilised combatants did not receive enough money to travel to their areas of origin, and so they stayed behind in other areas where they have since become a nuisance factor for the local population. At the request of the authorities, SMI is now keeping these demobilised ex-fighters in the camps. They, however, feel they are being kept prisoner, in some cases they have been held for over seven months.

Annex 6 List of interviews

Interviews by Pyt Douma

Kinshasa

1	GTZ Kinshasa, Jean-Luc Mathey, Country Programme Manager	6-8-2007
2	Major Kabana Trudon, FARDC	6-8-2007
3	Bureau International Catholique de l'Enfance BICE Crispin Mulumba, Coordinateur National	6-8-2007
4	Head SSR at MONUC HQ, Lt. Colonel Kirill Dorozkhin	7-8-2007
5	UN-PNDDR, Professor Mumba Luaba Lumu, Directeur National Grevice Ditend, Directeur Integration	7-8-2007
6	GADERES, Philippe Muanza, Coordinateur	7-8-2007
7	Pere Rigobert Minani, RODHECIC	7-8-2007
8	Comite International de la Croix Rouge ICRC Joanna Davey and Florent Bopey	8-8-2007
9	Croix Rouge de Belgique, Guy Kumbi, Projet ESFGA	8-8-2007
10	Save the Children, Hussain Mursal, Country Director	8-8-2007
11	UNDP Fernando Larrauri, Head Post-conflict Unit	9-8-2007
12	William Swing, SRSG MONUC	9-8-2007
13	Civil Affairs MONUC, Richard Snellen	9-8-2007
14	PAREC Pasteur Ngoy Daniel Mulunda-Nyanga	9-8-2007
15	Political Affairs MONUC Christian Manahl, Deputy Director Political Affairs	9-8-2007
16	UE PNDDR, Grevisse Ditend, Directeur Reintegration	10-8-2007
17	ASADHO, Roger Katembwe, DDR/SSR Officer, Amigo Ngonde, Directeur	10-8-2007
18	Interview Services Militaires d'Integration (SMI) Colonel Shulungu, Coordinateur Nationale and Colonel Prosper Nzekani Zena, Supervisor Special Integration Operations	10-8-2007
19	USAID, Nicholas Jenks, Programme Officer	13-8-2007
20	Development Alternatives Inc Charles Tobin Vaughan (Toby), Chief of Party	13-8-2007
21	World Bank, Abderrahim Fraiji, Demobilisation and Reintegration Specialist, MDR Secretariat	13-8-2007

Bukavu

22	CONADER Bukavu, Willy Kikungu, Head of Office Lievain Cirhuza, Programme Manager	15-8-2007
23	Héritiers de la Justice, Maurice Bahati, Coordinator	15-8-2007
24	BVES Murhabazi, Namegabe	15-8-2007
25	CARITAS Bukavu, Serge Bingane, Directeur Jean Claude Mahananu, Programme Officer Reintegration	16-8-2007
26	MONUC Bukavu, Madani Head Unit DDDRR	16-8-2007
27	Political Affairs Bukavu Ebrima Njie, Associate Political Affairs Officer Sarah Brigitta Kanafani, Political Affairs Officer	16-8-2007
28	Provincial Government of South Kivu	16-8-2007

	Emmanuel Rugarabura, Provincial Interior Minister	
	Amisi Kapokela, Minister of Youth, Sports, Culture and Arts.	
	Theophile Mutalisiso, Minister of Environment	
	Jeanne d'Arc Chapupewa, Minister of Planning and Finance	
29	Class of sixty ex-combatants Bukavu at mechanic workshop	17-8-2007
30	OCHA Bukavu, Modibo Traore, Office Manager South Kivu	17-8-2007
31	UNICEF Bukavu, Agnes Katavali, Educational Programme Officer	17-8-2007

Bunia (Ituri district)

