

A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS



**IKV PAX
CHRISTI**

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

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Utrecht, Januari 2009

Cover picture: A mushroom cloud produced by XX-27 Charlie's detonation on 30 October 1951. Charlie was a 14-kiloton nuclear bomb. The explosion was part of the 'Buster-Jangle' series of nuclear weapons tests held at the Nevada Proving Grounds, in the US, in October and November 1951. Picture: ANP.

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Preface

The world now stands at a crossroads in the history of nuclear weapons. This history started when atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. From that moment in 1945 up to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, nuclear weapons played a leading role in the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union used them primarily as a deterrent. The end of the Cold War was an historic opportunity to end the nuclear era. The political and military importance of nuclear weapons declined once the US and the Soviet Union no longer needed a deterrent.

Indeed, since then many nuclear weapons have been dismantled. Yet there are still 25,000 of them in the world today; enough to annihilate life as we know it. In 1988 then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi put it this way in a speech before the United Nations, “Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet Earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness”.¹

The risks that nuclear weapons pose have not declined in the twenty years since these words were uttered. On the contrary. The two main dangers at this time are:

- proliferation, i.e. the risk that more countries will come to possess nuclear weapons. Whereas initially there were five countries that had nuclear weapons, India, Pakistan and Israel have since joined the group. North Korea’s nuclear tests and the uncertainty about Iran’s nuclear ambitions are clear evidence that a further expansion of the number of nuclear-weapon states is a real possibility;
- the risk of inadequate supervision of current nuclear arsenals. In times of (political) instability, nuclear material and nuclear knowledge can fall into the hands of radical or terrorist groups.

Ever since it entered into force in 1970, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been seen as the international community’s most meaningful attempt to put an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to pursue total nuclear disarmament. However, the NPT and the international community’s efforts display serious deficiencies. The nuclear-weapon states that signed the treaty have not kept their formal promise to pursue nuclear disarmament. Some of the new nuclear

powers have not signed the treaty. A few of the signatories already have developed, or want to develop, nuclear weapons.

IKV and Pax Christi view this as a political and moral scandal. We are convinced that possessing, developing, modernising and testing these weapons is immoral and politically unacceptable. International law obliges nuclear weapon states to pursue negotiations in good faith, intended to pave the way to nuclear disarmament. Moreover, we reject the continuous political legitimisation of nuclear weapons as a necessary part of protecting national interests, as a seal on alliances or as means to counteract international terrorism. This just impels the proliferation of nuclear weapons and increases the chance that these weapons will be used or will fall into the wrong hands.

We, the chairmen of the peace movements Pax Christi and IKV, call upon all political leaders in the Netherlands, in Europe and in the world to comply with the NPT and make it more stringent and petition them expressly and insistently to undertake the actions we propose here.

Luckily, a growing number of present and past political leaders are coming to realise that radically banning nuclear weapons is the best guarantee that these weapons will never be used. They call for a world without nuclear weapons. A growing number of civil society organisations, civil communities and churches support the cogent call to governments to get serious about disarmament once and for all. A growing number of countries have become aware that a world free of nuclear weapons is a necessary choice. The world has once again reached a crossroads and can choose a new direction. A world without nuclear weapons lies within reach; every government can take practical measures to grasp it. Therefore, all states must reach a consensus on the right path, must make clear and bold decisions and strive for progressive, joint nuclear disarmament.

The world can be free of nuclear weapons by 2020, if we all work together. We call on to everyone to support the appeal to make our world a world without nuclear weapons.

Bishop Adrianus H. van Luyn, SDB
President Pax Christi Netherlands

Jan Pronk
Chairman IKV

¹ See <http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Disarmament/disarm15.htm>.

Appeal for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

The world still lives under the threat of nuclear weapons. Despite the end of the Cold War, there are still more than 25,000 nuclear weapons. Thousands of them can be launched within moments. 9 countries now possess nuclear weapons. There is a growing danger that terrorists will obtain nuclear materials.

Today, forty years after the Cold War, the promise that the nuclear powers made in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons has yet to be fulfilled. Their military planning and foreign policies foresee retaining nuclear weapons far into the future. The role of nuclear weapons in tense international situations is again expanding. The costs are enormous, more than 50 billion dollars annually in the United States alone.

We consider continued reliance on the threat of nuclear destruction of human life morally unacceptable. A world free of nuclear-weapons does not lie beyond the politically possible. It is a question of political will. And there are new opportunities. It is heartening to note that, since the end of the Cold War, many nuclear weapons from what used to be much larger arsenals have been dismantled. It is encouraging that the United States and Russia are cooperating on additional reductions. It is significant that they have performed no nuclear tests in recent years.

Former foreign secretaries Kissinger and Shultz now call upon the United States to develop a new policy aimed at freeing the world from all nuclear weapons within the foreseeable future. They have now gained the support of at least two thirds of all former US defence and foreign affairs ministers and national security advisers. Their effort is no longer aimed at reducing nuclear weapons but at eliminating them radically. Moreover, President Obama has made clear that he will put nuclear disarmament high on his agenda. We support the call issued by aforesaid former foreign secretaries and secretaries of defense. We believe that a world free of nuclear weapons is a moral obligation and a political necessity.

We are convinced that we now have a historic opportunity to fulfil the promise of a world free of nuclear weapons, and this no later than 2020. This will be possible if government leaders clearly speak out NOW in no uncertain terms and if they take irrevocable steps in this direction.

We urgently ask our government to take action now by:

1. Declaring officially that it supports the call for a world free of nuclear weapons by 2020 latest.
2. Seeking support for this call from all European countries and NATO allies.
3. Urging at the 2009 NATO summit to end the political and military role of nuclear weapons in NATO's security policy.
4. Speaking out in favour of a Europe that will be free of nuclear weapons no later than 2015, taking steps to achieve this and ending the nuclear task of the Dutch Air Force.
5. Advocating that nuclear warheads no longer be kept on hair-trigger alert but stored safely and apart from their delivery systems.
6. Promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
7. Discouraging any further modernisation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
8. Promoting agreement in 2010 on a treaty that forbids production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
9. Promoting supranational control of the entire fissile material cycle of nuclear materials, also as a way to prevent nuclear terrorism.
10. Urging the governments of the United States, Poland and the Czech Republic to refrain from deploying a missile defence shield in Europe.
11. Taking the initiative for an independent and authoritative international technical investigation into all aspects relating to the worldwide abolition of all nuclear weapons.

When taken by a resolute vanguard of countries, these steps can move states with nuclear weapons within their own alliance as well as Russia and China to free the world of nuclear weapons by 2020. This can also get the nuclear powers like India, Israel and Pakistan that are not part of the NPT to follow suit. That is why we ask governments, religious leaders, civil society organisations and citizens to support this appeal. The hope for a world free of nuclear weapons will be more than a dream if enough people lend it their support.

Introduction

The financial crisis, the climate crisis, the energy crisis, the food crisis, the world seems to be overrun with trans-national crises. They affect the lives of millions of people and can only be defused when government leaders work together. There is another problem that is more dangerous than all the aforesaid crises taken together. In the present report, IKV and Pax Christi draw your attention to the thousands of nuclear weapons that are still on high-alert and that pose a threat to life on earth. Even today, nuclear weapons threaten the safety of all people on our planet. If anything, the danger they pose is only increasing.

The danger that nuclear weapons proliferate, become spread over more countries, is very real. Moreover, there is the risk that the supervision over current nuclear arsenals is inadequate. In times of (political) instability, nuclear material and nuclear knowledge can fall into the hands of radical groups, with all the dangers that this entails.

We now have an historical opportunity for nuclear disarmament. More than in past years, a world without nuclear weapons is now within the realm of political possibility. A growing number of people in influential positions shares a belief in such a world. George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn – four stalwarts of US security policy – argue for a radical abolition of nuclear weapons. They think that this can and should be done by 2020. The call from this ‘Gang of Four’ (followed soon by four well-known British colleagues and in January 2009 by four renowned

German colleagues) found support among two-thirds of all former US secretaries of defence, secretaries of foreign affairs and national security advisors. Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Verhagen lent his support to this call in March 2008. The Global Zero initiative was also recently launched. Many world leaders have given it their support. What also gives hope is that President Obama has said that freeing the world from nuclear weapons is one of the new US government’s main objectives.

IKV and Pax Christi urgently request all political leaders – particularly the Dutch government – to support the call officially and unequivocally, to speak out in favour of a Europe that will be free of nuclear weapons no later than 2015 and to take steps in that direction.

In the present report, IKV and Pax Christi provide a brief history of nuclear armament and the resistance to it (Chapter 1). It addresses the various ways in which nuclear weapons can be regarded and the arguments for and against disarmament (Chapter 2). The organisations also provide a survey of the current challenges facing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and of the opportunities for strengthening it (Chapter 3). Moreover, they explore the importance of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) as prelude to a world free of nuclear weapons (Chapter 4). The four chapters lead to a strategy for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons – and an appeal to political leaders and society to line up behind this strategy (Chapter 5).

Nuclear Weapons and the Resistance to Them: A Brief History

1.1. The Dawn of Nuclear Armament

The nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 were the first and thus far last experiences with the use of nuclear weapons. The early history of these weapons began in the 1930s with the publication of Hahn and Strassmann's work on uranium fission. Einstein and other physicists were afraid that Hitler would try or was already trying to develop nuclear weapons, using the information in this publication. Einstein insisted to President Roosevelt that the United States should also examine how nuclear fission could be used. This led to the Manhattan Project in 1941. In it the US, Canada and Great Britain worked successfully on the production of nuclear bombs.

Political Importance

The official objective in bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to force Japan to capitulate. However, the attack was made against the will of many of the scientists who had developed the nuclear bombs. Even Eisenhower and McArthur, the highest field generals, were against or were not even asked. Japan was as good as defeated and was possibly even reluctantly willing to admit this. There were political as well as military reasons behind the US government's decision to drop the bombs. The Soviet Union had to witness proof that the US was the most powerful state in the world.²

That nuclear weapons have long been connected to political interests is evident from the first attempt to ban them. In 1946 the US Baruch Plan argued for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.³ According to that plan research on nuclear energy and its development would be placed under supranational authority. Existing nuclear weapons would also come under this authority. Moreover, those signing the plan would not be allowed to create new nuclear weapons. At that time, the US was the only country with such weapons. Yet the Soviet Union still did not accept the Baruch Plan. This would have given the US a knowledge monopoly.

In a counter proposal, the Soviet Union suggested prohibiting the production and use of nuclear weapons

and destroying current stockpiles. But that met with US objections. An international monitoring system would have to be set up first before the US would agree to this new plan. However, the Soviet Union saw international monitoring as a kind of espionage. The negotiations ran aground and the nuclear weapons race began: the Soviet Union produced its own nuclear weapon in 1949. All calls for supranational control fell silent.

Nuclear Urge

On one side, the climate in 1946 favoured doing away with nuclear weapons. The young weapon had few bureaucratic roots in the US defence system. On the other, the climate was unfavourable because of rapidly disintegrating political relations between the US and the Soviet Union, which ended in the Cold War. After 1949, when the US and the Soviet Union both had nuclear weapons, their military role became more important. Evidence for this is found in the US decision in 1950 to develop the hydrogen bomb that was one hundred to one thousand times more powerful. The political and military importance of nuclear weapons became ever more tightly interwoven. There was no longer any question of doing away with them.

