COPTS IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS 1919–1952

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COPTIS
IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS
1919–1952

Dr. Mostafa El Feki
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Note on Transliteration

For familiar proper names I have used the English spelling in common usage at the time. Hence, Makram Ebeid, Moustafa El-Nahhas, Saad Zaghloul, etc. Elsewhere, in transliterating Arabic words, I have generally conformed to the method adopted in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, with slight variations.
List of Abbreviations

FO 371  Foreign Office – General Correspondence
FO 407  Foreign Office – Confidential Print
FO 800  Foreign Office – Private Collection
M.M.N.  Madabit Majlis Al-Nuwab (Chamber of Deputies)
M.M.S.  Madabit Majlis Al-Shuyukh (Senate)
P.Qs    Parliamentary Questions
PRO    Public Record Office
Introduction

The modern Egyptian national movement pursued, in spite of all the differences among the political and social groups, two main objectives: independence and the Constitution.

The national movement has not yet received adequate academic research in Egypt, mainly because of the political and social climate under the military regime since 1952. The year can be considered as a dividing line between two distinct periods. Since that time the earlier period has been greatly disparaged, to the extent that the present young generation in Egypt is unacquainted with, and indifferent to, the history of the national movement, especially the period from 1919 to 1952. Because of the scant dispassionate appraisal of those years, that period will be the historical background of this research, when political parties were most active in seeking independence and a constitution. The circumstances of political life in Egypt in that period were influenced by the main power centers, the Royal Palace, the resident representatives of Britain in the country and the political parties themselves.

Among various interesting aspects of those times, the role of the Copts in the Wafd party and their contribution to the national movement will be the focus of this research.

Makram Ebeid, among other leaders, Coptic or Muslim, attracts special interest. His role, as a Copt politician, has been chosen as a case study throughout that period because Ebeid, as an active Coptic element, furnishes a richly illustrative example of the participation of Copts in the Egyptian National Movement. His political activity continued without interruption to cover the whole period, from 1919 to 1952, of parliamentary and constitutional government. Ebeid was the Secretary General of the Wafd, the majority party,
for fifteen years, and began his involvement in the national movement as an intimate associate and follower of Saad Zaghloul Pasha. Ebeid possessed all the classic qualifications and talents of the Egyptian politician of his time. An excellent orator and accomplished writer, he was able to influence public opinion, and displayed great dexterity in the manoeuvres of political life, being considered one of the ablest political tacticians of the period.

Both as a personality and in his political career, Makram Ebeid was the very embodiment of the thought, feelings and ambitions of an individual coming from a minority community, insisting on playing an effective role within the majority. Mainly for those reasons, Ebeid’s political career is a reflection of the period of secular liberalism in modern Egypt, which gave the National Movement, particularly during its early years, a special character by including both sections of the Egyptian nation, Copts and Muslims, in the political process and offering a practical solution to religious divisions. Thus, Ebeid was one of the phenomena emerging within the growth of secular liberalism in modern Egypt. Without major changes and radical reform taking place in the political system and social atmosphere since Mohamed Ali, such circumstances yielding a type like Ebeid would not be found.

Ebeid was also the reflection of the spirit engendered by Zaghloul. Such a spirit was characterized by pure Egyptian thought free of any religious undertones, unassociated with any foreign power and conditioned only by the aim of full independence. The spirit of Zaghloul could be described as the creation of a large group of Egyptians, without reference to any common social roots among them, except the belief in a unified Egyptian Nation, seeking independence and democratic rule. The spirit of Zaghloul differs from that of the Watanist thought and the Umma party, as the former was based on the belief in an Islamic nation, and encouraged originally by the Ottoman Caliph, while the latter was the political articulation of the Egyptian elite and the landowners of the middle size property with some of the intellectuals coming from the wealthy families of the countryside. Zaghloul’s aspirations strongly attracted the Coptic minority, enabling it, for the first time in Muslim Egypt, to become a positive element in Egyptian public life.

Any concentration on the religious factor in this study is not concerned with theological beliefs, but rather with a lifestyle and a type of culture leading
to a certain structure of thought in their reaction or response to ideas and events as well as in the shaping of the social relations between the individual and the community in the context of power, or in the political process.

Thus this study will deal with several elements and factors some of which are political, others social or religious. This thesis is not a historical survey, but history will provide the background and the selected material for the purposes of the study, which is an attempt to follow Makram Ebeid in his political career. It also seeks to investigate his inner struggle with high ambition, conditioned by certain factors, and to appraise the opportunities that came his way, to enable him to act as the main representative of the Copts in the modern Egyptian National Movement.

It should be remarked here that the social-political atmosphere in Egypt before 1952 was such as to elicit the response of the whole populace to the Wafd’s leadership of the national independence movement without any undue inter-denominational friction. Political partnership between Muslims and Copts under the banner of the Wafd offered the opportunity to all groups and factions to express their various ideas through the mechanism of political activity and participation.
The term “Copt” derives from the Arabic word Qibt, which, in its turn, is merely a shortened form of the Greek word Aigyptios (Egyptian).

The expression “Coptic Church” thus means “Egyptian Church” and it is applied to the church which, according to tradition, was founded by St. Mark the Evangelist at Alexandria, where on April 25, 63 A.D. he suffered martyrdom. For the next hundred years or so, down to the time of the Patriarch Demetrius, ca. 189 A.D., we know little of the occupants of the throne of St. Mark beyond their names\(^{(1)}\).

In the fifth century, the Egyptian Church, in the person of St. Cyril, Patriarch of Alexandria, played a very important role in the Christological controversies which rent the Church at that time.

“In his anxiety to safeguard the real humanity of Jesus Christ against the theory of Apollinaris, Bishop of Leodicea stated that in the person of Christ the Divine Logos took the place of the human soul”\(^{(2)}\).

This point, in particular, is the main difference between Copts and Catholics, as the former believe that the human soul of Christ is integrated with his divine nature. On the contrary, Catholics believe that Christ possessed his human soul whilst on earth, and his divine nature was assumed only when he had gone to Heaven after his crucifixion\(^{(3)}\). It was St. Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria, who led the assembled bishops to excommunicate St. Leo, Pope of Rome, and to depose St. Flavien from the see of Constantinople\(^{(4)}\).

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(2) Ibid.: 2.
Two years later, the whole question of the nature of Christ came up again at the Council of Chalcedon, held in 451 A.D. The Egyptian Church under the leadership of her Patriarch, St. Cyril, maintained the “One Incarnate Physis of the Word of God”, giving to the term “physis” its primary meaning of “nature”; whereas, the see of Constantinople accepted the definition of the Faith as set forth by St. Leo, Pope of Rome, namely, that “the true God is born with the complete and perfect nature of a true man, perfect in His own Nature (divinity) and perfect in our nature (humanity)”\(^\text{(5)}\).

The schism between the Egyptian Church and the Greek and Latin Churches was now complete. The Egyptian Church, loyal to what she held to be the teaching of St. Cyril on the Nature of Jesus Christ, upheld the doctrine of Monophysitism, which may be stated as follows: Two Natures, not divided according to Nestorius, nor confused or submerged, according to the heterodox teachings of Eutyches and Apollinaris, but united inconfusedly and indivisibly, according to what St. Cyril of Alexandria states in his thesis against Nestorius: ‘One is the Incarnate Nature of the Word, as the Fathers said’\(^\text{(6)}\).

Thus it came about that two lines of Popes and Patriarchs of Alexandria arose, the one representing the Monophysite Egyptian Church, and the other, the Greek Orthodox Church in Egypt, which, after the Arab Conquest of Egypt, was reduced to an insignificant number. Her patriarchs resided normally at Constantinople, and were represented in Egypt by Patriarchal Vicars. However, from the sixteenth century onwards there has been a regular succession of Greek Orthodox Popes and of Patriarchs of Alexandria resident in Egypt. As soon as the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon were known, serious disorders broke out in Egypt\(^\text{(7)}\).

From now on, down to the Arab Conquest of Egypt, the country was the scene of bloodshed, strife and persecution which arose from the fatal policy of


the Emperors of Constantinople, whereby they attempted to impose by force the theology of the Council of Chalcedon on their non-Hellenic subjects, who for the most part were solidly monophysite, with a view to secure thereby the unity of the Empire.

With the intention to conciliate the Egyptian Christians, the Emperor Heraclius in 631 A.D. appointed Cyrus to be the patriarch of Alexandria. Cyrus had embraced the monothelite doctrine, but when he found that he could not win over the Egyptian Christians to monotheletism, he embarked upon a savage persecution which was to have fatal results for the unity of the Empire\(^{(8)}\). In 640 A.D. Amr Ibn Al-As invaded Egypt and defeated the Imperial forces at the Battle of Heliopolis. The following year, the Fortress of Babylon capitulated, and as no help came from Constantinople, the Imperial forces evacuated Alexandria under treaty, and sailed away from the city on September 17, 642 A.D.

As a matter of fact, the Coptic Church may be regarded as a living museum of early forms of primitive Christianity\(^{(9)}\). This supports the view that the Coptic Church is an original one of a classic type. The spiritual side of the Copts is revealed in the teachings of the Orthodox Faith. From the very beginning, the Coptic Orthodoxy has clung to the doctrines of monophysitism and monothelitism, that is, the one nature and one will of Jesus Christ. The Coptic creed believes in the Trinity, but that undivided oneness is very predominant in their faith. These may be considered minor issues now, but in the old days, they caused wars and persecutions amongst the various groups and peoples. The Coptic Church is considered on the conservative side of the Christian Church as a whole. It is known for its reserved character and marked distaste for change.

Since the Arab Conquest of Christian Egypt, the population of Egypt consisted of two main elements: Muslims and Copts, the latter now representing around 10% of the total. There are, of course, several very small minorities of non-Coptic Christians and Jews.

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\(^{(8)}\) *Ibid.*: 131.

A survey of Muslim Egypt since the Arab Conquest reveals that the policy of the Muslim ruling classes towards the Copts was never stable or integrated. Thus, policies, attitudes and decisions were subject to change, often abrupt, according to the disposition and policy of the ruler\textsuperscript{(10)}. At first, Egypt was ruled by a governor, appointed first by the early Caliphs to 661, then by the Omayyad Caliphs to 750 and after that by the Abbasid Caliphs. Then followed the Fatimid Caliphs with direct rule for some two centuries, 969-1169.

The treatment of the non-Muslim population, \textit{Ahl Al-Dhimma}, during the pre-Fatimid era was subject to the political and economic vicissitudes through which Egypt passed. Often the treatment of minorities was harsh. This change would seem natural under the Fatimid Shiites, mainly because they were independent of the Sunni State in Baghdad and their relation was subject to political and religious competition. The Fatimids, accordingly, could not depend only on the support of the Sunni Muslims of Egypt. That explains the increasing influence of non-Muslim elements in the Fatimid era.

The Fatimid rulers appointed some non-Muslims to important positions in the State, as advisers and ministers. This period of the Islamic history of Egypt is rich in material dealing with the State treatment of the \textit{Ahl Al-Dhimma}, and is full of events to illustrate it. Every ruler had his own policy in dealing with minorities. Whilst many of the Caliphs were very tolerant and broad-minded, others were bigoted and prejudiced, taking severe measures against the minorities without any cogent cause (e.g. \textit{Al-Hakim bi-amrillah}).

There is, however, a significant point which emerges from any survey on minorities in the history of Islamic Egypt. The treatment of rulers towards them has been governed mainly by the former’s need for cash or wealth, and in order to obtain this they were obliged to implement their policies through their systems of collecting taxes and the “\textit{Jizyah}”. The non-Muslim minorities suffered, not basically because of religious prejudice, but from financial pressures. The Fatimids in Egypt were very ambitious to extend their State and prestige. They were interested in building mosques and palaces,

\textsuperscript{(10)} J. Tager, \textit{Aqbat Wa Muslimun}, Cairo 1951: 63.
and in living in a luxurious style to make Cairo the center of attraction to the Muslims, rather than Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid State.

They were in need of money and at the same time they required a strong organized administrative system to collect taxes and develop the State’s financial resources. The Copts proved a suitable community to carry out such duties, and were ready to fulfill them in a competent way. When the Fatimids lost all hope of bringing the Sunnis over to their side and felt assured of the reliability of the Copts and their ability at accounting and matters of taxation, they showed their gratitude to them by tolerance and open-mindedness\(^{(11)}\).

The vagueness of some points concerning the position of Copts in the Fatimid State emerges from some rumours recorded in Coptic history; for instance, that the first Fatimid Caliph, Al-Mu’izz, apostasized from Islam to Christianity and vacated the throne just before his death; and that Al-Hakim, who had a Coptic mother, disappeared after spending most of his time in the last months of his life with bishops and rebuilding monasteries and churches\(^{(12)}\). In short, the position of the Copts under the Fatimid Caliphs has been considered a turning point in the former’s history.

During the Crusades, the Copts, under the Ayyubids, showed little sympathy with the Europeans. On the contrary, they saw the defeat of the Crusaders as a punishment for the heresy of the Western Church\(^{(13)}\). They also rejected the claim of the Crusaders that they were trying to protect Christian minorities, among them the Copts\(^{(14)}\).

The Copts naturally have been deeply attached to their homeland and jealous of their ancient origin throughout the vicissitudes of Islamic history and have never thought of fleeing the country, in spite of the incidental violence and unjust treatment dealt out to them by several of their rulers.

During the Crusades, the position of the Copts was of course critical because of the religious character of the struggle and the suspicion of

\(^{(11)}\) Ibid. : 151.
\(^{(12)}\) Ibid. : 152.
\(^{(13)}\) Ibid. : 171.
\(^{(14)}\) A speech of Patriarch Shenouda, Head of the Coptic Church, Al-Ahram, February 9, 1977.
doubtful loyalty that permeated the Islamic State towards such minorities at that period. In spite of the fact that the Coptic Church has no religious affinities with the Roman Catholic Church and that Copts had not welcomed the Crusaders, some Copts were not wholly indisposed to the idea that they might co-operate with the Crusaders to establish a Christian State in Egypt. The Crusades left a historical antagonism between Islam and Christianity, yet it was the start of the cultural link between East and West.

Under Mamluk rule (1250–1517) the Copts did not enjoy the same privileges in public life they had during the Fatimid period. Thus one can state that their condition deteriorated and was hardly alleviated during the six centuries before the Campaign of Napoleon. No important events occurred except isolated policies implemented by some rulers against Copts to exclude them from public life and to restrict them to the field of tax collection, as they had long acquired a special reputation in financial administrative posts and in taxation.

In 1517, Egypt became a conquered province of the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim I, who sent to Istanbul some thousands of the most skilled Egyptians in all professions; among these were a considerable number of Copts(15). The condition of the Copts under Ottoman rule was subject to the varying policy of the Sultan’s representative in Cairo. For example, they were secure under the rule of the strong man, Aly Bey Al-Kabir, but whenever a new governor was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan, the former’s demand for more money by decreeing new laws for taxes, caused many difficulties and much suffering for the Coptic tax-gatherers. One can mention some outstanding personages among the Copts, who played a part in public life before the establishment of modern Egypt: Mu’allim Rizk was the head of the Coptic clerks under Aly Bey Al-Kabir and on his death, he was succeeded by Mu’allim Ibrahim El-Gohari(16).

The Copts’ attitude towards the French Campaign was a reaction to Napoleon’s policy. He had arrived in Egypt, claiming that he had come to

help the Muslim population against the Mamelukes because he respected Islam as a religion and as an historical fact. The Copts had accused the French of wishing to get rid of them, by no longer depending on them for tax-gathering. Coptic writers who dealt with that period explain their criticism of Napoleon’s policy, e.g. Mikhail complains in his book:

“In 1798 Napoleon conquered Egypt, posing as a Moslem deliverer. But the virtues of the French were as injurious to them as their vices, and in a few months they had continued to set every class, nationality and creed against them. The English, who were then at war with the French, followed them into Egypt in February 1801, and drove them out the same year”\(^{17}\).

After the rebellion of Cairo against the French, the latter’s attitude towards Copts was changed in an attempt to have the Coptic community on their side. When the rebels of Cairo asked for security, Kléber agreed, but he decided upon a new exceptional tax on the whole population except Copts and other non-Muslims\(^{18}\).

There is only one point which has never yet been satisfactorily cleared up: it concerns the military co-operation between the Copts and the French conquerors which is known as the “General Yacoub Movement”.

“The Copt Yacoub co-operated with the French and they made him the Commander of the Coptic troops which included Coptic youths with a special military uniform similar to the French uniform”\(^{19}\).

However, most of the Copts opposed General Yacoub’s policy and condemned it on many occasions. Al-Bishry states that General Yacoub was not on good terms with the Coptic Patriarch and it was rumoured that he once entered a church on horseback brandishing his sword\(^{20}\). On the other hand, some Coptic writers consider the General Yacoub movements as a


special trend in patriotism. They found in Yacoub’s attempt the first Egyptian movement for independence from Turkish sovereignty\(^{(21)}\).

After the French Campaign, the nineteenth century marks the turning point in Egypt from medieval conditions and institutions in thought and politics to the beginning of a modern State. In agriculture, as in industry, modern administration and even education, there were stirrings that could be considered the real birth of Egyptian nationalism and the shaping of modern Egyptian society.

As Mohamed Ali represents a factor for independence in the Ottoman Empire; he gave the Egyptian character his attention and encouraged in some measure the beginnings of an Egyptian nationalism which was really the start of the secular state in modern Egypt. In so far as Mohamed Ali attempted to depend on the Egyptian element in his State projects for modernization and power, his policy towards Copts was correspondingly affected. As an example, he never refused a request for building a new church\(^{(22)}\), and he was the first ruler to bestow the rank of Bey upon a Copt. Furthermore, he afforded Copts all the necessary facilities for pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

When Said Pasha came to power, he initiated a policy with more dependence on the Egyptian element, especially the “fellaheen”, and offered them opportunities to enter the administration and the army. He wished to limit Turkish participation in all fields, and finally removed the last obstacle to the integration of Egyptian society when he decided to admit Copts into military service with the Egyptian Army. At the same time, in 1855 he abolished the taxes (Al-Jizyah) on the non-Muslims\(^{(23)}\).

For their own part, the Coptic community was formulating its organizations and improving its condition by the establishment of the modern schools, as a result of the Coptic communal reform, which is associated with

\(^{(21)}\) For example, Salama Moussa in his article in Misr Journal November 26, 1946, and Dr. Louis ‘Awad in his lecture at the Institute of Diplomatic Studies, Cairo 1969. For further details on Yacoub’s Coptic Legion see: O.F.A. Meinardus, Christian Egypt, Faith and Life, Cairo 1968: 14-16.


\(^{(23)}\) Ibid.: 238.
the Patriarch Cyril IV, 1854–1861. He is now known as the Father of Reform (Abu Al-Islah). In actual fact, reform, understood as an attempt at raising the educational level of the generally ignorant Coptic clergy, had its origin at an earlier period. In 1843, the few missionaries of the Church Missionary Society active in Egypt converted an educational seminary, founded in 1833, into a Coptic institution.

Patriarch Cyril IV established the Patriarchate, dividing it into two administrations, one concerned with Coptic Waqfs and the other with religious and legal matters. In constructing a school contiguous to the Cathedral, Cyril performed the most valuable and lasting service to the community. Prior to this time, the Copts had had a primitive system of education, based on small village schools similar to the Kuttabs. Cyril’s school (Madrasat Al-Aqbat Al-Kubra) was the first to function on sound pedagogical lines. The school gradually attracted an ever-increasing number of students and Cyril found it necessary to build a similar school in the Coptic district of Harat al-Saga’in. From these two schools graduated many students who were to play important roles in both the Coptic community and Egyptian society at large: e.g. Boutros Ghali Pasha, the Prime Minister, the politician and historian, Mikhail Abd Al-Sayyid, founder of the Coptic paper, Al-Watan. Cyril also established schools for Coptic girls.

This educational activity, in its religious and secular branches, required the use of books. Hitherto knowledge had been gleaned from handwritten manuscripts which were both tattered and faulty. Cyril remedied this situation by importing the first Egyptian private printing press. It was welcomed by a religious ceremonial reception, but the patriarch could not make much use of it as he died soon after.

Cyril’s sudden death is intimately associated among Coptic authors with the displeasure of Sa’id Pasha at the former’s close connection with the heads of the Greek and Armenian Orthodox Churches. Seeking unity between the Coptic and the various branches of the Orthodox Church, Cyril

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was represented as having been intent on placing the Coptic Church under foreign, that is Russian, protection. Infuriated at this supposed design, Sa’id Pasha is alleged to have ordered the poisoning of Cyril.

Ismail Pasha, who was motivated by his aim of making modern Egypt a part of Europe, gave financial support to the Coptic schools, and appointed Coptic judges in the Courts. In 1866, he granted Copts the right to become members in the first Egyptian parliament *Majlis Shura Al-Nuwwab*. Since that time, the element of what one might call the Egyptian nation came into being, in the modern sense, to distinguish between the Egyptians, Muslims and Copts on the one hand, and other foreigners such as Turkish and Armenians on the other. Ismail Pasha, for instance, bestowed on the first Christian, the Armenian Nubar, the rank of Pasha.

A few years after the death of Cyril, the Coptic educational activities deteriorated and on the death of Demetrius, his successor, when the affairs of the Coptic community were entrusted to the care of a Vicar-General, a group of Copts formed a “Reform Society” to press for communal reform, and for a better supervision of communal affairs. The Society presented Bishop Mark of Alexandria with a memorandum, calling for church assistance of the poor, and church provision for Coptic education.

The hitherto unchallenged clergy were much perturbed at this remonstrance and protested against it to the government. It appears that the government was somewhat disturbed by the formation of the Society. This, however, did not demoralize the members, who demanded the establishment of a lay council (*Majlis Milli*) to assist in administering the civil affairs of the community.

Bishop Mark, with the approbation of some of the clergy, favoured the suggestion, and accordingly petitioned the government to concur in the formation of a council. The petition was written by a rising Coptic figure—Boutros Ghali. It entreated Khedive Ismail, described as the patron of

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advancement and civilization, to assent in the formation of a lay council which would assist the clergy in furthering reform in the Coptic community. On February 25, 1874, a Khedivial decree was issued ordaining the formation of such a Council, which was to be composed of twelve elected and twelve appointed members.

The Coptic Church stood against the foreign Protestant missionary activities pursued by the Americans and the British, by establishing more national Coptic schools. Modern Egypt had experienced two waves of foreign Christian missions in the nineteenth century, the first was from Britain, after the failure of Napoleon, 1821; and the second from America, 1854. The Americans, despite early hopes, succeeded in converting only an insignificant number of Copts, and forming them into a native Presbyterian church. Both these missions had been opposed mainly by the Coptic Church which jealously guarded its own character and power. The stand of the Coptic Church against foreign Christian missionaries can be explained in the light of the steadfast convictions of the Copts that they are unique people, possessing a unique language and history, the most important factor, however, in consolidating the self image of the Copts was the discovery of a past. The process of discovery of ancient Egypt, of bringing to light the magnificence of a past civilization, rallied Copts to found their real identity.

There are many details in Coptic life in the nineteenth century, all of them centering around the fact that the modernization of the State of Egypt, which saw its beginning during the French Campaign and grew at the hands of Mohamed Ali and his successors, greatly influenced the life and role of the Copts in Egypt. Thus Mohamed Ali appointed some of them such as Mu’allim Girgis Al-Gohari or Mu’allim Ghali in higher government posts. Sa’id Pasha admitted them into the military service and issued his famous decree Al-Lai’ha Al-Sa’idia which gave the fellaheen, for the first time, the right to own their land.

Surveys of the history of landownership in modern Egypt show that Copts were active in that field during the era of Mohamed Ali. As early as

1846, Basileos Bey, son of Mu’allim Ghali, owned a number of villages in the Delta, one of them with 2,000 feddans of land. During the 1870s, a number of writers mentioned a great Coptic landowner called Butrus Agha, with some 2,000 (or even, 5,000) feddans near Girga, who bred horses, cattle, and sheep on a large scale (31).

Some rich Christians from Upper Egypt invested capital in land and farms in the Delta, the development area of that time. For instance, a Christian merchant, Jirjis Istefanus, from Upper Egypt, acquired over 2,000 feddans near Aga (Daqahliya) and other places, installed many irrigation pumps on al-Mansuriya canal, bought a cotton ginnery and a sugarcane press and built a mansion and garden in his village (32). The number of Christians, owners of irrigation pumps in Lower Egypt was especially large in the provinces of Minufiya and Daqahliya (some 9% in each case) and somewhat less in Gharbiya (4.2%); although even here it was higher than the percentage of Christians in the population as a whole (33). However, in 1891, a few Coptic families with large estates in Upper Egypt came as the fourth most important group in terms of the size of their landholdings (after the State, the Mohamed Ali family, and the high officialdom). A number of books written at the beginning of the present century stress the importance of the Copts as large landowners in Upper Egypt (34).

In addition to the Coptic landownership as individuals, there are the Coptic Waqfs (religious endowments). Muslim waqf law allows members of other monotheistic religious denominations living in Muslim countries (Ahl Al-Dhimma) to endow waqfs of certain types. Accordingly, members of Christian minorities founded waqfs in favour of their religious institutions. Large areas were endowed for the benefit of the Armenian Patriarchate and others for the Greek Catholics. The largest endowments, however, belonged to the main Christian community—the Orthodox Copts (35).

(32) Ibid.: 63.
(33) Ibid.: 37.
(34) Ibid.: 37.
(35) Ibid.: 179.
According to a report submitted by the Lay Council “al-Majlis al-milli al-‘amm lilaqbat al-orthodoks” in 1906, their churches and monasteries possessed some 15,000 feddans of landed property, and the total area of Coptic Waqfs belonging both to monasteries and the Patriarchate amounted to 32,124 feddans. It is difficult to come to any conclusion regarding the development of Coptic Waqfs. A bitter struggle has in fact been going on for over eighty years between the Coptic clergy and monks and the secular organization of the community, “al-Majlis al-milli”, concerning the administration of the Waqfs. One of the express purposes for which the latter was founded in 1874 was to take over the Waqfs from the clergy, who till then had been managing them (36).

The Coptic landownership had its effect on their role and their social significance in modern Egypt. Later, the Khedive Ismail appointed Copts in the judiciary and permitted them to be members of parliament. All these concessions helped the Copts for the first time, perhaps, since the Arab Islamic conquest, to enter public life and take an active part in the political sphere. It can be argued that Mohamed Ali and his successors relieved the Copts from persecution and gave them their first opportunity to use their talents in the public service (37).

One must emphasize an important factor in this connection regarding the evolution of the Coptic community in the nineteenth century, and that it is the growth of Coptic education. The Coptic Church had a parallel movement to the educational reform movement in the State since Mohamed Ali’s era which was pioneered by Rifa’a Rafi‘ Al-Tahtawy and Ali Pasha Mubarak. Both of them had been affected by Western civilization and believed that the progress of Egypt had laid in one path only the development of education and the understanding of the European system of life. Rifa’a Al-Tahtawy was born in 1801 and had studied in Al-Azhar the usual educational basis for the Egyptian intellectuals for culture and education until the end of the nineteenth century. Al-Tahtawy was chosen as the “Imami” of the first

(37) A.H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, Oxford 1947: 45.
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A Scholarly Peer-Reviewed Pamphlet (5)

educational mission to France in 1826. He returned to Egypt very impressed by the advanced way of life in Europe and the modernization in all fields. He described his impressions in his famous book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Fi Talkhis Bariz.(38) He established the school of foreign languages Madrasat Al-Alsun and gave special attention to the movement of translation of European books into Arabic. At the same time, he is considered as the pioneer for women’s liberalization in modern Egyptian history.(39)

Ali Mubarak is known as the father of education (Abu Al-Ta’lim). He was born in 1824, and sent to France on an educational mission in 1844. On his return to Egypt, he established the school of engineering Madrasat Al-Muhandiskhana. He also implemented the programme of education in the days of Abbas Pasha and opened many schools at various levels and in different specializations. He published his famous work Al Khitat Al-tawfikia as a local encyclopaedia of knowledge. In 1888, he became Minister of Education, taking this opportunity to carry on his efforts for educational reform.(40) Al-Tahtawy and Mubarak are the pioneers of modernization in nineteenth century Egypt. They represent an older generation to Mohamed Abduh and his group. Their contribution was undoubtedly of great value to both Muslims and Copts in the emergence of modern Egypt.

The political and social participation of Copts in public life was considered as heralding the birth of a secular State in Egypt. The Coptic schools educated a generation of Copts and Muslims among them being a group of politicians and leaders of public opinion. One may cite the names of two Muslim Prime Ministers who were graduates of Coptic schools. Abdel Khalek Sarwat and Hussein Rushdy. The state of Copts under British control has been dealt with in many works and most of them dwell forcibly on the policy of Lord Cromer, and later of Sir Eldon Gorst towards Copts.

At first the Copts welcomed the British occupation. In the summer of 1882, the British landed their troops at Alexandria and soon afterwards

(39) H.F. Al-Nagar, Rifa’a Al-Tahtawy, Raid Fikr wa Imam Nahdah, Cairo (N.D.): 154.
defeated the Egyptian forces under Arabi at the battle of Tell El-Kabir. The Copts, who anticipated a new era of freedom, rejoiced in the coming of the British, a Christian nation. The financial chaos, the agitation and the disorders under the reigns of Khedive Ismail and Tawfik and the Arab proclamation that Islam in Egypt was endangered by the increasing Coptic participation in Government, caused the Copts to be well disposed towards the arrival of the British\(^{(41)}\).

The census of 1897 showed that there were at that time 608,000 Copts in Egypt. Of these, a few were Catholics and still fewer Protestants, but by far the greater number belonged to what is termed the Orthodox Church\(^{(42)}\). Any feeling of relief experienced by the Copts was short-lived, and for several reasons. The main one was the disappointing attitude of the British, especially Cromer, towards the Copts in particular before the 1919 movement. The period from 1882 until around 1919 was a critical one for Coptic–Muslim relations and this was due to two factors: the first was the Islamic character of the Egyptian National Movement after the failure of Arabi, and especially at the turn of the century, led by *Al-Hizb Al-Watani* (The National Party). Egyptian nationalists believed that the policy of the full reinstatement of Turkish sovereignty in Egypt was a weapon in the hands against the British\(^{(43)}\). Al-Bishry claims that *Al-Hizb Al-Watani* was not in fact working for the establishment of a pan-Islamic State, nor did it really wish the reinstatement of Turkish sovereignty in Egypt, in spite of Turkish support for Mustafa Kamel. Rather it merely tried to exploit the relation with Turkey in Egypt’s struggle against the British.

The second was the competition that arose between Muslims and Copts for appointments to State posts particularly at the beginning of the British occupation.


Kyriakos Mikhail, a permanent representative of Copts in London till his death in 1956, makes this point in his book that the question of Coptic grievances was by no means a new one in Egypt.

"In its present form it dates back to the early days of the British occupation. Now the Copts do not, and never have, doubted the material and lasting good which has been accomplished since the administration of the country was placed under British control. It is said in some quarters that the fact of Britain being a Christian nation led the Copts to expect favoured treatment at the hands of British officials in Egypt. There can be no doubt that this statement, constantly reiterated, has gained considerable credence among foreign observers. Yet it is a misleading statement. The Copts, Mikhail argued, never asked for any special favours from the Government; what they wanted was justice and equality with other Egyptians, and a full participation in the developments resulting from the new regime. One of their chief grievances arose from the fact that they were denied many of the appointments which had been in the hands of the members of their community in the past.

Until 1882, there was no attempt to change this pattern of administrative appointments. Gradually, however, as posts formerly occupied by Copts fell vacant, they were filled with Muslims and the Coptic Community began to view their future with anxiety. The anxiety was not uncalled for; the Copt has already lost much of his former position in Egypt, he is in danger of losing the little that remains"(44).

Lord Cromer’s assessment of the Copts, which may be taken as the prevailing 19th century view, is significant:

“*The modern Copt has become from head to foot, in manners, language and spirit, a Muslim, however, unwilling he may be to recognise the fact*”(45).

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Lord Cromer later expands his views on the Copt’s attitude towards the British:

“The Copts, moreover, had another cause of complaint against the English reformer. Not only was he disappointed that no special favours were accorded to him, but he saw with dismay that, under British auspices, he was in danger of being supplanted by his rival, the Syrian Christian”\(^{(46)}\).

The contribution of Syrians in raising the culture trend in modern Egypt is undeniable; they helped in formulating the secular liberalism in Egypt. One can mention some examples in their active role in various fields such as Arabic literature, press and the theatre movement. Jurji Zaidan, the founder of *Al-Hilal*, wrote many well-known historical novels concerning the Islamic period and Farah Anton published his magazine *Al-Game’ah* as a window on Western life. Yacoub Sarrouf, editor of *Al-Muktataf*, was interested in scientific studies, simplifying them for the Arabic reader. Amin M’alouf gave more attention to linguistics. These are some examples of Syrians, who were pioneers in modern Egypt\(^{(47)}\).

Most of them were Christians from Lebanon.

“Involved in the first stirring of secular liberalism in Egypt was not just the emergence of political party organizations and an active reformist press. Two very strong factors operating in the Egyptian environment at that time influenced this trend further. One was the British presence in Egypt, dominated for a quarter century by the forceful Lord Cromer. The other was the appearance of leading Syrian—mainly Christian—journalists in Egypt”\(^{(48)}\).

“In forming political conceptions, a role was played by the literary and scientific periodicals, and in particular by two of them, *Al-Muktataf* and *Al-Hilal*, both edited by Lebanese intellectuals, and perhaps constituting the most important contribution made by Syrian writers to the intellectual development of Egypt”\(^{(49)}\).

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\(^{(46)}\) Ibid.: 209


In such political, economic and social circumstances, Copts were occupied by reflecting on their future, rather than their present, especially because they were concerned over their future participation in the Egyptian administration. In 1901, Sir Eldon Gorst, the British High Commissioner, sent a report to his government stating that the Copts who were less than one tenth of the whole population, were occupying 45.32% of the posts and were receiving 40% of the total salaries, while the Muslims were receiving 44% of it and 6% were kept by others (50). That report reflects the attitude of Gorst towards Copts as he was always accused that he “shows greater sympathy towards the Muslims and the official class” (51).

An examination of the figures of wealth distribution in Egypt at the end of the 19th century will reveal a significant factor in assessing Coptic life at the time. They owned one–fifth of the agricultural lands and buildings in addition to what they had in the banks (52). Although they were 6% of the population of Egypt, they were paying 16% of the taxes of agricultural land (53), which means that they enjoyed a comparatively better social status than the rest of the Egyptians. It explains, at the same time, the rise in their standard of education.