32	Commissaire de District Adjoint, Dieudonne Rwabona Mugabu	21-8-2007
33	CONADER Ituri, Colonel Duku, Chef d'Antenne	21-8-2007
34	Eric Mongo, ACIAR	21-8-2007
35	Forum des Mamans d'Ituri (FOMI) Catherine Budzja, Presidente Catherine Bonive, Conseilliere	22-8-2007
36	ADRA Bunia Deo Bashokwire, Regional Coordinator Emanuel Tjibangu, Reintegration Officer	23-8-2007
37	Société Civile Bunia, Bosco Lalo, Coordinateur	23-8-2007
38	UNDP Bunia Harouna Dan Malam COMREC officer	23-8-2007
39	FAO Bunia, Mutima Lambert, Agricultural Consultant	23-8-2007
40	CARITAS Bunia, Abe Emmanuel Ndrundro Kodjo, Directeur Jean de Dieu, Reintegration Officer	24-8-2007
41	UNICEF Bunia, Sandra Lattouf, Head Bunia Office	24-8-2007
42	Political Affairs MONUC Bunia, Christophe Billen	24-8-2007

Interviews by Bart Klem, Ituri district

43	Five ex-combatants (Likana Weba Eric, Mugisa Joseph, Ndjabu Sala, Jean de Dieu Maki and Brandonne Bakabona Jerry) outskirts of Bunia	22-8-2007
44	Six ex-combatants UPC at Gatoto village	23-8-2007
45	George Malo, Motor Taxi Driver, Bunia	23-8-2007
46	Londry Pascal, Association of Motor Taxi Drivers in Congo (Ituri branche) Aseco Moto	23-8-2007
47	COOPI Bunia, Nicoletta Confalone, Coordinatrice Régionale	24-8-2007
48	Borive Esperane Consolate, Female ex-combatant	24-8-2007
49	Five ex-bush wives, Bunia	24-8-2007
50	Two ex-combatants, Mongbwalu	25-8-2007
51	Ron Mininger, PACT Congo, Former Programme Manager Chemonics Ituri at Mongbwalu	25-8-2007
52	Seven ex-combatants (all men) Raci Arombo, Matthieu Kalonga Mitiso, Patrick Kagha Ilongu, Pascal Muhindo Numesu, Gerard Qpadyu Kingapa, Theo Hantela Zob and Omar Manghetu Apole at Mongbwalu village	25-8-2007
53	Six ex-combatants at Nizi village (two women, four men)	25-8-2007
54	Katho Beraki, John Hairdresser, Bunia	27-8-2007
55	Lokpatchu Roger, Superviseur, ADRA DRC field visit	27-8-2007
56	Rudi Sterz, German Agro Action, Bunia	27-8-2007
57	Mrs Magarite, Tailor, Bunia	27-8-2007

58	Major Michel Nchaki, SMI FARDC Headquarters Bunia	28-8-2007
59	COOPI follow-up interview External Researcher	28-8-2007
60	Two females, one ex-combatant, the other abducted bush wife	28-8-2007

Interviews by Stefan van Laar, Kindu

61	Thierry Kisukulu Asianande, Law Student, Kindu	5-8-2007
62	Ahmed Shariff, Head of MONUC in Maniema	6-8-2007
63	Caritas Kindu/CRS Aimi Césaire Shango (Caritas Kindu) and Roger Nwaka (CRS)	6-8-2007
64	Political Affairs Section, MONUC, Joseph Kmuri Nyembo	6-8-2007
65	FAO, S. Amsini, Chef District Office FAO Kindu	7-8-2007
66	Ex-CONADER staff member, Monique Akupendae	8-8-2007
67	GTZ, Achim Koch, responsible for youth programmes	8-8-2007
68	ICG, René Lucanda Ngonbo, Head ICG Maniema	8-8-2007
69	CRONGD, Oxfam Novib partner	8-8-2007
70	UPKA, Farmers' Union in Maniema, Amurani Aruna, Chairman	9-8-2007
71	Lotange village, 65 km from Kindu	10-8-2007
72	Lubao village, 26 km from Kindu	10-8-2007
73	Lokando village, 67 km from Kindu	10-8-2007
74	Local NGO MALI, Director Paul Kasongo	14-8-2007
75	Willy Kikungu, Head CONADER Bukavu, Former Head CONADER Kindu	24-8-2007