In the meantime, techniques for delivering nuclear weapons evolved. Initially long-range bombers were used, later missile technology was introduced. When the latter was developed (the Soviets' 1957 Sputnik launch showed that the US was no longer invulnerable), total mutual destruction came into sight. In addition to being stationed on land, missiles equipped with nuclear weapons were also fitted into submarines, which insured their invulnerability. It became possible to strike back at the enemy even after being attacked.

The political and military power of nuclear weapons touched off more than an arms race between the two great powers. It also whetted the urge of other countries to develop their own nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Great Britain, France and China did that in 1952, 1960 and 1964. In addition, US nuclear weapons

² Sijde, B. van der (2008), *Zeventig jaar nucleaire problemen*. Eindhoven: Vredescentrum TUE, pp. 5-10. This document offers a more extensive treatment of the history than we can provide here. See also: <http://www.pugwash.nl>.

³ For the text of the Baruch Plan, see: <http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/mp/index.shtml>.

were deployed on the territory of a growing number of US allies. In the second half of the 1950s, placing US nuclear weapons in Europe, including the Netherlands, came under discussion. This deployment took place in a NATO context.⁴

1.2. The Protest is Born

The development of nuclear weapons and the attendant arms race prompted protest. After the protest of the scientists who had developed the atom bomb against its first use, we see a wave of protest in the 1950s against the development and testing of the hydrogen bomb. In those days, this testing was still done in the atmosphere with the consequent radioactive fallout. That a hydrogen bomb detonated on the 'American' Bikini islands in the South Pacific could contaminate Japanese fisherman – a 130 km away – made a serious impression. Scientists who had laid the foundation for nuclear weapons – among whom Einstein – warned publicly against the dangers of these weapons. The warning led to the Pugwash movement of scientists against nuclear weapons (see box below). Public unrest also grew. That was evident in the US where SANE quickly grew. This was a movement against health-threatening atomic tests and in favour of a sensible and healthy ('sane') nuclear policy. In Great Britain the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) grew swiftly.⁵



A lot has changed since the 1980s. But not the principle-based, moral rejection of nuclear weapons. It stays 'NO!'.

Drawing: Len Munnik.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Public unrest in this period could not prevent the world from stepping up to the brink in 1962. In that year, the Cuban Missile Crisis arose when the Soviet Union wanted to station missiles with nuclear warheads on Cuba, threateningly close to the US, as response to the US stationing of similar weapons in Europe and the US failed attempt to terminate Castro's rule on Cuba. The US reacted as if stung by a wasp. A nuclear confrontation was avoided at the very last minute, thanks to the Soviet Union's willingness to withdraw the weapons from Cuba and the US guarantee to leave Cuba alone and to remove US nuclear weapons from Turkey.

The crisis led both superpowers to realise that they would have to work together on some points. They could continue to use nuclear weapons as deterrents and, at the same time, reduce the risk of a nuclear war.⁶ The Cuban Missile Crisis had one more effect: it heightened public unrest. To calm this, the US and the Soviet Union

⁴ A. Levite argues convincingly that US placement of its nuclear weapons in Europe was at least in part intended to prevent its European partners from developing their own nuclear weapons. See: Levite, A. (2002-2003), 'Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited', in: *International Security*, Vol. 27(3), pp. 59-88.

⁵ See: Wittner, L. (1997), *The Struggle Against the Bomb*, vol. 2, 1954-1970, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Wittner provides a detailed survey of the opposition to nuclear weapons in this period. In vol. 1 he treats the period up to 1954; in vol. 3 the period 1971-2002. A description of the Dutch peace movement from 1945 to 1982 can be found in Everts, Ph. P. and Walraven, G. (1984), *Vredesbeweging*, Utrecht/Antwerpen: Het Spectrum. Information on the years 1983 to 2002 is given in articles in the *Jaarboeken Vrede en Veiligheid*. For information on the history and positions of IKV and Pax Christi, see the annex to this report.

Pugwash

The international Pugwash movement was set up by scientists who wanted to turn back the threat of (nuclear) wars. The organisation borrowed its name from the village Pugwash in Nova Scotia (Canada) where the first meeting was held in 1957. 22 prominent scientists attended this meeting. They found the emerging nuclear arms race to be a reason for concern. They came from the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, the People's Republic of China, Austria and Poland. The Pugwash movement still organises symposiums and workshops every year on the threats that confront the human race. A general 'Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs' has been held annually since 1967. The Netherlands was the host country in 1980.

had to do something to control nuclear weapons – and to prevent the radioactive fall-out resulting from testing weapons in the atmosphere.

1.3. Arms Control and Continuing Build-up

The Cuban Missile Crisis and the public unrest are what directly precipitated nuclear arms control. In 1963, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to establish a direct telephone link between their leaders. This should prevent a nuclear war from breaking out 'by accident' because of incorrect or delayed communication. The second measure that year was a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. This was to reduce the risks to health posed by nuclear testing. The US and the Soviet Union also recognised the need for preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. By 1964 China had joined Great Britain (1952) and France (1960) in the 'nuclear club'; something had to be done to prevent more countries from developing nuclear weapons.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)⁷ stemmed from that effort. The stress fell on cooperation and the

elimination of tension (*détente*). In the NPT, each of the nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty promise not to



“Get rid of nuclear weapons worldwide: to start with in the Netherlands.”

Drawing: Len Munnik.

transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly or indirectly, or to assist non-nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons (Article I). The non-nuclear weapon states that signed the Treaty promised not to acquire nuclear weapons (Article II) and to accept the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Article III). In exchange for this they receive the right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; this use is subject to IAEA inspection (Article IV). Each of the parties to the Treaty are obliged to see to it that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear weapon states (Article V). Moreover, each of the parties to the Treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete

⁶ The CIA did not know at the time that nuclear warheads were already present on Cuba. That only became known in 1992 at a conference in Havana that Cuban and Russian representatives attended and when the archives were opened. In 1992 McNamara wondered, “Why did the Soviet Union deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba? Here at the Havana conference, General [Anatoly] Gribkov said yesterday that the tactical weapons were only for deterrence. But how could they have been for deterrence when we didn’t even know they were on the island?”, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_11/cubanmissile.

⁷ For the full text of the treaty see: <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/NPT/npttext.html>.

disarmament under strict and effective international control (Article VI).⁸

The NPT was not the only agreement intended to restrict nuclear arms. The ABM (on anti-ballistic missiles intended to ward off a nuclear assault) and the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaties between the US and the Soviet Union followed in 1972. The ABM treaty, which the US left in 2002, restricted the number of anti-ballistic missiles to the number present around Moscow and at the US air force (USAF) base at Grand Forks, North Dakota. This excluded the possibility of invulnerability, preserving a state of mutual deterrence. The SALT Treaty set an upper limit on the number of strategic weapons (see following box) that each side could fire at the other from its own territory; this limit was so high that neither of the two countries were obliged to disarm.

The thaw in East-West relations and the agreements reached reduced public turmoil about nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the race for supremacy in strategic (aimed at one another's territory) and tactical arms continued.

A new race began in Europe in the late 1970s. The Soviet Union replaced old missiles with much more modern SS-20 missiles. The US announced the arrival of the neutron bomb (known as the 'friendly' nuclear bomb because it only killed people without destroying buildings). By the end of 1979, NATO decided to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe.⁹

As for the West, the presence of US nuclear weapons in Western Europe was intended to serve military and political goals. Militarily, they compensated for Western weakness in conventional weapons in the event of a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Politically, they were to ensure that any nuclear war would not be restricted to Europe. Because Pershing II and cruise missiles deployed in Western Europe could reach targets in the Soviet Union, the US would also be a target for the Soviet Union's response. This would increase Western Europe's belief that it was covered by the US nuclear umbrella.

The US has always refused a 'no first use' policy that would state that it would not be the first to use nuclear

Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons


Treaties on *strategic* weapons cover only the nuclear weapons with which the US and the Soviet Union (now Russia) can reach one another's territory. A *strategic* nuclear weapon is mainly intended to eliminate major strategic targets in the event of war. These run from complete command centres to launching facilities for nuclear weapons and from (military) industrial sites to complete cities. The purpose is to eliminate as much as possible of the opponent's ability to wage war. Strategic nuclear weapons have an enormous explosive power varying from approximately one hundred kilotons to several megatons. *Tactical* nuclear weapons, by contrast, are smaller and less powerful. They are intended for battlefield use where they are combined with strategic nuclear weapons and conventional non-nuclear weapons.



Cartoonist Opland designed the logos for the two mass peace demonstrations in the Netherlands held on 21 November 1981 (Amsterdam) and 29 October 1983 (The Hague). The 1981 logo depicts a determined woman kicking away the bomb. The 1983 logo shows that her husband and children have come to support her. It dictates the slogan 'No new nuclear weapons in Europe'.

⁸ Sijde, B. van der (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 18. See also: <http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html>. Most non-nuclear weapon states explain 'nuclear disarmament' as the obligation to eliminate all nuclear weapons (an obligation that the nuclear weapon states did not respect), while nuclear weapon states claim that they already are participating in 'nuclear disarmament' by signing treaties and reducing the number of nuclear warheads. Another dispute centres on the question whether 'total disarmament' is a precondition for an effective non-proliferation policy or vice versa.

⁹ For a detailed survey on US and Soviet modernisation decisions, Europe's role and the function of arms control negotiations on public opinion, see Hogebrink, L. (1981), 'NAVO Modernisering', 'Een geschiedenis herhaalt zich' and 'Modernisering: een plaatje (NAVO en Warschau Pakt)', in: *IKV Vredesmagazine*, 1981.



In the fall of 1979 IKV core groups in many dozens of communities polled citizens about nuclear weapons. On 7 December 1979, the results were presented in The Hague (see picture). In the early 1980s, more than a hundred municipalities declared themselves Nuclear Weapon-Free.

Picture: IKV. Drawing: Len Munnik.

weapons. That would undermine the deterrent strategy in which the opponent must always take escalation to the nuclear level into account. In 1982, the Soviet Union did issue a no-first-use statement, but the West considered this a propaganda stunt (it was the time of the mass protests against nuclear weapons). In 1993, Russia withdrew its pledge.

Dutch Protest

In 1977, the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council IKV developed a campaign under the slogan 'Help rid the world of nuclear weapons, let it begin in the Netherlands'. IKV decided to do this because the nuclear arms issue had nearly disappeared from public attention, while the arms race continued unabated. For IKV, a security system that relied on the willingness to perpetrate mass destruction was to be rejected on moral grounds as well as being dangerous. Shame about this deterioration in the way people treated one another was a major theme in the 'Manifesto against Nuclear Weapons' published during the Peace Week in 1977.