Khedive Abbas, during the early days of his reign, had seemed to be the leader the nationalists were looking for. They felt that a monarch who, theoretically, rules his country in an absolute fashion, should deliberately encourage liberal nationalists—men who would aim at goading the apathetic Egyptians into becoming an active population capable of expressing forceful public opinion, and who would agitate for a constitution and full parliamentary life. Both Ismail and Tawfik (to a lesser extent) had encouraged a limited liberalism to appear as a stop to Western criticism of their autocracy. But whereas they supported pliable politicians who could be contained, Abbas encouraged the young intellectuals.

(51) Gorst’s Papers, Autobiographical Note: 121, St. Antony’s College, Oxford.
(53) C. Issawi, Egypt, an Economic and Social Analysis, Oxford 1947: 34.
The Khedive’s connections with the nationalist movement rendered it suspect to Cromer. He was convinced that Abbas had manufactured the whole movement for his own ends, and that it was suprious. The attitude of Abbas towards the Nationalists completely changed when he had a free hand of the Waqfs land, in spite of the opposition of Sheikh Mohamed ‘Abduh. The Khedive moved closer to the new British High Commissioner, Sir Eldon Gorst. The latter noticed that the growth of the Nationalist spirit had caused Cromer to antagonize the Egyptian Muslims and this had forced him to seek the support of the European communities and native Christians.

In his book, Weigall, the Inspector General of Antiquities to the Egyptian Government during Gorst’s term of office, dealt with the government’s policy towards Copts as follows:

“As the vast majority of Egyptians are Muslims, and as the occupation, against which the national movement is directed, is Christian, it became a political necessity for the Nationalists to use this religious difference as one of the main planks of their platform, while the leaders wished to convey to Europe the impression that they were too highly educated to be fanatical, they were constantly using the inherent Muslim enthusiasm as a means of arousing the nation. Now, a large number of educated Egyptians are Copts and the Nationalist Party Al-Watani had therefore to decide whether, on the one hand, they would eliminate the religious aspect of their movement and incorporate the Coptic ‘patriots’ with themselves, or whether, on the other hand, they should retain the important asset of religious fervor and should dispense with the services of this not inconsiderable minority of native Christians”.

Any attempt to discuss the critical period in Muslim–Coptic relations in Egypt between 1908–1911, should include the role of the Coptic press. The two main Coptic newspapers were *Al-Watan* and *Misr*. *Al-Watan* newspaper had been established in 1878 by Mikhail Abdel Sayyed, a Copt who had graduated from a Copt school and had studied at Al-Azhar. His newspaper started its press activity by criticising Gamal Eldin Al-Afghani and his Islamic trends\(^{(58)}\). *Al-Watan* newspaper closed down until it began publication again under Gindi Ibrahim in 1901. *Misr* newspaper was established in 1895 by Tadrus Al-Menkabadi, who was motivated by Boutros Ghali Pasha, as he was not on good terms with Abdel Sayyed, the editor of *Al-Watan*. *Misr* newspaper played a main part in the propaganda for the Coptic Congress of 1911. It was fanatically Coptic and Mikhail, the permanent Coptic representative in London, was its correspondent\(^{(59)}\). The two Coptic newspapers had exchanged criticism until they found common cause concerning the Coptic Congress. Starting from 1918 *Misr* newspaper took the side of Saad Zaghloul and his colleagues\(^{(60)}\).

On the other side, there were *Al-Muayyad* and *Al-Liwa*, two main newspapers which were provoked by some articles in the two Coptic newspapers and a press battle started on a religious basis. To understand the background of the Islamic newspapers, especially Sheikh Ali Youssef, editor of *Al-Muayyad*, and Sheikh Abdel Aziz Jawish, editor of *Al-Liwa*, one should discuss their role in the whole context of Islamic reform. With the British occupation, social and political thought in Egypt found itself faced with new problems. The rapidly growing middle class was full of hatred against the confrontation of Islam as their religion and the Western system of life and modernization. Gamal Eldin Al-Afghani gave the first expression of the progressive Islamic feelings. In exile in Paris, he and Mohamed ‘Abdulh founded an Islamic Nationalist Society *Al-‘Urwah al-Wuthqa* and began to publish a periodical of the same name. The principle of pan-Islamism was stated unequivocally. The religious tie between Muslims is stronger than any racial or linguistic tie. At the same time, the leading part which Egypt could play in the Muslim world was emphasized. Al-Afghani inspired...


\(^{(59)}\) *Ibid.*: 150.

\(^{(60)}\) *Ibid.*: 151.
Islamic nationalism by propounding that all progress could be reconciled with, and was revealed in, Islam, which should be united under a Caliph whose nationality was unimportant as long as he could rule and defend his territories. Al-Afghani had great influence everywhere in the Muslim world and particularly in Egypt, where his powerful personality swayed the pupils and teachers at Al-Azhar, who themselves went out to the towns and villages of Egypt spreading his message of an Islamic revival. The simple people of the Nile Valley identified Islam as ‘of them’, that is, not of the Copts, of the Greeks, the Circassians or other Christian foreigners, who were allied as friends or servants to the oppressive ruling class.

Sheikh Mohamed ‘Abduh’s dearest wish was to reform Al-Azhar University. Since it was the centre of Islamic learning he believed that if it were reformed, then the whole of Islam would be reformed also. He wanted, he said, to turn Al-Azhar into a beacon that would be a guide-light for the whole Muslim world, not only on matters of religion, but in secular affairs as well, so that it should come to resemble a European University as much as possible. When the Khedive Abbas ascended the throne, ‘Abduh approached him with his plan for reforming Al-Azhar, and he succeeded in convincing the Khedive of the necessity for this move. In 1895, the Khedive appointed Sheikh ‘Abduh as government representative on the Administrative Committee of Al-Azhar which is in charge of reforming this institution.

Unfortunately, the intellectual reforms in Al-Azhar that Sheikh ‘Abduh hoped for never came to fruition. ‘Abduh’s reforms were judged as too revolutionary by the ‘Ulama, for he wanted to broaden the curricula and to improve teaching methods. Gradually the Khedive also became ‘Abduh’s opponent and halted his attempts at reform. One of the reasons for the Khedive’s disaffection with ‘Abduh arose from the intrigues of Sheikh Ali Yusif and Moustafa Kamil, who set the Khedive against ‘Abduh.

Mohamed ‘Abduh was quoted as saying:

“They think that the failure of my attempt in reforming Al-Azhar means that it will be available for them (his opponents) to do


whatever they like. On the contrary, I have already lit a flame never to be extinguished”(63).

To that trend of Islamic reaction to reform, Sheikh Ali Yusif and Sheikh Abdel Aziz Jawish were closely associated. Al-Muayyad defined its purpose as being to disseminate useful ideas and accurate views(64).

Abd Al-Aziz al-Jawish (1876–1929), of Tunisian descent, but born in Alexandria, became leader of the extremist native press in Egypt, as editor-in-chief of Al-Liwa after the death of Moustafa Kamil in 1908. He had been educated in Al-Azhar and was afterwards instrumental in founding the Young Men’s Muslim Association (Jam‘iyyat al-Shubban al-Muilimin)(65).

Sheikh Ali Yusif had a similar background, but with more political experience with good contacts and special relations with the Khedive Abbas. Al-Muayyad enjoyed the highest figures of distribution at the start of the twentieth century and was called the “Times” of the East(66).

The confrontation between the Muslim and the Coptic press escalated by 1908, with the newspapers Misr and Al-Watan on the Coptic side, and Al-Muayyad and Al-Liwa newspapers on the other. On May 22, 1908, there was an article in Misr newspaper attacking all those who had come to Egypt since the Islamic conquest, whoever they were, Turkish, French or British, and attacked the idea of Panislamism on the grounds that religion could not stand alone as a sole element in the formulating of a nation. Again on June 15, 1908, there was an article in Al-Watan newspaper attacking the Islamic record in Egypt, against which Sheikh Abdel Aziz Jawish wrote an article in reply in his own newspaper, Al-Liwa, under the title “Islam is a stranger in its own country” which was considered as the start of an angry dialogue between the Islamic and Coptic press(67).

Abdel Latif Hamzah has stated that the Coptic press provoked Muslims and attacked their record in Egypt\(^{(68)}\), while Salama Moussa insists that Sheikh Jawish was responsible for all the sectarian dialogue in the Egyptian press\(^{(69)}\). During this time, Mustafa Fahmy Pasha left the premiership after thirteen years, and on November 13, 1908, Boutros Ghali Pasha was appointed as Prime Minister, a choice that was welcomed by the Coptic press as he was the first of their number to assume this office. Boutros Ghali made a considerable contribution in organizing the Coptic community and strengthening their unity with Muslims. In 1881, for example, he founded *Al-Gami’a Al-Khairiya al-Qubtiya* (Coptic Welfare Society), and Sheikh Mohamed ‘Abduh, together with Abdallah Al-Nadim, “the Orator of the Arabi Movement” were invited to the inaugural celebration of the society, where they delivered outstanding speeches, confirming the unity of the Egyptian Nation, Copts and Muslims. When the Khedive Abbas dismissed Selim Al-Bishry, the rector of Al-Azhar, Boutros Ghali visited the latter and declared his support for him\(^{(70)}\).

One of the main elements of the background of political life at the start of the twentieth century in Egypt, is the contribution of Mustafa Kamel Pasha in the Egyptian National Movement, contained in his attempt to include both Muslims and Copts in his party. Among the latter was Wissa Wassef and Murqus Hanna. Mustafa Kamel declared in one of his speeches, that Muslims and Copts were one people joined by every means and there was no reason to make separation between them. On the other hand, Copts remained suspicious of the programme of the Watani party, which admitted the right of the Ottoman Sultan to rule Egypt. They were also apprehensive of the relation between Mustafa Kamel and the Sultan, which was well-known, and the Ottoman attempt to exploit the activity of Mustafa Kamel against the British occupation in Egypt\(^{(71)}\).

Salama Moussa, writing his memoirs for the period between 1903 and 1907, records that in spite of the fact that young Copts bought the *Al-Liwa* newspaper, they did not join the Watani party itself because of its religious character\(^{(72)}\).


\(^{(72)}\) *Al-Kateb Al-Masri*, Cairo, July 1946.
During this period, the Coptic question acquired greater political significance, by the resignation of Wissa Wassef from the Executive of the National Party on August 6, 1908, after the death of Mustafa Kamel. The new leader of the party was Mohamed Farid, who lost, however, the support of the Copts, mainly because he took a hard line against Boutros Ghali and was openly unaffected by the latter’s subsequent assassination. The relation between the Watani party and the Copts was always uneasy, especially in view of the Islamic image and the Turkish influence on the latter party. In view of this tense situation, Akhnoukh Fanous announced on September 2, 1908, the plan for the foundation of the Misr party as a Coptic reaction to the Islamic character of the Egyptian politics in that time.

The choice of Boutros Ghali in the same year as Prime Minister exacerbated the situation between Muslims and Copts. It is not very easy to say whether the probable results of this action had been carefully considered, or whether Boutros Pasha was appointed simply because he happened to be one of the most capable men available. Boutros Ghali Pasha was assassinated by an extremist member in the Watani party, named Ibrahim Al-Wardani, in February 1910. Weigall, who was an eyewitness of those days in Egypt, stated in his book that Sir Eldon Gorst, who had been watching the struggle with a somewhat sardonic smile, is said to have been profoundly moved by the tragedy; and he certainly saw to it that the murderer suffered the death penalty, in spite of the organised propaganda in his favour.

Thus Egypt, which had presented a fairly united front in 1907, was now split into four distinct factions: the occupation and its supporters; the Khedive and his loyal adherents, whose fraternising with the British was superficial and expedient; the Copts; and the Nationalists, who themselves were much divided. The opening days of 1911 witnessed an attempt on the part of Wasif Ghali, son of the late Prime Minister, to effect a reconciliation between Copts and Muslims. On January 23, he issued a statement declaring

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that, in the interest of harmony and as a demonstration of fraternity between Copts and Muslims, he would overlook the offences directed against the memory of his father. Coptic reaction to the statement was a loud criticism and disapproval as it did not reflect general Coptic opinion\(^{(76)}\).

A few days after Ghali’s statement, a Reuter telegram, emanating from Cairo, appeared in *The Times* on January 26, 1911, in which the Coptic claims were ridiculed and misconstrued. It reported on Gorst’s extensive inspection tour of the province of Egypt\(^{(77)}\). The text of the telegram was:

> “Sir Eldon Gorst visited the provinces where the Coptic are. He actively settled and thoroughly investigated the question of the alleged Coptic grievances, but found that outside Cairo there were no serious complaints. Moslems and Copts, he declared, generally live together quietly if they are left alone, and the worst possible service to the Copts would be to treat them as a separate community. Sir Eldon found that Coptic educational interests everywhere received due consideration from the provincial councils”.

A Coptic protest campaign in Cairo was equally consistent with the Coptic protest in Upper Egypt towards Gorst’s observations. Tawfiq Doss refuted Gorst’s insinuations that the Copts desired to be treated as a separate community and insisted that they were only demanding that the principle of equality be respected\(^{(78)}\). To Gorst, therefore, the Coptic plight was by no means so serious as the Copts claimed. He persistently rejected their emotional pleas against an impending catastrophe, and considered their impassioned claims as lacking a factual basis. The reaction in London to the Copts’ claims contrasted with Gorst’s views. Support for the Copts was not limited to the British press. The Anglican Church also shared in the expression of solidarity with its Christian brethren. The Bishop of London received Mikhail and announced his sympathy with Coptic claims\(^{(79)}\).


\(^{(79)}\) Ibid.: 238.
The Coptic claims were prior to the assassination of Boutros Ghali, since their leaders had raised a written request to Mustafa Fahmy Pasha, the Prime Minister, and Lord Cromer asking for complete equality in the allocation of administrative posts, for the closing of the courts on Sundays, the appointment of Coptic members in the Bar Association, and lastly the teaching of the Christian religion in the State schools. The Government accepted the second and third of these requests, while it postponed the first request for discussion.

There is a significant factor which is connected with the Muslim–Coptic dialogue; it is the weakness in the national movement. Copts, in spite of their fears of the Watani party’s religious roots, accepted, for the greater part, the idea of resistance to the British Occupation. French support for Mustafa Kamel and the Egyptian National Movement died down after the Anglo French agreement of 1904. The political climate in Egypt was amenable to such arguments in the absence of the national movement’s activity.

In these circumstances the Coptic Congress was held at Assiout and their grievances discussed in five main points. The first dealt with the idea that Copts were forced to violate the commandments of their religion by having to work on Sundays. As the government officers and the government schools were open on Sundays, it was impossible for Coptic officials or the pupils of the schools to rest on the Sabbath day as enjoined by the Christian religion. The Congress therefore requested that government officials be exempted from duty, and students from study on the Christian Sabbath.

The second concerned a large number of administrative posts in the government service which were entirely closed to Copts and it was felt that, in general, they were not promoted in accordance with their capabilities and merit. The third was connected with the electoral system in Egypt as Copts were left unrepresented on the provincial councils. They asked for a system which secured the rights of minorities. The fourth was concerned for the equal right to take advantage of the educational facilities provided by the new provincial councils. The Egyptian Government has authorised the provincial council to levy a special tax equal to 5% of the general land tax, chiefly for the purposes of education. Of these taxes, the Copts paid about 16% and it was felt that in return they should expect some improvement to be made.
for the education of their children under the present system. Their children could not attend the Kuttabs (village mosque schools), or elementary schools which were supported by the special taxes, because as declared officially by the Department of Education, these Kuttabs, as well as the normal schools, were purely Islamic institutions. The fifth point was the Coptic claim that government grants should be bestowed on deserving institutions without the invidious distinction of race or creed.

These subjects were discussed in an orderly manner, and the Congress concluded with an unanimous vote expressing the loyalty of the assembly to His Highness the Khedive of Egypt which was at once despatched by telegram. A general committee of representatives of the different provinces was formed to meet when necessary for the conducting of business. George Bey Wissa was elected President, and Khalil Bey Ibrahim and Dr. Akhnoukh Fanous as Vice Presidents, with Andrews Pasha as Treasurer\(^{(80)}\). The motive for the Congress’s telegram to Abbas II was with the knowledge that the Khedive had personally enquired about Coptic grievances, and had expressed support for the convocation of a Congress\(^{(81)}\). Gorst, however, was quick to perceive the Khedive’s intentions and required him not to receive any Coptic delegation\(^{(82)}\).

The repercussions of the Coptic congress were many and wide. Thus, it was not welcomed by the British authorities in Cairo, nor by the Egyptian Government. Al-Watan and Misr newspapers reported the Congress with active publication. Al-Jarida, the newspaper of Al-Umma party (the Nation party) strongly opposed the Congress, but when the Ministry of Interior argued in giving the permission for the holding of the Congress, the two main political parties, Al-Watani and Al-Umma, stood against the government on the ground of the freedom of meeting and speech. Al-Umma party, including the intellectual elite from the landowners and the higher strata of the middle class without Islamic basis, had a moderate line against Copts compared to the extremist element in Al-Watani party.

\(^{(82)}\) *Ibid.*: 290.
The most significant reaction to the Congress was the attitude of many Copts who were opposed to the idea of the conference itself. Among these were Wassif Ghali and Wissa Wassef. It was also reported that those who had participated in the Congress were only a minority among Copts, and represented only 12,000 from the total number of 700,000 Copts in Egypt\(^{(83)}\). In spite of the fact that the Bishop of Assiout had given his support to the Congress, the Patriarch Cyril V, the Head of the Coptic Church, was not very anxious to participate\(^{(84)}\).

A day after the opening of the Coptic Congress, an Alexandrian by the name of Muhamed Fahmi Al-Naduri issued a call for the formation of a Muslim Congress\(^{(85)}\). The Preparatory Committee of the Islamic Congress held its first session at Ali Sharawy’s house, and in the opening session of the Congress on April 29, 1911, at Heliopolis, Riad Pasha, who was nominated as President, gave a calming speech outlining the aims of the Congress at “the discussion of” the Copts’ demands

“Because the situation in the country did not allow the division of the interests between its people according to their religion”\(^{(86)}\).

The main trend in the Congress was to insist on national unity and the equality between the two communities of the nation. Jack Tager stated in his book that the Muslim Congress was encouraged by Gorst\(^{(87)}\). Seikaly, in his thesis, explains that the Congress was approved by the British Agency in Cairo\(^{(88)}\).

The two main political parties, Al-Watani and Al-Umma, half-heartedly welcomed the idea of the Congress from a political angle, while Al-Islah Al-Dusturi party (Constitutional Reform Party) founded by Sheikh Ali Yusif as a creature of Khedive Abbas II, was not much concerned with

\(^{(86)}\) Ibid., March 22, 1911.
political discussion, declaring that the Congress had the specific purpose of safeguarding the Islamic nature of the country\textsuperscript{(89)}.

The whole Coptic situation in that period reflected their general feeling that in spite of the sympathy of the British for the Copts, Cromer and Gorst were under the impression that Copts enjoyed more than they deserved in the Egyptian life and they were expecting to receive special favours at the hands of the British\textsuperscript{(90)}. Coptic education took advanced steps and was given special attention. Some Coptic students had the chance to complete their higher studies abroad, among them being Makram Ebeid who has been taken here as a case study within the role of Copts in the Egyptian National Movement.

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\item[(89)] \textit{Ibid.}: 293.
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Chapter Two

Ebeid and the National School of Zaghloul

One cannot find in the modern history of the Copts a better example of their role in the Egyptian National Movement than in Ebeid himself, mainly because he exercised first class talents in the part he played in the political life of his country. He was born in October 1889 in Qena, Upper Egypt, of a family originating from Assiout. His paternal great-grandfather had married a daughter of Mu’allim Girgis Al-Gohary and the family moved to Qena when Mohamed Ali Pasha preferred Ibrahim Al-Gohary to his brother. Makram Ebeid, the father, was one of eleven brothers and sisters. He owned around thirty feddans of land, but later embarked on a career as a construction and public works contractor. He and his brother carried out construction work on the railway line between Nag‘a Hamady and Luxor. On completion of this project, Makram Ebeid was decorated by the ruler with the order of Al-Majidi, and granted the title of Bey, second class. Ebeid, the father, later bought nine–hundred feddans from the Royal Domains Land, Al-Daira Al-Saniya, around Qena. He died in December 1925.

William Makram Ebeid completed his primary study at a government school in Qena around 1900. After he had spent a short period at Al-Tawfiqia Secondary School in Cairo, his father was advised to enrol him in the American School in Assiout, which was run by American missionaries. Later Akhnoukh Fanous, a well-known Coptic lawyer, suggested to Ebeid’s

(91) Financial adviser of Mohamed Ali Pasha. He was mentioned by Al-Jabarti on several occasions in his book Aja’ib Al-Aauthar Fi Al-Tarajim wa al-Akhbar, Cairo, A.H. 1322.
(92) From an interview with Mr. Fekry Makram Ebeid on February 14, 1975.
(93) The well-known writer Abbas Mahmoud Al-Aqqad, was among Ebeid’s colleagues at school. Al-Aqqad remarked on this in his introduction to the collection of Ebeid’s speeches, entitled Al-Makramiyat.
father that he should send William, an intelligent student, to Oxford University to complete his studies. He arrived there in 1905, at the age of 16.

William Makram Ebeid was considered one of the more outstanding students of New College. The Dean had once said that the College had not admitted a student younger than William Makram Ebeid, who was not yet 17 years of age, except William Pitt. It was also mentioned that the Dean had praised the excellent progress of William Makram Ebeid in the English language by saying that he would follow the same steps as William Shakespeare. Unfortunately his New College record merely reveals that he was there 1905–1908 and took a second in Law.

After getting his degree from Oxford in 1908, he did not immediately return to Egypt, but went to Lyons University in France, to continue his studies in Law. There he was, however, attracted to Egyptological studies, spending almost two years in France, where he found an Egyptian colleague, Omar Moustafa, who was studying in the same discipline. They corresponded in hieroglyphics as a sort of joke, because they had a common interest in Egyptology. But William Makram Ebeid was also attracted by the current materialistic trends while he was in France, and admired Marist thought, cultivating as well an interest in non-religious attitudes. That is why, on his return to Egypt, it was stated that King Fouad had dubbed that group, including William Makram Ebeid with others like Dr. Mohamed Hussein Heikal and Dr. Mahmoud Azmy, as republicans or “Les socialistes francais” because they had been educated in France, and affected by the social culture there. These early roots of Ebeid’s culture could be understood in the light of his whole life, especially when later he became well-known as an unprejudiced Copt.

(94) Oxford University enjoyed an excellent reputation at that time among the richest families in Egypt. Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha, son of Mahmoud Soliman Pasha the leader of Al-Umma party, had graduated from Oxford a few years before William Makram Ebeid.

(95) Same interview with Mr. Fekry Ebeid.

(96) From a letter received from New College in Oxford dated February 28, 1975.

(97) Same interview with Mr. Fekry Ebeid.

(98) Ibid.
It should be noted here that Makram Ebeid, the father, had converted to Protestantism around 1900, thus creating a division in the family between those in it who remained Copts and himself. William Makram Ebeid, however, adhered to his Orthodoxy all his life\(^\text{(99)}\). This adherence gives a pointer to Ebeid’s early personal ambition. He was to discover that his political ambition required him to keep to the national Church as his religion. The Coptic Church was the native Egyptian Church, whereas Protestantism was easily associated with a foreign church and, in Egypt, was itself an imported phenomenon. Ebeid’s personality and career confirm his lasting political ambition, as well as his high motivation to play an effective role in Egyptian politics without any considerable attention to the religious factor. On examining his social background, it can be seen that he was not a scion of the Coptic “aristocracy” because his family’s status was not of the same level as many of the other wealthy Coptic families, who bought domain lands from *Al Daira Al-Saniya*, bearing such names as Ghali, Hanna and Doss\(^\text{(100)}\).

To go through Ebeid’s national political role it is necessary to consider briefly (or to recapitulate) the evolution of political life and the character of the national movement in modern Egypt which took its genuine start nearly one century ago.

When Arabi came to the forefront of Egyptian political life as a potential leader, discontented elements soon gathered round him, for his bold action had shown that the army could be used as a coercive force against the Khedive. His first moves had been prompted by motives of self-interest and self-protection; but later when he found himself involved in a national movement, he assumed the part of a genuine nationalist leader\(^\text{(101)}\).

A small, bold group of the faithful seized on Arabi’s revolt as a signal and impulse for a still more daring enterprise than the political and spiritual liberation of Egypt—the revival of a positively Muslim civilization, which would incorporate modern developments without submitting to them in the


\(^{\text{(100)}}\) This point was the subject of discussion in an interview with Mr. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal on September 30, 1975.

realm of politics. It would be absurd to try to compress the efforts of Jamal Eldin Al-Afghani or Mohamed Abduh and their companions into the narrow framework of the Arabi rising\textsuperscript{(102)}.

Jamal Eldin Al-Afghani was not above trying to arouse the spirit of particularist nationalism as a step toward his universalist goal of one Islamic Nation. The chief aim of Jamal Eldin Al-Afghani in all his untiring efforts and ceaseless agitation was the accomplishment of the unification of all Muslim peoples under one Islamic government, over which the one supreme Caliph should bear undisputed rule, as in the glorious days of Islam before its power had been dissipated in endless dissension and divisions, and the Muslim lands had lapsed into ignorance and helplessness to become the prey of Western aggression. The present decadent condition of Muslim countries weighed heavily upon him. He believed that if these countries were once freed from the incubus of foreign domination or interference, and Islam itself reformed and adapted to the demands of present-day conditions, the Muslim peoples would be able to work out for themselves a new and glorious order of affairs without dependence on, or limitation of, European nations. To him, the religion of Islam was, in all essentials, a world religion and thoroughly capable, by reason of its inner spiritual force, of adaptation to the changing conditions of every age\textsuperscript{(103)}. At the same time, Al-Afghani and Abduh saw the connection between the rise of Protestantism and the emergence of the modern States of Europe as a parallel motive to their reformist ideas for Muslims\textsuperscript{(104)}. Abduh, in his turn, considered the reformist programme of Al-Azhar and the foundation reconciling Islam with modern life a necessary step for liberalism and progress\textsuperscript{(105)}.

Abduh recognized that Muslims were hopelessly divided into sects, each of which claimed to be the Orthodox. Moreover, he felt the religion of Islam, as conceived by the doctors of the schools, had become so vast and complex a system, that it was difficult for any one, particularly if he was an uneducated
person, to understand what Islam implied. Abduh’s theory of corporate unity, and also of corporate morality, within the Muslim Community as a whole or within the individual nation, was based upon the principle of mutual cooperation and encouragement in the restraint of evil and the promotion of the good\(^\text{106}\).

Abduh manages to suggest that the Islamic system, being a civil one, is of the same general species as modern secular systems, and therefore presumably open to the same speculation, critical examination and progressive development. He emphasized that true Islamic government contains those virtues that are commonly recognized in the modern world—national sovereignty, the conditional nature of authority, and regard for the public interest; virtues that are supposedly of proven and universal validity—he hints, almost imperceptibly, that the Islamic theory coincides with natural law\(^\text{107}\).

Mohamed Rashid Rida, Syrian scholar who died in 1935, emigrated to Cairo and established himself as Abduh’s most intimate disciple. As Abduh’s leading biographer and as the founder and editor of the journal *Al-Manar*, he devoted most of his career to propagating a revivalist interpretation of the Islamic faith and institutions which he proclaimed to be the reflection of Abduh’s teachings. He wrote voluminously, discussing a host of subjects, mostly of religious significance, in the *Manar*, and he elaborated a doctrine of Islamic law and politics in a systematic and specific way. Rida argued that the failure of the Muslim Nation to present an effective exposition of Islam with which to stem the drift among Muslims towards Western secularism—let alone their failure to win new converts in the West to Islam is due to the fact that the

\begin{quote}
*“Muslims do not have a leader and an organized body to undertake such a task with the necessary organization and funds in the manner that it is done by the leader of the Catholics, the Pope, and the patriarchs and bishops and missionary societies in Christian lands”*\(^\text{108}\).
\end{quote}

This trend among Muslim thinkers at the turn of the century was taken up through the National Movement in Egypt, especially among those Political leaders who were affected by abduh’s teachings and his reformist spirit.

In 1879 the fellah officers formed an association to combat the foreign influences in Egypt. They called it Al-Hizb Al-Watani, which is usually translated as “The National Party”. Afterwards this association was called the First National Party to distinguish it from that of Mustafa Kamil. After the Arabi rebellion had been crushed and its leaders imprisoned or exiled, national resistance to foreign intervention and occupation in Egypt seemed at an end. As has often been the case in the Near East, the movement died with the imprisonment of its leaders(109).

While the national movement in Egypt during Arabi’s days was essentially religious and emotional, and intended to arouse the oppressed fellahin to action, the Egyptian National Movement at the turn of the twentieth century, though in certain respects a revival of the earlier movement, appealed mainly to the intellect and was headed by a small Europeanized bourgeoisie. The dream of a reformed Islam gave place to a well organized demand for political freedom and self-government. This was not merely a change from Islamic agitation to political xenophobia, but also to party organization and propaganda, in the manner of Europe, with the political element dominant(110).

Anti-British propaganda was intensified during the early years of the twentieth century. Anglophobes, mistrusting all Great Britain’s policies towards Egypt, harped continuously on the unfulfilled pledges of the occupying power. Religious conviction, economic reasons and ambition combined to supply the educated Egyptian with material for anti-British invective(111).

Mustafa Kamil’s finest contribution to the nationalist movement was his insistence, from his earliest days as an orator and the pleader of Egypt’s case before Europe, on the absolute necessity for unity among all who called

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(110) Ibid., 135.
(111) Ibid., 136.
themselves Egyptians. Ahmed Lutfi Al-Sayyed pursued the same lines throughout his long, colourful political and academic career. The picture of the Egyptian nation as it emerges from Kamil’s sometimes steamy oratory is in some ways close to Lutfi’s, though in many features it tended towards an extreme that Lutfi avoided or at least approached with caution.  

During the period of great internal dissension which followed on the assassination of Boutros Ghali Pasha, Lutfi wrote:  

“The time for friendly hospitality has come, and it remains only for the Muslim majority to extend the hand of tolerance and solidarity to their brethren, pledging themselves with them to serve the common fatherland.”

Lutfi was an expression of liberal thought in modern Egypt.

Before 1907, a number of small and short-lived political groups had come into existence, but in the last quarter of that year three parties were suddenly created which were to dominate political life during the period until the outbreak of World War I. They were the People’s or Nation Party (Umma), the Constitutional Reform Party, and the Nationalist Party (Watani). This rapid creation of political groups would not have been possible, however, had there not already been a ferment of political ideas. The growth of pan-Islamic feeling was led mainly by Al-Afghani and Abdulh. It was in this atmosphere that the disciples of Mohamed Abduh met and decided to set up a publishing house and found a journal, Al-Jaridah.

The first issue appeared on March 9, 1907. The paper did not have to wait long before abuse was heaped on it. Its managing editor, Ahmed Lutfi Al-Sayyed, was accused of being a rebel against the Sultan. He and his associates were charged with being apologists for British policy. This was indeed a common allegation made against Abdulh’s group as most of them worked in the British administration. Nevertheless, the paper quickly won a

(112) See A. Kamil, Mustafa Pasha Fi 34 Rab’an, Cairo 1908; and A. Al-Rafey, Mustafa Kamil ba’ith al-harakat al-Wataniyah, Cairo 1939.
(113) Al-Jaridah, May 6, 1911.
reputation for moderation and sobriety, and within a few months those who had founded it decided to organize a political party with Al-Jaridah as its organ. Hassan Pasha Abdel-Raziq, Deputy-Chairman of the founding group, gave a speech that amounted to a definition of policy. The chief aim of the Umma Party, he announced, was the formation of the Egyptian personality and the creation of a distinctive character for it. The party believed that any progress attained, or measure of independence achieved, could not be of lasting value if it were not built on the foundation of the sense of unity, which Egypt needed above all else. The party was to be composed of individuals and families firmly rooted in the soil of Egypt and therefore deeply concerned about its future. They had real interests in the country and wished to be associated more closely with its government; in all healthy societies, once they were sufficiently developed, the nation automatically became the source of all authority. The party was particularly interested in the problems of the countryside. It noted with alarm the increasing lack of rural security and said that it would attempt to reform the indigenous machinery of justice; the rural population had outstripped the existing system of irrigation, and new and larger schemes were therefore necessary. Native industries had long been neglected and the party would do all it could to revive interest in them. Education also should be expanded, and the high schools should turn out more men capable of taking over the government. The last point of the programme was that which, in time, became the most important: the widening of the powers of the Provincial Councils and Legislative Assembly, preparatory to self-government.

To the nationalists this policy did not sound very different from the declared policy of Britain\(^{(115)}\). It contained all the elements of gradualism. It seemed to imply, and in this they were right—that the Umma party had confidence in England and would co-operate with it in preparing Egypt for independence. They noted with suspicion the friendly personal relations between some members of the party and some high British officials, at a time when, in general, personal relations were more strained than ever\(^{(116)}\). The Khedive also viewed the birth of the party with suspicion. He saw behind it the hand of his adversary, Saad Zaghloul. The party was a spontaneous and

\(^{(115)}\) Ibid.: 70.

natural growth. It rested on an alliance between a group of educated men and a number of notables from the provinces. Many of those who played a part in forming it were men whose families had also played a part in the Arabi movement a generation earlier. They were opposed in principle, and from interest, to the continuation of the personal rule of the Khedive, just as they were opposed to the absence of any check on the power of the British. They wished to act as a ‘third force’ to check the other two. The party’s moderation attracted a number of Coptic leaders and notables, such as Fakhri Bey Abdel-Nur and Sinut Bey Hanna, who later became pillars of the Wafd.

Shortly after the Umma party was created, the Nationalist party (Al-Hizb Al-Watani) officially came into being. In a sense, however, it had already been in existence for some years, as the personal followers of Mustafa Kamil. The young nationalist leader did not believe in forming a party officially, because he thought that to form parties was to divide the nation. As soon as the Umma party was formed, however, he wrote to his friend and confident, Mohamed Farid, that the Nationalist Party, which had carried the main burden of the fight against the occupation for thirteen years, must now be officially constituted in ‘its true colours’. He criticized the Umma Party for its policy of gradualism.