Uvira-South Kivu

76	Mr Gilbert, Head Cordaid partner ADED	20-8-2007
77	Nathalie Vezier, Advisor Cordaid partners	20-8-2007
78	ADED training, Lemera	21-8-2007
79	Fieldworker Didier and CTO Lemera Manager Pascal	21-8-2007
80	Follow-up interview Nathalie Vezier, Cordaid partner advisor	21-8-2007
81	Two child soldiers, Lemera	21-8-2007
82	Staff member Centre de Transit et d'Orientation Lemera	21-8-2007
83	Caritas Uvira, Jean Kabambu and Pascal Kyanga	22-8-2007
84	CONADER Uvira, Chef Juvenal Mufunzizi	22-8-2007
85	Francoise Kyakula, Gender Specialist Caritas Uvira	22-8-2007
86	Nicole, Head of Mission Jesuit Refuge Service Uvira	22-8-2007
87	Camp official at the Centre de Brassage, Luberizi	23-8-2007

Abbreviations

AAA	Agro Action Allemand
ACIAR	Appui à la Communication Interculturelle et à l'Autopromotion Rurale, a local Ituri-based NGO
ADED	Appui au Développement de l'Enfant en Détresse
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération
AGV	Activités Génératrices de Revenues
BICE	Bureau International Catholique de l'Enfance
BVES	Bureau pour le Volontariat au service de l'Enfance et de la Santé
CAR	Central African Republic
CBO	Centres de Brassage et d'Orientation
CBR	Centres de Brassage
CGFDDR	Comité de Gestion des Fonds pour le Désarmement, Démobilisation et de la Réintégration
CI-DDR	Comité Interministériel chargé de la conception et de l'orientation en matière de DDR
CLAP	Comité Locale d'Approbation des Projets
CO	Centres d'Orientation/ Orientation Centres
COFS	Combatants on Foreign Soil
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale
CONADER	Commission National pour la Démobilisation et la Réintégration
CRB	Croix rouge de Belgique
CRONGD	Conseil Régional des ONG de Développement
CTO	Centres de Transit et d'Orientation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRC (2)	Plan Opérationnel de Désarmement et Réinsertion Communautaire
EAFGA	Enfants Associés aux Forces et Groupes Armées
FAO	UN Food and Agricultural Organisation
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FAZ	Forces Armées Zairoises
FNI	Forces National Intégristes- a Lendu ethnic militia group based in Ituri district-DRC
FNL	Front National pour la Libération, a Burundi rebel group
FOMI	Forum des Mamans d'Ituri
GRET	Groupe de Recherche Études Technologiques
GTZ	Gemeinschaftliche Technische Zusammenarbeit
Hdlj	Héritiers de la Justice, South Kivu-based human rights organisation
HIMO	Haut Intensité de Main d'Œuvre
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MDRP	Multi Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MONUC	Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies au Congo
PN-DDR	Programme National pour le Désarmement, Démobilisation et de la Réintégration
RCD	Rassemblement pour la Démocratie- Goma
SECA/Chemonix	Synergie d'Éducation Communautaire et Appui à la Transition, Congolese branch of American consultancy firm Chemonix

SMI	Service Militaire d'Intégration
SSR	Security System Reform
UE-PNDDR	Unité d'Exécution du Programme National pour le Désarmement, Démobilisation et à la Réintégration, successor organisation of CONADER
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPC	Union Patriotique Congolais, a Hema ethnic militia group in Ituri
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defence Forces
WB	World Bank
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