The start of IKV's campaign nearly coincided with the tumult that arose in the summer of 1977 around the neutron bomb, stimulated by the 'Stop the N-Bomb' campaign. Public attention for nuclear weapons roared to life in the Netherlands. After the 1979 NATO decision

to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, wide-spread public protest arose nearly everywhere in Europe. IKV played an important role in stimulating and coordinating this protest.¹⁰

In the Netherlands, IKV worked with several other peace groups and leftist political parties to organise a mass demonstration. In November 1981, 400,000 gathered in Museum Square in Amsterdam. This cooperation continued in the 'No to Cruise Missiles Committee' (KKN) set up in 1982. This committee instigated the demonstration in October 1983 when 550,000 gathered in Malieveld/Zuiderpark in The Hague. In 1985, the KKN organised the people's petition against the deployment of cruise missiles. More than 3.75 million Dutch citizens signed this petition to the government to refrain from deploying cruise missiles.

1.4. Disarmament Starts, Will It Continue?

A combination of political changes and public unrest in the early 1980s induced the first real steps toward disarmament. Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. During the acclaimed Reykjavik summit in October 1986, US President Ronald Reagan suggested eliminating all offensive missiles within ten years. In response, Gorbachev suggested eliminating all strategic nuclear weapons within ten years. President

¹⁰ On the development of IKV's international policy see: Hogebrink, L. (1983), "Voorbij de "hollanditis"", in: Faber, M. J., Hogebrink, L., Ter Laak, J., & Ter Veer, B., *Zes jaar IKV campagne*, Amersfoort/Leuven: De Horstink; Walraven, G. (1987), 'Het Internationale Werk', in: Everts, Ph. and G. Walraven (eds.), *In Actie voor een Vredesklimaat, Twintig Jaar IKV*, Amersfoort/Leuven: De Horstink.



The legendary demonstration in The Hague on 29 October 1983. Its slogan was 'No new nuclear weapons in Europe'.

Picture: Jan Stegeman, IKV.

Reagan raised the stakes. He proposed eliminating all nuclear weapons (the tactical as well). But President Reagan insisted on the development of a protective shield against nuclear weapon attacks from whatever source. That would have to be an anti-missile shield built under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) programme. The Soviet Union, to whom President Reagan had also offered the SDI or 'Star Wars' programme, regarded this as a sign of distrust. For the time being, disarmament remained restricted to removing intermediate-range missiles from Europe via the famous 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Thanks to this agreement, the Netherlands was saved from the deployment of cruise missiles.

Right before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, then President George H.W. Bush made a unilateral decision to which Russian President Gorbachev responded with comparable pledges. Nearly all tactical

nuclear warheads would be eliminated. However, these promises were never put into a treaty and today there is little certainty about their being kept. Some US weapons have remained in European countries, including the Netherlands. The US and the Soviet Union had already decided in the 1991 START 1 treaty to lower the ceiling number of strategic missiles to 6,000. The 1993 START 2 treaty lowered this maximum to 3,500.

The START 2 treaty was never implemented. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between the US and Russia, also known as the Moscow Treaty, replaced the START 2 treaty. In it the US and Russia undertook to reduce their operational strategic nuclear capacity to 1,700 to 2,200 warheads before 31 December 2012. The SORT treaty contained no provisions for verifying progress. That means that even today the two parties have to depend on the verification regime in the START 1 treaty for exchanging information and permitting inspections. The START 1 treaty expires on

5 December 2009, three years before the SORT treaty expires.¹¹ So new agreements have to be reached in 2009.

Between 1986 and 2008, the total number of nuclear weapons fell from approximately 70,000 to approximately 25,000. The future of further reductions is uncertain. The verification system for the agreed reduction in strategic weapons expires in 2009 and there are no arrangements and no negotiations for tactical nuclear weapons.

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme started in 1992, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The goal of this Nunn-Lugar programme (named after the US senators who proposed it) is to dismantle weapons of mass destruction and to secure and dismantle the accompanying infrastructure in the former Soviet States.¹² The US-Russian cooperative programmes for protecting nuclear sites in Russia and

cleaning up the highly enriched uranium used in Russian nuclear weapons are still running and producing results.¹³ Enriched uranium from Russia's nuclear arms programme now provides 10% of the fuel for US power plants. Furthermore, the US and Russia decided voluntarily in 1992 to place a moratorium on nuclear tests. This has lasted for 16 years already.

One effect of the steady pace of disarmament between 1986 and 1994 was that public interest in nuclear weapons declined. This lack of interest meant that policymakers and the military in the nuclear weapon states felt no need to hurry with disarmament, but rather were able to make cautious plans to upgrade their weapon systems. Yet, so far the US Congress has rejected all plans to replace or modernise nuclear weapons. This is one reason why nuclear warheads have not been updated for the last twenty years despite continuing research and proposals.

¹¹ See: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_10/strategiclimbo.

¹² See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nunn-Lugar_Cooperative_Threat_Reduction and <http://nunn-lugar.com/#>.

¹³ Thomas D'Aghostino, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, reported on 20 September 2008 that, "Under the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, the US National Nuclear security Administration (NNSA) accelerated its nuclear security cooperation with Russia and has completed security upgrades at 85% of Russian nuclear sites of concern. We are on target to complete the balance of sites by the end of this year. In 2008 we ceased operations of two reactors located in the city of Seversk, Russia, ending 43 years of weapons-grade plutonium production there. They anticipate shutting down the one remaining plutonium-producing reactor in Russia no later than 2010. And we have verifiably down blended more than 337 metric tons of Russian former-weapons HEU - material which provides 10 % of all U.S. electricity - and have reached agreement with Russia on a technical and financial plan to eliminate 34 metric tons of their weapon-grade plutonium.", D'Aghostino, T. (2008), speech at the Council on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament (CCADD) Conference in Washington, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/print/2140.htm>.



In 1985, 3.75 million Dutch citizens signed the People's Petition against the deployment of cruise missiles. This made it the biggest signature campaign ever held in the Netherlands. Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers accepted the signatures from Sienie Strikwerda (chair of the No to Cruise Missiles Committee, left) and Mient Jan Faber (secretary of the No to Cruise Missiles Committee, right).

Picture: IKV.

1.5. Non-Proliferation Treaty Extended and Thwarted

After President Bush sr., disarmament was no longer high on the US political agenda. President Clinton set its priority too low, missing the opportunities to force a breakthrough that arose during his administration.¹⁴ It thus could not be taken for granted that the NPT would be extended indefinitely at the 1995 NPT Review Conference or that the conference would adopt several important principles and objectives.¹⁵ The great effort that was needed to continue on the path to disarmament and to put the principles into practice

became apparent already that same year when it proved impossible to start talks on a treaty forbidding the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, known as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).¹⁶ Resistance from the US and others have thus far delayed talks on this treaty. In 2006 it seemed that the impasse could be broken when the US presented a draft treaty. Talks on it without preconditions, as the Netherlands and the EU suggested in 2007, have not yet taken place.

However, it was possible to agree on and sign the international Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. The US did sign this treaty, but in 1999

¹⁴ For the US, see Sauer, T. (2008), "US Nuclear Weapons Policy under the Clinton Administration: A Missed Opportunity due to Bureaucratic Inertia and a Lack of Political Leadership.", Paper delivered at the SOAS Conference in London, 7 January 2008, <http://www.cisd.soas.ac.uk/Editor/assets/soas%20paper%20sauer.doc>.

¹⁵ On the principles and objectives see: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/1995dec.html#2>. The principles and objectives were adopted during the 1995 NPT Review Conference, referring to a UN Security Council resolution.

¹⁶ See: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/fmct.html>.

The CTBT or Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) forbids all nuclear explosions in any environment for either military or civil purposes. It is the successor to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. 71 countries signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996; among them five of the eight countries that had nuclear weapons at the time. So far, 176 countries have signed the CTBT and 132 of them have ratified it. India, Pakistan and North Korea have all failed to sign the treaty. India and Pakistan carried out atomic tests in rapid succession in 1998, North Korea did so in 2006. The test ban treaty will only take effect when 44 countries thought able to develop nuclear weapons have signed and ratified the agreement. Thirteen signatories have not yet ratified the treaty. Among them are China, Iran, Israel and the US.¹⁷

the Senate refused to ratify it. The US and some other countries whose ratification is needed before the treaty can take effect have still not ratified it (see box).

There was not much hope that the NPT would be during the 2000 Review Conference. Yet participating nuclear weapon states that were members of the NPT did promise to work to implement Article VI of the NPT via thirteen promises for further steps toward nuclear disarmament¹⁸ (see box in Chapter 3). The terrorist attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 led the US to pursue its own path disregarding the promises made in 2000.

The US sought its own partners, disregarding the UN, to prevent nuclear terrorism. Its priority was to prevent

proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iraq, North Korea and Iran, countries that President Bush jr. called 'the axis of evil'. In 2003 the US attacked Iraq and North Korea left the NPT. The US gave little attention to the IAEA's balanced reports on Iran or to its own intelligence service's restrained reports.¹⁹ The US put its own security first. In 2002 it withdrew from the ABM treaty so that it could develop and build a missile shield as protection against attacks from potential new nuclear weapon states. One consequence was that the 2005 NPT Review Conference was a total failure. It could not adopt a final declaration to which all parties to the treaty could agree.

There is a real fear that nuclear weapons will spread to more countries. Proliferation has not halted. India conducted its first nuclear explosion in 1974, its second in 1998. Pakistan followed India a few weeks later in 1998. Neither country has signed the NPT. Israel, longer reputed to be a nuclear power, is not a party to the NPT. In 2003 North Korea withdrew from the NPT and carried out a nuclear test three years later. This explosion was evidence that it belonged to the nuclear club.

At the end of 2008, North Korea again again joined the IAEA regime after the US removed it from its list of terrorist states. Even though Iran is a party to the NPT, many countries distrust Iran's claims to be studying the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Evidence that Iran is acquiring the means to use this technology for military purposes has grown since 2003.²⁰ Moreover, Iran has not ratified the Additional Protocol intended to strengthen the NPT. Iran did apply the Protocol voluntarily for a few years, allowing (irregular) inspections. But Iran withdrew this permission²¹ when the IAEA report was presented to the Security Council in 2005.

In September 2008, there were again signs that Iran would be willing to be a party to the Additional Protocol

¹⁷ For the text of the treaty and an update on those who have signed/ratified it, see: <http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/>.

¹⁸ The thirteen promises from 2000 are not defined in a treaty and thus are open to interpretation. There was a gradually increasing scepticism about whether the nuclear powers would fulfil these promises. And this proved justified. Except for the promise to maintain the moratorium on nuclear tests in anticipation of the CTBT treaty, hardly any promise was kept.

¹⁹ "In May 2003, Iran sent the Foreign Affairs Department a secret proposal for a 'large-scale agreement' that would be 'completely transparent' and that would include a guarantee that Iran would not develop any nuclear weapons. The proposal also encompassed the end of 'all material support for Palestinian resistance groups' and the transformation of Hamas and Hezbollah into 'purely political organisations'. Did President Bush torpedo the planned meeting in Geneva without realising how hard his own officials had worked on it?", Owen, D. (2008), *Zieke Wereldleiders* Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, p. 251. [Original title: In Sickness and in Power: Illness in Heads of Government During the Last 100 Years].