On October 22, 1907, a large meeting was convened at Alexandria. Kamil made one of his longest and most impassioned speeches to an audience of 6,000 composed mainly of townspeople and students, but with a few notables who were attracted by his fire and earnestness. In many ways the speech marks an important stage in the development of Kamil’s political ideals. Shorn of its rhetoric, the programme he advocated was not so different from that of the Umma in fundamentals. It is true that his assessment of the realities of his country’s situation was clouded by excessive enthusiasm; but perhaps, for the first time, he acknowledged that Egypt could look neither to Turkey nor to France for its salvation, but only to her own efforts. In December, the executive of the Watani Party adopted an elaborate programme advocating

that the people should be associated with the work of the government and that the bonds between Muslims and Copts should be strengthened\(^{(119)}\).

Like the Watani Party, the Constitutional Reform Party (\textit{Hizb al-Islah al-Dusturi}) revolved around one man, Sheikh Ali Yusuf. Ali Yusuf pursued various activities in his life, but his most important was as editor of \textit{al-Muayyad} for over twenty-three years, from the date of its first publication in 1889 until his retirement from politics and journalism in 1912. All through his career, as an editor and a public figure, he remained faithful to the Khedive. He built up \textit{al-Muayyad} from nothing. In time, it came to rival in technical achievement the well-run Syrian papers, and became ‘the doyen of the native Muslim press’.

Mustafa Kamil and the Khedive parted company after the Anglo–French agreement of 1904, and, from that time the Khedive drew closer to Ali Yusuf, whose Islamic sentiments were not in any sense pro-Turkish but nevertheless seemed to serve the Khedive’s purposes. When the Umma Party was formed and Mustafa Kamil set to work to create his own party, Ali Yusuf, with the Khedive in the background, and with the help of a number of notables and high officials, drew up a programme for a third Party. Its first declared aim was to support the Khedivial authority within the limits laid down by the Firmans granted by the Sultan, and to compel Britain to honour her promises of evacuation. The Party also declared that it stood for the creation of an Egyptian representative body to legislate for all matters pertaining to Egyptian interests, for free universal education, with Arabic as the language of instruction, for the replacement of foreign officials by Egyptians, and for the unification of the judicial system. In the preamble the programme stated that religion and politics should be kept separate in all Party deliberations. In his speech at the first general meeting of the Party, Ali Yusuf stated that his Party agreed with Mustafa Kamil on the need for evacuation, but disagreed on the methods to be employed; persuasion was a more effective method than force\(^{(120)}\).

After the death of Mustafa Kamil in 1908, the Egyptian national movement lost its vitality and the warmth of his patriotic enthusiasm. The ten

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\(^{(119)}\) \textit{Ibid.}: 77.

\(^{(120)}\) \textit{Ibid.}: 81.
years from the death of Kamil to 1918 are waiting and reflecting period. They are the years of the Muslim–Coptic critical relations and the two religious congresses\(^{(121)}\).

These years could be considered as the incubating period for the movement of 1919. The political climite in those ten years nourished the foundation of the Wafd as a Party. One can find more than one story concerning the birth of the Wafd. One of the stories originates from Prince Omar Tousson, who claims that he conceived the Wafd idea in the early weeks of 1918\(^{(122)}\). In Zaghloul’s memoirs he himself recalls that the idea of the Wafd came to his mind at the same time as it came to others, but he took the practical step of inviting his colleagues to take part in it\(^{(123)}\). A similar idea came to the mind of the Prime Minister at that time, Hussein Rushdi Pasha, who was anxious for a visit to London with an Egyptian delegation to discuss their demands with the British\(^{(124)}\).

On November 13, 1918, Saad Zaghloul, Abdel Aziz Fahmy and Ali Sharawi went to the British High Commission and met Sir Reginald Wingate to ask for Egypt’s independence. That meeting is considered as the beginning of the establishment of the Wafd Party. Their request was naturally based on the temporary nature of the Protectorate. Zaghloul said to Wingate “England is the strongest and most liberal of the great powers. In the name of those principles of freedom which guide her, we ask to be her friends”. Taken off his guard, the British High Commissioner played for time, but advised the Foreign Office to start conversations and, as a means of exploring some of the political problems, to allow the delegation to state its case at the Peace Conference which was about to open in Paris. London answered sharply, ordering ‘firmness’. Saad protested, organized meetings, and telegraphed to Paris. On March 8, 1919, the head of the delegation and three of his


followers, Mohamed Mahmoud, Ismail Sidqi and Hamad el-Basel, were deported to Malta. England had learnt that the Egyptian nation was born. On the morning of March 9, from Alexandria to Luxor, strikes, riots and acts of sabotage broke out all over the country.

The chief strength and attraction of the Wafd lay in the personality of Zaghloul, a popular leader originating in the countryside. The son of a well-to-do fellah of Lower Egypt, he imbibed the traditional Koranic culture at Al-Azhar before learning French at the age of forty. As a young magistrate, he had taken part in the Arabi revolt of 1882, alongside his master, Mohamed ‘Abduh. Apart from men like Mohamed Mahmoud, the Oxford-trained Egyptian whose family’s wealth and father’s standing were exceptional, there were Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid—Abduh’s chief disciple—Wasif Ghali, head of the most prominent Coptic family in Upper Egypt, Sinut Bey Hanna, another Copt whose devotion to Zaghloul once endangered his own life, Moustafa al-Nahhas and Hafiz Afifi, who represented the Kamil’s group of younger Egyptians. These and others, together represented the landlord, the intellectual, and the up-and-coming generation. Saad Zaghloul was a true product of the preceding years of leadership of the Wafd he began to combine the outlook of Kamil, the intransigent nationalist, and Abduh, the thoughtful exponent of Egyptian freedom.

The Wafd under Saad travelled the usual road of a nationalist group: rebuffs, banishments, imprisonment, but power in the end. Zaghloul, inseparable now from the Wafd, surrendered his old flexibility to the masses, who gave him instead unquestioning support and unbounded affection. Only three years after his election to the Party leadership he was powerful enough to dismiss some of his early colleagues whose natural endowments, educational background, and family connexions rendered them out of touch with the masses, whom they shunned and whom Saad alone could handle. He dismissed Lutfi, the highbrow theoretician, Mohamed Mahmoud, the prim unbending reformist, Adli Yeken, the Turco–Egyptian aristocrat, and many others; although they constituted a majority in the Party’s executive, Saad only had to dub them ‘dissidents’ to discredit them in the eyes of the Egyptians.

What he lost in dismissing them, however, he gained in the new recruits, who included men like Makram Ebeid, the young advocate who rose to the much-coveted post of secretary of the Party and who shaped its destinies, and consequently those of Egypt for almost two decades. He was, like his later chief, Moustafa al-Nahhas, a middle-class Egyptian of fellah origin. Zaghloul, the follower of Mohamed 'Abduh, the believer in constitutionalism and reform, found he had, in pursuit of power, to appeal to the more violent instincts of the masses.

Just as the political revolution of 1919 must be viewed against the backdrop of the World War I, so the accompanying economic changes reflected wartime economic developments. The War exposed major weaknesses in Egypt’s pre-War economy. It demonstrated the vulnerability of an economy which depended so fundamentally upon the export of a single crop—cotton—and on substantial European financing for the marketing of this product.

The most important new economic institution created after World War I was the Banque Misr, the brainchild of Tal’at Harb. As a co-founder of the Umma Party’s newspaper, al-Jaridah, Tal’at Harb made certain that the paper carried articles dealing with economics. He himself wrote several, one of which contained a plea for creating the economic basis of political independence.

Although the Bank was founded with a modest capital, it commanded immediate attention in the press. Tal’at Harb used the Banque Misr as an instrument of industrial development, as he had predicted. In 1923, he began to invest a small amount of the Bank’s surplus profits in founding national industries, and extended this programme in subsequent years.

(128) Tal’at Harb was a graduate of the Egyptian Law School. He began his career as a translator in the Daira Saniya and pursued various activities in the political and economic fields. He is considered as the father of the modern Egyptian national economy.
A second institution which reflected new directions in the economy was the Egyptian Federation of Industries. Founded in 1922, this body represented the modernising industrial sector, rather than the still persisting artisan and local handicraft groups.

A third new economic institution founded after the War was the Egyptian General Agricultural Syndicate. It represented the interests of Egypt’s landed magnates and their desire to gain greater control over the marketing of cotton.

These three new economic institutions were the consequences of the Egyptian Revolution of 1919. Like the political movement of Zaghloul, they reflected vigorous nationalist orientation. Moreover, the desire to establish such institutions, apparent in Egypt before the War, was intensified by the economic impact of this conflict. Claiming to be a purely Egyptian bank, with only Egyptian shareholders and an Egyptian board of directors, Banque Misr was committed to creating the economic underpinnings for Egypt’s political independence. The Egyptian Federation of Industries, although dominated by the so-called cosmopolitans of Egypt, also sought to create a more diversified Egyptian economy with a strong industrial sector. The Egyptian General Agricultural Syndicate agitated against the dominance of a small group of European merchants over the marketing of cotton and wanted to gain a larger share of the profits from Egypt’s main export. All of these patently nationalist demands were couched in powerful nationalist imagery. The proponents of these new bodies were not trying to create an autonomous and self-sufficient national economy. They all recognised Egyptian backwardness and the need to rely on a certain amount of foreign capital and technical assistance. But at the same time they sought to dismantle the old Cromerian arrangement in which Egypt was seen only as an agricultural country, exporting cotton. They favoured industrial development, a modified tariff system affording protection to nascent industries, and an end to monoculture. The founding of these new organisations marked the emergence of the Egyptian bourgeoisie.\(^{(130)}\)

These institutions manifested new power and confidence on the part of the nineteenth-century Egyptian families who had been fortunate enough to become large landholders as a result of the changes in land laws and the

\(^{(130)}\) Ibid.: 64.
distribution of private estates carried out by Mohamed Ali and his successors. Makram Ebeid, as a product of the Revolution of 1919, could be counted among those enthusiastic for the new institutions of Egyptian National Economy. Later, on becoming Minister of Finance, he took the opportunity to give expression to an independent aspect towards the Egyptian economy. He repeated, on several occasions, that the Egyptian economic evolution was wholly involved in the political and social evolution of the Egyptian nation.

Makram Ebeid joined the Ministry of Justice in 1913 as the secretary of the Official Gazette, al-Waqa’i’Al-Misriyya. He subsequently worked as a private secretary to the British legal advisers of the Ministry from 1915 to 1918. He wrote a memorandum suggesting the establishment of a sort of alliance between Egypt and Britain which must have been a very interesting subject at the time\(^{(131)}\). He resigned from his secretaryship in 1919. His open letter of resignation, appealing in the press, was widely considered as one of the glorious patriotic articles. It was said that the resignation attracted Saad Zaghloul’s notice. Ebeid was then appointed as a tutor at the Royal School of Law, lecturing on the Law of Contracts. Among his students were Mohamed Salah Eldin, Ibrahim Abdel Hady and Mahmoud Soliman Ghannam, all to become later leading members of the Wafd Party, but then only members of the Wafd students’ committee. He was dismissed by the school in August 1921, because he had participated in a banquet honouring Saad Zaghloul. In September 1921, in a public speech he openly stated that he would not retain the name ‘William’, as a foreign name, but henceforth wished to be known as Makram Ebeid. Two years before in 1919, he had written a public memorandum criticising the policies of the British Adviser in the Ministry of Justice, Sir Walter Brunyate. He was among those who, in 1919, welcomed Zaghloul on his return from his exile in Malta. On that occasion, Wissa Wassef introduced Ebeid to Zaghloul as the man who had written the memorandum against the British Adviser. Yet, as late as 1921 there had been no direct contact between Zaghloul and Ebeid\(^{(132)}\).

As to the Coptic participation in the Wafd, it started early when Zaghloul and his two colleagues appeared before the British High Commissioner on


\(^{(132)}\) From an interview with Mr. Saad Fakhry Abdel Nur, on September 13, 1974.
November 13, 1918. A few days later, some Coptic notables held a meeting at the ‘Ramsis Club’ and discussed the fact that there were no Copts among the three leaders. They thereupon chose three of their number, Fakhry Abdel Nour, Wissa Wassef and Tawfik Andrawos to meet Zaghloul and tape up with him the absence of the Coptic element in the delegation. At the meeting, Zaghloul asked them to choose one to represent them in the new stage of the national movement. They put forward three names: Wassif Boutros Ghali, Sinout Hanna, and George Khayat. The three took the oath in front of Zaghloul at the same meeting with Hamad el-Basil, a Bedouin notable from Fayoum, who had also been deported with Zaghloul to Malta. Khayat then asked in a direct way about the Coptic role in the political and national movement, Zaghloul answered by declaring “Copts have the same rights and duties as Muslims and are on the same footing”\(^{(133)}\).

Copts became very close to Zaghloul and always showed their loyalty to his leadership. When he faced the first split in the Party in June 1921, most of them remained with Zaghloul, supporting his extremist national line for complete independence. Among the small group with Zaghloul during his differences with the group of Adly Yeken were three Copts: Wassif Ghali, Sinout Hanna and Wissa Wassef. Among the young Copts surrounding Zaghloul was Ebeid, as the former was impressed by the latter’s intelligence, culture and charismatic effect on the masses. Besides these many talents possessed by Ebeid, his competence as an excellent English speaker and writer made him the spokesman of Zaghloul’s policy in London.

Ebeid was to be Zaghloul’s envoy in London on more than one occasion to represent the opposition against the activities of the moderates of the national movement, as the Zaghloul group considered itself the real representatives of the Egyptian Nation. In his letter to the Egyptian Journal in London, Ebeid wrote\(^{(134)}\):

“Further, you ask me whether the dissenting members of the Egyptian delegation do not represent the nation, and again I reply most emphatically that neither they nor the Adly Cabinet can in any way claim to represent the people. I would say more: they and


\(^{(134)}\) The Egyptian Journal, London, September 8, 1921.
the Adly Cabinet are alone responsible for persuading the British and European public that there is disunion in our ranks.

It is my sacred duty, however, to prove to them, beyond the shadow of doubt, that the nation is and will remain united in upholding its national ideal and its chosen leader. Nations do not easily bestow their confidence upon eleventh hour patriots, whose stock of patriotism consists merely in parrot-like words. The practical Englishman judges men by their ‘Shade of opinion’ and not by the outward expression thereof, and you cannot get rid of the fact that Lord Milner, the British Government, and the greater section of the British Press, are still agreed that Adly Pasha represents a shade of opinion favourable to their own, unlike Zaghloul Pasha whom they term an ‘extremist’. Mr. Perceval Landon, who in a previous article in the Daily Telegraph expressly stated that Zaghloul Pasha could not negotiate with the British because he had rejected the Milner Scheme, expresses the hope, in a more recent article, that Adly Pasha, with his ‘reasonable compromise’, would ‘in conjunction with the British Government, reach the common goal’.

You say that Zaghloul Pasha was willing to negotiate in conjunction with Adly Pasha. Well, so he was, but on his own conditions, and when Adly Pasha refused them, he naturally and rightly opposed him with all his power; so much so that strong military measures had to be taken to protect the Adly Cabinet from the wrath of the people whom they now claim to represent. In spite of the above facts, you still raise the absurd point about the Presidency, which the Adly Cabinet and its supporters have been exploiting in a most pitiful manner. One single observation will destroy the whole fabric of this insidious argument. Don’t you honestly think that had it been merely for the question of the Presidency, the British Government would have moved heaven and earth to appoint Zaghloul Pasha as President (while retaining Adly Pasha comfortably in his post as Prime Minister), thereby avoiding all the difficulties that they are now encountering in Egypt? Further, had Zaghloul Pasha been so desirous of ingratiating himself with
the British, would he have been so open in his attacks against the Milner Project on his arrival in Cairo? No, sir; the whole matter is obvious, and I have not come across a single Englishman who does not agree with the bulk of the Egyptian people on this point. Finally, you ask me why Zaghoul Pasha is now demanding the abolition of martial law when Adly Pasha is negotiating, but did not press for it when he himself was negotiating with Lord Milner. I really fail to understand you. Zaghoul Pasha stipulated for the abolition of martial law both before leaving Paris and in Egypt, long before the present disagreement between him and Adly Pasha arose.

When requested to co-operate in the official negotiations, he accepted the invitation, stipulating both for himself and for Adly Pasha that no official negotiations should take place before the abolition of martial law, an abolition which would prove the good faith of the British Government”.

In that article, Ebeid was emphasizing Zaghoul’s genuine representation of the Egyptian nation, confirming that the Prime Minister, Adly Pasha should not accept the official negotiations while martial law is in force. The Editor commented by saying:

“Mr. Makram fails to see that to deal with the character of his public statements does not mean that we are indulging in personalities. In answer to the question: Why did not he protest against the Ministry at the time of its formation? He says that the Cabinet promised to co-operate with the Egyptian Delegation under the presidency of Zaghoul Pasha. Presidency here, we take to mean, of course, presidency of the Zaghoul Delegation. We hope that Mr. Makram does not want us to understand that the Adly Cabinet promised to make Zaghoul Pasha president of the Official Delegation. We do not know what he means by the “millennium of liberty”. Does it mean securing for Egypt a settlement based on the Milner report and the reservations as put forward by Zaghoul Pasha’s Delegation. This is exactly what Adly Pasha is endeavouring to secure now. The truth is that when Zaghoul Pasha failed to come to terms with Adly Pasha concerning the
presidency of the Official Delegation he attempted to prove that the latter long before he formed his Cabinet was intriguing with Lord Milner against Egyptian interests, and consequently Adly Pasha was called a traitor. In view of this allegation, how is it that Zaghloul Pasha could, at any time, have agreed to negotiate with Adly Pasha?

Zaghloul Pasha’s attitude is remarkable. First he refused to come to London, then he came to London. First he demanded complete independence. Then he gradually reduced his demand to “Complete independence” according to the Milner scheme with certain reservations. Now his envoy is telling us that this is a “theatrical independence”.

Ebeid showed himself to be very active during his mission in London and wrote many articles in newspapers and held interviews with several British journalists. For example, in one day he held two interviews, for the London Evening News and for the Manchester Guardian.

The Evening News published the interview under the heading:

“The disgruntled Egyptian Cairo professor demands full Independence”, whilst The Manchester Guardian headed their interview “The British Egyptian negotiations—An apostle of real Independence—No Milner Scheme”

The Manchester Guardian wrote:

“The mission of professor Makram Ebeid... is to inform the public here of the reasons why the followers of Zaghloul are opposed to the Adly delegation, which is at present negotiating a treaty with the British government, and why they hold that any treaty so concluded will not be accepted in Egypt as a solution”

On August 9, 1921, Ebeid delivered a long speech as guest of the Egyptian parliamentary committee, at a dinner held in the House of Commons. In it he

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(135) A scheme offered by the British government as a half way to independence rejected Zaghloul and his followers.

raised several points, such as: freedom of speech in Egypt and the democratic farce, and explained why he and his colleagues had no confidence in the official negotiations\textsuperscript{(137)}.

He outlined in his speech the difference between Zaghloul and Adly saying:

“To put the whole matter in a nutshell, the difference is now, as it has ever been since the British occupation, between the people and the government. Zaghloul represents the national ideal and is the acknowledged mandatory of the nation, while Adly is the government’s representative and, in reality, though not in theory, England’s nominee. He has been entrusted with the conduct of the negotiations because he and his colleagues are, according to Lord Milner, “The more moderate men” of Egypt. Lord Milner shrewdly sums up the position by saying that in his discussions with Adly Pasha and his colleagues, he discovered that under the banner of nationalism several shades of opinion existed among the Egyptians. The practical Englishman cares more about the shade of opinion than its outward expression. The British Government has therefore wisely chosen men representing that shade of opinion which is most favourable to its own plans.

Thus, although, owing to the pressure of public opinion, our poor cabinet is made to talk the language of revolution, and although its members are posing as ultranationalists, the British Government knows their true colours as well as we do. In a word, the whole dispute really turns upon the Milner scheme, which the official negotiators are merely trying to trim and polish and render attractive, but which Zaghloul Pasha and the whole nation have rejected. The British Government is endeavouring to force upon us an independence which is a mere diplomatic expression, a sad travesty of the true independence which we demand; and Adly Pasha is the “Moderate man” chosen for the work.

\textsuperscript{(137)} M. Ebeid, versus the Milner Scheme; or the Zaghloul-Adly Issue, London 1921.
I must confess that my outlook is a gloomy one. Thanks to the short-sighted policy of the British Government in endeavouring to enforce upon us the minimum of our rights in the shape of the Milner Scheme, the bulk of the Egyptian nation, with Zaghloul Pasha at the head, are thrown into an attitude of the strongest opposition. Instead of obtaining a solution, you will merely obtain a dead lock. Instead of fostering a friendly feeling between our two peoples, you will only enhance that feeling of suspicion as to British intentions which is latent, but ever present in the mind of every Egyptian. The Adly Ministry is merely an incident in the history of our national movement, an accident of our public life. Its influence is purely governmental, and therefore short-lived. Besides the Government there is the people whom it is essential to satisfy. The discontent and disappointment in Egypt are even more bitter now than in 1919, and I must call upon you in the name of justice to try and avert the coming storm, we have every desire to be on the most friendly terms with the free people free England, but we want an honest agreement, based on our complete independence and on mutual respect and sympathy and not a grudging, half-hearted settlement. Lord Milner said rightly enough in his report that the cause of the popular discontent in Egypt was that the British Government had never boldly faced the facts of the situation. You are committing the same mistake today; you are not facing the situation as it really is. Here is our hand; either take it or refuse it, as men and Englishmen. But, please, no half measures, no hollow theatrical independence, and, above all, no Milner scheme!"

Ebied continued his speech by envisaging the improved future of Anglo–Egyptian relations. He believed that friendship could be complete if the independence of Egypt was achieved:

"Gentlemen, one last word. By helping the Egyptian cause of real independence you will not only be fulfilling the best traditions of your free country, but also furthering its best interests. The more independent we are, the better friends you will have in us; and our friendship can only be complete if our independence is complete."
Remember that we entered the war with the Allies three months before the British protectorate was declared over Egypt; and that we have therefore every justification in claiming our right to self-determination, which the Allies extended even to their enemies. Remember that for the last forty years English statesmen, who are first and foremost English gentlemen, have frequently pledged England’s honour to the evacuation of our country and the restoration of our rights. Remember also that the cause of Egyptian freedom is in a sense the cause of Eastern freedom, and that a discontented Egypt is a menace to the tranquillity of the whole East”.

An evaluation of this speech by Ebeid should not be made through the national movement criterion, but rather on that of the capability of Ebeid to deal with the British political mentality. Many of the Egyptian politicians at that time were either of Turkish origin, e.g. Adly Pasha, or came from the Egyptian village, like Zaghloul Pasha. The first type were known as capable in dealing with the Western political mentality, as they were able to converse in foreign languages and had been educated according to the European system and culture. The second type had mostly tarted their studies in the local government schools, or in the religious primary schools (Kuttabs). Thus most of these latter lacked experience of foreign cultures and some of them were incapable of coping with the European mentality and outlook. Ebeid was among those few who had begun his life in rural surroundings and had passed through both the national and foreign schools, till he became unique in his cultural outlook and had the ability to deal with both domestic and foreign affairs. This talent is one of the most effective elements in Ebeid’s character.

He had become increasingly involved in the national movement as he moved closer to Zaghloul, acting as his spokesman to the extent that he was known as the faithful son of Saad (Ibn Sa’ad Al-Barr). At one of Ebeid’s interviews concerning the Adly–Milner deliberations, he stated:

“I think that the Milner project with certain reservations would be acceptable”.

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“We however intend starting a boycott similar to that of Gandhi, to cause a strike of government officials and to start a campaign of intimidation against anyone who would be likely to form a cabinet, it is out of the question to allow Adly Pasha or any other to form an opposition party, should he do so we shall have to crush it by every means. Hitherto we have only been playing with the British. But the time has arrived for serious work. Should Adly Pasha desire to work sincerely for the country, there is only one way in which he can prove his sincerity to the nation, and that is by allying himself to Zaghloul Pasha.

The nation has lost all confidence in Adly, he is the cause of the great blow which the nation has recently sustained”<sup>(138)</sup>.

In another article in *The Egyptian Journal*, Ebeid faced a problem with the British press when it was published as follows:

“An amazing statement is reported to us by a correspondent who heard Mr. Makram addressing a number of Egyptian students at a London Hotel last week. Mr. Makram, it is reported, told his audience that Zaghloul Pasha had given him money for the Press in England”.

This statement first appeared in our issue of August 18th. Mr. Makram’s “absolute denial” is dated September 10th. Our readers will remember that Mr. Makram has been carefully studying the contents of the “Egyptian Journal”, and has replied in detail to several of our articles prior and subsequent to the appearance of the one in question. He allowed the observation to remain unanswered for twenty–two days”.

Ebeid wrote a letter to the Editor of *The Egyptian Journal*:

“Sir,—I must ask you to publish my absolute denial of the statement made in your last issue to the effect that I said that I had money for paying British journalists. My speech was made in the presence

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<sup>(138)</sup> F.O. 371/7744, December 27, 1921. Allenby to Curzon.
of about eighty Egyptians, who could testify to the fact that this absurd statement is entirely without foundation.

I am, Sir, yours, etc.,
W. Makram Ebeid.
Hotel Cecil, Strand, London W.C.
10th September, 1921 [139].

The dialogue between Ebeid and the press continued under the titles of “From Zaghloul Pasha’s New Envoy to the Editor of The Egyptian Journal”:

“Sir,—May I be allowed to reply very briefly to the article in your issue of August 11th, headed “Zaghloul Pasha’s New Envoy”? With your permission I will disregard the personal allusions to myself and your jeering at the “sentimental character of the ‘Professor’”...

You are entirely wrong, sir, in your appreciation of my mission which you characterise as “washing dirty linen in the streets”. I am here to tell the British public what the Adly Ministry have neither wished nor dared to say, namely, that the Egyptian people have no confidence in any negotiations which are:

1- Conducted by men who have no mandate from the nation, and, what is more, have refused to summon a National Assembly for the election of the people’s delegates.

2- Carried on in an atmosphere of oppression under martial law with the sole object of stifling opposition to the Ministry.

3- Without any precise and actual guarantees as to the free and popular election of a National Assembly.

No self-respecting nation will negotiate on a question of life and death without demanding at least the above guarantees. I consider my mission to be imperative and of vital importance to the cause of our long-suffering Egypt.

(139) The Egyptian Journal, September 15, 1921.
With regard to your allegations that the Zaghloulists have not rejected the Milner Scheme, I think that you are confusing the facts. The nation has never accepted the Milner Scheme as it really is, but as it was explained to them by the envoys, and even as such it was not accepted without the reservations. You know better than I that if anyone was responsible for these glorified interpretations, it was not Zaghloul Pasha, who had sent his famous telegram from Vichy, declaring that “the scheme was rejected by the Delegation because it was outside their mandate and did not give Egypt her independence, although it secured for the country some appreciable advantages”. The reason why it was submitted to the nation was to avoid internal dissensions within the Delegation which were already beginning to appear, since even at that early stage the dissentients had manifested pronounced Adlist sympathies and like, Adly Pasha, favoured the Milner Scheme”.

The Editor of *The Egyptian Journal* commented saying:

“We publish with pleasure Mr. Makram’s reply, and we thank him for giving our readers an opportunity of studying the points of view conveniently.

He speaks about the members of the Egyptian Official Delegation as people “who have no mandate from the nation”. What does he mean by “mandate from the nation”? The mandate Adly Pasha has is in no way different from that held by Zaghloul Pasha, namely, documents of confidence from representative bodies. Both sides have any amount of these. Another reason why he condemns the Official Delegation is because the negotiations are “carried on in an atmosphere of oppression under martial law” ...

The atmosphere of the present negotiations is most decidedly not so degrading to Egyptian honour and dignity as that in which Zaghloul Pasha conducted his negotiations”*(140).*

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*(140) The Egyptian Journal, August 25, 1921.*
A Scholarly Peer-Reviewed Pamphlet (5)

Zaghloul expressed confidence and pride in seeing Coptic colleagues around him on the same footing as Muslims. It is significant that one cannot easily find a similar situation in 1882, in the Orabi movement, and even in Mustafa Kamel’s activities in the same field. It is evident that Zaghloul’s movement was a purely national one, devoid of any religious bias, whilst both Arabi’s and Kamel’s activities contained in them religious overtones.(141)

Following the character of the national movement, whereas Arabi and Kamel had Islamic attitudes in their national trend, Zaghloul’s line was pure Egyptian. In later years, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s thought and policy reflects the colour of the movement as he defined it in his book Philosophy of the Revolution in 1953. He considered the Islamic circle as one of the major fields of the Egyptian foreign policy. In spite of the fact that there were no Copts among the “free officers” and many of the members were influenced by the thought and organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Kamal Eldin Hussein, Abdel Moneim Abdel Raouf and Hussein El-Shafey, nevertheless the secular basis of Nasser’s policy is apparent. In 1954, he destroyed the Muslim Brotherhood movement and again obliterated its remains in 1965(142). He resisted, even rejected, all offers of an Islamic Alliance from a political standpoint. The Coptic role in political life in Nasser’s era however was limited because of the disappearance of political parties and the absence of democratic institutions(143).

The active role of Copts around 1919 therefore marks the high water of their national history. On December 22, 1921, the British authorities in Cairo gave an ultimatum to the active members of the Zaghloulist group, ordering them to return to the countryside or be exiled from Egypt. The ultimatum was rejected by Zaghloul, Nahhas, Fathalla Barakat, Atif Barakat, Senout Hanna, and Makram Ebeid. They were thereupon exiled to the Seychelles. Dr. H. Mu’nis believes that it was Ebeid’s emphasis that the ultimatum should be rejected that swung the decision among his colleagues. They were discussing the matter, when he arrived and forcibly argued for rejection(144).

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Mahmoud Ghannam states in his book, that the arrival of Ebeid on December 20, 1921, at Alexandria and his subsequent speeches delivered at stations on his way to Cairo, the warm welcome at Cairo station where Zaghloul and the vociferous clamour against the British, including the shouts of “Down with Allenby”, together with students’ arrangements for celebrating Ebeid’s success at the London mission, and the failure of the Adly–Curzon negotiations, all provoked the High Commission to issue such an ultimatum. Ahmed Shafik Pasha in his political Annals of Egypt, describes the disturbances in Cairo upon Ebeid’s arrival as Zaghloul’s representative in London. He mentions that one British soldier was killed and another wounded.

Apart from the reason behind the deportation decision, it had very important repercussions in the political life of every one of the deportees, because being exiled with Zaghloul implied that they had been honoured by the stamp of patriotism. As mentioned before, for Ebeid himself it was very significant as a decisive point in his political career, transforming Ebeid, the party politician into Ebeid, the national revolutionary.

Three main consequences arose from his exile experience. The first is that he became personally closer to Zaghloul and on more intimate terms with his other colleagues, especially Mustafa El-Nahhas. It is said that when Ebeid was taken ill in the Seychelles, suffering from malaria, the hospital authorities asked for one of his colleagues to accompany him during the treatment period. Mustafa El-Nahhas volunteered, and stayed with him in the hospital till he recovered.

A copy of the Aden report quoted that:

“I have the honour to inform you that William Makram Bey was admitted to the British Station hospital for treatment of fever on the 3rd February 1922 and was discharged from the hospital on the 13th February 1922 completely recovered.”


(146) A. Shafiq, Hawliat Misr Al-Siyasia, vol. 2, Cairo 1927: 544; and F.O. 371/7741, January 2, 1922, Allenby to Curzon.

(147) F.O. 371/7734, May 3, 1922 (From Political Resident, Aden, to H.M. Secretary of State for colonies, London).
Secondly, it was an opportunity for Ebeid to refine and perfect his Arabic language enabling him to become a talented orator. In this respect there was among his colleagues, Zaghloul’s nephew, Atif Barakat, who had formerly been headmaster of the School of Religious Judges. He helped Ebeid much during nearly two years to perfect his Arabic rhetoric, so that he was to become one of the most famous orators in Egyptian political life(148). Lastly, the period of exile was the basic element that established his national image; it may well be that the experience of this exile was to sustain in Ebeid and Nahhas, among Zaghloul’s group in exile, that power of continuity in their future role in Egyptian political life, through their activity in party and government.

One of the most interesting events connected with Ebeid’s exile is the request by Mr. Louis Fanous, an Egyptian lawyer sent to the Warden and Fellows of New College, Oxford, asking them to use their good offices for the release of Ebeid, as he was a former graduate of the College. The value of that letter, dated in January 1923, lies in its summary of Ebeid’s effort:

“Dear Warden, I beg to bring to your notice and that of the College the case of worthy member of the College, William Makram, who was deported last December by the British Military authority to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, where he is now suffering grave ill health with malaria contracted at Aden on his way to Seychelles early this year.

In doing so I hope to achieve the double object:

Firstly: of explaining to the College the exact nature of the role played by Makram since 1919, which I feel confident the College would find to have been a perfectly honourable and loyal one, well worthy of the best traditions of a New College man.

Secondly: of enlisting on his behalf the active interest of the College to obtain his immediate release and repatriation in order to secure the medical treatment he urgently requires as well as recover the personal liberty to which he is entitled as a law-abiding citizen.”

(148) An interview with Mr. Sa’ad Fakhry Abdel Nour, on September 13, 1974.
When political developments in Egypt in the spring of 1919 brought Egyptian patriots into conflict with the British Military Authorities, Makram found that his duties as private secretary of the British Judicial Adviser, who was then called upon to do a great deal of political work for the British High Commissioner, put him in a very delicate position morally as he, naturally, was a Nationalist, by virtue of his post would have access to confidential British documents, which he did not feel would be right or fair to the British. Rather than find himself in a position where his patriotic duties as an Egyptian might easily conflict with his duties as the confidential secretary of his British Chief, he immediately communicated to his Chief, his political views frankly and plainly and asked to be relieved from that post of trust and confidence.

Subsequently Makram became an adherent of Zaghloul Pasha, the popular national leader with whom he acquired some considerable influence which I feel sure he used in a friendly way towards the British. That was why Zaghloul Pasha sent him last year as his representative to this Country to promote a better understanding of the Egyptian claims and explain the Zaghloulist attitude towards the British, which Makram did with credit in several interviews in the press, e.g. Evening News, Manchester Guardian, Daily News, etc. ... August to December 1921.

During this period an unfortunate split occurred in the Nationalist ranks. Makram supported Zaghloul Pasha while I was a supporter of Adly Pasha; so that for some time we did not always see eye to eye in our local politics, though we were one in seeking in different ways, otherwise, to the utmost of our power, to promote a good friendly understanding and better feeling between the country of our birth and that of our education and friendships.

About the middle of December Makram returned to Egypt where he arrived about the 20th to receive a wonderful ovation from the thousands that met him at the station.