²⁰ See: 'Iran's Nuclear Programme in a Dangerous Poker Game', in *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue 84, Spring 2007, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd84/84news03.htm>.

²¹ See: http://www.iran-press-service.com/jips/articles-2005/october-2005/Iran_nuclear_91005.shtml.

if the IAEA would help with setting up a fissile materials circuit for peaceful nuclear energy.²²

There are also positive signs from other quarters for strengthening the NPT. South Africa decided to get rid of its nuclear weapons in 1993, Libya did the same in 2003.²³ That smoothed the way for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in Africa (see Ch. 4). Moreover, all former Soviet

states – except for Russia – have been declared Nuclear Weapon-Free. Several of them in Central Asia declared themselves a NWFZ in 2006. (See Ch. 4).

1.6. The Role of Nuclear Weapons in 2008

The United States

The George W. Bush policy left a heavy mark on the role of nuclear weapons in the first decade of the 21st century. A document published in 2002 on US national security strategy substantially sharpened US nuclear policy. Its response to the terrorist attacks in September 2001 was to announce possible ‘pre-emptive strikes’. A counter-attack, potentially with nuclear weapons, was an imaginable response even in the case of a threat that not yet posed an immediate danger to US security. Understood in this way, the ‘pre-emptive strike’ concept allows for the use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear threats.²⁴

The peril of nuclear terrorism and proliferation to countries that the US considers members of the ‘axis of evil’ are what prompted this strategy. In 2007, Kissinger, Shultz, Perry and Nunn noted that it was far from certain that this strategy would scare off new nuclear enemies. They feared that the risk that nuclear weapons would be used would increase dramatically and argued for dismantling all such weapons.

The US government’s announcement that it could attack preventively unravelled the guarantee that nuclear weapon states gave to non-nuclear weapon states at the 1995 NPT Review Conference that they would never use nuclear weapons in an attack.²⁵ In addition, this strategy requires keeping many weapons on alert, ready for use.

In September 2008, Secretaries Gates (Defense) and Bodman (Energy) published a paper entitled “National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century”. In it they wrote that even in the future “strategic nuclear warheads [need to remain] available on a day-to-day basis”.²⁶ This will do little to reduce the danger of a



An Indian soldier beside a Prithvi missile during a parade in New Delhi, India on Republic Day, 26 January 2004.

Picture: ANP.

²² See: <http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/0809238440164232.htm>.

²³ On Libya see: <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/libya/libya-nuc.htm>.

²⁴ Schennink, B. (2003), ‘Pre-emptieve oorlog of pre-emptieve vrede? De Nationale Veiligheidsstrategie van de Verenigde Staten: een uitdaging voor de vredesbeweging’, in: Bomert, B., Van den Hoogen, T., & Wessel, R. (eds.), *Jaarboek Vrede en Veiligheid 2003*, Nijmegen: CICAM, p. 118-130; Simpson, E. (2008), ‘New Opportunities to Question US Reliance upon Nuclear Weapons.’, in: *INESAP Information Bulletin* 28, April.

²⁵ Of the nuclear weapon states that are a party to the NPT, only China has guaranteed that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The other four have not offered this guarantee. France and Great Britain refer to the guarantee that they gave in 1995 to the parties to the NPT and to the guarantees that they gave to countries that are part of a NWFZ. Russia is willing to accept an agreement that gives non-nuclear weapon states a negative security guarantee. See: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/positions_matrix.html.

²⁶ See: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/nuclearweaponspolicy.pdf>, p. 13.

nuclear weapon being fired unintentionally. The secretaries argued emphatically for modernising nuclear weapons. This modernisation is primarily aimed at replacing the current, aging nuclear warheads with a safer version, that would also be more precise. The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) awaiting production is one example.²⁷ The secretaries urged Congress to fund the modernisation of the present nuclear weapons via RRW development. In addition, upgrading would allow the US to maintain its moratorium on testing while ensuring that, in time, it would have fewer old nuclear weapons in stock.²⁸ This modernisation plan could be presented to the new Congress as an option for adjusting the US nuclear arsenal without testing and with fewer nuclear weapons. That would give Congress an opportunity to ratify CTBT and to show the world that the US is working on reducing its nuclear weapons.²⁹ However, it is also quite possible that now neither Congress nor senior military personnel will give priority to modernising nuclear weapons. The cut-backs prompted by the financial crisis could make the army decide to give greater priority to military means for missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The extent to which public opinion asks the new administration to work on a world without nuclear weapons can help determine which path is chosen.

Europe, Russia and China

France has also spoken up on expanding the use of nuclear weapons. In January 2006, President Chirac stated that France was ready to launch a nuclear attack against any country that supported a terrorist attack against French interests.³⁰ There was hardly any mention of any restriction. The new president, Sarkozy, has toned this down and announced that French nuclear weapons would be limited to 300. France will continue with modernising its missiles for its submarines and air force.³¹

The UK does not plan to stay behind. The UK has a programme to renew its Trident submarines. The plans to renew the nuclear warheads used on the Trident are the same as those in the US. Modernising the Trident will ensure that Great Britain remains a nuclear power in the coming decades.³² One hopeful sign was that in 2007 the British Foreign Affairs Minister, Margaret Beckett, strongly pleaded for vision and action to bring about “a world free of nuclear weapons”.³³

Russia withdrew its ‘no first use’ pledge in 1993 and ascribes an important role to its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.³⁴ Due in part to the US plans to build a missile shield in Europe as protection against Iran, Russia is putting more emphasis on its nuclear weapons. The country now threatens to withdraw from several treaties, among them the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.³⁵ Russian President Putin had already suspended the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).³⁶ In November 2008, Russian President Medvedev threatened to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad on the Polish border in response to the US installation of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.³⁷ Only one nuclear power, China, remains as proponent of the ‘no first use’ principle. But it is working on modernising its nuclear arsenal.³⁸

1.7. Conclusion

If none of the opportunities to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2010 are used, the NPT risks becoming a weak, ineffectual agreement. It is urgently needed and possible to strengthen the NPT. The commission led by Hans Blix, former UN arms inspector and head of IAEA who wrote the nuclear arms report entitled *Weapons of Terror* called the NPT “the weakest of the treaties on WMD in terms of provisions about implementation”. For that reason, the commission argued for a much stronger role for

²⁷ See: http://nnsa.energy.gov/defense_programs/reliable_replacement_warhead.htm.

²⁸ See: “National Security and Nuclear weapons in the 21st Century”, *op cit*, pp.18-22.

²⁹ See for example Thomas D’Aghostino’s speech at the CCADD conference on 20 September 2008, *op. cit*.

³⁰ International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (2007), *Securing our Survival (SOS), The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention*, Cambridge (Mass.), p. 16, <http://www.icanw.org/securing-our-survival>.

³¹ See: Tertrais, B. (2008), *France and Nuclear Disarmament: the Meaning of the Sarkozy Speech*, April 30 2008, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20090&prog=zgp&proj=znpp>.

³² British Nuclear Forces (2005), ‘Nuclear Notebook’, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November/December, pp. 77-79.

³³ See: *SIPRI Yearbook 2008*, Oxford/Stockholm: Oxford University Press, p. 7.

³⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 373-381.

³⁵ For the text of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty see: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf.htm>.

³⁶ Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), see: http://www.osce.org/documents/doclib/1990/11/13752_en.pdf.

³⁷ See: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2900>.

³⁸ See: *SIPRI Yearbook 2008*, *op. cit.*, pp. 385-381.

the IAEA.³⁹ While it is true that in 1996 the International Court of Justice ruled that according to international law nuclear states are obliged “to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”⁴⁰, there is, unfortunately, no recognised body that can call them to order when they fail to satisfy this obligation. The IAEA could become this body. But for this to happen, the nuclear weapon states and other parties to the NPT would have to choose expressly for rigorous measures and would have to be committed to a world free of nuclear weapons. History shows that states do not take such measures easily. That is why the anti-nuclear weapons papers published by the renowned ‘Gangs of

Four’⁴¹ and the support that two-thirds of all living US former secretaries of state and defense and national security advisors have given these publications are encouraging and important. Moreover, given his statements on the need for nuclear disarmament, Barack Obama’s presidency could lead to the breakthrough the world is waiting for.⁴²

True change will have to come from leaders with vision and courage. The time is ripe. The history of the resistance to nuclear weapons shows that political leaders are more willing to work for a reversal when public opinion demands this. That is the reason why IKV and Pax Christi and their international partner organisations call upon citizens and political leaders to help free the world of nuclear weapons.

³⁹ Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) (2006), *Weapons of Terror, Freeing the World of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Arms*, Stockholm: WMDC, p. 63. For the full text of the document see:

http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf.

⁴⁰ Stelling, M. (1999), ‘The Illegality of Nuclear Weapons’, in: *Nuclear Arms: a Problem of the 20th Century or the 3rd Millennium*, Den Haag: IKV, p.29.

⁴¹ In a remarkable op-ed article in the 4 January 2007 issue of the *Wall Street Journal* (repeated on 15 January 2008), Henry Kissinger, Georg Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn speak out for a world free of nuclear weapons. See: http://www.2020visioncampaign.org/pages/113/Kissinger_Shultz_Perry__Nunn_call_for_A_World_Free_of_Nuclear_Weapons. Their statement was followed up by a British ‘Gang of Four’. In June 2008 Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Lord David Owen, Lord Douglas Hurd and Lord George Robertson published a similar article entitled ‘Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb’ (see: <http://www.nti.org/>). In January 2009 a German ‘Gang of Four’ consisting of Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizsacker, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher followed suit (see <http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/01/09/opinion/edschmidt.php?page=1>). For President’s Obama’s view see: ‘Where they Stand: John McCain and Barack Obama on Nuclear and Related Issues’, in: *Disarmament Times*, fall 2008, Vol. 31(3).

⁴² See also Daalder, I. (2008), ‘US Nuclear Weapons Policy after Bush’, in: *Atlantisch Perspectief*, 4, pp. 17-19, <http://www.atlcom.nl/site/english/nieuws/wp-content/AP%202008%20nr.%204%20Daalder>.

Chapter 2

Various Views of Nuclear Weapons: Arguments for and Against Their Abolition

2.1. Nuclear Weapons as 'Just Another Weapon' and as Nuclear War Fighting and Battlefield Weapons

Many views have been developed on the possession and use of nuclear weapons since the nuclear era began in 1945. One view of nuclear weapons sees them simply as one of many weapons that can be deployed to win a battle. It took until several years after the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki before others beyond a small circle of specialists and critical employees at the Manhattan Project came to realise that nuclear weapons were something totally new, that they

were not just another kind of weapon. Since nuclear weapons have a much larger, more unpredictable and more destructive impact than other weapons, it is factually incorrect and morally reprehensible to put them on the same level. In other words, it is a dangerous and deceptive way of classifying nuclear weapons. In addition, history offers numerous examples that de-emphasise the wartime military significance of nuclear weapons. In the final analysis, nuclear states derive no military benefit from these weapons: it is too dangerous to cross the nuclear threshold. The experiences of the US in Vietnam and Iraq, and of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan are classic examples.



*During a commemoration, a girl comforts the souls of those who fell victim to the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945.
Picture: Reuters.*

When nuclear deterrence theories were developed in the mid-1950s, nuclear weapons gradually came to hold an important position as war fighting weapon. This arose from the awareness that deterrence was not possible with weapons with which one could not fight. Once the nuclear threshold was crossed, a nuclear war also had to be won. Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons were necessary for the many war fighting scenarios; the arms race continued until far into the 1980s.

On a strategic level, the nuclear weapons' war fighting function included both the capability to deliver a first destructive strike on cities and 'strategic' military and industrial targets and, when the other side attacked first, the capability to counteract with a massive retaliation. Under all circumstances, the enemy had to keep massive retaliation in mind. As of the 1960s, the choice between the options of doing nothing or all-out nuclear war was no longer credible. Technology had developed many more options that made deterrence more credible. In deterrence theories the war fighting function often coincided with the deterrence function.

Fighting a nuclear war would also require tens of thousands of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. As a NATO member, the Netherlands was assigned six nuclear weapons tasks between 1960 and 1963: the navy was to fight submarines with nuclear depth charges, the army was given nuclear missiles, landmines and artillery shells, and the air force was given missiles and free-fall bombs. The last of these – currently assigned to a squadron of F-16 jet fighters at the Volkel AFB – is the only one remaining now that the Cold War has ended. It is no longer clear against which enemy these battlefield weapons are to be used.

After the Cold War, US military strategy reduced the military role of nuclear weapons because new conventional alternatives had become available.⁴³ But, on the Russian side, nuclear weapons must increasingly compensate for weakness in conventional weapons. Thinking about a nuclear weapons' war fighting function has returned in a new context. In 2003, the US government suggested developing nuclear 'earth penetrators' to penetrate Al-Qaida's deep underground

bunkers in Afghanistan's mountains. Congress did not give its consent⁴⁴ and the Bush administration withdrew its proposal in 2005.

2.2. Nuclear Weapons as Deterrent

Broadest support goes to the view of nuclear weapons as deterrent. Political scientist Bernard Brodie articulated the core of the 'doctrine of deterrence' for the first time in 1946. This mindset was the alpha and omega of political and military strategy for more than forty years. In Brodie's words, "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."⁴⁵ In short, the only objective of possessing nuclear weapons is deterring other possessors of these weapons from using them by ensuring that any first strike would be met with retaliation.

And this is how it seems to have been: no nuclear weapons have been used since 1945. However, during the Cold War, deterrence was defined much broader. In Europe, more than elsewhere, the threat that nuclear weapons would be used, was intended to deter an attack with conventional weapons. Deterrence was insatiable: always some new 'step' on the nuclear escalation ladder could be devised. *The* nuclear weapon as deterrent did not exist. There were many more types of deterrence than massive retaliation after any attack, nuclear or otherwise. That also explains why so many different types of nuclear weapons were developed. The two most important nuclear powers in the Cold War continued to compete in developing new means of deterrence.

After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the US and the Soviet Union both realised that a nuclear war would be disastrous for both parties. This reinforced the view of nuclear weapons as deterrent and resulted in theories and strategies intended to optimise one's own military and political position while minimising the chance that these weapons would be used. Once the two superpowers reached nuclear parity (a 'balance of terror'), the assumption that there would be no winners in a nuclear war replaced the idea of massive retaliation. As of 1967, 'mutually assured destruction'

⁴³ See: Coyle, Ph. E. (2008), 'U.S. Nuclear Forces and Conventional Force Alternatives', in: *The Defense Monitor*, vol. XXXVII, November/December 2008, pp. 1-4.

⁴⁴ See: CRS Report for Congress, 'Nuclear Earth Penetrator Weapons', January 2003, <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RS20834.pdf>.

⁴⁵ Brodie, B. (Ed.) (1946), *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.



Russian President Dmitry Medvedev walks near the Ballistic Missile Topol (RS-12M) in Plesetsk on 12 October 2008. Russia stated that it has a strong nuclear deterrent. Picture: ANP.

was the cornerstone in all deterrence theories and remained so to the end of the Cold War. This system of ‘mutually assured destruction’ came to be referred to as ‘MAD’. Slowly but surely, it came to be accepted broadly that deterrence was the only purpose of nuclear weapons. Some authors believed this awareness contributed to the creation of a taboo against using nuclear weapons.⁴⁶ Others even posited that just the mere existence of nuclear weapons was a sufficient deterrent, even without all kinds of strategies.⁴⁷ But deterrence theory remained ambiguous. It also had to take into account *limited* military conflicts as well as

the Warsaw Pact’s superiority in conventional weapons in Europe. By 1967, NATO strategy replaced ‘massive retaliation’ (even for a conventional attack by the Soviet Union) with ‘flexible response’. This was intended to provide an appropriate answer to every level of threat or aggression.⁴⁸ Uncertainty about whether NATO would respond with conventional or nuclear weapons to a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact served a purpose, which was to ensure that the Eastern Block would not use its supremacy in conventional weapons to attack Western Europe. Given this, it was logical that NATO did not provide a ‘no first use’ guarantee. That

⁴⁶ Tannenwald, N. (2007), *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁷ For example: Benthem van den Bergh, G. Van (1988), *The Taming of the Great Powers. Nuclear Weapons and Global Integration*, Amsterdam.

⁴⁸ “This concept (...) is based upon a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression. These responses, subject to appropriate political control, are designed, first to deter aggression and thus preserve peace; but, should aggression unhappily occur, to maintain the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area within the concept of forward defence.” Cited in Freedman, L. (1982), *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, London, p. 285.

would undermine the deterrence strategy in which the opponent must always take escalation to the nuclear level into account. It was hoped that having an appropriate response on every level even *after* crossing the nuclear threshold would prevent total nuclear annihilation. For the US, that meant restricting any nuclear war to the European theatre. But ultimately, 'flexible response' derived its credibility from having MAD as its cornerstone.

After the Cold War, many hoped that nuclear weapons would become 'weapons of last resort', only to be used when all other options were gone. A 'minimum deterrence' with some 100 nuclear weapons would be sufficient for this strategy.⁴⁹ Although for a time it looked as if the US and Russia would move in that direction, this strategy was never put into practice. In 1993, when Russia lost its conventional edge as a result of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Russia cancelled its 'no first use' policy. In 1997 it stated explicitly that it did not exclude the use of nuclear weapons as a response to a conventional attack. Russia says it is aiming at a minimum deterrent, but its large supply (approx. 2100) of tactical nuclear weapons is not compatible with this aim.⁵⁰ Although the US and NATO now have greater conventional strength than Russia, western nuclear powers do not consider this a reason for providing a 'no first use' pledge. Western nuclear powers have said that their nuclear weapons are no longer aimed at Russian targets, because Russia is no longer an enemy. NATO briefly used the term 'weapons of last resort', but then abandoned it. Today's term is 'insurance'. Nuclear weapons are an insurance against an uncertain future. Proponents of this view of nuclear weapons argue for new and far-reaching reductions, but are utterly against total abolition.

New questions arose after the Cold War. Is there still any deterrence in a multipolar world where India, Pakistan and North Korea are nuclear weapon states and Iran and Syria are potential nuclear weapon states? In that context, is possession of nuclear weapons sufficient for deterrence? Is there really a taboo against use, and if so,

does that also apply to the tense relations between India and Pakistan? And does that taboo apply only to states or also to terrorists? Former co-architects of deterrence during the Cold War, Kissinger and Schultz, have given their answer to some of these questions. Today, the perpetuation of nuclear weapons – and restraining their use via deterrence with MAD as keystone – is extremely dangerous, given the risk of further proliferation and the chance that the weapons will fall into terrorist hands. "It is far from certain that we can replicate the Soviet-US 'mutually assured destruction' with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies worldwide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used."⁵¹ That is why they argue for the abolition of nuclear weapons – not for a policy of minimum deterrence.

2.3. Nuclear Weapons as Weapons of Terror

Mass destruction and more than a hundred thousand dead and wounded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki quickly led to nuclear weapons' being called 'weapons of terror'⁵², a weapon that serves not any military objective. Robert Oppenheimer, one of the fathers of the atomic bomb, came to adopt this view. The reasoning behind the use of atom bombs is that the terror that such bombings causes will demoralise the population of the enemy state, and so bring about victory more rapidly. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is classified under this heading, as are the German bombing of Rotterdam and London and the allied bombing of Hamburg and Dresden. The US likes to speak of an ultimate coercive weapon or winning weapon.

This reasoning about breaking a people's will to defeat the enemy resembles the argumentation of current non-state terrorists. The idea that it could be easy for terrorists to obtain nuclear weapons (e.g. in politically unstable nuclear powers like Pakistan) has revived the fear of nuclear weapons as weapons of terror. And not only that: unlike most states, terrorists would probably have no qualms about really using nuclear weapons. As Kissinger, Schulz, Perry and Nunn noted,

⁴⁹ See: Homan, K. (1999), 'A World without Nuclear Weapons Remains Utopia', in: *Nuclear Arms, From Yes To No And Vice-Versa*, Den Haag: IKV.

⁵⁰ See: SIPRI Yearbook 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 373-381.

⁵¹ Shultz, G.P., Perry, W.J., Kissinger, H.A., & Nunn, S. (2007), 'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons', in *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 January, http://www.2020visioncampaign.org/pages/113/Kissinger_Shultz_Perry__Nunn_call_for_A_World_Free_of_Nuclear_Weapons

⁵² *Weapons of Terror*, the title of the Blix Commission's 2006 report, shows that the description of nuclear weapons as 'weapons of terror' is not out of date. The description of nuclear weapons as 'weapons of terror' draws attention to the fact that nuclear weapons' only function is to terrorise. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (2006), *Weapons of Terror, Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms*, Stockholm.



The newer version replacing this British Naval submarine can dive to 150 metres. It is equipped with the most recent weaponry and contains such advanced nuclear technology that it will never need refuelling.

Picture: ANP.

“Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weapons is increasing. In today’s war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges.”⁵³

In 2004, the Security Council of the UN passed Resolution 1540, opposing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Of course, the proliferation of components of nuclear weapons is also a great risk. Manufacturing highly enriched uranium is a complicated technological task, but once it has been produced, it does not take much effort to make a Hiroshima-style bomb. Terrorists can

⁵³ Shultz, G.P, Perry, W.J., Kissinger, H.A., & Nunn, S. (2007), ‘A World Free of Nuclear Weapons’, in *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 January, *op. cit.*

do it as well. That is why it is very important that precedence be given to downgrading all enriched uranium that has no further military purpose and that a 'cut-off treaty' be negotiated: an international agreement that prohibits the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Moreover existing fissile materials need to be placed under supranational control.⁵⁴ Vigilance, a bit of luck for the world's security services and efficient cooperation between services are essential for preventing nuclear terrorism.