This reception coupled with his previous activity in the British press as protagonist for Zaghloul brought him under the special
attention of the British Military Authorities who at this time were contemplating some measure of repression against Zaghloul in order to enable the Adlyist “party” to rally to the new premier-designate, Sarwat Pasha.

Accordingly, about the 22nd December, or two days after his arrival in Egypt he was ordered with several of the more prominent Zaghloulists and Zaghloul Pasha himself to abstain altogether from all political activity.

Some of these Zaghloulists gave way and retired from politics; but Zaghloul himself together with Makram and four other members of his committee declined to do so claiming freedom to exercise their right as Egyptian citizens within the law. The military authorities, acting under Martial Law powers and not under any civil or proper legal authority, therefore, arrested them and deported them first to Aden, where Makram caught malaria, and then to Seychelles, where he is now suffering from that malaria fever, at great risk to his life.

No crime and no specific legal offence was ever alleged against Makram or Zaghloul, except that of disobeying the order of the British Comander-in-Chief to withdraw from the political arena, an order of very doubtful legality which many authorities consider arbitrary and inexpedient.

In other words the ‘offence’ for which Makram is now undergoing such terrible suffering is no other than that of refusing to abstain from the service of his country in the proper otherwise perfectly lawful and legitimate ways which he felt it his duty to do. As a man brought up in British ideas of legality and the right of citizenship he protested against what he deemed an arbitrary order on the part of the Military autocracy, then supreme in Egypt, and refused to obey it.

It might interest you to note that the precise programme which Zaghloul and Makram have been all along advocating as the only one susceptible of achieving the desired friendly settlement,
has since their deportation been urged by Lord Allenby himself on H.M.’s Government and accepted by them as embodying the elements of the only possible honourable solution—so that in effect, Makram has been instrumental in bringing about the present better situation to which we have been working on other ways.

He had in fact, at risk to himself and at the cost of his present sufferings rendered a service both to Egypt and to Britain by boldly advocating what he thought was right and is now generally regarded as such.

The present policy of H.M.’s Government is in fact none other at least in theory than Zaghloul’s own programme. In practice however this programme is still being bungled by being entrusted to Zaghloul’s opponents—the Turco-Egyptian Pashas whom Sarwat, the present Premier, represents to carry out instead of being left to its authors to execute.

Inasmuch, therefore, as Makram’s conduct throughout has been one of exemplary honourability, honesty, and frank steadfast loyalty as well to his own country as to the British, whom he always considered as our country’s best friends, and as his conduct has always been marked by the courage of his convictions all of which are qualities to be respected in any man, I appeal with the greatest confidence to you and the College to take up his case with the Prime Minister and the Colonial Office and the old New College men now in power such as the present Under Secretary of the Colonies, the Honourable William Ormsby-Gore M.P. and the Right Honourable H.A.L. Fisher and in any other way you may deem fit to secure Makram’s early release thereby saving a valuable man’s life and saving his abilities and character for further noble services.

I remain, Dear Warden,
Yours Sincerely,
Louis Fanous”

The real value of Fanous’s request stems from the fact that he and Ebeid did not share the same political views. Whereas Ebeid was leading support
of Zaghloul, representing the extremist national trend, Fanous was among those supporting Adly in his moderate line in dealing with Egyptian national demands. Fanous’s letter was followed by a letter from Allenby to Curzon on February 4, 1923, against his claims\(^{(149)}\).

The Zaghloulists enjoyed more popularity after the exile of their leaders and most of the public sympathised with them. An example of that was the election of Atif Barakat and Makram Ebeid in the General Union of Teachers, while they were in the Seychelles. After his return on July 19, 1923, Ebeid gave a characteristic speech a month later to a group of youths in Shubra, emphasising that “All Egyptians, Copt and Muslim, are brothers, because their mother is Egypt and their father is Zaghloul” and he quoted a conversation between himself and Zaghloul, in which he had pointed out to the latter that there were more Copts than Muslims in Zaghloul’s group. The latter retorted that he did not know Ebeid and his colleagues as Copts, but as Egyptians only\(^{(150)}\).

If we follow Ebeid’s career after his return to Egypt we find that he became deeply involved in political life as well as following his career as a lawyer, especially in defending cases of a political nature.

In 1924, Zaghloul, having become Prime Minister, formed his cabinet. Ebeid and other colleagues were not however among his cabinet members, although his father-in-law, Morcos Hanna, became Minister of Public Works\(^{(151)}\). Zaghloul made a rallying call to the Egyptian nation on December 28, 1924, and at the end of this proclaimed:

“O, Egyptians, let the whole world know that there is in Egypt a living and rising nation which is seeking liberty seriously and struggling for independence lawfully”\(^{(152)}\).

\(^{(149)}\) F.O. 371/8964, February 12, 1923, Curzon to Allenby.


\(^{(151)}\) Ebeid married Aida Morcos Hanna in November 1923; there were no children of the marriage.

\(^{(152)}\) F.O. 371/10886, December 29, 1924, Kerr to MacDonald.
As the political struggle for independence grew and progressed the participation of Copts, although a minority, become more effective in the fateful decisions of the majority in that period. Within that political and social atmosphere, Copts had shed that minority complex and enjoyed the feeling of full security, as if they were an integral part of the majority. This period followed on the Declaration of February 28, 1922, which included four reservations. The third concerned the protection of foreigners and minorities. The Copts in the Zaghloulist group took a hard line against this reservation in particular, and the Coptic press attacked the declaration on that point emphasizing that minorities had not asked for protection or special care because they felt that they were an integral part of the nation. They could not accept that foreign protection and discrimination, because it concealed its real purpose (153).

On April 3, 1922 the Constitution Committee of thirty members was announced and boycotted by the Wafd and Watani Parties. Minorities were represented on the Committee according to a similar representation prevailing in the Legislative Assembly of 1913 (154). Copts were represented by Bishop You’an as of Alexandria, Qalini Fahmy, Elias ‘Awad and Tawfik Doss. At the session of May 7, 1922, the subject of the representation of minorities in the Parliament according to a certain system was discussed. Tawfik Doss expressed his own view that there should be a minority quota of seats in the Parliament. His reasons were first, to avoid any foreign intervention, and second, that Parliament was the legislative authority and could pass any laws against the interest of any minority, unintentionally. On the opposing side was Dr. Abdel Hamid Badawy. When a vote was taken a majority of Muslims and Copts were against Doss’s suggestion.

This example gives the exact image of the spirit of the Copts in the Zaghloulist era. In his book, Salama Moussa considered the reaction of Copts against Doss’s suggestion as a reflection of the first achievement of the 1919 movement (155). There was a parallel discussion in the press between

(153) Misr, Cairo, March 5, 1922.
(154) Al-Watan, Cairo, April 5, 1922.
Mahmoud Azmy, a Muslim writer supporting the view of Tawfik Doss, while Aziz Merham, a Copt politician, opposed them. Dr. Taha Hussein was among those who were against the representation of minorities in the Parliament\(^{(156)}\).

In such an atmosphere, Makram Ebeid enjoyed the full chance to take some of the main roles in the political theatre.

In that period, in the middle twenties, Ebeid was a member of Parliament and one of the most active politicians of the Wafd Party. Ebeid was not a very active element in that Parliament, because he was then more taken up by his direct participation in Zaghloul’s national involvement and political missions abroad. In 1924 he joined Zaghloul on his London visit for negotiation with the Labour government headed by Ramsay MacDonald. On this visit he acted as Zaghloul’s right hand, particularly in press relations and publications, and in dealing with British political figures. Zaghloul was dissatisfied with the negotiations, stating that he has refused to accept in London what others had previously offered\(^{(157)}\). He returned to Cairo with his delegation without achieving his demands.

On November 19, 1924, General Sir Lee Stack Pasha was murdered in Cairo, and Lord Allenby issued an ultimatum to Zaghloul demanding, among other things, the withdrawal of the Egyptian Army from the Sudan. After the ultimatum, the British troops occupied the Customs, Zaghloul’s government resigned, and many nationalists were arrested. Among these, on November 27, 1924, was Ebeid, who had been accused of making speeches to incite them masses against the British authorities\(^{(158)}\).

The murder of General Sir Lee Stack Pasha was the most important politically, interesting technically, in modern Egyptian politics, and was the decline of Zaghloul’s movement until his in 1927\(^{(159)}\). One of the results of Ebeid’s provocative activities at the time of General Stack’s murder, was that


the British authorities put him back on the list of suspects from which he had been removed about seven months earlier(160).

The Coptic community view towards Ebeid’s activities was not different from that of the Muslims. The momentum of the 1919 movement and Zaghloul’s spirit dominated the feelings and reactions of the masses. The Copts viewed Ebeid’s activities and that of his colleagues, Muslims or Copts, in the whole context of the national movement.

Ebeid in that period of his political career in Zaghloul’s life, typifies the national revolutionary who did not hold any governmental posts. As a member of Parliament and a lawyer, he was acting according to this national convictions. He enjoyed a great popularity equally among Muslims and Copts, and was never accused of acting on the basis of the interests of the minority he sprang from. On the contrary he often quoted the Quran in his speeches. One explanation is that he felt that he should behave as a Muslim in the stream of the majority, believing in the unity of the Egyptian nation, without any religious barriers. In his article, Hurewitz discussed this point and stated that Ebeid and Wassif Ghali, among the most successful Coptic politicians, were inclined in their political behaviour to act more Muslim than their Muslim colleagues(161).

Any evaluation of the 1919 movement therefore must affirm that it engendered an extremist Egyptian trend in politics, literature and arts. It produced some pure Egyptian models in various branches. Sayyed Darwish in music, Mahmoud Mokhtar in sculpture, Tawfik Al-Hakim in literature and Salama Moussa in social thought. It strengthened the unity between Muslims and Copts and, at the same time, opened the door to the Western influence in both style and content(162).

(160) F.O. 371/10899, June 10, 1925, Foreign Office to Allenby.
(162) A.A. Moustafa, Tarikh Misr al-Siyasi min al-Ihtilal ila al-mu’ahadah, Cairo 1967: 27.
Chapter Three

Ebeid, the Politician of the Majority Party

The effects of the 1919 revolution were more noticeable in the relations between the Muslim majority and Coptic minority. The latter played a particularly active part in the national rising, and the common struggle welded the two communities together as never before. Saad Zaghloul, who fought religious fanaticism, had much to do with this achievement. He made coexistence one of the golden rules of the Wafd (his cabinet containing two Copts and one Jew), and after him the President of the Chamber of Deputies was a Copt, Wissa Wassef Pasha. Thanks to the Revolution, the Wafd would appear to have solved the religious problem and achieved national unity(163).

After Zaghloul’s death on August 23, 1927, Moustafa El-Nahhas was chosen by the Wafd leaders to be his successor. For some days it seemed probable that the presidency of the Wafd would be forever vacant, to be eternally occupied by some spiritual emanation of the lost leader, or that Madame Zaghloul would be elected as honorary president, the affairs of the Wafd being managed by an executive committee of three, Fathallah Barakat Pasha, Moustafa El-Nahhas Pasha, and Wissa Wassef Bey. Nahhas Pasha’s personal chances improved considerably however, when it was known that his candidacy was favoured by the extremist elements and that the personal relations between Madame Zaghloul and Fathallah Pasha were strained(164).

The choice of Nahhas Pasha as president of the Wafd was followed by the appointment of Makram Ebeid in his place as Secretary-General of the Party. The choice of Ebeid as Secretary-General was the natural result of several factors such as the strength of the trend of Zaghloul’s policy in including Copts with Muslims in the leadership of the National movement,

(164) Fathallah Barakat was expected to be Zaghloul’s successor as he was his nephew and had participated in all his uncle’s efforts in the national movement. F.O. 371/12359, October 3, 1927, N. Henderson to Chamberlain.
but the singling out of Ebeid among the Copts, rather than Wissa Wassef, who was elected as the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, or Wassif Boutros Ghali (who was more interested in foreign affairs), was because of the personal understanding and cooperation between him and Nahhas, as they had been in Seychelles together and both of them had shown a special loyalty to Zaghloul and his political approach, as well as the active role of Ebeid in the choice of Nahhas.

The political adroitness of Ebeid, his ability as a negotiator, his facility in foreign languages and his experience in dealing with the European political style, his visits to London and Paris on political missions as a man of propaganda and Party spokesman were all qualities which seemed to complement the character of Nahhas, who was then well-known as a man of honesty, frankness and dignity, but who was not qualified as a State politician or as a clever negotiator, and was not in direct touch with foreign cultures.

On March 17, 1928, Nahhas was asked by King Fouad to form the first government in his political life. It was a coalition government, including Mohamed Mahmoud, the leader of the Constitutional Liberals, as Minister of Finance, with other colleagues of the latter. Ebeid also took office for the first time as Minister of Communications.

The Nahhas government lasted for only a few months, as he was dismissed on June 20, 1928, when the coalition collapsed, as a result of the resignation of Mohamed Mahmoud and his party colleagues\(^\text{165}\). Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha then became the new Prime Minister. He was known as the man of the iron hand. It was rumoured that Ebeid, as suggested in various quarters, might become the next Egyptian minister to London. The British Government at that time was undecided on the matter, especially whether Ebeid could be considered persona grata, and could be received in that capacity\(^\text{166}\). In any case, Ebeid was not appointed permanent minister to London: but Nahhas did what Zaghloul had done before when he had sent

\(^{(165)}\) “The real reason of the Nahhas’ dismissal was that he acted as defence lawyer on behalf of Prince A. Seifeldin, who had been accused of attempting to assassinate King Fouad”


\(^{(166)}\) *F.O. 371/13141, June 1, 1928*, Hoare to Chamberlain.
Ebeid as his representative against Adly in London, by sending Ebeid again in 1929, but this time to oppose the policies and negotiations of the new Prime Minister, Mohamed Mahmoud.

It was an accepted form that every new Egyptian prime minister, particularly in the period from 1919 to 1936, began his term of office by seeking new negotiations with Britain. When Mohamed Mahmoud became Prime Minister he followed this practice. After dissolving parliament he made contact with the new British Labour government and initiated the so-called Mahmoud–Henderson discussions. The Wafd stood against both the domestic and foreign policies of Mahmoud, using their overwhelming popularity for that purpose.

Ebeid’s mission to London started in August 1928, where he joined Dr. Hamed Mahmoud, the permanent representative of the Wafd in London, and also another Wafdist, Abdel Rahman Azzam. Ebeid broke his journey in Paris on his way to London, but the immigration officers at Dover refused him permission to land for political reasons, so that he and his wife were compelled to spend the night in detention in Dover, although his wife was ill.

Subsequently, after resolving the situation with the Home Office, he was allowed to proceed. On his arrival in London, he arranged propaganda meetings, and made public speeches against the dictatorial regime of Mohamed Mahmoud. One of these meetings was held under the auspices of the Egyptian Association of Great Britain and Ireland, where he delivered a long speech dealing chiefly with the alleged horrors of the Mahmoud dictatorship. He stated that no students were allowed to participate in politics, and everything in Egypt was labelled “political”. The Mahmoud government, he charged, had created a turbulent atmosphere in the country. Among its tactics, Ebeid alleged, was the use of agents provocateurs to cause disturbances. He went on to say that over fifteen newspapers had been suppressed and the police had authority to dismiss peremptorily any gathering. Ebeid gave harrowing

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(167) Abdel Rahman ‘Azzam Pasha who became the first Secretary-General of the Arab League in 1945.

(168) F.O. 371/13123, September 25, 1928, Foreign Office (Egyptian Department) to Cairo Chancery.

(169) Formed in London, including a considerable number of Egyptian students studying at the universities of the United Kingdom.
instances of police tyranny. At this juncture in the meeting, the members rose
and shouted three times, “Down with Mahmoud”\(^{(170)}\).

Ebeid continued his activities in London by writing articles in the press,
or meeting British public figures and attacking the policies and claims of
Mahmoud’s government. He issued from the Egyptian Association a political
bulletin under the name of “Egypt” and had it distributed among political
circles in Britain. The Egyptian Government headed by Mohamed Mahmoud
stood against Ebeid’s mission and had attempted from the start to prevent
him from travelling to London, claiming that he was in London to ameliorate
direct relations between the Wafd and the British\(^{(171)}\).

Ebeid succeeded through his special contacts in motivating some British
Labour members of Parliament, a group of five members headed by Mr. Conorthy,
to criticize their Government for its negative attitude towards the suspension of
the Egyptian Constitution and dissolution of its parliament\(^{(172)}\). Ebeid returned
to Egypt, receiving great acclaim from his party and the populace.

On his arrival at Alexandria, the newspapers named him the Great Striver
\((Al-Mugahid Al-Kabir)\). Addressing a tea party audience of five-hundred at
an Alexandria hotel, Ebeid said that as regards the British proposals for an
Egyptian settlement, Mahmoud Pasha was merely a communicator of the
Labour Government’s proposals to the Egyptian people, and that Mahmoud’s
casual participation in these proposals should not affect Egyptian opinion in
considering proposals upon their own merits. The Wafd’s decision in refusing
to consider these proposals until the Egyptian parliament re-assembled,
he added should be taken as indicating a friendly spirit on the part of the
Egyptian people. “Moreover”, he continued:

“Labour’s move in wishing to establish friendly relations with
Egypt is a friendly step which Egyptians highly appreciate and
reciprocate. All we demand, he continued amid cheers, is that our
Constitution and Parliament be fully restored, a condition which

\(\text{(170)}\) \text{F.O. 371/13845, July 23, 1929, Metropolitan Police (Special Branch) to the Home Office.}

\(\text{(171)}\) From a speech by Nahhas in a political conference at Mansoura, A. Shafiq, \text{Op. cit., vol. 5, Cairo}
1928: 1291.

\(\text{(172)}\) \text{Ibid.: 1257.}
we consider essential, because there can be no free friendship unless there is a free atmosphere”\textsuperscript{(173)}.

Speeches were also delivered at that party by other Wafdists, but perhaps the most interesting one was that delivered by Hafez ‘Awad Bey, a Wafdist who had been in Europe while Ebeid was in Paris and London. He stated that Ebeid was in Paris for medical treatment, but when he learnt of the arrival in London of Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha, he went to London, ignoring his doctor’s advice. Mahmoud had gone to the Labour Government carrying his book, *The Iron Hand*, to prove to the British that dictatorship was the suitable system to govern Egypt. Hafez’Awad added that Ebeid had challenged the activity of Mahmoud, although the latter was Prime Minister and had every opportunity to knock on all doors, by exercising extraordinary efforts to defend his views and claims by every means of propaganda. Ebeid had the patience and the firm determination, combined with the political flexibility, as he had observed him closely in his mission in London\textsuperscript{(174)}.

In the meantime, while the Wafdists were celebrating Ebeid’s arrival and praising his achievements in London, Mohamed Mahmoud’s supporters issued a statement against Ebeid’s mission. This was widely distributed in Alexandria, under the title *Al-Mugahid Al-Fashil Al-Kabir* (The Great Striver Who Failed). In it they stated that he had failed to give a bad impression about the ministry of Mahmoud, and merely gave an example of the split in the Egyptian Nation in the face of the British. They claimed that Copt had collected £10,000 for his mission\textsuperscript{(175)}.

What is more, *Al-Siyasa*, the journal of the Constitutional Liberal party, published a long article against Ebeid and his mission and the Wafd Party. It stated that the Wafd was under the increasing influence of William (Ebeid) and his prejudiced group.

“We are not saying that for prejudicial reasons, but simply because we have in our party more Copts than the Wafd has. The


\textsuperscript{(175)} *Al-Balagh*, Cairo, September 8, 1929.
issue is not a question of religious bias but it is a plan of William and his group. Nobody in Egypt can control his astonishment of the Wafd, which is the only party having two Coptic ministers in all their cabinets, in spite of the fact that all the Egyptian cabinets headed by Copts like Boutrous Ghali or Youssef Wahba had only one Coptic minister in it. Only few people knew that we had suggested that the deputy speakers of (Majlis Al-Nuwab) should be from our party or the national party as they are the columns of the coalition, but the Wafdist insisted in keeping the post of the Deputy Speaker for a Coptic Wafdist as long as the speaker himself is a Muslim. It is clear that William and his participants want to dominate the Wafd party to serve their own purposes and they have succeeded in that; Muslims have no weight in the party, William is everything and Nahhas is nothing but a zero on the left side or an instrument in William’s hand” (176).

This was an example of the method used by his rivals in other political parties against Ebeid. Exploiting the matter of his faith, they alluded to him as the politician of the Coptic minority who tended to dominate the majority party.

Ebeid in all his political activities never acted as a representative of the Copts, but as a national leader in Egypt or as an advocate when abroad of the national movement represented by the Wafd. He gave a speech at the Wafd meeting held on November 13, 1929, to commemorate the anniversary of the visit of Zaghloul to the Residency in 1918. It was a remarkable oratorical effort; in the most pure and mellifluous Arabic, he greeted Zaghloul as the father of the modern Egyptian National movement and criticised the dictatorship of Mahmoud’s Government. He talked about the relation between Muslims and Copts, answering the allegation put out by the anti-Wafdist and their press. He said:

“Finding that the nation, despite all efforts of the Dictatorship remained united, the late government decided to pull down the whole structure of the nation. (After us the Deluge). An attempt was made to revive religious antipathies. It was sought to set

(176) *Al-Siyasa*, Cairo, September 8, 1929.
Muslims against Copts. But the attempt failed miserably as would all similar attempts.”

This period of Ebeid’s political life reflects his position as the guiding light of the extremist wing in the Wafd Party. He greatly influenced Nahhas, and in fact dominated him, especially in convincing him to take an extreme anti-treaty position and to insist upon the realization of maximum Wafd aspirations.

In January 1930, Ebeid became the Minister of Finance in the Nahhas Cabinet and from March to May 1930 he was a member of the delegation headed by Nahhas for the treaty negotiations in London. The delegation also included Wassif Ghali, Osman Moharram and Ahmed Maher.

In an official conversation between Ebeid and Watson, at the British Embassy in Cairo, on June 17, 1930, only a day before the Nahhas Cabinet resigned—Ebeid said that the Prime Minister was on the point of submitting the cabinet’s resignation to the King, in view of the King’s refusal to sign the law dealing with Ministerial responsibility and his attitude in regard to the nomination of senators. Ebeid said that there was a very strong feeling in Wafd circles that if H.M.’s Government desire to keep the door open for a treaty had been genuine they would have found some way of averting the present crisis. That conversation clearly shows the intention of the Wafdists to take a hard line with the King and to show him that they were not disposed to stay in power unless they enjoyed full prestige. It also indicates the change for the better in the relations between the Wafd and the British, which became more reasonable and understanding.

During his term of office as Minister of Finance, Ebeid devoted more attention to the political side of his post than to his daily ministerial duties, and even appeared to have neglected departmental work in favour of political manipulations. He dealt with financial affairs and the economic problems

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(177) F.O. 371/13849, November 25, 1929, Lorraine to Henderson.
(178) F.O. 371/13849, November 12, 1929, Lorraine to Henderson.
from a political angle. Realising the importance of cotton as the main product of Egypt at that time, he was keen to establish a stable cotton policy. Soon after the resignation of the Wafd Cabinet, he wrote a press article explaining that policy saying:

“I declared in the Senate two days before the Ministry’s resignation that we intended to adopt a stable cotton policy, and not one of makeshifts, and that such policy would tend to protect prices against artificial factors and fraudulent speculation. With this object in view the Wafd Ministry succeeded, within the incredibly short time at its disposal, in introducing a Bill setting up an agricultural bank for the help of small peasants and agricultural cooperatives, and in drawing up a scheme of reform for the Minet-el-Bassal Exchange, after consultation with leading members of the Alexandria Produce Association. Furthermore, I was fortunate in obtaining the services of a British cotton expert, Professor Todd, who was to study the cotton question in Egypt during this summer and report to me on the matter...”

When Ismail Sidqi Pasha formed his cabinet in June 1930 and began his well-known policy of suspending the constitution of 1923, the Wafd strongly opposed his autocracy, and when they considered launching a political propaganda against Sidqi in London, they again chose Ebeid as their envoy. Ebeid carried out this task in London from July to September 1930.

One of the most interesting aspects of Ebeid’s character was brought out on the occasion of a pan-Islamic congress held in London in honour of Ebeid early in August 1930, during his stay there, working against Sidqi’s regime. Views were expressed at that Congress—under the name of “At Home”—regarding the independence of Muslim States and the struggle against imperialism. No British newspaper gave that Congress any mention, only a French magazine *Echo de Paris* on August 24 published a report of the meeting under the title of “Le reveil de l’Orient” (The Awakening of

the Orient). More than eight-hundred people attended the meeting as the magazine reported(182). They were mainly Egyptians, Indians and Palestinians.

The Imam of the London Mosque, Sheikh Abdel Majid from India, introduced Ebeid as a Christian and declared that Egypt and India were united in the common aim, which was liberty. In his speech, Ebeid said that the Congress was not only a symbol of nationalism but also an expression of the long suffering of the Eastern Nations, and added that East is East and West is West and that they were struggling against the barriers dividing them, to create a new link.

One has witnessed several Egyptian politicians who have come to European capitals, without thinking of attending or encouraging an Islamic Congress, but Ebeid the Copt was keen to have such a meeting in his honour, because he was always anxious to identify with the Muslim majority. The identification for him was essential to his political career.

Ebeid prepared other political activities in London against Sidqi’s government and had several meetings with British personalities. He published articles to justify the economic policy of the Wafd (since he had been the Minister of Finance) one of which was published in The Times, where he stated:

“Apart from the grave constitutional, and possibly political, issues involved by the present crisis in Egypt, may I, as a former Minister of Finance, be permitted to deal, in the dispassionate language of facts and figures, with the purely financial aspect of the present unrest in Egypt?

According to all reports from Egypt, business is completely at a standstill and the financial position at its worst owing to the present unsettled condition of the country. Doubtless the financial position will be much worse a month or two hence, when the Wafd campaign for non-payment of taxes will take full effect. Taxes will

(182) In an answer from the Foreign Office to the Spanish Embassy in London to their inquiry about the conference, they estimated the audience as not more than one hundred and fifty. F.O.371/14652, September 30, 1930 (Home Office to the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires in London).
begin to be due by next October, and it seems certain that the success of the Wafd’s campaign cannot be promoted by the present financial misery of Egyptian taxpayers, mostly of the peasant class”\(^{(183)}\).

On October 24, 1930, Ebeid delivered a lecture to the Union of Democratic Control on the subject of democracy in Egypt with reference to the present situation. He stated that democracy in Egypt and the Wafd were synonymous. He added:

“Democracy in Egypt has been dealt what was intended to be a mortal blow by the publication of a Royal Decree making surprising changes in the constitution and the franchise. By a stroke of the pen the king had abolished the constitution of 1923. He had introduced a new constitution which he would maintain by brute force, for in this age of democracy force is still the ruling principle of human intercourse. Egypt was patrolled from end to end by troops and police, and the king has assured that ‘no voice should be heard, throughout the land but that of cannon and that there should be no law but the law of the mailed fist’”\(^{(184)}\).

Ebeid always preserved the extremist tone in his criticism of his opponents in politics; he employed all his talents in his battles against his party enemies whoever they were, Adly, Mahmoud or Sidqi. In his three main missions as an envoy of the Wafd to Britain, Ebeid succeeded in propagandizing widely for his party’s cause as well as advancing his own political image. Thus during the three years of Sidqi’s regime, Ebeid played a leading and dynamic role in the Wafd portraying it as the popular party of the majority which had been denied power.

In 1931 Ebeid visited Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. His visit reflected a possible new dimension in the attitude of a Coptic politician towards the idea of Arabism. He gave several speeches in Beirut, Damascus, Shtura, Jerusalem, Acre and Jaffa, in which he argued that the idea of “pharaohism” reflected in certain literary trends represented a movement to separate Egypt

\(^{(183)}\) F.O. 371/14741, August 18, 1930, Henderson to Lorraine.

\(^{(184)}\) F.O. 371/14621, October 28, 1930, Henderson to Hoare.
from the other Arab nations\(^{(185)}\). This attitude was rather unorthodox, not only for a Copt but also for any Muslim Egyptian politician of the time. Ebeid declared he was opposed to the Coptic trend which entertained fears of Arab nationalism, and claimed that Copts had Egyptian roots before and above all. Later, in 1939, he published an article discussing one Arab nation, and explaining how Egypt was an integral part of the movement for Arab unity, he elaborated his Arab ideas by saying in his article:

“The Arab history is a chain, the links being connected to each other because the unity of language and Arab culture which among these countries are stronger than in any other countries on earth. The religious non-fanatic and unprejudiced spirit had deep roots among the religions in those neighbouring Arab countries. I mean by stating that Egyptians are Arabs, those group of connections which had not been effected by geographical borders or political barriers, in spite of those who are attempting to kill the Arab spirit, and cut the relations, between the Arab countries. The Arabs need unity and solidarity to face the European storming policies. They need also to believe in Arabism, whose strong elements established a glorious civilization the culture of which dominated foreign countries for a long time.

We are Arabs and should remember in our times that we had been unified by the common trials and mutual hopes to the extent that it has made us similar in all aspects of life. We are Arabs by standing struggle in every country for complete liberty and for raising the Arab civilization. We should sense our own dignity and discover the modern life around us, so as to pick and choose the useful elements to help us in building up an up-to-date system of life, established on our glorious history, with its excellent merits forming the spiritual power and the religious belief, mixed with the merits of the modern life such as the scientific progress and the industrial production. We are Arabs from the depth of our civilized history and its extension through the Semitic race which immigrated to Egypt from the Arabian peninsula, thus we have to

\(^{(185)}\) A. Sayegh, Al-Fikra al-’Arabiya Fi Misr, Beirut 1959: 127-173.
work together in solidarity and strengthen our unity through its elements and factors such as the common history, language and the qualities of nationalism.

Arab unity is an established fact, it does exist, but it needs to be organized by the setting up of a national front against imperialism and to retain our nationalism and to work for prosperity to develop our economic resources, encourage our local production, and co-ordinate our commerce. We should do what the Europeans have done, and create a centre at which we can meet, and draw our countries together into one national league. Why would it not be possible to organize our Arab Unity on the theory of harmonized nationalities? We have already seen in the last few years that actual efforts are going on to unify cultures and to exchange benefits. Having conferences and exchanging views, all that would lead to a general Arab solidarity on a strong basis for the sake of the common Arab struggle for freedom and independence” (186).

It should be noted here that Ebeid had a clear idea of Arabism, and was competent to discuss such aspirations in those comparatively early years concerning the talks and writings on Arab Nationalism. Ebeid also used the term “Al-Jami’a Al-‘Arabiya” (Arab League), six years before the organization by that name was created. But Ebeid’s interest in the Arab dimensions did not take him far enough to play a pioneer active role in the Arab policy as it did another colleague, Abdel Rahman Azzam. However Ebeid’s interest in the Arab dimension of Egypt, in addition to his readiness to participate in Islamic events, gave rise to the idea that Ebeid wanted to be more Muslim than Muslims themselves because he felt that those two elements, Islam and Arabism, were a handicap to any Copt. Possessed of great political ambition, Ebeid wanted to overcome those two barriers between him as a Copt and his political future on a wide popular front.

In an attempt to investigate his views on economics, and his ideological thought concerning the social solution of the economic question in Egypt, one can examine two speeches delivered by him, introducing the Egyptian

budget to the Parliament in 1936 and again in 1942 as Minister of Finance, on the two occasions the Wafd was in power. He stated in the first speech:

“Egypt could be considered a rich country if the criterion is that it could be independent, and had its own resources or if we measure it by the government wealth as translated in its budget figures. But if we see how the wealth is distributed among the classes of the nation we will discover that 1% owns nearly 46% from the total figure of the ownership, the other fact is that more than 90% of the Egyptian people are employed at very low wages as slaves in the service of the rich people. The cheap manual labour in our country makes the gap between poverty and wealth wider than in any other country of the world. The fellaheen are paying the greater part of the land taxes. These taxes represent the only fixed source which supports our economic structure; its amount is 6,300,800 Egyptian pounds. Then, according to what social law or to what economic system do the poor bear the burden of taxes, while the rich escape. Besides that, the average of what the Egyptian owns in his country is 2.34% of the cultivated land, while the foreigners own an average of 78.97%. That is the condition of the public wealth in our country. If it continues like that we will find that the poor are the slaves of the rich, and the rich are the slaves of the foreigners” (187).

In his speech introducing the Egyptian budget to Parliament in 1942, Ebeid described the miserable condition of the Egyptian peasant, who was the backbone of the Egyptian economy, by saying:

“I never pass a village or see a peasant without feeling that he suffers poverty, disease and lack of services, in order to offer a soft life for others. Have we achieved a real independence of Egypt, if the peasants and workers are the slaves of the land. What exploitation is worse than when a people’s dignity and spirit of

(187) A.K. Gouda, Al-Makramiyat (Khutab Wa Baynat Sahib Al-Ma’ali Makram Ebeid Pasha), Cairo (N.D.): 173-175 (A selection of Ebeid’s orations, speeches and articles on various political occasions, collected and edited by A.K. Gouda, the Editor-in-Chief of Al-KuILA newspaper).
independence are destroyed by poverty and need. (...) We are still too far from social justice or any kind of socialism”

Hefni Mahmoud Bey, a Wafdist and brother of Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha cited, in his introduction to the Makramiyyat that while Ebeid was giving one of his annual budget speeches in the Chamber of Deputies as Minister of Finance and introducing definitions such as the “Egyptian peasant” and the “Feudal lord”, one of Hefni’s neighbours in the session exclaimed with surprise at such use of dangerous words and expressions and accused Ebeid of having extremist socialist sympathies.

In another annual report in the Chamber as Minister of Finance, Ebeid said:

“You may enquire what I mean by saying a ‘popular policy’? Is it socialist or liberal? But I say the answer emerges from the nature of the evolution of the Egyptian democratic system which is still unsettled. If I talk about fixing minimum wages for workers, or giving exemption of land taxes to poor peasants or ending slavery. If I dealt with those expressions it does not mean that I have come to be a real socialist, I am still in the period of talking about social equality.”

These speeches of Ebeid as Minister of Finance and the similarity of social thought they both contain, lead to an important question: Had Ebeid a progressive attitude and mentality in dealing with the subject of property and wealth? He was well aware of the class differences and the wide gaps in the standards of living in his country. That would confirm the idea that he was affected by the French socialist trend while he was studying in Lyons. But one cannot impute to Ebeid any effect of Marxist Socialism, what can be confirmed only is that he believed in social equality and the necessity of raising the standard of living for the Egyptian people, in particular those in the countryside.