2.4. Nuclear Weapons as Political Symbol

Nuclear weapons are a status symbol for superpowers. All permanent members of the Security Council have



*Hans Blix was head of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission from 2000 to 2003. In 2002 his commission started a search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
Picture: ANP.*

nuclear weapons. Their *status aparte* is explicitly recognised in the NPT. Former colonial powers Great Britain and France, more than others, derive status from their nuclear weapons. It is not surprising that over time status has come to play a role in several countries' attempts to acquire their own nuclear weapon, whether successful or not. The power they aim for in this way can relate to the whole world or their own region. But regardless of this level, the non-nuclear weapon states' aspiration to gain power via nuclear weapons only becomes stronger when established nuclear weapon states refuse to relinquish or drastically reduce their own nuclear arsenals.

Apart from that, history teaches that most political leaders have not given in to the nuclear temptation and that others have backed away.⁵⁵ The Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the reasons for this. Thanks to the NPT, Sweden, Germany, Italy and others decided against having their own nuclear weapons (often under US pressure). When the apartheid system fell in South Africa in 1991, the country gave up its six nuclear weapons and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear state. Another reason is NATO membership. The US nuclear umbrella has permitted NATO allies to perform nuclear tasks without themselves becoming nuclear states. This umbrella is sufficient for many countries.⁵⁶

2.5. Nuclear Weapons as Subject to International Control

Various plans for a diplomatic, international solution to the nuclear weapons issue were developed between 1946 and 1949. For instance, the US devised the failed Baruch Plan (see Chapter 1). With a lot of good will, the 1968 NPT can be considered a new attempt to place nuclear weapons under international authority. But even the rather modest proposals in this context have thus far proven unachievable in practice. Yet plans continue to be developed at least to promote some international control over nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction where real international management should prove unattainable.

The highly esteemed Blix Commission that advises the UN on dealing with weapons of mass destruction has made many practical proposals.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ In December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution proposing that negotiations be opened on a verifiable, non-discriminatory treaty forbidding the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The negotiations for this Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, as it is to be called, have still not begun.

⁵⁵ Hymans, J. C. E. (2006), *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Levite, A. (2002-2003), *op. cit.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (2006), *op. cit.*

2.6. Conclusion

The most widely shared view of nuclear weapons are those of nuclear weapons as means of deterrence and as weapons of last resort. A growing number of former and present policymakers are calling the deterrence theory into question. They think that there is little chance that under current conditions “deterrence based on balance” will be “a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament” which in 1982 Pope John Paul II called the only morally acceptable justification of nuclear weapons.⁵⁸ All quarters point out the growing danger that they will be used. The call to abolish nuclear weapons is becoming louder. Increasingly, measures are advocated that reduce the chance that nuclear weapons will be used and that strengthen the taboo against them. Recent studies by Perkovich and Acton, Daalder and Lodal and Mendelsohn show that there is a safe and traversable path to a world free of nuclear weapons.⁵⁹ This argues for using the given *Gnadenfrist*⁶⁰ to urgently work on those measures and abolish nuclear weapons.

⁵⁸ Pope John-Paul II (1982), *Message to the Special Session of the United Nations on Disarmament*, in: *Archief van de kerken*, 38 91983, nr. 7, p. 3.

⁵⁹ Perkovich, G., & Acton, J. M. (2008), *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 396, August 2008; Daalder I., & Lodal, J. (2008), ‘The Logic of Zero: Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons’ in *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2008, vol. 87, pp. 80-95; Mendelsohn, J. (2008), ‘Getting to Zero: The Path to a World Without Nuclear Weapons’, in: *The Defense Monitor*, vol. XXXVII, November/December 2008, pp. 5-7.

⁶⁰ The term was borrowed from the German atomic physicist C.F. Von Weizsäcker who joined 17 German colleagues in publishing a statement in which they refused to work in any way on the production, testing or use of nuclear weapons. See also: Grandia, A. C., & Van der Laan, H. (1983), *De gereformeerden en het oorlogsvraagstuk*. Delft: Meinema.

Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation From Impasse to New Perspective



Submarine 'Le Terrible'. It is the first French naval vessel that can be equipped with the new M-51 ballistic missile. President Sarkozy attended its launch on 21 March 2008.

Picture: ANP.

3.1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The NPT was opened for signing in 1968. Since then, all countries except India, Israel and Pakistan have signed the NPT. North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003, but has signed up again since (see box on next page). The NPT's principles – see chapter 1 – helped prevent the distribution of nuclear knowledge for military purposes apart from a few unwelcome exceptions (e.g. Khan affaire⁶¹). Yet the dominant opinion is that the implementation of the NPT has been stagnant since 1995 and that the treaty risks becoming meaningless. The international community's failure to comply with the obligations for states parties to the treaty, contrasts

sharply with the urgent challenges that threaten the continued existence of the non-proliferation regime. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) assumes in its 2008 yearbook that there are currently 10,200 operational nuclear weapons. A few thousand are at hair-trigger alert i.e. ready for firing. When including those that are not operational, SIPRI counts 25,000 nuclear warheads around the world.⁶² The NPT risks becoming very weak, unless the 2010 Review Conference results in a patently obvious turnaround with legally binding agreements that offer perspectives for the future. This chapter paints a picture of the developments concerning The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the threats to it, and ends with

⁶¹ The Pakistani atomic physicist Khan used the know-how that he obtained as employee of the Dutch URENCO (manufacturer of enriched uranium) on enriching uranium using ultra-centrifuge technology to develop a nuclear weapon in Pakistan. He also exported this knowledge to Libya, North Korea and Iran. See: <http://www.ochtenden.nl/artikelen/25234289/>.

⁶² SIPRI Yearbook 2008: *Armament, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford, p. 367. <http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/>.

North Korea

In 2002 North Korea broke an agreement dating from 1994 in which it stopped production of plutonium in exchange for oil and food. The breach came after President George W. Bush had classified the country as part of the “axis of evil” and stopped US oil deliveries. North Korea conducted a nuclear test and claims to possess nuclear weapons. According to experts, it has sufficient plutonium for approximately eight nuclear weapons. The country could see that its best response to the US threat of aggression was to ensure that it had its own ultimate weapon. As for the North Korean problem, new opportunities have opened. There is even a new agreement, part of which has been implemented. In principle, the country is willing to give up its new nuclear status in exchange for life insurance in the form of sturdy security guarantees, food and fuel. The nuclear power plant at Yongbyon and other nuclear installations have been closed, IAEA inspectors are once again allowed to do their jobs and the country has provided many documents on the state of its nuclear programme. Of course, the real test is whether North Korea will completely dismantle its nuclear programme, will destroy its supply of plutonium and rejoin the NPT as non-nuclear state. The other partners in the six-country talks have to maintain a constructive attitude. The past has shown that things can go wrong quickly when it comes to North Korea, for instance in response to actions by the new rightist government in South Korea or by the US. However, it appears that the dialogue between the US and North Korea is starting to bear fruit.

the political opportunities and challenges for the NPT Review Conference in 2010 as seen by those working to achieve nuclear disarmament. One such is the Middle Powers Initiative.⁶³

3.2. The 1995, 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences

The quinquennial NPT Review Conferences and the commitments made there are an important departure points for further NPT policy. The meetings examine whether the parties to the NPT have complied with their obligations under it and make decisions on improving

the implementation of the NPT. The last three post-Cold War Review Conferences (1995, 2000, 2005) have been determinative for the present status of the NPT.

Uncertain Status

Hindsight shows that the 1995 Conference took place at a time when there had already been a decline in disarmament. However, the Conference formulated numerous positive, albeit non-specific, steps to be taken in the near future. The options were to terminate the treaty, extend it for a limited period, or for an indefinite period. The latter was chosen. The 1995 Conference also adopted a series of important principles and objectives to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In addition, the most important point on the agenda was completing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), that was finally adopted in 1996.

In 2000 the NPT seemed to be in a tight corner. Relations between the five nuclear weapon states had degenerated, in part because of US plans for a missile shield. Moreover, the US Senate had refused to ratify the CTBT. There was also not much progress in achieving the objectives of the 1995 Review Conference. It was thus all the more surprising that the 2000 Conference produced a programme with detailed promises which became known as “the thirteen steps.” The programme was adopted. Sceptical observers immediately wondered whether the well-crafted and pleasingly worded intentions would come to anything. It quickly became clear that the nuclear weapon states indeed lacked the political will to follow through on the thirteen steps. The inauguration of George W. Bush in 2001 marked the start of a new US policy on nuclear disarmament and nuclear proliferation. The 2001 terrorist attacks were an extra incentive for Washington to transform its strategy for arms control and disarmament into a counter-proliferation strategy centred on direct action against the danger of proliferation. The 2005 Review Conference revolved round the controversy between the US – that wanted to direct all attention at problem countries Iran (see box) and North Korea – and the countries that accused the nuclear weapon states of not complying with the obligations under the NPT to eliminate nuclear weapons. The US sent a lower official rather than the Secretary of State to the Review Conference that got tied up in procedural disputes. The result was that the meeting was a total failure and that no document acceptable to all states was adopted. This obfuscated the status of the agreements made during the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

⁶³ The Middle Powers Initiative is a coalition of eight international non-governmental organisations that by putting pressure on “middle power” governments try to encourage nuclear weapon states to disarm. See: <http://www.middlepowers.org/about.html>.

The 13 Steps:

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Steps by all the nuclear weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
 - a) Further efforts by the nuclear weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally
 - b) Increased transparency by the nuclear weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
 - c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
 - d) Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
 - e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
 - f) The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a Nuclear Weapon-Free world.

Iran

There is still a chance that the situation centring on Iran's enrichment activities will get out of hand with an air war or a single preventive strike by the US. The Security Council's imposing ever stricter sanctions on Iran risks increasing its recalcitrance. There are several aspects that are difficult to reconcile. For instance, there is the fear that Iran is clandestinely on the way to – or has already set up – a nuclear programme, despite Iran's repeated assurances that it is enriching uranium solely for peaceful, civilian purposes. Israel is determined not to allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons and is willing to use a targeted attack – alone or with US support – to prevent this. Israel does have its own nuclear weapons. It seems as if political leaders are ignoring the report from the US intelligence services that concludes that Iran abandoned its military aspirations in 2003. Furthermore, the IAEA is reasonably satisfied about the access that it has to Iran's nuclear installations. In addition, the IAEA is making progress, however belaboured, in untangling Iran's pre-2003

clandestine past. As a party to the NPT, Iran has a right to nuclear energy under the IAEA safeguards regime, and even to help in using it. The conflict lies mainly between Iran's legalist approach (according to Article IV of the NPT, Iran has a right to civil nuclear development) and the political approach (others do not trust Iran's intentions). Poor relations with Israel cast a shadow on the political side of the question. The key problem is that now that the political approach seems to have precedence – as evinced by the three-fold UN sanctions – the NPT is being pushed aside. It is essential that the IAEA be allowed to continue monitoring that the country restricts itself to producing low-grade enriched uranium. Imposing sanctions that bar inspectors from working in the country is totally counter-productive; the world no longer knows what is going on in the country. Perhaps the new US president, Barack Obama, will start a new way of dealing with Iran. This should target including Iran's enrichment programme in a multilateral programme as various think tanks have suggested.



A group of Iranian women demonstrate in Teheran on 31 October 2003 against Iran's agreement on nuclear weapons.
Picture: ANP.