(188) Ibid.: 177-181.
(189) Ibid.: 5.
(190) Ibid.: 181.
(191) See Chapter II, note 8.
On December 15, 1933, he was re-elected as batonnier, president of the Bar Association, which inspired the government to various emergency measures of preventive legislation, causing widespread resentment among lawyers in Egypt. These were rescinded by Nessim Pasha’s government in December and Ebeid’s re-election thereby ensured.

Gouda introduces his chapter on “Makram, the lawyer” by stating:

“Makram Pasha succeeded, by his talents as an orator and jurist, in occupying the foremost position in the bar in Egypt. He has historical pleadings particularly in the political and national cases. At the end of his defence on behalf of Al-Noukrashi and Ahmed Maher on 13th May, 1926, he declared that his duties as a lawyer were completed, but that his role as a human being started, because it was completely wrong to judge persons merely from the point of view of situations and behaviour; without taking into consideration the circumstances and human motives”(192).

He acted as a lawyer on behalf of Abbas Al-Aqqad, who, while a member of parliament, was accused of lèse-majesté. Ebeid said in court:

“It is clear that Al-Aqqad, the writer and Al-Aqqad, the Deputy in the Parliament, has committed no mistake nor made any insults against the name of the king. Al-Aqqad has suffered much in prison and has claimed several times that his health has worsened, but nobody has given it any attention”(193).

Ebeid continued his speech in court, made a comparison between the resolute determination of Al-Aqqad and the struggle of Prophet Mohamed against those who rejected his new religion. The point which Ebeid emphasized in his speech in court on behalf of Al-Aqqad was that first and foremost the latter was a well-known intellectual and a famous writer, before being a politician. Ebeid’s defence on behalf of Al-Aqqad is one of the most

(193) A. Mansour, “Al-Aqqad Fi Dhikrah”, Akhir Sa’ah, Cairo, March 26, 1975.
arresting and famous in the history of the Egyptian Bar. He had won an outstanding reputation, as a lawyer in both political and civilian cases.

When he was batonnier of the Egyptian Bar, he had the idea of organizing a general strike against the British as:

“Lawyers are in Egypt the last element a Government should provoke, and a lawyer’s strike, if properly organised, would prove effective in dislocating public life” (194).

Such a strike did not take place as the improved relations with Britain left it as an idea only.

In his political activities, Ebeid never forgot that he was a lawyer; he always gave his profession ample attention, especially at times when the Wafd was not in power. He played an active role as a batonnier, adding to it political colour by virtue of his position as Secretary-General of the Wafd. At the same time, Ebeid, like Nahhas and other political leaders, was deeply involved in Anglo–Egyptian relations, through a prolonged series of negotiations, from the Zaghloul–Milner discussions in 1920 until the Sidqi–Simon talks in 1932. Ebeid always viewed Britain in the context of the Egyptian demand for full independence, keeping friendship with the permanent ally, Great Britain. He once explained his views by saying:

“The restoration of the constitution of 1923 and the achievement of an Anglo–Egyptian treaty are paramount aims of Wafdist policy” (195).

From 1933, Wafdist relations with the British slowly improved, when the possibilities facing the Wafd to achieve a real step forward with Britain might materialize, when they next would take power. At Victoria College Old Boy’s dinner on March 27, 1934, Ebeid who was present as a guest of honour, made a sympathetic and conciliatory speech bearing on the Anglo–Egyptian problem. He praised British education and particularly its effects on character building. He considered one of the greatest advantages of English education

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(194) F.O. 371/1/17983, July 23, 1934, Lampson to Simon.

(195) F.O. 371/17980, October 5, 1934, Peterson to Simon.
the fact that it fostered and encouraged, in those who received it, a spirit of liberty and independence\(^{(196)}\).

Britain meant different things to Ebeid. It was the country in which he had been educated, and in which he had spent some of his formative years. He considered it to have partly moulded his character and widened his cultural outlook. At the same time, it was the occupying power in Egypt, which he opposed through the national movement. In an earlier speech delivered in September 1920, in honour of Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha by the Egyptian graduates from Oxford University, Ebeid said:

“A year ago we were not happy by even saying that we were graduates from Oxford. I say that with pain and pride at the same time. Those days of study are emotional and full of good hopes and sentimental feelings. The days we spent in Oxford left the best memories and we always miss its atmosphere; students, professors, buildings, streets and even also the cold weather, snow and fog. Those happy memories are shocked by the last events but we, the graduates of Oxford, succeeded in pushing our memories aside, and involving ourselves in the stream of revolution”.

In the same speech, he criticised some British writers, who had blamed Egyptians educated in Britain for their subsequent participation in the 1919 movement as being ungrateful to the country which had given them the chance for the best education. He continued by explaining how the British schools and colleges foster in their students from all nations the spirit of sacrifice for their mother countries. In that speech, Ebeid expressed his admiration for the merits of the British people, such as love of their country while at the same time feeling sympathy for the foreigner, giving him their care and attention. He added that he could not see any kind of conflict between his respect and admiration for the British people, as standing for freedom and democracy, and his own feelings of opposition to the policy of the British authorities in Egypt\(^{(197)}\).

In spite of the fact that Ebeid was considered a nationalist extremist, he always affirmed that Britain was a centre of democratic and liberal thought.

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\(^{(196)}\) F.O. 371/17982, April 16, 1934, Lampson to Simon.

He always dealt with Anglo-Egyptian relations within the framework of equality and friendship. His articles and speeches in his political missions to London reflect his admiration of the English style of life and the British parliamentary system.

In 1935, the relaxed atmosphere in Anglo-Egyptian relations reflected itself in the statements of the Wafd leaders. In a speech made by Ebeid at a tea-party given in honour of Nahhas by the Egyptian Bar at Alexandria, he declared:

“There is now a golden opportunity for agreement and friendship between England and Egypt”\(^{(198)}\).

At an earlier function Ebeid said:

“An Anglo-Egyptian treaty settlement is, sooner or later, essential. It must be negotiated by a parliamentary government; it must, to bind Egypt, be negotiated by the Wafd. The Government negotiating the treaty must remain in office to execute it. A treaty negotiated by the Wafd cannot be attacked by any other party; the Liberal Constitutionals are committed to the Mohamed Mahmoud–Henderson project of 1929, Ittehadists and even the President of the Watanist party gave these proposals their official blessing at the time. A treaty negotiated by any minority Government, even if more favourable to Egypt’s cause than that so nearly signed by the Wafd in 1930, is unacceptable to the Wafd because it is vitiated by the background of an unconstitutional regime”\(^{(199)}\).

During 1935, the British Government began to sound the views of the Egyptian political leaders to discover their attitudes concerning the possibility of negotiations. Sir Miles Lampson, the High Commissioner, had meetings with the leaders of the various parties, particularly those who had held negotiations with Britain before; Nahhas of the Wafd, Mahmoud of the Liberal party, and Sidqi of the Shaab, obviously because the British wanted to negotiate with national delegations, representative of all the political parties in order to avoid the criticism of any sector of public opinion in Egypt. On


\(^{(199)}\) F.O. 371/17980, October 5, 1934, Peterson to Simon.
February 13, 1936, a Royal decree was issued which included the names of the members of a National Delegation to conduct negotiations with the British Government. These were: Mustafa Nahhas (Chairman), Mohamed Mahmoud, Ismail Sidqi, Abdel Fattah Yehia, Wassif Boutros Ghali, Ahmed Maher, Ali El-Shamsi, Osman Muharam, Ahmed Hamdi Seif El Nasr, Helmi Issa, Makram Ebeid, Hafez Afify and Mahmoud Fahmy El Noukrashi (Members).

Ebeid joined the political all-party or National Government as a representative of the Wafd and became Minister of Finance in the Nahhas Cabinet, in May 1936. He was given the title of Pasha, and was a member of the Egyptian treaty delegation. He was Nahhas’s constant companion and adviser and as such held a position of certain weight, both in the Cabinet and in the Wafd.

The role of Ebeid in the discussions and negotiations of the 1936 treaty, and his evaluation of it are included in a lecture on that subject delivered at the Egyptian University in November 1936(200). Ebeid gave this lecture in polished and refined Arabic, using apt and vivid words in his famous literary style. There is no doubt that he made effective propaganda not only for the treaty but also for the Wafd and himself. He considered the treaty included material benefits for the nation, which would make independence a real fact and not merely a theoretical gain or, as Shakespeare had said, “There is much in a name”.

Ebeid recounted all the recent steps of negotiations between Egypt and Britain(201), till the two sides reached the agreement embodied in the 1936 Treaty. He evaluated the attempt of Nahhas–Henderson made by the Wafd government, as the solid base of the 1936 Treaty, because it included most of the items discussed in those 1930 talks. These talks had failed mainly because the two sides could not reach a common ground about the question of the Sudan. Ebeid was affected in that by his party role, as he considered that only an agreement by the Wafd would imply acceptance by the nation.

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This point was known even to some of the British politicians themselves. It was recognized and recorded by Hugh Dalton, the British Labour politician, later Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1945, who wrote in his Memoirs:

“We had a second innings with the Egyptians in the spring of 1930. This time they sent a large delegation, headed by Nahhas Pasha, their Prime Minister, and Makram Ebeid. It was a Wafd Government and I believed, and had often said openly, that in carrying out an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, if we could get one, only a Wafd Government could deliver the goods. Any other Egyptian Government even if it signed a Treaty, would be outbid and upset by the Wafd” (202).

It is obvious Ebeid was influenced in his evaluation of the Treaty in his lecture at the Egyptian University by his party bias. While publicly not prejudiced in his religious feelings, he was fiercely partisan in his political beliefs.

His lecture was described by one student as being passionate in style and marked by an extremist party bias (203). In it he repeatedly praised Nahhas, (who was among the audience), and enunciated his appreciation of the party leader’s efforts in achieving the treaty of friendship and alliance, or as Ebeid the Wafdist called it, the Treaty of Honour and Independence. Ebeid had taken a very strong line in defending and justifying the treaty, which was strongly opposed by the Watanist party, a large sector of students and by the Young Egypt Society, headed by Ahmed Hussein (204).


(204) F.O. 471/20119, September 16, 1936, Kelly to Eden (The Young Egypt Society was a political movement that emerged in the early thirties and was infected by some Nazi ideas and organizations. It was headed by a young lawyer, Ahmed Hussein with some assistants such as Mohamed Subeih and Ibrahim Shukri. It had semi-military groups, with a special uniform, green shirts. Their relation with the Wafd was broken when one of their members, “Ezzidine Abdel Kadir” attempted to assassinate El-Nahhas on November 28, 1937. The Young Egypt Society was linked with the group of Aly Maher and Aziz El-Masri, which was known for its sympathy with the Axis powers). See A. Hussein, Imani, Cairo, 1936.
Many students of the modern national movement mark the decline of the Wafd with the signing of the Treaty. They argue that it robbed the party of its militant nationalist appeal, transforming it into the establishment party of moderation and cooperation with Britain\(^{(205)}\). This is the reason why the Wafd, which was then in power, had to exert every effort to justify the treaty and give the impression that it was its main achievement. Ebeid played the part of the propagandist trying to sell the treaty to Egyptian public opinion both on behalf of the Wafd as a party and as a government at the same time. The treaty fortunately was followed by another step forward. This was the Capitulations Conference at Montreux, which opened on April 12, 1937, when an Egyptian delegation under the chairmanship of Nahhas Pasha\(^{(206)}\) negotiated with the countries concerned and obtained their acceptance to end the system of Capitulations for their citizens in Egypt\(^{(207)}\). This achievement seemed to elevate the morale of Egyptians since it rendered Egyptians and foreigners for the first time in nearly four centuries equal before the law.

In spite of the fact that Dr. Abdel Hamid Badawi\(^{(208)}\) made the main contribution in the conference as a legal expert, Ebeid also had an active part to play, especially regarding the period of transition for the ending of the capitulations. The Egyptian delegation insisted on making the transition period as short as possible, while the Western delegations were keen to make it twelve years at least.

\(^{(205)}\) See for example, E. Soliman, *Op. cit.*: 65. This view was also confirmed in an interview with Mr. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, September 30, 1975.

\(^{(206)}\) The Egyptian Delegation members were: Ahmed Maher, Wassif Boutros Ghali, Makram Ebeid and Abdel Hamid Badawi.

\(^{(207)}\) “The capitulations refer to a class of commercial treaties which Western powers concluded with Asian and African states and under which Western nationals enjoyed extraterritorial privileges. European residents were thus subject to the laws of their home governments and immune from those of their host countries. Among the Near and Middle East lands the system developed most fully in the Ottoman Empire”. See: J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, vol. 1, Princeton, 1956: 1-21.

\(^{(208)}\) Dr. Badawi started his public life as a political secretary to Sarwat Pasha. He was, in a way, anti-Wafd. The Wafdist used to call him Mufti al-Qarya (The village mufti). He was not on good terms with Ebeid, and they were always critical of each other.
On October 6, 1936, Nahhas and Ebeid were received by Hitler in Berlin. The real reason of the visit was not clear, whether it was a courtesy visit or had political aims. There was a cover story for the reason of the visit at the time:

“The ostensible, and, no doubt a genuine reason for the visit of the Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister of Finance to Germany was their desire to consult a German doctor. The Egyptian Minister in Berlin told Sir Eric Phipps that Makram Pasha’s health was in fact precarious and that the doctor consulted in Berlin stated that he might die at any moment. On the other hand, Amin Osman Bey informed a member of the British Embassy that the main object of the visit concerned Germany’s attitude as regards the capitulations.”

One feels that Amin Osman’s information—he was very intimate with both the Wafd and the British—is closer to the truth because their visit was, in fact, on their way home from the Montreux Convention. One can also add that the leadership of the Wafd was attempting an investigation of the rise to power of Hitler’s regime which had a striking world-reaction at that time.

While the Wafd was successful as a government in achieving the 1936 Treaty and securing the end of the Capitulations, there were adverse developments within the structure of the party itself. The main event occurred in 1937, with the defection of Mahmoud Fahmy Al-Noukrashi and Ahmed Maher, who then established the Saadist Party. The influence of Ebeid on Nahhas, and on the Wafd as a whole, had been increasing. Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi were envious of Ebeid’s domination over the party and in this way they were supported by the widow of Zaghloul, *Umm-Al-Misriyin* (Mother of the Egyptians), who had often criticised the policy of Nahhas and Ebeid.

According to Lampson, there was considerable friction between Ahmed Maher and Ebeid, the latter having accused Ahmed Maher of being in the pay of the Prime Minister and of carrying on secret intrigues for the purpose

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(209) *F.O. 371/20122, November 20, 1936*, Phipps (Berlin) to Eden (The irony here is that Ebeid died twenty-five years later).

(210) From an interview with Mr. Saad Fakhry Abdel Nur on September 13, 1974.
of keeping Aly Maher (his brother, who was Royal Chamberlain) in power and of reducing or destroying the power of the Wafd\(^\text{(211)}\).

Nahhas accorded Ebeid special treatment, motivated by the principle of “national unity” which emerged with Zaghloul. As Nahhas was concentrating all his attention on national unity, he did not anticipate the signs of the split in the Wafd to be precipitated by Al-Noukrashi and Ahmed Maher\(^\text{(212)}\). The breaking-point of the split of Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi came when a difference of opinion arose in Nahhas’s Cabinet on the subject of generating electricity at the Aswan Dam. Mahmoud Ghaleb, Minister of Justice, and Al-Noukrashi, Minister of Communications, supported by Ahmed Maher, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies wished to offer the project to international tender, whilst Ebeid and other members of the Cabinet, supported by Nahhas, insisted that a certain British company should undertake the project, even though the costs would be higher. Nahhas reshuffled his cabinet in August 1937, dropping Al-Noukrashi and Ghaleb.

Afterwards, the Wafd Higher Committee held a meeting to discuss the matter, and Maher, having little support, withdrew\(^\text{(213)}\). It was one of the main splits in the career of the Wafd, and caused the subsequent birth of the Saadist Party, under the leadership of Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi. The split would indicate the real political weight of Ebeid, and his influence on Nahhas and the party.

“The presence and influence of Makram in the Cabinet were contributing factors in the early downfall of Nahhas. Within the Cabinet itself, Makram’s domination over Nahhas was the cause of growing resentment, and the enemies of the Wafd did not scruple to invoke religious prejudice in their campaign against a cabinet which they pilloried as dangerously subservient to Coptic influence”\(^\text{(214)}\).

\(^\text{(211)}\) F.O. 371/20105, April 27, 1936, Lampson to Eden.


\(^\text{(214)}\) F.O. 371/22004, April 13, 1938, Lampson to Eden.
The period of the thirties represented the acme of Ebeid’s career as a politician. In simple terms, he was the real power behind the leadership of the majority party. His charisma was his chief asset in his political activity because he had the ability to reach and influence the masses. Being a first-class speaker, with the ability to choose appropriate words, in a rhythmical cadence, he directed his advocacy to the heart of an emotional nation rather than to the mind of its intellectuals.

“‘Charisma’ is a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which one is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These powers are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them, the individual concerned is treated as a leader”(215).

If that is meaning of the term ‘charisma’, then Ebeid can be considered a leader of charismatic quality, his colourful personality, at home in both cultures, Arabic and foreign, and his easy and effective communication with the masses gave him a political star quality, above and beyond that of an official party leader.

He was in a sense a political demagogue. In a developing society as obtained in Egypt, he was able to attract the common people to himself. If one compares Ebeid with the other Egyptian politicians, as for example Ismail Sidqi, one finds that the latter lacked the easy communication and vital rapport with people that Ebeid possessed. Being a good speaker was, of course, a great asset, not only in the backward countries but also in the advanced countries (e.g. Lloyd George in Britain). Ebeid is considered as the most renowned orator in modern Egyptian political history.

Unfortunately any translation of his speeches cannot yield their real force because his particular style of rhetoric cannot be sustained in translation. He was well-known for his use of rhymed prose to drive home his point of view.

He gave speeches on countless occasions; some for patriotic purposes, others for political or party reasons, in addition to his ministerial and parliamentary speeches. To these must be added his intelligent advocacy in the famous legal cases where he showed himself as an excellent trial lawyer in both political and civilian causes.

Abbas Al-Aqqad, the famous writer and journalist described Ebeid in his introduction to the Makramiyyat as “A mixture of various interests, different activities, with talent in both literature and politics”\(^{(216)}\).

Ebeid’s experience as a lawyer greatly helped him as a politician, because the Bar, as a profession, was an extension of his political work. In fact, most Egyptian Ministers regardless of specialisation were originally lawyers. Ebeid was a famous lawyer, and enjoyed one of the most active practices in the history of the Egyptian Bar. It was mentioned that he used to win all the cases in which he took on and defended by demonstrating the logical analysis of the motives, and by putting himself in the place of the accused and acting out his part before the court\(^{(217)}\).

Among the significant debates in Ebeid’s political life one can cite the article he wrote in Kawkab Al-Sharq\(^{(218)}\) on October 6, 1935 against Abbas Al-Aqqad, accusing him of arrogance and hypocrisy and of starting his public life in the service of the British Military authorities as a censor of the Egyptian press. The main reason behind that violent article was that Al-Aqqad had severely criticized the Government of Nessim Pasha, because the Minister of Education, Al-Hilaly Pasha, had rejected some personal demands of Al-Aqqad concerning some of the latter’s friends in the Ministry. The Wafd policy towards Nessim’s Government was not hostile and Al-Aqqad, as a Wafdist writer, had not consulted the leadership of the party before starting his press campaign against the government. Ebeid’s article in considered an excellent example of press articles in Arabic. Al-Aqqad rose to the attack by answering Ebeid in Rose Al-Youssef on October 17, 1935.

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\(^{(217)}\) From an Interview with Mr. Salah al-Shahid on January 20, 1975.

\(^{(218)}\) \textit{Kawkab al-Sharq} was a Wafdist newspaper which replaced Al-Minbar newspaper in 1924 with the same Editor-in-Chief, Hafiz ‘Awad. It took the extremist line in the Wafd and followed Ahmed Maher and El-Noukrashi in their split in 1937.
refuting the allegation and accusing him in turn of wasting Wafd money by his journeys to London and Paris\(^{(219)}\).

The relations between Ebeid as a politician and Abbas Al-Aqqad as a writer was one of ups and downs. Before the press debate, Ebeid defended Al-Aqqad in his political trial, and after that debate, Al-Aqqad wrote an introduction to *Al-Makramiyat*, praising Ebeid as they had both come from the school in Qena which was famous for its pupils who subsequently made a name for themselves in literature\(^{(220)}\).

That was Ebeid, the effective power of the Wafd, and the star of the parliament, the famous lawyer, the renowned orator, the active minister and the popular writer. Moreover, “the post of Secretary-General of the Wafd was the most important political and popular one in Egypt at that time”\(^{(221)}\).

He was, as described by one of the intellectuals, and a well-known friend of Zaghloul, Dr. Mahgoub Thabet:

“A sentimental orator like a musician, faithful friend, severe enemy, he is an angel in his friendship and a devil in enmity”\(^{(222)}\).

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Chapter Four

Ebeid and the Split in the Wafd

The period 1937–42 represented the golden days of Ebeid’s political life. Since the 1937 defection of Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi, Ebeid had become the most powerful man in the Wafd, without any political rivals. The Nahhas temperament which “was honest and forceful, but less intelligent and imposing than Zaghloul”\(^\text{223}\) helped Ebeid much in being the effective power behind the leader.

In the period of Wafd power, Ebeid was the number-two man, as Minister of Finance, and as first adviser to Nahhas. At other times, he was the mainstay of the party, besides engaging in other activities, such as parliamentary duties and his bar syndicate work.

The Ebeid phenomenon in Egyptian politics may not have been a one-time affair if the same or parallel political arrangements in Egypt are reproduced. But his was perhaps a unique situation, shaped by particular factors in a favourable climate. He was a product of the link between Egypt and Britain as the co-existence with the latter was a main factor in keeping the democratic system and encouraging a trend of liberal thought and a civil political climate. At the same time, the phenomenon was a natural extension of the popular urge for national unity in order to gain independence which was first promoted in Zaghloul’s days. He also was an expression of Egyptian social maturity and a reflection of political understanding in a democratic atmosphere.

The relationship, personal and political, between Nahhas and Ebeid was established mainly through their joint contribution in the national movement under Zaghloul’s leadership, and politically during the exile period when they became very intimate. Ebeid enjoyed a special place in Zaghloul’s estimation. The former himself said that Zaghloul had told him: “I am a Muslim and you

\(^\text{223}\) Egypt’s struggle for independence, Beirut 1965: 127.
are part of my flesh and blood” (224). It was because of that partnership between Zaghloul and both Nahhas and Ebeid, that the latter two developed the same outlook and took the same hard line. Ebeid thus played an active part in the choice of Nahhas as a successor to Zaghloul by supporting him against other political rivals and gathering the extremist votes for him (225).

He amply made up for shortcomings in the personality and capabilities of Nahhas. As an example, most of the contacts between the Wafid and the British in the early period were through Ebeid, for, as an Oxford man, he was more capable in dealing with the British, and had visited London on several occasions, thus adding to his political experience and earning him many friends, especially among the leaders of the Labour Party.

He had been implicated in previous splits in the Wafid in 1930 and 1937, and was the safety valve of Nahhas’s more unrestrained temperament (226). Not only in Nahhas’s relations with the British does one find the temporizing efforts of Ebeid, but also in the former’s image with the Egyptian press.

Ebeid was also behind the expulsion of Abbas Al-Aqqad from the Wafid Party in spite of the fact that the latter was an eminent pro-Wafid journalist. Later, the same treatment was afforded Fatma Al-Youssef, publisher of *Rose al-Youssef* who mentioned in her memoirs that Ebeid was dominating the meetings of Nahhas (227). The story of the dispute between the *Rose al-Youssef* magazine and the Wafid affords a good example of the influence of Ebeid in the party, as he was the decision maker by ending the relation between the Wafid and the most active magazine supporting it. Fatma Al-Youssef cited the reason as an article she had published entitled “William, the Liar” which

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(224) Ebeid stated that in evidence at the trial of Fouad Seraj el-Din on January 2, 1954, in Cairo.

(225) See for example, A. Shafiq Al-Hawliya Al-Rabica, 1927, Cairo 1928.

(226) Before the split of Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi in 1937, there was another split in 1930, when a group of Wafidists withdrew from the party in protest against the mild policy of El-Nahhas and the influence of new elements in the party. Those defecting were called the group of seven and a half as one of them was a very short person. See M. Hashish, *The Wafid Party*, unpublished MA thesis, Ein Shams University, Cairo 1970.

commented on a false story written by a lawyer called William Al-Duwaini in Al-Gehad, another Wafdist newspaper, accusing Rose al-Youssef of receiving bribes. Ebeid considered the choice of the Rose al-Youssef article’s title as a subtle allusion to him as he was also carrying the name William before his involvement in the national movement. He considered that her behaviour, beside other publications such as the attacks of Rose al-Youssef on Nessim’s Government, without instructions from the leadership of the party a sort of heresy in the Wafd policy. The Higher Committee of the Wafd took a decision on September 28, 1935, that Rose al-Youssef was no longer to be considered a Wafdist magazine (228).

Since the start of the World War II, Egypt, like some other countries, contained groups of people who sympathized with Nazi Germany, not only because they agreed with the ambitions of Hitler or with some Nazi principles, but mainly because they believed that therein lay the road to liberty and independence, as both Egypt and Germany opposed Britain, but for different reasons (229).

Pressing internal problems added difficulties to the government of Sirri Pasha (230). The poor grain harvest in 1941 compelled the Government to limit cotton acreage aiming to bring about an increase in the cereal supply. In addition, measures were taken to prevent hoarding and to control cereal prices. As most members of parliament were landowners, who could only be adversely affected by these measures, Sirri was forced to compromise, which in turn made his policy ineffective and brought about a constant rise in the cost of living (231).

The period between the start of World War II in September 1939 to February 4, 1942, was characterised by its crowded political incidents and what could be called political instability. During that period, three Prime Ministers

(228) *Ibid.*: 182-190.
(230) Hussein Sirri Pasha, an Egyptian independent politician. Formed a cabinet more than once. He was related to King Faruq by marriage.
took office, starting with Ali Maher Pasha, the most effective independent character in modern Egyptian politics who formed his first Cabinet on August 18, 1939, in the critical circumstances which attended the start of War\(^{(232)}\). Ali Maher started his days in office by putting in first consideration the interests of Britain, the ally, according to the articles of the 1936 Treaty. He, as Prime Minister, was appointed as a see at the back General Military ruler and put the press and other mass media under censorship according to martial law.

By the mid of 1940, Ali Maher’s policy changed with the news of the battles in Europe and his pro-Axis sympathies were revealed when France collapsed under the Nazi advance. The main reason which put Maher’s Government in a critical situation vis-à-vis the British was the influence of some persons in the cabinet, known for their anti-British feelings, like Al-Noukrashi and Abdel Rahman Azzam, besides others who were outright pro-Axis, like Saleh Harb, Minister of National Defence and Aziz Ali El-Masri, the Inspector General of the Egyptian Army.

During Maher’s time of office, the Wafd, which had been out of power since 1937, did not assume the role of direct opposition to Maher’s policy. In April 1940, Nahhas Pasha offered a memorandum to the British Ambassador, asking for complete withdrawal of British troops from Egypt by the end of the War.

Ebeid’s activities in that period were an integral part of the Wafd role, as he was the party Secretary-General and the effective power behind the leader of the party. He and the Wafdists—in general—dissociated themselves from the general drift of Ali Maher’s government, which was sympathetic to the Axis.

Ali Maher Pasha was followed by Hassan Sabri Pasha in June, who died whilst addressing Parliament, and was succeeded by Hussein Sirri Pasha till the arrival of the Wafd to power in February 1942.

The Wafd attitude in the main political question of whether Egypt should declare a state of war on the side of the Allies or not, was not clearly committed as it was a delicate point which divided the Egyptian politicians and public opinion. The main interest of the Wafd and Ebeid was focussed on the necessity of having a popular government through democratic elections\(^{(233)}\).

\(^{(233)}\) *Ibid.*: 108.
The British authorities in Egypt were well aware of the pro-Axis trend represented mainly by Ali Maher, Aziz Al-Masri, Ahmed Hussein, leader of *Misr Al-Fatah*, and their followers in the civil service and the army. That apprehension explains in part the motivation of what is known in modern Egyptian history as the incident of February 4, 1942, when the British Ambassador presented the King with an ultimatum demanding that Nahhas be invited to form a government. The deteriorating circumstances of the World War II in the Western Desert had forced the British to depend on the Wafd as a majority party because popular government was the only alternative to direct rule by the British Embassy in Cairo\(^{(234)}\).

The ultimatum submitted by Sir Miles Lampson (later Lord Killearn), the British ambassador in Egypt, to King Faruq, on February 4, 1942, has come to be regarded as a landmark in Egypt’s political history. It humiliated the palace, and brought the Wafd back to power after more than four years in the political wilderness. Yet the Wafd’s return was made in unfortunate circumstances, as it resumed power by threat of British military intervention, and not by its own prestige. Thus the following two years, during which Nahhas was Prime Minister, heading a purely see at the back Wafd’s popularity and a parallel rise in the fortunes of anti-parliamentary movements\(^{(235)}\).

Although Nahhas Pasha started his new administration by releasing Aziz Al-Masri and his colleagues\(^{(236)}\), he arrested Ali Maher because of his suspected activities against the Allies. This was in spite of the denial by Nahhas Pasha that he had received orders for this from the British authorities\(^{(237)}\).

To complete the picture one would have to take a brief look at occurrences outside Egypt, both military and political. First the Rashid

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(236) Aziz Ali Al-Masri was arrested for the first time in November 1941, and again arrested in August 1942 during the Wafdist Government, when he was accused of being implicated in the Spies on the Nile Case, in which Anwar El-Sadat was also involved. Al-Masri was released in November 1944 (See, M. Subeih, *Batal La Nansahu Aziz Al-Masri We Asruhu*, Cairo 1971).

(237) A. Ramdan, “4 Febrayir, Wathaïq Gadidah”, *Al-Ahram*. 

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‘Ali Al-Kelani uprising in Iraq in 1941, which created a feeling of unrest in Egypt, and, according to Anwar El-Sadat who was at the time involved in an officer’s pro-German plot, together with ‘Aziz ‘Ali Al-Misri, was the first sign of the liberation of the Arab world(238). Then came British military setbacks in Libya with expectations of a successful German invasion of Egypt running high. Finally, in the sphere of external relations, came the “Vichy crisis” which served as a pretext for mass political demonstrations against the Government and its so-called British overlords, instigated by the palace through ‘Ali Maher and Sheikh Mohamed Moustafa al-Maraghi, the rector of Al-Azhar until his death in 1945, and one of the chief instigators of King Faruq’s Islamic policy. The Vichy crisis was prompted by British insistence that Egypt suspend diplomatic relations with Vichy. The matter was delayed for several months due to the reluctance of King Faruq to comply with British wishes. When, in January 1942, Sirri Pasha finally decided to act, he did so without previously consulting King Faruq and hence was accused of usurping the Royal prerogative. The King, fearing a direct confrontation with the British authorities, refrained from dismissing Sirri’s government and chose the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Salib Sami Pasha, as a scapegoat(239).

Ebeid played a major role on behalf of the Wafd on the fateful February 4, 1942. He had joined Nahhas on a trip to Upper Egypt, when King Faruq called leaders of Egyptian parties and former prime ministers to consult with him about the British ultimatum. Although Ebeid fell into neither category, he was included in the invitation because the King was advised to call him due to his party relations with Nahhas(240). Ebeid had been the real moulder of the Wafd decisions and party architect in its contribution to the main national policies, such as the Treaty of 1936, and the British ultimatum of February 1942, and his share in the drafting of the letters exchanged between Nahhas and Lampson, the High Commissioner, when Nahhas formed his cabinet to avert the collapse of the monarchy. Ebeid was appointed both as Minister of Finance and Minister of Supply, which were the two most important responsibilities in the time of war. This would seem to imply that he was on completely good terms with Nahhas at the start of the

new cabinet’s work, although Nagib Al-Hilaly, Minister of Education, stated much later that he felt that there was a rift between Nahhas and Ebeid, from the very first day of work in the new cabinet, as he had noticed that personal relations were not as close as before, and there was not the same harmony between them in leading the government (241).

In fact the rift between Nahhas and Ebeid began as early as 1937, when Ali Maher, the Royal Chamberlain of the young king, brought in Sheikh al-Maraghi, the rector of Al-Azhar, to place difficulties in the way of Nahhas’s Government and to create a wedge in the Wafd leadership. They spread an inflammatory propaganda by claiming that the Wafd was dominated by the Copts under Ebeid’s leadership, thus attempting to put Nahhas in a critical position and poison his relation with Ebeid. They made allusions to the pro-Muslim sentiments of the Royal Palace to give Nahhas a new image as a weak leader under the Coptic influence in his party. The British Chargé d’affaires in Cairo reported to the Foreign Office saying,

“Taken in connexion with Sheikh al-Maraghi’s visit to the Oriental Secretary it seems clear that a coup is being seriously considered and that our attitude is regarded as an important factor. Ali Maher took full soundings of me before referring to proposal and saying he had advised against it” (242).

He reported two days later saying,

“If we had told Ali Maher and Sheikh al-Maraghi that the question of Government was a purely Egyptian concern and that His Majesty’s Government was ready to deal with any Constitutional Government, they would almost certainly have interpreted this as a signal to go ahead” (243).

While Faruq’s Islamic policy under Ali Maher’s guidance was alarming Copts, al-Maraghi on the other side was reviewing the increasing Coptic

(241)  Al-Ahram, Cairo, December 14, 1953 (From Al-Hilaly’s evidence given at the Siraj Eldin trial).
(242)  F.O. 371/20885, August 31, 1937, Kelly to Eden.
(243)  F.O. 371/20885, September 2, 1937, Kelly to Eden.
influence in the Wafd as a party and Government. The British Embassy in Cairo continued in the previous report saying,

“There is no doubt that the oppositions to Nahhas are counting on fanning the latent antagonism of the Muslim for the Copt as one of the trump cards. The greater part of what I described as my ‘general talk’ with Sheikh al-Maraghi was in fact taken up with the Sheikh’s denunciation of Coptic influence in Egypt. He cited the names of various societies which have sprung up among Egyptian Muslims and said that the continued government of Egypt by a religious minority was intolerable and would in fact be put an end to. He maintained that the Copts were also a racial minority as the Muslims were now so largely Arab in blood, and he alleged that the English influence in the Ministry of the Interior had always been used to prevent Copts becoming officers in the Police. Under cross-examination he distinguished between the two aspects of the question, one social and political, the other religious; and professed his hope that the question would be settled to the satisfaction of the Egyptian Muslims on the former basis and that there would be no religious war. He did not however conceal that if the Coptic influence could not be reduced without the aid of religious fanaticism the latter would eventually play an important part”.

Ali Maher designed his policy to destroy Nahhas and divide the Wafd by trying to create an Islamic aura around Faruq facing Nahhas’s secular pro-Coptic attitude. He used Al-Azhar in his campaign against the Wafd and succeeded in that policy exploiting the Islamic pose of the new king which he (Ali Maher) had created with Sheikh al-Maraghi. In the 1938 elections the students of Al-Azhar were shouting “A vote for Nahhas is a vote against Islam”(244). This connivance throws light on the machinations of the Royal Palace in the Nahhas–Ebeid dispute later on in 1942, as the Islamic propaganda against the Wafd was directed mainly to the close relation between the two leaders of the party.

(244) F.O. 407/222, May 17, 1938, Lampson to Halifax (For further anti-Coptic propaganda, see Al-Kashkul: issues February and March 1938, Cairo).
Any attempt to explain the rift between Nahhas and Ebeid which led to the second split in the Wafd should take into consideration two main factors: the first concerns the power on the political stage, namely, the Royal Palace, the British Embassy, the political parties and their inter-relationship in the light of the February 4 episode. The second is the political climate generated by the circumstances of war and the economic situation, together with some changes taking place inside the Wafd as a party affecting its policy, all of which affected Egyptian public opinion.

Concerning the first group of factors, one can easily discern the effect of the February 4 event on them as regards the Royal Palace and in order to understand the attitude of the King and his personal advisers, it is necessary to assess the influence of Ahmed Hassanein, the Royal Chamberlain and former mentor of King Faruq when he was Crown Prince. Hassanein was a master of cunning, but outwardly bearing a deceptively bland character. He was a man of manoeuvres, who liked to play his game deviously. He naturally felt the event of February 4 to be an insult to the King and the palace. Moreover he believed it was due partly to the failure of his own tactics since he was the personal adviser to the King.

On February 7, Hassanein said in conversation with the Egyptian journalist Mohammed Al-Tab’i that he would never forget what had happened, and that the efforts of eight months had all been for nothing. By this he meant that the British had been quicker than he had in containing the Wafd, and he then had some suspicions about the role of Nahhas, Ebeid and Amin Osman, because they might well have arranged what happened in collusion with the British Embassy. Hassanein was saying, however, that in spite of his bitterness he could be convinced that Nahhas, Ebeid, and Osman had nothing to do with what happened. Hassanein’s subsequent revenge was to teach the Wafd a lesson for what he deeply felt on February 4. He discovered that the

(245) Ahmed Mohamed Hassanein Pasha was born in 1885, the son of an Azharite Sheikh. Following studies at Balliol College, Oxford, he had joined the staff of General Maxwell in Egypt as private Arabic Secretary, in World War I. After several appointments in the Egyptian Foreign Service, he became Chamberlain to King Fouad. After Fouad’s death, he enjoyed strong influence in the royal palace through his influence over the Queen Mother Nazli (See Al-Ta’i’s book: 14-21).
most sensitive point he could exploit for his purpose was the relationship between Nahhas and Ebeid\(^{(246)}\).

Hassanein has been quoted as saying that “My opinion about Ebeid is still as poor as it ever was, but I use him as an instrument with which to beat the Wafd”\(^{(247)}\). His feelings illustrate, if they do not quite explain, the role of the palace in the split in the Wafd, and their support and encouragement to Ebeid to that end.

As for the British Embassy, G. Warburg wrote,

> “Lampson’s prime motive in the events of 4\(^{th}\) February, 1942, was to secure Farouq’s abdication, and the suggestion to ask Nahhas to resume power, was a compromise put forward by the king on Hassanein Pasha’s advice”\(^{(248)}\).

Afterwards, however, the British Ambassador showed flexibility and good-will towards the Wafd and, to some extent, to the palace as well, in an attempt to temper the repercussions of the event of February 4, and to avoid any severe reaction to it.

The Embassy and the Wafd inaugurated this new era of reconciliation by exchanging letters of courtesy, containing the principle of co-operation and good relations. Ebeid established with them a joint Anglo–Egyptian committee to study the food situation, with expected possibilities of British assistance or an alternative\(^{(249)}\).

In the case of the political parties, the minority ones among them claimed that the Wafd had come to power this time “behind the British tanks”. In their meeting with the King on the night of the fourth, Ahmed Maher and other party leaders criticized Nahhas for his refusal to form a national government and his determination to form a pure Wafdist cabinet\(^{(250)}\). It was a golden

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opportunity for the minority parties to attack the Wafd from this new angle, accusing it of changing its policy and allying itself with the British.

This briefly was the position of the main political forces in Egypt in 1942: the palace was suspicious towards the Wafd, the minority parties hurled accusations of betrayal of the national cause against the Wafd, and the British attempted to recover the trust of the King and public opinion under British control during the vicissitudes of war.

The remaining complicating factor was the threat posed by the War in the Western Desert, where the battle was going very badly for the Allies. An atmosphere of fear and horror spread amongst the Egyptian people and a host of rumours circulated that the advancing German troops were at the gates of Alexandria, causing Nahhas to invite the Council of Ministers to discuss the emergency. They decided to send a letter, written by Nagib Al-Hilaly, and signed by Nahhas, to be handed to Rommel through the Governor of Alexandria, Abdel Khaliq Hassonna Pasha(251). The letter said that Egypt as a state was not a partner in the War and that all the military arrangements in Egypt were carried out by the British military authorities against the will of the Egyptian Government. The letter added that Egypt as Government and people were looking for peace and stability, therefore the Egyptian Government had taken the necessary arrangements for maintaining security and preparing for any internal troubles. The letter was an attempt to make contact with the German military commander as the arrival of his troops in Alexandria was fully expected. Needless to say, the letter never reached Rommel. First, there was no easy way of delivering it by courier. Second, Hassouna was not prepared to risk his life in delivering it(252).

The economic situation had greatly deteriorated. There was apprehension over the food situation. There was not only a shortage of general goods, which was made worse by the tendency of a panicking to public hoard, but also an acute shortage of wheat in towns(253). Nahhas announced that Egypt was

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(251) Abdel Khaliq Hassouna, Secretary-General of the Arab League for almost twenty years until 1972.
conserving its own food supply for one month. Egyptian Jews were fleeing the country before the arrival of the Nazi troops in the Egyptian cities.(254)

With this brief review of the general situation we must now turn to developments within the Wafd which led to the split of Ebeid from the Wald, a split which, in spite of the ebb and flow of the battles between the Allies and Axis in the Western Desert, occupied the attention of Egyptian public opinion.

One must consider firstly the personal factor in the structure of the Wafd which led to the rift. Nahhas himself had changed over the years since he had signed the 1936 Treaty: he was no longer that hard lineman of revolutionary approach to the political struggle. He had become, by age and experience, more realistic and ready to co-operate with the British to a certain extent. There was another important factor in the changes in the Nahhas personality; it was his wife, Madame Nahhas, Zeinab Al-Wakil, a young, pretty, and intelligent woman, with ambitions for wealth, and an overbearing, dominating character. She used to interfere in Nahhas’s political work and in his relations with his friends and colleagues. One of the known examples of her interference in her husband’s affairs was her direct suggestion to Hassanein Pasha, the Royal Chamberlain, for some wealthy personalities to be honoured with the title of Pasha to motivate them to give donations to charitable organizations headed by her.(255)

Then there was the appearance in the 1940s of the personality of Fouad Seraj-Eldin in the Wafd, a young, rich and very presentable man. The interfering role of the wife of Nahhas together with the emergence of Seraj-Eldin in the councils of the Wafd, seemed to have a devastating effect on the behaviour of Nahhas. At the same time the disappearance of leading intellectuals from the Party, which now attracted only the landed magnates and the wealthy, but hardly the intelligentsia or the cultured elements who could carry the Party in a progressive direction, further weakened the party and rendered it prey to internal factionalism.

That was the general picture of the situation in the first few months after the event of February 4, the arrival date of the Wafd again to assume power.

Actually any attempt to examine in full the relation between Nahhas and Ebeid, to grasp the roots of the disputes, will be faced by a complicated set of reasons and factors that led to the rift. It would be difficult, that is, to take this reason or that as the real cause of the rift. Rather it was all those reasons taken together.

On discussing these reasons one by one it will be found that each cannot stand alone as a sufficient cause to explain what happened. All the reasons and factors behind the split could be accounted in a few main points. The first was the growth of Ebeid’s influence in the political life of the country generally and within the government in particular, to the extent that Nahhas’s wife told her husband that he was so flexible and generous with Ebeid, that the people believed that the latter was everything and her husband was nothing. Moreover, it has been mentioned that Nahhas in 1942 was trying to avoid what had happened in 1937, when the influence of Ebeid was behind the defection of Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi, by making a sort of balance amongst his colleagues from the older Wafdist generation. Nahhas tried to diversify his favours to other Wafdist personalities, like Sabri Abu-Alam Pasha and Nagib Al-Hilaly Pasha.

It is also certain that Madame Nahhas resented the influence and popularity of Ebeid. As an ambitious woman, she compared her husband with Ebeid and found that the latter enjoyed an extra income from his work at the Bar when the Wafd was out of power, whereas Nahhas had only his pension. Ahmed Hassanein told Al-Tab’i who was his friend, that Madame Nahhas told him that she wanted him to break the neck of Ebeid, when he asked her why, she told Hassanein, the Royal Chamberlain, that Ebeid hated the King. She blamed Ahmad Kassem Gouda, a journalist and a follower of Ebeid, because the Egyptian press was giving Ebeid more attention by fully reporting his speeches, meetings and travels, while Nahhas and other Ministers had not been given equal attention.

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Again, the rise of Fouad Seraj-Eldin in the Wafd was an undeniable factor in the rift between Nahhas and Ebeid. Ironically, Ebeid introduced Seraj-Eldin to Nahhas in the 1963 elections and persuaded Nahhas to accept Seraj-Eldin as a Wafdist candidate in his constituency\(^{(261)}\). The personal relation between Ebeid and Seraj-Eldin remained normal, while the latter’s relation with Nahhas was getting closer. Ebeid felt that Nahhas would find that this new relation would eventually displace his own relation and long friendship with Nahhas\(^{(262)}\). This explains the opposition of Ebeid in February 1942 to the suggestion of Abdel Fattah Al-Tawil Pasha, Minister of National Health and Social Affairs, supported by Nahhas Pasha himself, to appoint Seraj-Eldin as an undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior\(^{(263)}\). However the appointment of Seraj-Eldin as Minister of Agriculture on March 31, 1942, as an emerging figure, clearly had its effect on the Wafd and its policy\(^{(264)}\).

But there was also the role of the palace in the affair. Ahmed Hassanein intended to blacken the reputation of the Wafd, in order to avenge his master, the King, for the indignity he suffered on February 4, 1942, when he had been forced to accept a Prime Minister who enjoyed great popularity and who dared to put his own party prestige against the power of the King\(^{(265)}\). The Royal Palace, through Hassanein, tried to exploit Ebeid and widen the rift with Nahhas to break the unity of the Wafd\(^{(266)}\). On March 12, 1942, Hassanein, on a pretext, invited Ebeid to see the king. The ostensible reason was a consultation about financial affairs but in fact it was Hassanein’s device to divide the Wafd. Ebeid issued a statement to the press describing his royal

(261) Nahhas at first objected to the choice of Seraj-Eldin in the 1936 elections, as a Wafdist because his father was a main figure in the Sh’ab Party. Fouad Seraj-Eldin had graduated from the Faculty of Law and was a member of the ‘Parquet’. He was in his early thirties when he joined the Wafd. From an interview with Mr. Fekry Ebeid on February 14, 1975.

(262) Al-Tab’i. Op. cit.: 9. “Nahhas—by nature—needs someone to dominate him, that person was Ebeid before the split.” A statement by Dr. M. Salah Eldin the Foreign Affairs Minister in the last Wafdist Cabinet.


meeting, excessively praising the King, and explaining that the purpose of the meeting was to outline to the King his policy of supply and for cotton affairs. Nahhas reacted angrily to that meeting, and Ebeid was subjected to severe criticism within the Party.

Some Wafdists both in the Government and in the press, also proceeded to widen the split between Nahhas and Ebeid, mainly in pursuit of their personal aims. Sabri Abu Alam, Minister of Justice, and Nagib Al-Hilaly, Minister of Education, were active in this sphere, obviously because they were envious of the influence of Ebeid, who was of the same generation in the Wafd.

Mahmoud Abu al-Fath, the editor of *Al Misri*, the main newspaper of the Wafd, was under the impression that Ebeid was not well disposed towards him and had rejected the choice of him as a minister in the Wafd Cabinet. Abu al-Fath was not inclined therefore to patch up the rift through the press, but on the contrary to spread it by any means. Amin Osman was accused of having promoted the quarrel and of being mainly responsible for the failure of an attempt at reconciliation.

Lastly there was Ebeid himself, with his personal motives in his breach with Nahhas and his split from the Wafd. Counting on widespread popularity among the people, which he assiduously cultivated ever since his close association with Zaghloul, he felt he had the right in such circumstances to look forward to the post of Prime Minister, and that he was more capable than many who had so far occupied that post. What is interesting was his genuine belief that being a Copt did not constitute a barrier to achieving his ambition of being the first man in the Egyptian Government. On the contrary, there had been in the recent history two examples of that. Ebeid mentioned to

(267) *Al-Ahram*, March 13, 1942.
(270) *Ibid.*: 274.
(272) Boutros Ghali in 1908 and Youssef Wahba in 1919.
Hussein Heikal more than once that he did not see his religion as preventing him from being prime minister, and he believed that he had precedence over Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi, because while he was the Secretary-General of the Wafd they were just two members in the party. Lord Killearn had mentioned in his papers:

“I asked Amin Osman about the personalities behind Nahhas in the Wafd and he said that there were three men who practically ran the show; they were Makram Ebeid, Nokrashy and Aly Maher’s brother, but of those three undoubtedly the most intelligent and by far the best orator was Makram Ebeid”\(^{(273)}\).

If is probable that Ebeid was promised by the king, through Hassanein, that if he succeeded in splitting the Wafd and gathering a suitable group of members around him, he would be asked to form a Cabinet. It was the same kind of offer that was made to Ahmed Maher before. Earlier, in 1937, the Royal Palace watched with interest the critical meeting of the Wafd Higher Committee to discuss the split of Maher and Al-Noukrashi, hoping that they would cause a major split in the party, followed by a considerable number of Wafdists able to support Maher if the king dismissed Al-Nahhas and asked the former to form Cabinet\(^{(274)}\).

If these were the underlying factors or motives leading to the split, there were the direct and overt factors, which initiated the series of events leading up to the complete collapse of the relations between the two old colleagues, who had been in the same boat for almost a quarter of a century. That direct factor was known as the resistance of Ebeid to favouritism and corruption in the party and in the Wafdist Government. Among the events which activated the direct factor and set the timing for the whole split was that Nahhas’s wife made some demands of Ebeid, as Minister of Finance and of Supply. These entailed the provision of illegal facilities to further the business affairs of some of her relations. She wanted to exploit Nahhas’s post as Prime Minister and through his influence, to amass wealth for herself and


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her family. The business activities of Madame Nahhas’s two brothers were
in the export and import trade, which came directly under the regulation of
the Ministries of Finance and Supply, both held by Ebeid(275). It was said that
they acted commercial middlemen by exploiting their relation with Nahhas,
managing to get special facilities through the Ministries and thereby taking
commissions(276).

There was the vital matter of ‘exceptions and promotions’. The details
of that subject were that the Nahhas Government wanted to give some
exceptional promotions to Government employees who had officially suffered
under the non-Wafdist Governments or who were their staunch supporters.
Ebeid rejected the proposal and transferred it to the Ministerial Financial
Committee on May 1, 1942. Al-Ahram stated that

“The Ministry of Finance has received several Notes from the
various Ministries asking for approval to grant number of their
officials exceptional promotions and increments of pay. The
multitude of these demands has attracted the attention of the
Ministry of Finance, especially since the condition of the budget
prevents the grant of such exceptional treatment”.

Al-Ahram continued

“The Financial Committee then demanded the complete prevention
of exceptional treatment, whether in fixing salaries, promotions,
increments or in the final settlement of cases of officials”(277).

Al-Ahram published on the following day more details,

“It is learnt from a reliable source that the Note of the Financial
Committee was referred to the Council of Ministers and was
rejected by all Ministers, except the Minister of Finance”(278).

(277)  Al-Ahram, May 21, 1942.
(278)  Al-Ahram, May 22, 1942.
Al-Masri published the Memorandum of the Financial Committee on May 23, which had likewise rejected all the exceptional cases,

“The Financial Committee considers that it is its duty to remark that these exceptional cases will lead to serious consequences, as there exist a large number of officials in the various Ministries and Departments of similar qualifications and seniority to those whose cases are being referred to the Council of Ministers” (279).

Nahhas was expecting that Ebeid would exploit the subject of the exceptions in his dispute with the Cabinet. This explains perhaps why that issue was the final straw in the break between him and Nahhas (280). Matters developed rapidly. Nobody who was in a position to do so, lifted a hand to heal the breach, even among the Wafdist themselves. Ebeid began to deal directly with the Palace, by-passing Nahhas. In his annual ministerial Budget Report in the Chamber of Deputies, he made promises on behalf of the Government, without previously consulting the specialised ministries. Among the examples of these promises were some commitments of the Government such as decision to stop the forced sales of bankrupt properties without previous consultations with Sabri Abu-Alam Pasha, Minister of Justice, which caused a kind of contradiction in the Government policy facing the public. In March 1942, Seraj-Eldin was appointed Minister of Agriculture, over Ebeid’s objection; on next day, Nahhas received separately Ahmed Hassanein and Ebeid; on the 8th, Nahhas visited Monoufia Province with Sabri Abu-Alam and Seraj-Eldin, but without Ebeid, to whom, however, he had sent a congratulatory telegram on the occasion of the Coptic Easter.

In an attempt to rein in Ebeid, Nahhas removed him from the Ministry of Supply, giving as the reason a new policy agreed between himself and the king (281). Ahmed Hamza was then appointed as Minister of Supply on

(279) The three main names suggested by the Wafdist for exceptional promotions were: Ibrahim Farag Massiha, Tawfik Al-Kadi and Mohamed Osman Al-Masri. F.O. 371/31572, May 27, 1942, Lampson to Eden (The same names were also in Al-Masri, May 23, 1942).


(281) M.M.N., Session No. 2, Cairo, March 30, 1942: 149. “Nahhas announced that decision in the one speech in the parliament as if it was the King’s instruction”.
May 15, 1942. Ebeid subsequently told the Commercial Counsellor of the British Embassy that the two Ministries of Finance and Supply were too much for one minister to tackle. No doubt this remark was partly dictated by his desire to cover up his humiliation\(^{(282)}\).

In the second half of May 1942, the situation between Ebeid and Nahhas deteriorated further. Each held meetings with his supporters to explain his views. All attempts to end the dispute were unsuccessful. Seraj-Eldin suggested to Ebeid to go with him to his village for a rest until matters had quietened down, but Ebeid refused, adding that he did not like to leave when the political battle was raging\(^{(283)}\). The respective stands of Ebeid and Nahhas were so desperate and diametrically opposed, that one of their colleagues in the Wafd, Abdel Qawi Ahmed Pasha said, “I believe that if I carried the Quran in one hand, the Bible in the other and went to Nahhas and Makram to solve their differences, both would ignore me”\(^{(284)}\). The King received Ebeid on May 26, 1942, and met Nahhas later the same day. Neither, at the time, was aware of the other’s visit, when Nahhas outlined to the King the details of the dispute. The King was playing a double game, planned by Hassanein to divide the Wafd. No sooner had the King invited Ebeid to hear his point of view, than he invited Nahhas on the same day to hear his side of the story.

It was mentioned by Ghannam, a Wafdist Minister, that when Nahhas explained to the King the roots of the differences between him and Ebeid, the King told him, “You have good cause to be aggrieved because you bore all that from Makram and you were patient with him”\(^{(285)}\). The King’s duplicity was evident when Ebeid was quoted as describing his reception by the King as ‘very sympathetic’\(^{(286)}\). Nahhas had asked for the immediate dismissal of Ebeid, but the King refused, saying that it was open to Nahhas to resign and re-constitute his Cabinet. Nahhas there upon resigned and was asked to

\(^{(282)}\) *F.O. 371/31572, May 21, 1942, Lampson to Eden.*


\(^{(286)}\) *F.O. 371/31572, May 26, 1942, Lampson to Eden.*
re-form his Cabinet, which he did, appointing Kamel Sidqi Pasha, a Copt, instead of Ebeid, to the post of Minister of Finance\(^{(287)}\). A Royal Decree was issued on the same day appointing Nahhas—as Prime Minister—Military ruler of Egypt, because of the international circumstances of the war\(^{(288)}\). Ebeid was still officially the Secretary-General of the Wafd and a member of Parliament, in addition to carrying on his syndicate activities as a \textit{batonnier} of the Egyptian Bar. In the middle of June 1942, he attended a meeting of the Wafd Executive Committee and they agreed to freeze the quarrel for a period and prevent further escalation. The agreement did not last more than a few days however. Nahhas announced in a meeting of the Wafdist Parliamentary Committee that Ebeid was no longer Secretary-General of the Wafd and that the Wafd would oppose his election to the Bar Syndicate\(^{(289)}\). Ebeid replied in a letter, reminding Nahhas that he was elected Secretary-General of the Wafd by the same methods and at the same time as he, Nahhas, was elected president of the Wafd. As for the elections of the Bar Syndicate, Ebeid reminded Nahhas that no Government had any right to interfere in it.

As Nahhas ignored Ebeid’s letter, the latter sent him a second letter on June 27, 1942, signed by him and twenty other Wafdist parliamentary members, asking Nahhas to hold a meeting of the Wafdist Higher Committee the 29\(^{th}\) to discuss the military situation, the exceptional measures taken by the Government, the permission granted to some of its favourites to export some raw materials and the unlawful surveillance of Ebeid’s house by the Government, and to clarify Ebeid’s position in the party after Nahhas’s announcement that Ebeid was no longer Secretary-General of the Wafd. Nahhas sent an oral answer through Mohamed Salah-Eldin to Ebeid telling him that he wanted those who had signed the letter to meet him to explain why they wanted such a meeting, and that he had nothing more about the general situation than what he had already stated in the Chamber. As for the issue of exceptions and promotions, Nahhas added that Ebeid could raise that


\(^{(288)}\) Al-Ahram, May 27, 1942.

\(^{(289)}\) Al-Masri, June 19, 1942.
subject in the Chamber on the 29th. In the meantime he denied both accusations concerning special permission for exports and the alleged surveillance of Ebeid’s house and confirmed that Ebeid was no longer the Secretary-General of the Wafd. Ebeid was clearly expecting such an answer, but must have sent his and his supporters’ letter in order to probe the determination of Nahhas in the affair.

The British Embassy in Cairo watched the dispute and followed its steps with some sympathy for Ebeid. The Embassy reported to the Foreign Office that

“The origins of the affair date back to the marriage of Nahhas Pasha some years ago. Up to then Makram Ebeid had been ‘riding’ Nahhas Pasha. Madame Nahhas who is a masterful lady and has great hold on her husband would not play second string and the estrangement has been growing ever since”\(^{(290)}\).

Lampson trusted the capability of Ebeid in his ministerial posts. He wrote to the Foreign Office saying

“According to Amin Osman, the King had insisted to Nahhas Pasha that the Government ought to bring in one or more men with real knowledge of the administrative machine and technical ability. His Majesty pointed out that things could not work if there were an incompetent man as head of Supplies Ministry and some other unqualified man at the Ministry of Finance. I told Amin Osman that I considered King Faruq was right in this “\(^{(291)}\).

Moreover the Embassy made an evaluation of the personality of Nahhas, with Ebeid no longer behind him, in the party or the Government.

“The Wafd are now without a capable party organiser. At its head is an unbalanced leader swayed by an irresponsible and

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\(^{(290)}\) F.O. 371/31572, May 23, 1942, Lampson to Eden.

\(^{(291)}\) F.O. 371/31572, May 26, 1942, Lampson to Eden.
headstrong wife. He lacks the ability for administration or for party organization and is so obsessed with his hold on the populace that he often fails to appreciate the traps which his astuter opponents prepare for him. Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Supplies, two of the most important departments from popular point of view during difficulties and shortages, are in the hands of uninspired leaders who, if faced with serious crisis, may well prove inadequate to deal with them<sup>(292)</sup>.

Nahhas, Seraj-Eldin and others saw that the time was ripe to dismiss Ebeid from the Wafd, as they were then in power, and could pressure on him. On the other hand, if they dismissed him later, when they were out of power, it would be a golden opportunity for Ebeid to oppose them, supported by any anti-Wafd government<sup>(293)</sup>. On June 29, 1942, therefore, Nahhas officially announced in the Chamber of Deputies that Ebeid was no longer the Secretary-General of the Wafd. Finally, on July 6, 1942, the Wafd held a meeting in which they dismissed Ebeid and Ragheb Hanna from membership of the Wafd<sup>(294)</sup>.

That dismissal decision was taken in the absence of Ebeid and his colleague for they had not been invited to attend. The decision also stated that the Wafd would decide later how to deal with those who had jointly signed the letter with Ebeid. A collective resignation letter signed by seventeen Senators and Deputies was sent to Nahhas, protesting against his severe and unfair action taken against Ebeid and Ragheb Hanna. Eight at least among the seventeen were Copts and some of the rest were from Upper Egypt where Ebeid came from. They stated in their letter of resignation, dated July 12, 1942, that they were convinced that Nahhas had moved away from the great principles

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<sup>(292)</sup> F.O. 371/31572, June 3, 1942, Lampson to Eden.

<sup>(293)</sup> Al-Tab’i, Op. cit.: 322.

<sup>(294)</sup> F.O. 371/31573, July 11, 1942, Lampson to Eden. Ragheb Hanna Bey was a Coptic lawyer and a deputy representing a constituency in Al-Minia province. He supported Ebeid in his dispute with Nahhas and followed him in his split with the Wafd. Later, he became a Minister with Ebeid in the Cabinets of Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi, 1944–1945.
of the Wafd both as a party and a Government, to the extent that the rights of their country and the dignity of their people were in real danger\(^{(295)}\).

Nahhas ignored their resignations and dismissed them from the Wafd by a decision of the Wafd Higher Committee. Ebeid was at that time completely cornered since Nahhas and the majority of the Wafd were against him, and the circumstances of the War prevented him from pressing his views and explaining his standpoint to the public on the newspapers when press censorship was under the military emergency and in effect directed by Nahhas himself, as the Military Governor and Prime Minister of the country\(^{(296)}\).

Ebeid was in a similar situation to that which confronted on the other side, and even those who heartily believed in his honesty could not support him openly because of the threat of severe reprisals by Nahhas, the powerful ruler, against Ebeid’s followers\(^{(297)}\). Ebeid, and his colleagues who were

\(\text{(295) The resignation was jointly signed by:} \)

1. Al-Sayed Selim (al-Boha)
2. Mohamed Farid Zalouk (Sandal)
3. Ismail Fawaz (Senator)
4. Zaki Michael Bishara (Senator)
5. Abd Allah Fawaz (Awlad-Hamza)
6. Michael Rizk (Senator)
7. Galal Eldin Al-Hamamay (W. Desert)
8. Dr. Fahmy Soliman (Mehalt Rouh)
9. Abu El-Majd El-Nazer (Aramant)
10. Nagieb Michael Bishara (Kous)
11. Hussein Al-Hermil (Mehalit Marhoun)
12. Labib Greis (Sanbo)
13. Mohamed Abdel Kader (Abu Hamad)
14. Alfrid Kasim (Al-Mansoura)
15. Abu Al-Gheith Al-Aawar (Abu Gerg)
16. Mihana Al-Koumus (Dayrout)
17. George Makram Ebeid (Awlad Amr)


\(\text{(296) Heikal, Op. cit.: 266.} \)

\(\text{(297) For example, Abdel Hamid Abdel-Haq who felt guilty in remaining Minister of Social Affairs in Nahhas’s Cabinet, in spite of his friendship and sympathy with Ebeid. See Al-Tab’i, Op. cit.: 353-355.} \)
expelled from the Wafd, labelled ‘themselves as the ‘Independent Wafdist Group’. Nahhas riposted by issuing a statement declaring this title to be entirely bogus.\(^{(298)}\)

The difference between the case of Ebeid in 1942 and that of Maher and Al-Noukrashi in 1937, was that his dismissal from the Wafd had greater repercussions, mainly because his attack on Nahhas was stronger and in his complaint against favouritism and exceptions he was on very solid ground, in the sense that it appealed strongly to the Egyptian public. Like Maher and Al-Noukrashi however, he had to establish a political organization through which could act. He then announced the formation of his own party under the name of Al-Kutla Al-Waf'dia Al-Mustaqilla (The Independent Wafdist Bloc), consisting of his supporters, some of whom were intellectuals and journalists like Ahmed Kassem Gouda and Galal Eldin Al-Hamamsy.

In spite of this difficult situation facing Ebeid, he continued his public activities. He did not confine himself to the criticism of the Nahhas Cabinet and Wafd policy, but continued to behave like a leading political figure by depending only on his own reputation and on his new party policy. He joined with Heikal (Constitutional liberal) and Ahmed Maher (Saadist) in writing a petition to King Faruq, at the same time handing a copy to the Oriental secretary of the British Embassy in Cairo.\(^{(299)}\) In it they declared,

"The Cabinet adopts a policy of favouritism and nepotism, respecting no rule regarding the nomination, promotion and dismissal of officials, with the result that the Government machine was thrown into disorder".

Heikal, in his book, states that,

"Ebeid was the most hostile among the opposition to Nahhas. He was anxious to attack the Government, and had the right to do so because had proclaimed a personal war on Ebeid and his

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\(^{(298)}\) *F.O. 371/31573, July 26, 1942, Lampson to Eden.*

\(^{(299)}\) *F.O. 371/31575, November 14, 1942, Lampson to Eden.*
followers, such as those whose deputyship in the Chamber had been recently questioned and then approved. However, when they supported Ebeid, their candidacy was considered ineligible, and they were no longer able to take their seat in the Chamber. Naturally, the opposition was mainly directed at questioning the honesty of Nahhas, as his high reputation was taken for granted in the public mind as his hands seemed clean and he was as yet not wealthy, having gained little from his post. The answer to Nahhas’s enemies, who accused him of incompetence in political life, was that his honesty and sterling career compensated for his want of political talent.

Thus Ebeid was for the first time impugning Nahhas’ honesty, not his ability, about which there were already serious doubts expressed. The only way possible for Ebeid to denigrate the Government and attack Nahhas before public opinion was to marshal as many instances of favouritism and corruption in the Wafd Government, depending on his supporters, on opposition, and all those against the Wafd and its Government. The War and military regulations prevented Ebeid from publishing in the press, and there was no other alternative for him except to record all these accusations in a book to be published at the appropriate time. That was how the idea of publishing the *Black Book* (*Al-Kitab Al-Aswad*) as a petition to the King, detailing the irregularities and cases of favouritism and corruption committed by the Wafd came about. Ebeid and a small team of his followers and friends made a concerted but secret effort to have the book published because of the tight control of the Wafd Government in printing and publishing the book.

Galal Eldin Al-Hamamsi, a journalist and a close supporter of Ebeid, being one of those who had been dismissed from the Wafd after signing the letter of protest and resignation to Nahhas, wrote the story of the compilation of the *Black Book* at its different stages, gathering of data, its printing and distribution. According to him, the arrangement for publishing the book took eight months from the start when *Al-Kutla Al-Wafidia* saw that there was an opportunity to work against Nahhas and his regime. Al-Hamamsi recalls that he asked Ahmed Hassanein, the Royal Chamberlain,

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if there was any way of stopping the corruption of the Wafd Government, and that Hassanein answered that he could not take any action unless he had documental proof in his hands. When Al-Hamamsi asked whether Al-Wafdia could provide this, Hassanein replied that it was not the suitable time, because the Government was still in the honeymoon stage with the British Embassy, but that time was coming soon\(^{(301)}\). This is futher proof of the link between Ebeid and the Royal Palace through the intermediary role of Hassanein in the publishing of the Black Book. What is more, Al-Hamamsi mentioned in the same book that Hassanein suggested to him in March 1943 that he should keep the draft of Black Book and its supporting documents in the palace safe in order to avoid police investigation which then plagued the activities and movements of Ebeid’s followers\(^{(302)}\). Al-Hamamsi goes on to explain the difficulties involved in the process of printing the book in secret place. They wanted to surprise the Government by having the King receive the book at the same time as its public distribution through the members of Al-Kutla Al-Wafdia Party in all the provinces. He added also how they were forced to print at a commercial printer, a last minute account of furs bought for Madame Nahhas, from Britain through diplomatic facilities.

The Black Book is written in the style of a petition to the King, and contains several chapters on various kinds of corruption and favouritism. The complete edition of the Black Book was issued on March 29, 1943, of more than 500 pages, the official title being The Black Book on the Black Times. It opens with an introductory petition offered in the name of the King, explaining the circumstances of Ebeid’s ministerial differences with Nahhas and how he offered his resignation three times but Nahhas refused each time, promising to take actual steps against favouritism. Examining subsequent chapters of the Black Book some paragraphs will be chosen as examples of the tone dominating the work, because it contains numerous accounts and types of corruption in the political, financial and administrative life of the country.


\(^{(302)}\) *Ibid.*: 36 (The same information was included in Al-Hamamsi’s other book, *Maarakat Nazahat Al-Hukum*, from February 1942 to July 1952, Cairo 1952: 30).
He writes in the first chapter (General Survey) addressing the King,

“Public duty demands that I disclose to Your Majesty the irregularities of the present Regime and of persons concerned with the administration of the Country, by which the machinery of Government has deteriorated to such an extent as to create despair” \(^{(303)}\).

He added in the same chapter,

“As soon as we obtained power, the relatives and relations by marriage of Nahhas Pasha endeavoured to enrich themselves through me as a friend of Nahhas Pasha. I was asked by these persons to authorise the export of enormous stocks of oil and leather. Nahhas Pasha strenuously supported these demands but I refused. Nahhas Pasha endeavoured to obtain sugar, rice, etc. for his friends, without my knowledge. Nahhas Pasha himself profited from the Wakfs of Abdel Aal and Badraoui at Samanoud. Nahhas Pasha made every attempt to prevent me from pursuing a public enquiry with reference to the hoarding of cotton thread, which enquiry had been started before we came to power. These were the reasons that caused the dispute between us” \(^{(304)}\).