State Coalitions

Over the years there have been various coalitions of states that support nuclear disarmament. Japan has worked for years to gain acceptance of a resolution on “renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. It has received support from Russia and Great Britain. The resolution is primarily aimed at the implementation of the thirteen steps listed in the final document of 2000 NPT Review Conference. The New Agenda Coalition⁶⁴ has more or less the same approach. The same is true of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM).⁶⁵ It focuses on the 13 steps and linked them to a timetable. Of these three state coalitions, Japan’s receives the most support and NAM the least. Other, more informal coalitions, e.g. the Middle Powers Initiative, work to break the bonds of inertia. However, without the nuclear weapon states’ leadership and political will it is inconceivable that any major steps will be taken.

3.3. The Threats to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Patent shortcomings and compliance failure put the operation of the NPT at risk. Among these are:

- *Nuclear weapon states have still shown no signs of significant disarmament.*

This is the greatest threat to the NPT, because it turns the distinction between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states into a perpetual right, even though it was originally intended to be temporary. When nuclear weapon states do not keep their promises to disarm, they sap the will of other states to comply with their own NPT obligations.

- *There are no effective measures to compel compliance with NPT agreements.*

Most other arms control treaties do have these; they run from action plans in cases of non-compliance to formal reporting obligations. This kind of mechanisms provides a greater guarantee of compliance. The international community’s and the UN Security Council’s inability to force a state’s compliance undermines confidence in the NPT. But to an important degree it is a homegrown inability:

the permanent members of the Security Council are the same countries as the nuclear weapon states that are not disarming.

- *The IAEA has limited authority and resources.*
Moreover, the authorisation and means that the IAEA does have, relate only to non-nuclear weapon states’ obligations. Inspections that monitor and verify compliance with the NPT are needed for the NPT’s credibility and legitimacy.
- *Some nuclear weapon states are not a party to the NPT.* India, Israel (see box), and Pakistan are examples. The first three are seldom admonished by the recognised nuclear weapon states; moreover, they derive advantages from their status as nuclear weapon state. This can cause non-nuclear weapon states to consider ignoring their obligations under the NPT so that they, too, can have the power conferred by possessing nuclear weapons.
- *The NPT “has not kept pace with the march of technology and globalisation”.*

That was what then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan posed in 2005.⁶⁶ One important matter to which the NPT gives insufficient attention is the rise of non-state actors that could obtain nuclear weapons; there is a real risk that nuclear knowledge or materials will fall into terrorist hands. In response to 11 September, various efforts have been made outside the NPT focusing exclusively on proliferation among state and non-state actors. Among them are the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)⁶⁷, the G8 Global Partnership against Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and UN resolution 1540. These counter-proliferation initiatives constrain acquisition of nuclear material and nuclear weapons and reduce the chance that terrorist groups have access to them. That is positive, but the measures also have negative implications for the NPT. While they confirm the NPT’s non-proliferation obligations, they do not confirm the obligations it contains for the nuclear weapon states to disarm. Moreover, unlike the NPT’s measures, some of the PSI’s measures do not have a universal character. This reinforces inequality before the law.

⁶⁴ The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden set up the New Agenda Coalition in 1998 in response to Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Their objective was to move all nuclear weapon states to total nuclear disarmament. See: <http://www.acronym.org.uk/nac.htm>.

⁶⁵ The Non-Alignment Movement is the successor to the Cold War’s movement of non-aligned states. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Aligned_Movement.

⁶⁶ Anan, K., (2005), *International Herald Tribune*, 30 May.

⁶⁷ To quote from the recommendation from the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) on the nuclear non-proliferation regime: “The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was announced by President Bush in May 2003 as a practical addition to the (see next page).

3.4. Practical and political steps toward the 2010 NPT Review Conference

If non-proliferation and disarmament are to be reached effectively, compliance with the NPT must be universally compulsory. Only international cooperation where everyone pursues non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament to the same degree can lead to the outlawing of nuclear weapons. The 2010 Review Conference will have to spark far-reaching ventures if states and their populations are to obtain this security. That is why the Middle Powers Initiative⁶⁹ argues for the following priorities:

- *Very drastic and verifiable reduction of the number of nuclear weapons.*

A reduction by 90% of the number of nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia is a prerequisite for a truly positive development. In the other countries, a step-by-step reduction of certainly 50 to 75 is not only necessary, it is possible without risks to security. These large reductions in nuclear arsenals are necessary to put an end to the present insane level of nuclear overkill. Significant reduction in nuclear arsenals will also lead to risk reduction (think of nuclear terrorism) and will lead to still further reduction.⁷⁰

- *Immediate stand down of hair-trigger alert.*⁷¹

It is estimated that the US can launch 1,600 nuclear warheads within a few minutes. Russia can launch around a thousand. Keeping these nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert is unacceptable. This calls for

Israel

We can only guess the size of Israel's nuclear arsenal. Estimates differ. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) thinks there are eighty operational weapons. Other sources speak of 75 to 200. Some of these nuclear warheads are loaded onto missiles, others can be transported by plane. Israel also has three modern nuclear submarines since 1999.⁶⁸ Unlike India, Pakistan and North Korea, Israel has carried out no proven or admitted nuclear test. There was the Vela incident, a nuclear test in the South Pacific registered by chance in 1979, but it was never learned with certainty whether South Africa was behind this or whether it was a joint venture of Israel and South Africa. Israel has never officially admitted its nuclear status, but the Israeli technician Mordechai Vanunu's revelations and Prime Minister Olmert's slip of the tongue in 2006 have provided incontestable proof. Because the Dimona nuclear reactor proved to be larger than was assumed, Israel almost certainly has more nuclear weapons than the ten or twenty originally taken for granted. The tense situation in the Middle East and the international, certainly the Israeli, distrust of Iran, are additional factors that make the nuclear weapon issue in the region a very risky problem.

measures such as removing nuclear warheads from missiles, storing nuclear bombs and cruise missiles

existing instruments for combating proliferation. The US initiative is intended to facilitate interception of illegal transports of proliferation-sensitive material and is aimed at making better use of existing national and international instruments (export controls, treaties and legislation) and improving international cooperation in interception activities. It started with maritime inspections and is now being extended to the civil aviation sector. It is planned to extend it to overland transport too in due course. Some 60 states, including all EU member states, have now endorsed the PSI on a voluntary basis. The broad outline of the PSI is discussed in a core group of 17 countries to which the Netherlands belongs. Little is known about the interceptions themselves. For example, it is unclear how many have taken place since 2003, whether or not they have been successful, and what precisely they have found. The US is very reticent about this, even towards their PSI partners, in order (so they say) not to compromise future activities within this framework. The PSI is not a comprehensive world initiative and therefore its normative authority is less strong." See: [http://www.aiv-advies.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/advies_47_EN\(1\).pdf](http://www.aiv-advies.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/advies_47_EN(1).pdf) p. 12.

⁶⁸ Israeli Nuclear Forces (2002), Nuclear Notebook, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September, October 2002, pp. 73-75.

⁶⁹ *Towards 2010, Priorities for NPT Consensus, Middle Powers Initiative Paper for the NPT Preparatory Committee*, New York, April 2007. During his term as chairman of the EU President Sarkozy had also made many of these same proposals in a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon dated 5 December 2008. See: <http://www.ambafrance-se.org/spip.php?article2084>. See also the speech by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) delivered in the European Parliament on 9 December 2008.

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/104602.pdf.

⁷⁰ The Global Security Priorities Resolution, that 35 bipartisan members of the House of Representatives submitted to the US Congress in March 2008 argued for a reduction to 1000 nuclear weapons for the US and Russia by 2015. See: <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hr110-1045>.

⁷¹ See also: Commonwealth of Australia (1996), *Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons*, August 1996.

away from airports, keeping submarines in seaports and – when these ships sail – establishing alerts that last at least one full day. Such measures reduce the chance of errors and of the risk that can occur during a coup or an attack on nuclear facilities.

A UN resolution proposal submitted in October 2007 argued for practical steps that would lead to removing nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert status.⁷² 139 states supported the resolution. The only dissenters were France, the US and the UK. Most NATO countries abstained, except for Germany and Italy (where US nuclear weapons are stationed) and Iceland, Norway, Portugal and Spain. We are disappointed to note that the Netherlands was one of the abstaining NATO countries.⁷³

- *Starting negotiations on a treaty forbidding production of fissile materials intended for explosions.*

The need for a treaty that forbids the production of fissile materials intended for explosions is beyond dispute. This cut-off treaty can only come about when key players agree that this agreement would serve their own national security interests. Keeping open the prospect of producing fissile materials for internal use irrevocably insures that other countries will also want this capability. The US presentation of a draft treaty is a step in the right direction. However, the draft is no more than a codification of current treaties that confirms the NPT's discrimination against non-nuclear weapon states. The nuclear weapon states, primarily the US, Russia and China, must take the lead if there is to be a cut-off treaty. Without this leadership, India, Pakistan and Israel will not be willing to participate in constructive negotiations about their own production of fissile materials. In addition, the differences of opinion on the size of the stock of fissile material and on verification would continue.⁷⁴

- *Bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force.*

North Korea's nuclear test performed in 2006 highlights the importance of a comprehensive prohibition against testing nuclear weapons. So far, 135 states have ratified the 1996 CTBT. However, the

test ban treaty will only obtain force of law when all 44 of the countries named in it have done this. They have not yet done so. Of the nuclear weapon states, the US, China and Israel have signed but not yet ratified the treaty. India and Pakistan have neither signed nor ratified. During the vote taken in the UN in 2007 on a resolution supporting the CTBT, North Korea was diplomatically absent.⁷⁵ The US was the only one to vote against. India, Columbia, Mauritius and Syria abstained.

- *Regulating the production of nuclear fuels and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.*

An international authority must be established to control fissile materials. This body must hold final authority to regulate the fissile materials cycle and the size of nuclear capacities. All existing enrichment and breeder conversion reactors and heavy water factories must be placed under the authority of this international authority. This includes factories located in the nuclear weapon states. The authority will be authorised to grant production licences to existing factories and, where needed, regulate the expansion of production capacity. It will also be authorised to work with the IAEA, that will serve as operator, to set up verification and security measures to prevent misuse of fissile materials. The manufacturers will remain accountable for the sound commercial operation of their business.

- *Strengthening negative security assurances and introducing a no first use declaration.*

In response to the threat of international terrorism, the US, France and Russia have included in their security doctrines the option to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and to respond to conventional threats.⁷⁶ Non-nuclear weapon states have often linked their willingness to renounce nuclear weapons to the requirement that nuclear weapon states would desist from such attacks. These negative security assurances are laid down in declarations and protocols. One such instance was during the 1995 NPT Review Conference, albeit incompletely. All nuclear weapon states must reaffirm the negative security assurances. They need to be

⁷² Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland. Draft resolution *Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems*, United Nations, General Assembly, A/C.1/62/L.29; <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com07/res/L29.pdf>.

⁷³ See: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10666.doc.htm>.

⁷⁴ Rissanen, J. (2006), 'Time for Fissban – or Farewell', in: *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue no. 83, Winter 2006.