He then explained the circumstances of his dismissal from the Wafd, as follows:

“The reasons that inspired Nahhas Pasha to dismiss me from the Cabinet were the same as those which inspired him to eject me from the Wafd. When I called an assembly of the Wafd, after my dismissal from the Cabinet, Nahhas Pasha was astonished at the enthusiasm with which I was greeted. In order to meet the wishes of the Assembly, he shook hands with me and stated that he had intention of undermining my position in the Wafd, but he broke his promise and gave instructions that the Censor, in the report of the meeting, should strike out any reference to me as ‘General Secretary’ of the Wafd. He also gave instructions that my name

\(^{(303)}\) M. Ebeid, The Black Book, Cairo 1943: 1.

\(^{(304)}\) Ibid.: 15.
should not appear in the press, nor should the press accept anything that was published by me or even referred to me. He prevented the newspapers publishing a letter from Prince Omar Toussoun praising my services to my country. Nahhas Pasha censored every reference to me in the press; he kept my house under surveillance; he censored my telegrams and my telephone communications. A motion was passed in the Senate to thank me as Minister of Finance and Supply, but Nahhas Pasha threatened the members of Parliament that he would resign if they joined the Senate in recording their appreciation and gratitude for my services.”

In Part Two of the Black Book entitled ‘Facts’, Ebeid wrote two chapters, the first ‘The Question of Responsibility and Power’ and the second ‘The Question of Constitutional and Political Rights’. In Chapter I, Ebeid covered the growth of favouritism and corruption in all fields and exceptional promotions, giving many examples and citing many names. A significant point should be noted here which underlines the fact that Ebeid was not motivated by any religious motives in his criticism of Nahhas and his regime. Thus when Ebeid cites the names of some ‘Favourites of the Favourites’, one finds that all the names mentioned were Copts, simply to avoid being accused of having a religious bias.

“Dr. Khallaf Hanna, Sabet Rizkallah Effendi, Elias Effendi Rizkallah, Dr. Abdel Malek Rizkallah, Foud Effendi Rizkallah, Soliman Effendi Boutrous, have all received exceptional favours”

Under the title ‘The Last Flagrant Scandal’ Ebeid mentioned:

“A telegram in code was sent to our Ambassador in London to buy furs to the value of £3,000 for Madame Nahhas Pasha... Surely this makes a laughing stock of the dignity and the functions of the State? And how could Nahhas Pasha, a poor man, spend this amount for a luxury? What is the source of this abundant and unexpected wealth?”

(305) Ibid.: 46.
(306) Ibid.: 455.
(307) Ibid.: 509.
In Chapter II, Part Two deals with the political side of the corruption which Ebeid accused the Wafd Government as being involved in and discussed some other subjects such as the ‘interference with parliamentary government and its traditions’, ‘suppression of the liberty of the press’, ‘restriction of the liberty of the individual’, ‘interference with the liberty of parties’, ‘interference with free and honest elections’, and the ‘concessions at the expense of the country’s political rights’.[308]

In the conclusion to the Black Book, Ebeid offered his recommendations to the King regarding possible remedies. He asked Faruq to remove the Wafd Government as speedily as possible, in order to safeguard the Constitution and preserve justice and honour, and to revoke the various wrongful measures with regard to supplies and favouritism.

“We ask that favours to officials be the subject of special measures so that no official shall benefit by exceptional promotions or increases of salaries and shall be obliged to repay monies they have received as a result of favouritism”.

He also asked that a special judicial commission be appointed to examine all charges of injustice and dishonesty so that those responsible might be speedily punished, and that their punishment would be severe as an example to others. Ebeid suggested the enactment of a law by which ministers and officials could be questioned about their acquisitions while they were in office, and another to suppress all measures against the liberties of individuals and parties, free political prisoners and compensate the victims of the present regime for the injustices they had suffered.

In his petition to the King, Ebeid undertook to consolidate parliamentary rule and to guarantee constitutional liberties: freedom of the press, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, so that if it is necessary to maintain martial law, such a law shall not be exploited in matters which are not of military necessity. His report continues,

“The head of the British Government and his responsible advisers have stated that the danger of the invasion of Egypt from east or west is diminished; why therefore should Egypt remain under the...

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(308) Ibid.: 512.
shadow of martial law. We are prepared to adopt all measures with the exception of military law to safeguard interests of our allies and to carry out our obligations.\(^{(309)}\)

Ebeid did not obtain the reaction he anticipated from the King or his advisers, particularly Ahmed Hassanein, to his *Black Book*. Certainly the circumstances of the War and the strained relations between the King and the British after February 4, 1942, had weakened the palace vis-à-vis the Wafd. Consequently, the reaction to Ebeid’s petition could be no more than a passive one. The King was not even able to protect Ebeid from the severe reaction of Nahhas. But he certainly did use him in his efforts to embarrass Nahhas and the Wafd. It is also not unlikely that Nahhas had obtained previous approval from the palace and the British to continue his hard line against Ebeid, anticipating no objections from the King or the British authorities in time of war.

The only reaction of the palace to the *Black Book* was its transmittal with a covering letter to the Prime Minister on April 10, 1943. The letter contained a non-committal statement that the book contained some questions and events which deserved answers and justifications from the Government.\(^{(310)}\)

Although the Palace reaction to the *Black Book* was circumspect and mild, it was stated that King Faruq, whether advised by Hassanein or not, wanted to exploit what was written in it in order to dismiss the Nahhas cabinet but the prevailing stage of war prevented him from taking such serious decision.\(^{(311)}\)

The *Black Book* had great repercussions throughout Egypt. Although the press censorship prevented newspapers from mentioning the book, people from all parties were obtaining copies by any means possible.\(^{(312)}\) Copies found their way to foreign embassies, especially the British and American.\(^{(313)}\)

\(^{(309)}\) *Ibid.*: 549.


"It has caused considerable sensation largely owing to the precise nature of the charges made and includes documentary quotations and references." (314)

Mohammad Heikal and other opposition leaders considered that the Government had two choices open to them in dealing with the situation; either to report Ebeid to the Parquet who would examine the contents of the book in order to decide what action to take against Ebeid if the contents were not true, or to keep silent, accepting the contents of the book as the truth (315).

Some deputies in parliament entertained the idea of suing Ebeid in the Courts, but Nahhas refused saying that Ebeid’s situation was political, therefore should be discussed in the parliament and not in the Courts (316). There was another alternative for Nahhas, which was suggested by Lampson to Amin Osman as a comment on the reactions to the Black Book,

"I did not know whether Nahhas Pasha wished to appeal to the country but it seemed to me that was the logical course and the natural one in the democracy, if he desired to clear himself in the eyes of the public opinion everywhere. If he did, and if I were to advise King Farouk that we considered this to be the right course, it was vitally important that elections should not only be conducted fairly but demonstrably so." (317)

The official reaction of the Government was a period of silence; the only effective reaction was to prevent any mention of the Black Book in the Egyptian newspapers. A few weeks after publication, a question was put in the Senate by a Wafdist about the intention of the Government towards the Black Book and Ebeid. The answer was deliberately postponed for four weeks whilst the Government deliberated how to act. Some Wafdist deputies started to put parliamentary questions about the contents of the Black Book. Ministers gave detailed answers, concerning many questions, giving the impression

(314) F.O. 371/ 35531, April 4, 1943, Lampson to Eden.
(317) F.O. 371/ 35533, May 6, 1943, Lampson to Eden.
that the statements in the *Black Book* were grossly exaggerated and that some parts of it were demonstrably false. The answers of the Ministers to these P.Qs were collected afterwards in a Government publication issued by the Wafd under the title ‘The White Book’. This reply attacked Ebeid and refuted all his accusations.

In the session of the *Majlis Al-Nuwwab* on April 21, 1943, a question was directed to Nahhas by the deputy Omar Omar, dwelling particularly on those texts in the *Black Book* concerning Nahhas’s luxury life as represented by cars and houses. Nahhas began by reciting the history of the purchase of his car, and how he rented his house in Garden City, and gave stress to the story of the furs by saying that Ebeid claimed in the *Black Book* that their value was £3,000 whereas it was £80 only. He was followed by the Minister of Communications to complete the answers from the technical and financial aspects. The answers were followed by prolonged clapping from the deputies and one of Ebeid’s supporters Al-Sayed Selim was asked to leave the Chamber because of his interruptions\(^{(318)}\).

In the next session, a long discussion occurred between the Speaker (Wafdist) and some of Ebeid’s supporters, in the presence of Nahhas, concerning a P.Q sent by Ebeid to the Chamber asking the Prime Minister about all the subjects mentioned in the *Black Book*. The Speaker, supported by the majority, refused to accept the P.Q as it seemed general and vague. A lengthy discussion then ensued on parliamentary procedures and the limits of the authority of the Speaker. It was clear that the majority of the deputies supported Nahhas and his Government against Ebeid, who was absent from the session\(^{(319)}\).

In other later sessions P.Qs were put to Nahhas concerning some accusations in the *Black Book*, and to some Ministers about particular events. Nahhas and his Cabinet members attended these sessions, but Ebeid was absent, whilst his supporters were there. Questions were arranged and co-ordinated in advance by the Wafd, allowing every deputy to make his comment after the reply of every Minister, praising the honesty of the

\(^{(318)}\) M.M.N., Session No. 32, Cairo, April 21, 1943: 1290-1297.

\(^{(319)}\) M.M.N., Session No. 33, Cairo, April 27, 1943: 1336-1343.
Government and criticising Ebeid as a liar and a deceiver. Ebeid personally put a P.Q in the session of Majlis Al-Nawwab in May 1943(320). His question was directed to Nahhas, and made a great repercussion, especially among the opposition in and out of parliament because it was a bold step by Ebeid in the time of war(321).

Ebeid explained his question about his accusation of Nahhas and his Government as set out in the Black Book. He spoke in three successive sessions while Nahhas and his Ministers were in the Chamber. He was stopped several times by the Speaker, who took a hard line against him, and the majority had arranged in advance to create a situation against Ebeid.

In the third session, the deputies agreed with the suggestion of the Speaker, to stop Ebeid from continuing his speech as he had already taken up adequate time. Ebeid then withdrew from the session, followed by the opposition members, except the members of the Watani Party(322). The Chamber took a majority decision at the end of the session condemning Ebeid and his book and renewing their trust in Nahhas and his Cabinet. On July 11, 1943, the Wafd parliamentary group decided at a meeting to put forward a motion for the expulsion of Ebeid from his deputyship.

The very next day a proposal by the Bureau of the Chamber was put forward to expel Ebeid from his deputyship. The deputy Speaker stated that in application of Article (112) of the Constitution, the Bureau of the Chamber had already decided on May 23 that Makram Ebeid should be deprived of his seat. Shazli Pasha (an Independent) urged that constitutional precedents should first be examined and Fikri Abaza (Watanist) also spoke in favour of adjourning for this purpose. Wafdist deputies however demanded immediate discussion, and Ebeid was called upon to defend himself. The proposal of Ebeid’s expulsion included the description of him as the worst example of a deputy since 1924. Ebeid was deprived of his seat by a majority of 208 votes for and 17 against(323).


(323) M.M.N., Session No. 47, Cairo, July 12/13, 1943: 2130.
Ironically, Ebeid was the one who much earlier had insisted that the Wafd should have at least the majority of three-quarters in the Chamber to enable the leadership of the Party to expel any deputy, and he was the first one to be expelled according to that majority\(^{(324)}\). Afterwards, all Ebeid’s supporters were expelled from their deputyship for one reason or another as their penalty.

In spite of that desperate situation, Ebeid continued his activities against Nahhas and his Government in co-operation with the other opposition leaders. His efforts proved an effective and strong support to the opposition, as he was a former Secretary-General of the Wafd. He had his party, *Al-Kutla Al-Wafidia*, with its own newspaper. The ‘*Kutla*’ was not a large political party, but well-organized, and had enjoyed a loyal harmony in attitudes among its members. Most of them were former members in the Wafd party and criticized the new trends of the Wafd in the last few years and disagreed with Nahhas’s policy.

Members of the ‘*Kutla*’ were either former members in the Wafd who followed Ebeid in his split, or young members from different provinces who were disappointed by the Wafd leadership. Among the latter was the expelled officer, Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat who had the intention to be the *Kutla* candidate in the elections of 1945 in his county of Menoufia\(^{(325)}\).

*Al-Kutla* newspaper had started up in 1944. Ebeid had tried to make it an opinion newspaper at a time when the news press played a dominating role in influencing public opinion\(^{(326)}\). *Al-Kutla* welcomed the young journalists from the new generation, like Galal Eldin Al-Hamamsi and Talat Younan. The *Kutla* suspended publication in 1949. Ahmed Kassem Gouda was Editor-in-Chief for the whole period of its existence.

Ebeid added a fresh part to the *Black Book* in February 1944, and was even more severe in his criticism and attacks on Nahhas, because he dealt wholly with the political side. He accused Nahhas of endangering the interests of the country in order to seek the blessings of Britain\(^{(327)}\). While he was


\(^{(325)}\) From an interview with Mr. Fikry Makram Ebeid on February 15, 1975.


engaged in his activities against Nahhas and in his criticism of the military position in Egypt in the war, he was arrested on May 8, 1944, by an order of Nahhas, the Military Ruler. He spent the first few days of his period of arrest in the prison for foreigners and was later moved to Al-Serw, Irrigation Rest Hall, till he was later released to become a Minister for Finance in the Ministry of Ahmed Maher on October 7, 1944, when the King had dismissed Nahhas’s Cabinet.

Ebeid insisted afterwards that his arrest had been according to British wishes and proved his point by a call he directed to the nation to fight the British, only eight days before his arrest\(^{(328)}\). The Wafd Government issued a statement after his arrest explaining that he had been warned six months previously to stop the meetings he was holding, because they were illegal according to Martial Law\(^{(329)}\).

Yet did all this imply that Ebeid’s split from the Wafd and being followed by only a small minority and facing a real failure, was his main mistake in his political career? The following chapter will discuss the consequences of his split from the Wafd for him in his career, searching for any religious thumb-prints behind his situation.

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\(^{(328)}\) "From Ebeid’s Evidence in Seraj-Eldin’s Trial", *Al-Akhbar*, Cairo, January 1, 1954.

\(^{(329)}\) *F.O. 371/41329, May 11, 1944*, Lord Killearn to Eden.
Chapter Five

Review and Evaluation

Much of the research into modern Egyptian political history considers the split of Ebeid from the Wafd, and his publishing the Black Book as his cardinal political mistake, after a long and active political life. Even those who sided with him in his split from the Wafd, and were well-known for their hostile attitude towards Nahhas, blamed Ebeid for his mistaken strategy and poor tactics.

Al-Rafei the well-known historian of modern Egypt, who was then the Secretary-General of the Watani Party criticized the extremely impulsive behaviour of Ebeid, and the conception of the Black Book, in spite of the fact that he thought Ebeid was right in principle. Bahaa Eldin, former editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram, considered Ebeid the most distinguished and brilliant name in Egyptian politics from the time of the death of Zaghoul to 1952, but again, he considers the Black Book to be his sole mistake.

Dr. Fouad Zakaria, a professor of philosophy wished that Ebeid had not capped his distinguished political career with the publication of the Black Book. Dr. Heikal, the leader of the Constitutional Liberals, who had great sympathy with Ebeid in his differences with Nahhas, thought that Ebeid gravely erred in publishing and exposing such a long list of names in the Black Book. Heikal had suggested that Ebeid would have been wiser had he selected a few striking examples and emphasized their serious effect rather than offering so many examples with varying importance and giving each the same degree of attention.

These then are some examples of the reaction among Ebeid’s contemporaries who had been close to the events. Others felt that Ebeid had

(330) A. Al-Rafei, Fi Aaqab Al-Thawara Al-Misria, vol. 3, Cairo 1951: 120.
(331) A. Bahaa Eldin, article in Al-Watan, Kuwait, February 8, 1975.
(332) F. Zakaria, article in Rose al-Youssef, Cairo.
been too harsh in his criticism of Nahhas and had exaggerated the extent of favouritism during his terms of office. Al-Tab‘i asked himself with astonishment why Ebeid was attacking the cases of exceptional privileges in 1942 when he had justified them five years earlier in 1937\(^\text{(334)}\). There was a widespread impression in political circles that Ebeid had destroyed all the bridges linking him and Nahhas, and had exacerbated the situation without reasonable consideration\(^\text{(335)}\).

In addition to the foregoing criticisms, there was a more complex aspect to the dispute when Ebeid was accused by Nahhas and his supporters of being involved in a disreputable manoeuvre with the Royal Palace to blacken the reputation of Nahhas, who was widely considered by the public as an honest leader with clean hands\(^\text{(336)}\). This charge against Ebeid was based on the rumour that he himself had been involved in acts of favouritism for his relations and friends, among whom were Copts and Muslims from Qena\(^\text{(337)}\). Such accusations against Ebeid cannot be taken seriously, because they were cast, among other serious allegations, against the Wafd and Nahhas. Ebeid was comparatively straight-forward and honest, in contrast to many of his contemporary Egyptian party politicians\(^\text{(338)}\).

The *White Book*, written in response to the *Black Book*, contained some allegations by Nahhas and the Wafdists impugning the honesty of Ebeid. These accusations are mainly of a trivial nature, such as his acceptance of some small gifts from businessmen at his brother’s wedding party\(^\text{(339)}\). Ebeid was, like any politician, anxious to preserve his popularity and was therefore ready to extend courtesy facilities within proper bounds, especially at the election time, but his financial honesty had never been questioned.

The consequences and repercussions of the Ebeid split from the Wafd must now be discussed, in an attempt to evaluate that ominous step in his

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\(^{(339)}\) *M.M.N.*, *Session No.*, 42, Cairo, May 22/23, 1943: 1777.
political life, and to determine whether it was a successful tactic in his career, or whether, according to the then prevailing opinion, it constituted a real setback—a burning of his boats—to the extent that it meant the virtual end of his active political role in Egyptian politics. The latter rather common view emphasized the fact that by leaving the Wafd Ebeid lost his powerful position in the Party councils and consequently his influence among the majority.

In order to assess the validity of this conclusion or view, one must investigate the reaction of the main power centres in Egyptian political life to Ebeid’s split from the Wafd and to the subsequent publishing of the *Black Book*. The Royal Palace reacted to Ebeid’s actions very sympathetically, hoping that these would undermine the popularity of Nahhas and the fragmentation of the Wafd leadership, whereby the Party would lose its dynamic elements. The Palace, however, was more calculating and cautious in its reaction to the appearance of the *Black Book*, because the balance of power at that time was not in their favour. The cordial, close relationship between the two centres, namely the British and the Wafd, during the War and particularly after the February 4, 1942, incident was too powerful a combination for the Palace.

King Faruq and Hassanein were prepared to support Ebeid on condition that he could rally round him in a large sector of Wafdist and public opinion to enable him to oppose Nahhas and cause a major division in the Party. Then, in such a case, the Royal Palace would have sufficient reasons and justifications to move openly against Nahhas and his Government without fearing the reaction of the British, since the demand of the latter had been stable government. The decision of the Royal Palace however was not based on objective reasons, but simply on its resentment of Sir Miles Lampson over the February 4 episode. Besides that, the King was prepared to act in this way not because Ebeid was the man of the Palace but because he had become the enemy of Nahhas.

The British took a temporising attitude between Nahhas and Ebeid at the start, but when the latter took a hard line against Nahhas, accusing him of British support and that he was doing his best to meet their demands in time of War, they took such accusations seriously because of their possible effect on the public at that critical period. Thus soon after the rift between Nahhas and Ebeid, Lord Killearn records in his private papers:
“I repeated that I thought it was not in the best interest of the War effort that Makram should have the Ministry of Supply removed from him. According to my people he was doing the thing admirably well, had a clear head and was prepared to take a quick decision”\(^{(340)}\).

The British sympathised with Ebeid also because he did not enjoy equal power with Nahhas, the leader of the Muslim majority. After all, as a Copt, he was thought to have little public support.

“Full dress debate on supplies which was expected to provoke Makram Ebeid to telling attacks on Nahhas Pasha passed off without any such debate, mainly owing to the fact that Nahhas Pasha seems to have at least taken my advice, for he avoided attacks on Makram Ebeid. Makram Ebeid’s position as a Copt is very weak and he hesitates to take the offensive against Moslem leader of the Wafd; as long as Nahhas Pasha avoids attacks on Makram Ebeid, public bickering may be avoided”\(^{(341)}\).

The British reaction towards the split of Ebeid was influenced mainly by the circumstances of the War and they preferred not to involve themselves in an internal political affair at that critical time. The only issue which was able to engage British attention was Ebeid’s accusations against Nahhas concerning his relation with the British. Lord Killearn mentions in his papers:

“I was very much worried at the situation in which Makram was getting himself. He might attack Nahhas as much as he liked on personal grounds which was none of my affair, but he has now put down a most poisonous interpellation in parliament accusing the Prime Minister of selling the country to us. I thought that Makram should realise that if he went on in that way it might not be long before we were forced to regard him as an enemy, or at least a fifth columnist”\(^{(342)}\).

\(^{(340)}\) Killearn Private Papers: 12, Tuesday, May 5, 1942, Cairo.

\(^{(341)}\) F.O. 371/ 31573, June 21, 1942, Lampson to Eden.

The reaction to Ebeid’s secession within the Wafd both among the leadership and the rank and file of the Party could be gauged from the limited support that Ebeid received. Here, there is a significant factor that should be taken into consideration. The Wafd of 1942 was different from that of the twenties. The greatest factor making this difference was the Party’s new relation with the British that emerged from the Treaty of 1936 and the events in 1941–42 which brought it to power.

Concerning the changes in personalities and policies of the Wafd one finds reference to these in the MacDonald Papers:

“Dissentions in or secessions from the Wafd must not, to my mind, be taken seriously, especially at this time of financial stress. Indeed it is a surprise to me that there have not been more than hitherto. I well remember the time, both in 1921 and 1925, when the late Zaghloul Pasha was daily receiving letters of resignation and of withdrawal of support”(343).

This quotation suggests that the gap which divided Egyptian foreign policy and relations with Britain among the Wafdisths had been closed, the main issues of discussion had become moderated, and what is more, there was a gradual disappearance by retirement or death of most of the important figures, Muslims and Copts, in the history of the Wafd. The Treaty of 1936 was considered as a final stage in the Egyptian National Struggle and a start of a new era of relation between the British and the Wafd as the Egyptian majority party which signed the Treaty. On November 24, 1936, Eden, in the Commons, quoted the remarks Nahhas made in introducing the Treaty to the Chamber to Deputies in Cairo:

“From its inception the Wafd have had as their programme an agreement with Great Britain realising the complete independence of the Country and safeguarding the British interests which are not incompatible with that of independence”(344).

(343) James Ramsay MacDonald Private Papers, P.R.O. 30169 (1/272), January 1932.
All those changes in the national character of the Wafd from a movement of the Egyptian struggle for independence it had emerged as a political party with continuous ambition to rule. These changes influenced the reaction of the Wafd to the split of Ebeid and the publishing of the *Black Book* in 1942. Thus, the disappearance of the old leaders of the Wafd had given Nahhas full authority as sole ‘Za'im’. The split caused by Ebeid’s secession was dealt only by the leadership of the Wafd. The committees and lower echelons of the Party in the cities, and the masses in the villages were not involved in the dispute, or in the decision to expel Ebeid from the Party.

Ebeid however had been the strongest supporter of Nahhas within the Party since both men had been closely associated with the history of the national struggle. What is more, Al-Tab‘i, who was very close to the Wafd leadership for a long time, considered Ebeid as having the upper hand in the Government and the Party, especially when he was given the authority to act on behalf of the Wafd in the arrangements and the procedures of the Coronation of King Faruq in 1937.

The dismissal of Ebeid, as a politician with such power and political weight, was a great upheaval in the Wafd and a reflection of radical changes that had taken place in the party over the years, especially in its leadership, and its policies.

Among the weapons used against Ebeid in his differences with the Wafd were that he himself was responsible for the creation of the image of Nahhas before the public. Ebeid had showered much praise on the leader in earlier speeches and articles and gave him the titles of *Al-Zaama al-Muqaddasa* (the Holy Leadership). He used to talk or write with exaggeration about the honesty of Nahhas, “the leader with clean hands”. In this light, Salah-Eldin considered Ebeid as one of the worst personalities who had debased political life in Egypt. Ebeid’s standpoint against Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi in 1937 was held against him in 1942, as he underwent the same experience in opposing the majority of the Wafd. In 1937, when Nahhas and Ebeid were both accused of favouritism and corruption under the Wafd Government,

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Ebeid was refuting those allegations, yet in 1942 he found himself on the other side.

If these were the reactions of the three main power centres in 1942, the King, the British and the Wafd, one can find in addition further less powerful factors at work, such as Parliament, the minority parties and public opinion.

Parliament had a Wafdist majority, so its reaction to Ebeid and the publishing of the *Black Book* was an extension of the reaction of the Party itself. It is obvious in *Madabit Majlis Al-Nuwwab*, that the Speaker, Abdel-Salam Fahmy Goumaa, took sides against Ebeid during the Parliamentary discussions on the *Black Book*. The reason may well be that Goumaa, a Wafdist, felt that Ebeid had attacked him personally in the *Black Book* as being biased and undemocratic in conducting the sessions of the Chamber. Moreover, Ebeid had published the *Black Book* as a petition to the King, ignoring Parliament which, after all, was the proper authority for the consideration of his grievances. This objection was taken up by some members in Parliament like Senator Al-Rafei, on the grounds that it implied that Parliament was incapable of taking action on those allegations in a fair and impartial and proper way. Concerning the other parties and how they reacted towards the split and the *Black Book*, it has already been that the Constitutional Liberal views were represented in Dr. Heikal’s book. Although Dr. Heikal sympathised generally with Ebeid, he felt that enumeration of an excessive number of examples and names in the *Black Book* was a serious defect in Ebeid’s strategy.

The Watanists showed, in principle, the same sympathy with Ebeid, while not agreeing with him in his methods and particularly in the publishing of the *Black Book*. Their views were expressed by Al-Rafei in the Senate and Fikry Abaza in the Chamber of Deputies, the latter not wholly agreeing with the expulsion of Ebeid from his deputyship.

(348) Goumaa was a Wafdist Deputy of “Tanta”, and was a Wafdist Minister and became Speaker of M.N. in 1942.


(350) *M.M.N., Session No. 47, Cairo, July 12/13, 1943*: 2130.
Coming to the Saadists, led by Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi who had defected from the Wafd in 1937, after a dispute with Nahhas and Ebeid, it was expected that they might exploit the new situation to attack Ebeid who had been their political rival for a long time. However, this was not done, mainly because the dispute between Ebeid and Nahhas arose from similar reasons to that of Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi in 1937. Ebeid had already tried a rapprochement with them early in 1942. The *Egyptian Gazette* commented that

“A recent visit paid by Makram Ebeid Pasha, and a representative of Nahhas Pasha, to Ahmed Maher Pasha, President of the Chamber of Deputies and leader of the Saadist Party. Some writers professed to see in this a sinking of differences between the Saadist and Wafdist Leaders.” (351)

This item of news in the *Egyptian Gazette* gives the impression that Ebeid was trying to forge some strong links with other parties as he had already detected the signs of fundamental differences with Nahhas. That conclusion was corroborated by the remark of Al-Helali, already cited, to the effect that he had noticed the spirit of difference between Nahhas and Ebeid from the first session of the Wafd Cabinet in 1942 (352). On the other hand, it could well be that the news item in the *Egyptian Gazette* was occasioned by the atmosphere of February 4 Palace incident and its beginnings, as shown by its date.

Coming to Egyptian public opinion, one finds the repercussions of Ebeid’s action were not as expected, mainly because the *Black Book* was distributed only to the main figures in the Government and political parties and was not generally available. Its distribution was further curtailed by the prevailing press censorship which prohibited any mention of the *Black Book* or the discussions in the *Majlis Al-Nuwwab* concerning it. These factors tended to reduce the differences between Nahhas and Ebeid to a dispute at the top leadership level of the Wafd. It is obvious then that most of the reactions of the main power centres and other leading participants in the political field were critical—in some cases inimical—to Ebeid, for a variety of reasons.

(351) *Egyptian Gazette*, Cairo, February 3, 1942: 3.
(352) See Chapter IV, Note 19.
Firstly, Ebeid was unwise in the timing of his action and in the publishing of the *Black Book* since at a time of War, when all the mass circumstances distracted public opinion away from Ebeid’s accusations of Wafd favouritism. Of more immediate importance was the future of the War and the role of Egypt in it.

Secondly, there was the comparatively weak position of the King in facing the British and the Wafd which did not give the Palace the necessary capability and flexibility to support Ebeid openly. This was a real disappointment to Ebeid when he expected stronger support from the Palace in his political battle against the Wafd and Nahhas.

Thirdly, Ebeid’s extremist views in and out of Parliament were not his personal benefit. Nahhas used these against him in the critical time of war, when he could point to the behaviour of Ebeid as being contrary to the terms of the Treaty of 1936.

The fourth factor was that the final outcome of the Western Desert campaign precluded Ebeid from continuing to accuse Nahhas of selling the country to the British, because the defeat of the Allies in Africa had been expected, and Ebeid had urged Nahhas publicly to proclaim Cairo an open city on the assumption that the Axis troops would arrive in the Egyptian cities. When the British achieved their victory, however, the position of Nahhas became stronger, while the position of Ebeid became untenable.

The fifth factor in the obstacles facing Ebeid in his stand against Nahhas was the lack of a real democracy in Egypt. Such popular government as there was gave Nahhas all the political weapons and sinews of power, while it prevented Ebeid from putting up an effective opposition. Nahhas behaved as a dictator against Ebeid until the latter was deprived of his deputyship from the *Majlis Al-Nuwwab* and later arrested. Ebeid himself explained some of these steps in the *Black Book*.

(353) An interview with Mr. Saad Fakhry Abdel Nur, September 13, 1974.
“Was I patient? That I have acted with patience can be shown by the following facts:

1- I remained at the Ministry for months to advise and to help.
2- I offered my resignation three times.
3- Nahhas Pasha tried to dismiss me.
4- I did not state the grounds of our quarrel before the Wafdist Parliamentary Assembly.
5- Nahhas Pasha censored all reference to me in the press.
6- Telegrams to me were confiscated, my telephone was controlled.
7- Nahhas Pasha dismissed me from the Secretariat of the Wafd.
8- He opposed my Candidature for the Post of ‘Bâtonnier de l’Ordre des Avocats’.
9- He prevented the Chamber of Deputies thanking me for my services.
10- He prevented the Deputies and myself discussing his actions in the Wafdist Assembly.
11- He dismissed my colleagues and myself from the political group to which we belonged.
12- He placed restrictions both upon our political rights and our personal liberty.”

Nahhas, on personal grounds, exploited his position and popularity to put Ebeid in a difficult position to the extent that, as Ebeid mentioned in Point No. 9, when one of Makram Ebeid’s supporters in the Chamber on June 1, 1942, introduced a motion thanking Makram Ebeid for his services in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Supply, the President of the Chamber (the Speaker) disallowed it.

(355) F.O. 371/31572, June 3, 1942, Lampson to Eden.
In spite of all this harsh treatment Ebeid continued to act in the name of his new party, Al-Kutla Al-Wafdia, publishing its newspaper, Al-Kutla, resuming his political activities outside the majority party for the first time after being an active element in the Wafd for nearly twenty-five years. On May 13, 1944 Ebeid issued the text of a Resolution passed by the General Assembly of the Independent Wafdist Bloc, which accused Britain of establishing a protectorate over Egypt and of violating not only the Treaty, but also the spirit of the Exchange of Letters in February 1942 and the Atlantic Charter. Ebeid stated in his party resolution,

“The Independent Wafdist Bloc, therefore wish strongly to protest against this serious aggression by which the British Government has violated loyalty towards its own self as well as towards Egypt and the other United Nations, and even towards democracy, for which she is fighting. The Wafdist Bloc submit this protest to the Government of the U.S.A., Russia and other countries which have signed the Atlantic Charter, to intimate how Britain, by her action, has given an example of what small nations may expect under the Atlantic Charter, of violence, tyranny, loss of rights, and breach of promises, in a manner which is unimaginable even from a Nazi and Fascist Dictatorship”.

He ended the text by saying,

“The Independent Wafdist Bloc beg to submit these resolutions to His Majesty the King and to send copies to the British Embassy and to the representatives of foreign democratic Government in Egypt and to the other sister Arab Countries”.

That resolution gives an example of Ebeid’s views in the period between his dismissal and his arrest. He co-operated with the Saadists, Liberals and Nationalists in making several protests against actions taken to keep the Nahhas Government in power and continue British policy in Egypt. In fact, Ebeid took a stronger line against the British after he left the Wafd, than when he was member. The reason, of course, was his rivalry with Nahhas and his desire to appear more national than the leader of the Wafd.

(356) F.O. 371/41328, May 12, 1944, Lord Killearn to Eden (For further details about the activities of the Kutla Party, see the Political Police report No. 2248, October 20, 1943).
He spent five months in custody and was released on October 8, 1944, to be appointed Minister of Finance in Ahmed Maher’s new Cabinet, together with other colleagues from his Party. After the assassination of Ahmed Maher in February 1945, he was reappointed to his post in the Government of Al-Noukrashi. Ebeid was not wholly satisfied in working under the premiership of either Ahmed Maher or Al-Noukrashi. He felt that he deserved the Premiership itself more than either of his two Saadist colleagues.

Ebeid failed to fulfil his dream of becoming Coptic Prime Minister of Egypt. His split from the Wafd relegated him to second place even to Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi. He was on bad terms with the latter as Premier as well as with Dr. Abdel Hamid Badawi, his colleague, in the Cabinet.

“The quarrel between Noukrashi and Makram became acuter in March and April 1945, partly owing to Makram’s encouragement of the workers and partly owing to the dispute as to the procedure regarding the report of the Commission of Enquiry into the alleged misdeeds of Nahhas Pasha and of his Ministers. The dispute between Makram and Badawi regarding their precedence became acuter owing to the luncheon at the Palace to our Economic Conference, at which party the Palace placed Badawi above Makram... Makram meanwhile continued to court the workers and generally to evince mild socialist tendencies”.

The quarrel between Noukrashi and Ebeid seems to have been temporarily composed by

“the intervention of the Palace which continues to favour maintenance of Makram Ebeid in the Cabinet. Makram Ebeid seems to have been induced to put a check on his demagogic encouragement of workers and the question of prosecution of Nahhas seems to be sinking more into the background”.

(357) See Chapter IV, Note 50.
(358) F.O. 371/45930, April 8, 1945, Lord Killearn to Eden.
(359) F.O. 371/45930, April 15, 1945, Lord Killearn to Eden.
Meanwhile Ebeid continued his attacks on Nahhas who was out of power and stated that,

"The Committee of Enquiry had reached the conclusion that Nahhas Pasha and certain of his ministerial colleagues were guilty of crimes which were punishable under the existing Penal Code. The statement added that the charges would soon be referred to the Council of Ministers" (360).

In spite of the fact that Ebeid participated in all the national events and was involved in all important political questions of the time while he was out of the Wafd, his role was a limited and undistinguished one as he was no longer a leader in the majority party. He was appointed member in the delegation of the Sidqi–Bevan negotiations in 1946, but he and six of his colleagues refused the draft of the new agreement and the delegation was dissolved (361). Ebeid wrote some epigrams and proverbs daily in Al-Kutla under the pseudonym of “The Wise Man” reflecting his experiences in social and political affairs.

Such were the political activities of Ebeid after his split from the Wafd. Not only do they illustrate his post-1942 reduced position in the country’s political affairs but also they help to evaluate the split and its effect on the Wafd as a Party and on Ebeid as a politician. The split had a deep effect on the Party, because for the first time one of its recognized and popular leaders had publicly taken a violent stand against Nahhas and directed his criticism and accusation against the President of the Wafd, who was widely considered the symbol of patriotism and the leader of the national movement. One could describe the split in the Wafd of 1942, the contents of the Black Book and the scandals it attempted to purvey, as ‘The Watergate of the Wafd’ (362).

Such a deteriorating condition in the Wafd confirmed the widely held view that, after 1936, Nahhas had handed the Party over to the landbased elite,

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(360) Al-Kutla, Cairo, February 17, 1945.

(361) S. Koura’a, Nimr Al-Siyasa al-Misriyya, Cairo (N.D.): 557.

(362) That definition was coined by Mr. Saad Fakhry Abdel Nur in an interview, September 13, 1974.
the professional politicians with vested financial interests, thus transforming the original character and constitution of the Party\(^{(363)}\).

The split of Ebeid from the Wafd gave a great fillip to the other Parties opposed to the Wafd, which explains their welcome of Ebeid, in spite of their differences with the man himself, known to have been Nahhas’s foremost lieutenant and supporter, and the Party’s principal decisionmaker. The Royal Palace was the most delighted interested Party in the whole affair. The *Black Book* was seen by the King as his convenient weapon with which to attack and badger the Wafd\(^{(364)}\).

It is difficult to assess the effect of the split on the public support of the Wafd. On the whole, the Ebeid–Nahhas political conflict remained a crisis of leadership. It had not reached down to the masses of the *fellaheen* and workers, nor even the middle classes, all of whom represented the main bulk of Wafd supporters under leadership of the Egyptian landbased elite. In one of his reports to the Foreign Office, Lampson commented on this question, saying,

“It is extremely difficult to estimate to what extent the Wafd has actually lost support in the country. The recent election for the Presidency of the Native Bar provided, however, some indication in this respect. Importance has always been attached to these elections in view of the prominent role played by lawyers in the political arena, and they have always been a source of embarrassment to minority Governments, which have at times resorted to trickery to prevent the choice of a Wafdist President. The Lawyers’ Syndicate has always been regarded as a Wafdist stronghold. On the recent election, the Wafdist Government for the first time had to employ such methods in order to prevent the choice of Makram Pasha as president. In spite of these manoeuvres the Wafdist Candidate, Bassiouni Bey, was only elected by a majority of a few votes—a result which created something of a sensation and was regarded as reflection a considerable turnover

\(^{(363)}\) An interview with Mr. Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, September 30, 1975.
against the Wafd among the politically-minded educated classes. Nevertheless, the Government’s opponents seem to have been unable as yet to exploit this event effectively.”

More complex a factor in assessing the impact of the Ebeid–Nahhas split on the Party’s following is the fact that the Wafd had gained its good political reputation and popularity by being a party of the two main communities in the Egyptian nation: Muslims and Copts.

“The Wafd seemed to bring all the possible Egyptians together: that of the lords and that of the fellahs, intellectuals and agitators, anglophobes and anglomaniacs, pious Muslems, Christians and laymen. The great political struggle in Egypt took place between those who once belonged to the Wafd and those who still did, Zaghloul and Mohamed Mahmoud, Nahhas and Ahmed Maher, Sabri Abu Alam and Makram Ebeid... There is hardly a branch of Egyptian politics which did not grow out of the Wafd.”

Thus, in some Wafd Cabinets, the key Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance were held respectively by two Copts, Wassif Boutros Ghali and Makram Ebeid. This led the Wafd’s enemies to accuse ‘this delegation of fanatical Copts’ of trying to ‘establish their supremacy over the Muslims’. The Wafd showed both skill and dignity in ignoring religious differences. The influence of the Copts in the Wafd, which was a party of lawyers and landowners, can also be explained by their professional gifts and the stability of agrarian wealth among the Copt notables.

The Wafd therefore was a highly significant political movement, in which for the first time since the seventh century the Copts could openly manifest their nationalistic feelings and play a decisive role in the national struggle for freedom and independence.


(367) Ibid.: 95.

“Muslims and Copts had joined hands in the Wafd. Though the union had its ups and downs, it lasted until 1942, when it broke up in a public quarrel between the leading Copt and the leading Muslim in the Wafd Party”(369).

The split from the Party of the prominent Copt, Ebeid, put an end to the image enjoyed since the days of Zaghloul as the party of national unity. Although Ebeid’s secession had mainly political reasons, it was nonetheless a serious blow to Egyptian national unity. Having a Copt at the top level of the Wafd’s leadership bore a symbolic significance and always gave the Party a strong secular. The split, however, meant the disappearance from the political scene of the older generation of Copts in the Wafd, such as those who started with Zaghloul, as Wissa Wassaf, Senout Hanna, Wassif Ghali and Makram Ebeid. It was a final chapter in the real and actual participation of Copts in Egyptian public life which started

“at a time when the Egyptian National Movement was no more than nominal, when the Copts were, judging by their press, inclined to sympathize with opinion opposed to the occupation”(370).

Nahhas himself had kept this point in mind when he appointed Kamel Sidqi Pasha, a Copt, Minister of Finance in succession to Ebeid. He was, that is, fully aware of the possible religious complications and repercussions of Ebeid’s secession. Lampson, for instance, reported further to the Foreign Office that,

“it is unfortunate that the Minister of Finance, Kamel Sidky Pasha is quite incompetent to deal with these problems, but Nahhas Pasha is afraid to get rid of his only remaining Coptic Minister and thus still further strengthen the Coptic Cabal organised by Makram against his Government”(371).

Worrying about Wafd popularity among Copts after Ebeid’s split, Nahhas sought fresh assistance from the Coptic political community in replacing

Ebeid. He chose Ibrahim Farag Messiha as his adopted son in the hope of creating a similar relation which stood between Zaghloul and Ebeid\(^{(372)}\).

The question remaining is whether there were any religious motives behind the steps taken by Nahhas and the Wafd against Ebeid. There is no conclusive evidence to support such feelings, and if one compares Ebeid’s split in 1942 with that of Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi, one cannot find any different popular reaction. The difference was only in Nahhas’s reaction, which was more violent with Ebeid because the latter’s opposition to Nahhas’s policy was stronger, and because the nature of the two splits and their circumstances were different. The only point which is significant is the respective amount of support arising in the two splits. Ebeid’s support among the Wafdists was somewhat less than that in the case of Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi, but this can be explained by the fact that Nahhas was more powerful in 1942, backed as he was by the British, who were seeking political stability in Egypt in time of war. Nor is there any evidence that Ebeid, as a Copt, could not attract a considerable number of followers in the Muslim community.

Yet it is a fact that more than half of Ebeid’s main supporters came from the Wafdists in Parliament\(^{(373)}\). It is reasonable to argue that some Copts were dismayed by the split of the leading Coptic member in the majority party. On the other hand, there were many Copts in the Wafd who did not support Ebeid and retained their loyalty to Nahhas, such as Kamel Sidqi Pasha and Ibrahim Farag Pasha, who both became Ministers in the Wafdist Cabinets, whilst other Muslim Wafdists followed Ebeid and strongly opposed Nahhas and his Cabinet, such as Sayed Selim Pasha and Taha El-Siba’i Pasha, who both became Ministers with Ebeid in the Cabinets of Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukiashi in 1944/45. Whilst Nahhas was concerned with the Wafd’s popularity among the Copts, Ebeid, on the other hand, was keen to show his respect for the Muslim community by giving examples of the unfair policy of the Wafd towards Al-Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood. In this connection, he wrote in the *Black Book*:

\(^{(372)}\) Ibrahim Farag Messiha Pasha is a Copt from Samanoud, the city of Nahhas. He was a Minister in the last Wafdist Cabinet in 1952.

\(^{(373)}\) See Chapter IV, Note 73.
“The Government had closed the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Qena and other cities in the Egyptian kingdom. Nahhas’s Government had violently treated the students of Al-Azhar when they were on the march to the Royal Palace supporting the king. The Government had also arrested the Sheikh of the Religious Institute of Zagazig and his colleague in the Religious Institute of Cairo” (374).

In a telegram, in 1943, to the Rector of Al-Azhar, congratulating him on millennial anniversary, he wrote,

“It may be the right thing for Al-Azhar to be proud of its anniversary, that its message, which has stood for one-thousand years, is a message of right and truth and will never be hidden by another thousand years, but on the contrary it will blossom more. If I have the right as an Egyptian, with his own national belief, to be proud of Al-Azhar the honourable as an Egyptian institution, I am, as a man with his own spiritual belief, proud of Al-Azhar as a religious institution” (375).

When, in October 1944, Ebeid was released from detention and appointed Minister of Finance in the government of Ahmed Maher, he gave a remarkable speech, in the Ministry Hall, in the style of a sincere prayer to God, involving and reaffirming the national unity between Muslims and Copts. Sheikh Al-Maraghi was present there and commented on Ebeid’s oratory saying “It was a deep exercise in religious mysticism (tassawwuf)” (376). Ebeid, in any case, always openly showed his respect for Islam and paid proper attention of the national political leader to the Islamic festivals as well as a genuine concern for the feelings of the Muslim majority.

In his relations with his own community, Makram Ebeid deliberately refrained from playing the role of a sectarian leader. He was not like Boutros Ghali, for instance, who was considered the leader of the Coptic community

(374) The Black Book: 263.
(376) Ibid. Mentioned also by Mr. Saad Fakhry Abdel Nur (We have to consider the hostile relation between Al-Maraghi, who was the Rector of Al-Azhar, and Nahhas and the Wafd, as a motive for his statement praising Ebeid).

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before anything else. Ebeid was a different type of public figure, who spoke and behaved as an Egyptian firstly, and only secondly as a Copt. To the extent that he was successful, it may be posited that he represented “the Zaghloul spirit”. The fact that Ebeid assiduously avoided being considered a sectarian leader is the key to the nature of his relation with the Coptic community. He had never been deeply involved in Coptic organizations or religious affairs. He had never participated in the chronic dispute in the Coptic community between the Lay Council (Majlis al-milli) and the clergy. Some considered the Majlis al-milli as an ancillary organization to the Patriarchate, which would not necessarily conflict with the Canan Law of the Coptic Church; others rejected this idea and held that such a Council would constitute an interference of the laity in the authority vested in the clergy or the Patriarch. Ebeid did not figure in either of these two centres of opinion and had not taken part in such arguments. That explains why many Copts viewed Ebeid as an uninterested spectator and considered him as merely an ambitious Copt in Egyptian politics, rather than a representative of their interests in national politics. At the same time, Ebeid always believed that the Wafd and Nahhas somehow considered him to be the representative of the Copts in the majority party. Aware of that view, Ebeid never gave the chance to any other Copt politician to hold a distinguished post in the Wafd. He only kept Fahmy Wissa, another Copt, in the Wafd committee because he was not a markedly capable person and could not threaten his leading position in the party.

Lord Killearn recorded, in his private papers, a conversation between himself and Dr. Nagib Mahfouz in August 1942, which illustrates the view many Copts held of Ebeid in his quarrel with Nahhas. Killearn stated,

“I told Mahfouz that through his hatred of Nahhas and his intemperate attacks upon him in Parliament Makram was getting onto very dangerous ground when he dragged in the question of the Treaty and Nahhas’s loyal compliance therewith. I hoped Mahfouz would warn Makram seriously, for I personally should


(379) Dr. Nagib Mahfouz Pasha is considered as one of the pioneers in modern Egyptian medicine and the father of Egyptian gynaecology. He was related to Ebeid by marriage.
dislike it very much if we had to take action against a man whom I believe to be in his heart still thoroughly pro-British. Mahfouz said he fully agreed that Makram was absolutely idiotic. Mahfouz made no secret that he warmly welcomed our action in putting fifth columnists inside. Mahfouz also spoke of the damaging effect upon the Copts in general of this folly of Makram’s. The Copts had always looked to us as their protectors. He deplored Makram’s foolishnes and promised to speak to him within the next two days. I only hope that this warning may have some effect. Makram is such a violent individual that he is very difficult to handle”

Killearn’s serious warning sheds some light also on the role of the British in the decision by Nahhas later to arrest Ebeid in 1944.

As a prominent member of the minority community, Ebeid was treated with some reservations and doubt by Muslim political rivals. He was, on the other hand, also accused by Copts of being hypocritical towards Muslim, and was always quoted as saying that if he was “a Copt by religion, he was a Muslim by fatherland”

There is no clear evidence to prove that the decreased popularity of Ebeid after the split depended on any religious factors. The explanation of Ebeid’s swindling popularity could only be attributed to his opposition to the majority party and the ‘Za’im’ that is, the popular leader of the country.

Ever since the days of Zaghloul, the proportion of Coptic representation in the Egyptian Parliament was directly related to the Wafd representation as a whole, that is, was dependent on the electoral strength of the Wafd Party. An examination of the accompanying schedule and the curve of the Coptic representation will confirm that relation with the Wafd. In the elections of the years 1931 and 1945, the proportion of Copts in Parliament was low because the Wafd boycotted the elections. The proportion in the elections of 1938 was also very low because the Wafd was badly defeated on the heels of the

(381) From an interview with Mr. Fekry Ebeid who added that Nahhas, Ahmed Maher and Al-Aqqad were among aspersions on Ebeid’s religion either in their speeches or writings against him.
(382) T. Al-Bishry, Al-Kateb, No. 121, Cairo 1971.
Ahmed Maher–Al-Noukrashi split. Al-Bishry, for example, argued that the split of Ebeid from the Wafd proved that he had enjoyed a special influence on a Coptic group in the Wafd as he was a power centre in the political, rather than in a religious sense\(^{(383)}\). Wakin in his book, on the other hand, drew possibly the wrong conclusion when he stated,

“... in the 1940s, Nahhas Pasha, the Muslim and Makram Ebeid Pasha, the Copt, split and most of the Copts left the Wafd”\(^{(384)}\).

The evidence indicates that the support of the Wafd among the Copts was not affected by the split of Ebeid. It could have been affected only to some extent in Upper Egypt as most of the Senators and Deputies, Copts and Muslims, who followed Ebeid were mainly representing constituencies in Upper Egypt. Nahhas himself was wary on this point, and manipulated his policy accordingly. At the same time, Ebeid’s split from the Wafd did not affect his support and popularity among Muslims, many of whom took his side against Nahhas. Wakin again thought that “Makram Ebeid might have become a Prime Minister if he had not been a Copt”\(^{(385)}\). The view that Ebeid’s religion was a crucial factor in the matter was primarily one held by the Royal Palace. It may have influenced the choice of Ahmed Maher and not Ebeid as a Prime Minister after Nahhas had been dismissed in 1944. The natural choice as Prime Minister at that time should have been Ebeid, especially after his strong opposition to Nahhas and his violent propaganda against his Government which the King had been forced to accept in 1942.

Ebeid himself, as mentioned before, was of a mind that Ahmed Maher, and Al-Noukrashi afterwards, did not have prior claim or right to the premiership, and he did not feel that being a Copt was reason in itself to prevent him from becoming Prime Minister. Consequently, he became embittered towards the Palace and signed a petition, with other party leaders, in 1950, criticizing corruption in political life in general and among the Palace courtiers and the King’s advisers in particular, and generally deploring constitutional irregularities\(^{(386)}\).

\(^{(383)}\) Ibid.


\(^{(385)}\) Ibid.: 17.

It was soon clear, however, that Ebeid’s political influence, when outside the Wafd, diminished and he was no longer the powerful politician he was when he held high office in the majority party. His split from the Party marks his decline. There were no outstanding achievements afterwards, although he was the leader of a political party with its own newspaper, but a small and limited one in comparison with the Wafd. Most of those who voted for the Kutla in 1945 were among the intellectuals who had serious reservations about Nahhas’s policy, and some Copts besides Ebeid’s followers in Upper Egypt (387).

Ebeid himself regretted his split from the Wafd and the events surrounding it. He was seen embracing Nahhas at the funeral in April 1947 of Mohamed Sabri Abu-Alam Pasha, who had succeeded Ebeid as the Secretary-General of the Wafd. His gesture has been interpreted as a kind of apology and a new hope that he might recover his good relations with Nahhas and even win his old post in the Wafd (388).

Al-Shahid stated in his book that Ebeid after the elections of 1945 in which his Party took few seats compared with the Saadist and the Constitutional Liberals who were his allies in the elections, said “I have created that system and I had to destroy it” (389).

Among the results of Ebeid’s split of the Wafd was that his role as representative of the Copts in the National Movement diminished. On January 4, 1952, a very serious event took place in the City of Suez, which was an actual threat to the national unity between the two Egyptian communities: Muslims and Copts. The Suez Church was burned on that day and five Copts were killed by some irresponsible people who were under the impression that their victims were active spies for the British in the Suez Canal area at that very critical period of Anglo–Egyptian relations. That event had violent repercussions among the Copts, especially those living in the City of Suez.

(387)  
Al-Kutla Al-Wafidia Party had only 29 among 264 Deputies in the Parliament of 1945.

(388)  
An interview on July 18, 1974, with Dr. Rifaat Al-Mahgoub, who was present at Abu-Alam’s funeral. Mr. Fikry Ebeid confirmed the same information and added that Al-Hamamsi resigned from Al-Kutla Al-Wafidia protesting against that behaviour of Ebeid.

(389)  
and in some provinces in Upper Egypt. Dr. Mohamed Anis argued that this episode of sectarian conflict could have led to the withdrawal of Copts from the Egyptian National Movement.<ref>

Proof of the seriousness of the Coptic reaction was clear in their telegrams to the Prime Minister, Nahhas Pasha, and to the Orthodox Archbishop Yousab II (Joseph II) and all the daily newspapers. The most important telegram however was that sent to Ibrahim Farag Pasha, the Coptic Minister in the Wafdist Cabinet. They asked him to tender his immediate resignation from the Government on pain of being excommunicated from the Coptic Church. Moreover, they asked all the Coptic politicians to refrain from participating in any Government till their demands were accepted. Among the more vociferous protests was one from the Coptic priest, Basilus Ishaq of Ghorbal District in Alexandria, who sent telegrams on behalf of his congregation to the Royal Chamberlain, the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and the Coptic newspaper asking for immediate investigation into the crime by government committee, in the presence of Coptic representatives. The most violent Coptic reaction to the event came from the province of Suhag, in Upper Egypt, as the Copts, who constituted a significant part of the Province population, held a meeting in the main church of the city, where some of the leading Coptic personalities delivered angry speeches of protest. They sent telegrams to Nahhas Pasha, Ibrahim Farag Pasha, the Coptic Patriarch and all Egyptian newspapers asking for complete equality between Copts and Muslims and declared their refusal of any Government help for the victims’ families or in rebuilding the Church of Suez. They demanded also the resignation of Ibrahim Farag Pasha as a Coptic Minister; moreover, they asked all the leading Coptic personalities to refuse any appointment in ministerial posts. The telegram was signed by some Coptic notables and lawyers such as Fayez Abdel Nur, Fouad Nagieb, Kamil Zaki, Riad Bishai and Aziz ‘Azir.<ref>

That event in 1952, just a few weeks before the notorious burning of Cairo on January 26, reflects the confusions which had occurred in the

<ref>Misr, Cairo, January 10/11, 1952.</ref>
Wafd leadership after the split of Ebeid and the disappearance of his active role as the main representative of the Copts in the Party and in the National Movement(392).

One can imagine that, if the Suez event had taken place while Ebeid was still the second man officially in the Wafd, and the architect of national unity, he would have played the most effective and dynamic role in his political life, because, as a Coptic politician and a Wafd leader, he would have done best to avoid such reactions as did in fact occur.

The Wafd lost its credibility and position as the Party of national unity by Ebeid’s split and the disappearance of the effective Coptic figures in the leadership of the Party. Commenting on that situation, the Coptic newspaper Misr wrote:

“The Wafd seems to have forgotten that there are Copts qualified for nomination and that this nation and people are composed of two elements, Muslim and Copt... three million Copts did not pass by the lists in silence and quiet. No, on their lips was a bitter smile, remembering with pain a past happy era when the Wafd had many Coptic members, deputies and senators; May God have mercy on that time and on Saad Zaghloul”(393).

The political situation of Egypt in the 1940 was reminiscent, in many respects of the condition in 1919: the general temper still seemed ripe for anti-British demonstrations and acts of violence. Bloody anti-British demonstrations started as a reaction to the Sidqi–Bevan negotiations in 1946. The riots forced the Government to renounce the proposed agreement and to resign, but popular discontent and suspicion had reached such a peak that for the next few years the chain of murders and acts of violence followed. Tension and disappointment were dominating the general mood of the Egyptians, in particular the young generation and the intellectuals. These conditions could be explained in the light of the Wafd deterioration as the main party of the National Movement.

(392) Nomination to the Egyptian Senate.

(393) Misr, March 23, 1951, Cairo.
The Wafd was in its years of decline, surrounded as it was by severe criticism and an atmosphere of blame and bitterness. In 1936, the Wafd lost the support of the extremist national groups when they signed the 1936 Treaty and later, in 1942, when it lost a sector of supporters by the effect of the propaganda of the Royal Palace and the minority parties, who offered an anti-Wafdist explanation for the event of February 4. Besides those two main dates in the deterioration curve of the Wafd, the splits in its leadership were fatal. Losing such personalities firstly like Ahmed Maher and Al-Noukrashi and later Ebeid, had no doubt, its reaction on the structure of the popularity of the party\(^{(394)}\). The Wafd as a mass organization, not a party in the Western meaning of the term, needed a type of leadership which would always be able to reduce the complicated political accountabilities to simple slogans and effective propaganda. The disappearance of Ebeid, the orator of the Wafd, was fatal to the Party as political oratory was one of the main media used with great effect in the daily political life of the Egyptians.

There was a major reason behind the decline of the Wafd between 1942–1952. Some of the leading elements in the Party, mainly the landowners, were not able to assimilate the social changes in the structure of Egyptian society\(^{(395)}\). As a reaction, a socialist reformist trend showed up among some of the intellectuals in the new generation of the Party. They labelled themselves *Al-Talia Al-Wafdia* (the avant-garde Wafdist) and they announced their programme of social changes and offered some progressive ideas in a reformist outline. Their leadership included Dr. Aziz Fahmy, the lawyer\(^{(396)}\), Dr. Mohamed Mandour, the writer, and Ibrahim Tal’at, a deputy from Alexandria. Some Wafdist journalists showed sympathy with the group, such as Ahmed Abu-Al-Fath, the editor-in-chief of *Al-Masri*.

On October 8, 1951, the Wafdist Government abrogated the 1936 Treaty, which it formerly had been so proud to obtain. The wave of violence reached its peak in the riots of January 26, 1952, which saw the burning of

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\(^{(396)}\) Aziz Fahmy Bey was a son of Abdel-Salam Fahmy Gumaa, former speaker of the Chamber and Secretary-General of the Wafd. Aziz Fahmy enjoyed a great popularity among the intellectuals. He died in a car crash in 1952.
many buildings, hotels and shops in a very tense atmosphere which led to the dismissal of the last Wafdist Government, on the grounds that the Party was divided within itself and had no effective control over the army or the police. However, the popular desire for internal reforms—chiefly for the raising of the living standards—was frustrated when the country’s internal affairs were left to such conservatives as Fu’ad Seraj El-din, simultaneously party Secretary and Minister of the Interior, who actually had the interests of the landowners at heart(397).

There was moreover a new factor arising in Egyptian politics—it was the question of Zionist co-existence in Palestine which diverted public attention from internal grievances to external problems and which had since 1948, created a bitter spirit in the Egyptian Army(398).

The Kutla Party under the leadership of Ebeid had exploited the divided situation in the Wafd and joined the anti-Wafd campaign blaming mainly Nahhas and Seraj El-din for failure in leadership of their old Party, which in former days had been the real expression of the National Movement. The Kutla was a small party, but well-organized, claiming always to be the original line of the Wafd without being involved in its mistakes.

Ebeid, like most of the Party politicians, assumed a passive role after the emergence of the military regime in 1952. He was chosen a member in a limited committee to set a new Constitution in 1953(399).

Ebeid, as an Egyptian public figure, was a colourful character with various abilities, not only in indulging in a political life, but also in theoretical studies, which appeared to be his contribution in making an adaptation between the Islamic Sharia and the French Law(400).

(399) Rose Al-Youssef, Cairo, November 29, 1976: 27.
(400) Al-Ahram, Cairo, December 15, 1975 (From a speech by the French President Giscard d’Estaing in Cairo University. No grounds have so far been found to support the idea).
Wakin, in his book, paints a very gloomy picture of the end of the Coptic role in the Egyptian National Movement by stating:

"The aged priest Sergius and the old politician Makram Ebeid personify the Coptic experience in this century and within the context they stand out as epic figures, the one a leader of men, the other a disappointed nationalist with strong commitments and violent reactions. The old politician died in obscurity, his life’s work undone; the priest lived on, his untamed spirit trapped in an enfeebled body."

Ebeid died on June 5, 1961, and Anwar El-Sadat, who was the Speaker of the Nation’s Assembly, gave an oration at his funeral in the Morcos Church, recounting Ebeid’s national struggle for independence since 1919, and adding that the heroes of 1952 promised the heroes of 1919 to follow them in the party of struggle which the latter started and for which they died.

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(401) Marcus Sergius was a dynamic Coptic priest, who had a remarkable role in the Egyptian struggle for independence. He had an effective role in the establishment of the national unity in Zaghloul’s days. He mounted the pulpit in Al-Azhar Mosque as an expression of Muslim–Coptic brotherhood. He died in 1964.


(403) *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, June 7, 1961.
Conclusion

The Copts in Egypt are unique compared with other minorities in the world. Although they have their deep roots in a country with the longest known history, they were to become an integrated part socially and demographically of the whole community of Muslim Egypt. Their condition under the Islamic powers governing Egypt was tempered according to the policies, political and religious, of the rulers, whose attitude to the Copts was often viewed as a source of revenue and ex-action.

Copts, at first, were somewhat removed from Egyptian public life, but one finds their gradually increasing participation in certain sectors of government administration, with the birth of Modern Egypt. Since the French Campaign and the rule of Mohamed Ali, Copts have been an effective and significant element in Egyptian life, particularly in financial and administrative affairs.

The Muslim–Coptic relation passed through a critical period shortly after the death of Moustafa Kamel and the emphasis on the Islamic element in the National Party by his successors. The assassination of the Coptic Prime Minister, Boutros Ghali, was the immediate cause of the start of those critical days. A Coptic Congress was held to present the Coptic demands to the Khedive and the Government. The Congress was not encouraged by the British, mainly because they were constantly accused of Muslim bias as a product of Cromer’s policy and his successor Gorst. A Muslim congress followed, as a reaction, but the more sober elements among Muslims and Copts succeeded in preventing an escalation of the situation. The Egyptian National Movement then passed through a calm and relatively inactive period, to be followed by the inspiring events which characterized the National Movement in Zaghloul’s days, where the Copts were able to make their contribution.

Their pronounced role in the political field is no doubt connected with the Egyptian National Movement in the twentieth century. The secular nature of the 1919 movement gave the Copts a real chance to contribute strongly to
the patriotic attitudes and to dissipate any doubts that could be entertained about their reaction to British rule.

The Zaghloulist policy of dissolving religious divisions encouraged the Coptic elements to become deeply involved in the Egyptian National Movement. The Wafd Party continued the Zaghloulist strategy of containing the Copts, the latter in turn considering the Party as the centre of national activity. These circumstances bear comparison with the Congress Party in India, a Party which embraces all religious groups, and both the Egyptian Al-Wafd and the Indian Congress party started life at nearly the same time. Loyalty to the Party was paramount, that is how the Party could resolve religious differences.

Makram Ebeid of all Coptic leaders in the National Movement is the one who crossed the minority barriers to become a public figure, enjoying wide popularity in the Muslim Community, and was the first among Copts to hold a distinguished post in the majority party. Ebeid cultivated popular favour, and gave full consideration to public opinion as a power he could depend upon in his political strategy.

Although he was never Prime Minister, Ebeid’s contribution to official Egyptian policy is greater than the contribution of those who had assumed that office. In his dynamic role in the Wafd, both in the days of Zaghloul and after, he had busied himself in the two main facets of political life, home and foreign affairs, as he had been the representative of the Wafd in the critical missions abroad and the spokesman for the Party in the national events at home.

He was an amalgam of strong sentiments and ambitions, both of which drove him throughout his political life. There is a psychological aspect of a minority community which produces its own private emotions in the individual. Among these are fears for the future, a reserved attitude in public life, and a sensitive reaction to the majority. None of these psychological traits can be detected in the personality of Ebeid, mainly because he was a positive character who never countenanced passivity. He was an atypical member of a minority group, being extremely active in the bustle of public life, and
inordinately attracted by political issues, often taking up a controversial stand over issues.

Ebeid had never been a sectarian leader, he always avoided being involved in Coptic community affairs either through the Church or the “Majlis al-Milli”. He was consciously trying to overcome ethnic politics. Religion for Ebeid was only a system of culture, not a social obstacle. Thus, he was not a fanatical Christian or even a pious person. On the contrary, he played his part as a Muslim politician, often bringing into his consideration some dimensions of thought and action which might not have occurred to his Muslim colleagues.

Accordingly, he was far from being a representative of the extremist and fanatic section of the Copts. This is why he was criticized by some of them and was accused of following the Muslim majority for his personal and political ambitions. The Ebeid phenomenon in Egyptian politics was product of the link between Egypt and Britain and also the urge for national unity in order to gain independence, rather than a genuine reflection of Egyptian political understanding and maturity.

The career of Makram Ebeid and his role in Egyptian political life is an excellent example which vindicates the proposition that when a minority group casts its psychological separatism and involves itself in the daily political life of the nation, contributing to the multifarious activities of public life, it can then emerge as an integral part of the fatherland, and play a vital role therein.

Ebeid’s considered views on Arabism and Islam can be taken to demonstrate his way of dealing with the hopes and aspirations of the majority and establish for himself common ground with them. One feels that he was deliberately occupied with the very subjects and problems which attracted the thinking of the majority. He could never have assumed that role, unless he had sought and found the suitable political milieu represented in democracy, liberalism and a secular State. The Wafd, in a particular period, was the best institution in which a Copt could fulfil an active public and political role, and this for several reasons. First, it was the majority party; secondly, it was a
purely Egyptian party in aims and policies; thirdly, it was not identified with any religious thought, group or objectives; fourthly, Copt participation in the Wafd began with the birth of the idea of the Party itself.

Ebeid saw his most active days and lived his finest hours as Secretary-General of the Party, as he was officially the number–two man in that majority party. Moreover, he wielded great influence and enjoyed much popularity, as he was in fact the power behind Nahhas, and the active element in the Wafd’s contacts with the Royal Palace, the British, and the other political parties. One must agree with the general consensus of opinion arising from the studies on the Wafd, that Ebeid’s split from the Party was his fatal step, which marked the gradual decline in his political career. Yet at the same time, it is clear that for Ebeid there was no other choice as an honest citizen, as the only alternative would have been to carry on blindly accepting corruption, favouritism and preferential or exceptional treatments.

He had taken up his stand in his disputes with Nahhas and in his split from the Party on incorrect assumptions. Thus his tactics did not yield the results he expected. The assumption that Ebeid was encouraged in his departure from the Party and in the publishing of the *Black Book* by the Palace, and that he was used as the means to divide the majority party after the event of February 4, 1942, is correct, but against this we can state that Ebeid felt that he could exploit the King’s positions to serve his own strategy and achieve his ends. He cannot have expected the severe reactions of Nahhas.

Although Ebeid was sometimes an extremist opponent of the British policy in Egypt, he always believed that Egypt, at that time, could not sustain the parliamentary system it had only acquired in 1923 without the role of Britain.

There is no doubt then that Ebeid was an example of an honest and forthright leader, who was deeply involved in the daily round of politics. His ambition to become the head of an Egyptian government would seem to be evident and even justifiable since he was certainly more capable than others who had occupied that office. In this ambition, Ebeid reflects the hopes of the minority to play a role through the majority.
He had rid himself of the insecurity which is a handicap in minority groups, which impels them to avoid involvement in public life. The extremist line of Ebeid throughout his political life, together with his severe criticism of the British on certain occasions, was a reflection of his consciousness of being a Copt. That community, after all, had been accused before 1919 of a latent sympathy with the British occupation, and it would seem as if a member of minority community is compelled to act in more extreme terms over the demands of the majority if he wishes to retain an effective role.

Viewing the Copts in the political history of Egypt one can argue that they have played an integral part in society and maintained a certain harmony in the whole political community. Their thoughts and hopes have not materially differed from those of the majority community; the Copts have never had their “ghettoes” throughout history. Their social circumstances were conditioned by the temper of the ruler: when he encouraged them and treated them well, respecting their religious beliefs and acting tolerantly, they became socially active, and, to some extent, participated in public life; when he acted to the contrary, the Copts withdrew into a separate community, and became politically passive.

The Zaghloulist era after 1919 represents the golden era of the Coptic involvement in national politics. During that period and the Wafd’s political heyday, the Copts experienced a feeling of security and trust within the greater community, and began to be openly involved without any reservations, playing a positive role, even with many sacrifices. The Wafd Party pursued the same philosophy after Zaghloul until its power was suppressed in 1952. The Copts thereafter had a limited role in public life and turned their attention increasingly to private pursuits in business and the free professions. The Ebeid episode could perhaps be repeated if a similar climate of democracy and liberalism could again obtain.
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