⁷⁵ 62nd session of the UN General Assembly's 'First Committee'.

⁷⁶ See: Cirincione, J. (2008), 'Strategic Collapse: The Failure of the Bush Nuclear Doctrine' in: *Arms Control Today*, November 2008, which says, "... Russia and France mirrored U.S. logic justifying use of nuclear weapons against conventional threats." See: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_11/cirincione.

unconditional, not optional, and they must be legally binding. Moreover, all nuclear weapon states must confirm their commitment to a no first use agreement. Of the five original nuclear weapon states, only China has provided an official no first use agreement. India (see box) has also stated that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, unlike Pakistan, that is keeping the first use option open. It is assumed that this also applies to Israel.

Agreeing to no first use implies that until the time that they are abolished, nuclear arms are intended only as deterrent. The option of using them is dispensed with in all cases other than responding to a nuclear attack. When all nuclear weapon states sign a no first use agreement, they open the door to abolishing nuclear weapons.⁷⁷

- *Strengthening the IAEA.*

The International Atomic Energy Agency plays an important role in inspecting non-nuclear weapon states. The agency guarantees that non-nuclear weapon states do not abuse their right to peaceful use of nuclear energy to obtain nuclear weapon state status. In other words, the IAEA only serves to preclude proliferation; it has no authority to inspect nuclear weapon states to verify whether they are reducing the size of their arsenals. The nuclear weapon states have no obligation to keep the IAEA up to date on their activities.



Mohammed ElBaradei of Egypt, Director General of the IAEA, attends a meeting in Vienna (Austria) on a resolution against Iran.

Picture: ANP.

Is the India–US deal the end of the NPT?

Many view the India–US deal concluded on 6 September 2008 and approved by the US Congress a month later as the death knell for the NPT. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) caved in to US pressure and agreed that India had a right to nuclear technology even without being a party to the non-proliferation treaty. The NSG, which has 45 member countries, was actually established to prevent nuclear trade with ‘pariah states’.

The US wants to make an exception for India to obtain its strategic cooperation and because it considers India ‘proliferation proof’. The US does not expect this country to provide other countries with nuclear weapons. The Indian government has given IAEA permission to inspect some 14 nuclear installations, but it may not inspect military installations where India works on nuclear weapons. Proponents look on the bright side. India is at least taking a step toward the worldwide non-proliferation system and has agreed to a unilateral, voluntary halt to nuclear testing. Opponents see the dark side and consider it a complete disaster because:

- it undermines the NPT;
- worse, it sells out the NPT to obtain orders for the nuclear industry;
- it is a deal that contains no hard guarantees that there will be no Indian nuclear tests in the future;
- there is no prohibition against delivering enriched uranium, which India could covertly pass to its military programme.
- this is a case of applying a double standard.

This provides a dangerous precedent that will make Pakistan, North Korea and Iran less inclined to halt their nuclear programmes. The Netherlands was one of the last six countries to stand firm. But it is rumoured that the Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway succumbed to US pressure leaving only Austria, New Zealand and Ireland as the sole opponents.⁷⁸

The IAEA is subject to yet other restrictions. The verification system has several weaknesses. The introduction of a voluntary additional protocol has increased the IAEA’s access to locations and information, but not all countries have ratified the

⁷⁷ See also Panofski, K. H. (2007), ‘Peace Talk: My Life Negotiating Science and Policy’, in: *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November/December, pp. 48-53.

⁷⁸ See: Colijn, K., *Vrij Nederland*, 8 September 2008.

protocol. That puts a restriction on its operation. Moreover, the IAEA does not have the power to prosecute countries that violate the NPT. In the past, references to the Security Council where five nuclear weapon states have a veto seldom led to unanimous, decisive and effective action.

Yet, a robust inspection system is very important. Compulsory signing of the additional protocol would be an important step forward. Authorisation to carry out inspection in nuclear weapon states would contribute greatly to the promised transparency and to support for the NPT. It is also important that the IAEA be given more resources to perform these tasks.⁷⁹ In addition, Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of IAEA, argued in early 2008 for putting the entire fissile material cycle, including the monitoring and control of nuclear waste, under supranational supervision, “so that no one country has the exclusive capability to produce the material for nuclear weapons”.⁸⁰

Ruud Lubbers, former Dutch prime minister, has lent his support to this call. He urges that the IAEA – like the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom, see section 4.2) – be given a supranational status as legal owner of all the fissile material used for peaceful purposes.⁸¹

Call to the EU on the need for a common commitment to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

All EU member states are parties to the NPT. They have an obligation to breathe new life into the NPT. Former Dutch prime minister Lubbers thinks the time has come for the Netherlands and the EU as legal successor to Euratom to revitalise the NPT. Moreover, the Netherlands must press the EU to create a suitable authoritative body to supervise the job of making and keeping the world free of nuclear weapons. The EU could do this by convoking a nuclear ad hoc Security Council plus consisting of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Brazil, South Africa, India, Japan and the EU. This ad hoc Security Council plus would have to ensure that:

- the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would receive supranational authority over the production of nuclear fuels for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This can pursue the task performed by Euratom as owner of fissile material in Europe;
- the ad hoc Security Council expansion group unites around the principle that UN blue berets can be used (where needed and with a UN mandate) to guarantee an effective supranational IAEA and perform inspections and verifications;
- the nuclear weapon states once again commit themselves to reduce gradually the number of weapons and ultimately to abolish them;
- the UN or a body it appoints, like the supranational IAEA, reports in a manner to be determined on this gradual reduction;
- the ad hoc Security Council expansion group unites around the promotion of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) while awaiting the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

⁷⁹ *Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity, The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond*, report prepared by an independent Commission at the request of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, May 2008, p.6. <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/PDF/2020report0508.pdf>.

⁸⁰ ElBaradei, M. (2008), ‘Reviving Nuclear Disarmament’, lecture delivered to the conference on *Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons*, Oslo, 27 February 2008. <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2008/ebsp2008n002.html>.

⁸¹ See: Lubbers, R. (2005, 2006 and 2008), *Moving beyond the Stalemate: Addressing the Nuclear Challenge by Supranational Means*, August 2005 and the three follow-up papers dating from 2006 and 2008
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050830_ciep_briefing_lubbers_nuclearchallenge.pdf
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20060421_ciep_briefing_lubbers_nuclearchallenge_followup.pdf
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20061000_ciep_briefing_lubbers_2ndfollowup_b.pdf
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20081014_nuclear_challenge_lubbers.pdf.

Chapter 4

Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ): Confidence-building Measure and a Good Example

4.1. Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs)

The concerns around nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism and the hope nourished by the publications of the various Gangs of Four and the speech by Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Verhagen⁸² have drawn attention to the need for a world free of nuclear weapons. The election of Barack Obama as new president of the US fuels the hope that this attention will produce results. It is important that the political debate on a world without nuclear weapons keeps its sights locked on ultimately reaching a world without nuclear weapons without getting bogged down in illusions or talk without commitment.

With this in mind, it is important to reactivate the idea of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs). NWFZs operate essentially as confidence-building arrangements in anticipation of a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, they also contribute to regional security and stability.

Catalytic effect

Because the 1959 Antarctic Treaty banned all military activity from this area, this continent is de facto free of nuclear weapons. The first real NWFZ came into existence in 1967 as a result of the Tlatelolco Treaty.⁸³ This was before the NPT; it concerned Latin America and the Caribbean areas. Later, NWFZs were set up in the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok in 1995), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba in 1996) and the five central Asian republics (Treaty of Semipalantinsk in 2006). The IAEA's general director Mohamed ElBaradei noted in 2007 that "Today these five Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones cover between them nearly two-thirds of the countries of the World and virtually the entirety of the southern hemisphere. In effect, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones constitute important first steps to achieve a nuclear-weapon free world."⁸⁴

As we said, NWFZs can contribute to improving regional stability. They can also be catalysts for compliance with obligations under the NPT and for the advent of a world without nuclear weapons. That certainly holds when it comes to freeing regions, threatened with or undergoing proliferation, from nuclear weapons, as is the case in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. In principle, the protocols in NWFZ treaties offer a legally binding foundation to guarantee the security of the countries in the NWFZs. In signing the protocols, the five nuclear weapon states Russia, USA, France, Great Britain and China promise to respect the status of the zones, not to use nuclear weapons there and not to threaten to use them there. However, the ratification of these protocols is long in coming. Thus far the five nuclear weapon states have ratified only the Tlatelolco Treaty. The ratification of treaties by non-nuclear weapon states is also far from satisfactory. Because of that, some treaties that lie at the basis of NWFZs (e.g. in Africa) are not legally binding. It is striking that China has indicated its willingness to ratify the Treaty of Bangkok independently of other nuclear weapon states.

4.2. A Nuclear Weapon-Free Middle East

More than ever the Middle East resembles a powder keg from which wars and violence can escalate to global dimensions. Mixing nuclear weapons with that powder keg increases the risk factor. Syria's and Iran's (and in the past Iraq's) efforts to obtain nuclear weapons are inseparable from Israel's nuclear status.

Freeing this geopolitically strategic region of nuclear weapons would strongly contribute to stability in the world. But it is by no means certain whether creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East can be the first step or whether this must be included in a broader (peace) process.

⁸² In a speech delivered to the Atlantic Commission on 27 March 2008, Minister Maxime Verhagen said, "I (...) endorse the call by four US elder statesmen for a world free of nuclear weapons." "We should seize the opportunity of the NPT Review Conference in 2010 to show new resolve to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons." <http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/actueel/speeches,2008/03/Speech-Verhagen-bij-Atlantische-Commissie.html>.

⁸³ The Netherlands ratified additional protocol 1 for countries de jure and de facto responsible for implementing the treaty.

⁸⁴ ElBaradei, M., (2007), *Statement on the Fortieth Anniversary of the Adoption and Opening for Signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)*, Mexico City, 14 February 2007.

The Tlatelolco Treaty

The Tlatelolco Treaty (or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, as it is formally known) is an agreement in which the countries of Latin America and ultimately the Caribbean states undertook to keep their region free of nuclear weapons. The treaty was signed in the northern Mexican city of Tlatelolco in 1967 and took effect in 1968. But the treaty only actually became meaningful in the 1990s after disputes between Argentina and Brazil were resolved. But even before that it had a high symbolic value. It marked the first time that a large, inhabited region was declared free of nuclear weapons. The Tlatelolco Treaty forbids “testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons” and the “receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons”. The treaty was signed and ratified by all Latin American and Caribbean countries. Cuba was the last to ratify the treaty; it did so in 2002. In signing the protocols, the US, France, the UK and the Netherlands agreed to keep their territories in Latin America and the Caribbean free of nuclear weapons. The treaty forbids nuclear weapon states from carrying out activities that would undermine the region’s nuclear weapon free status. In 1982, Alfonso García Robles and Alva Myrdal received the Nobel Peace Prize for their work on the Tlatelolco Treaty.

Changed situation

Egypt and Iran had already launched the idea for a NWFZ in the Middle East in 1974. In 1990 Egypt expanded the proposal into a weapon-of-mass-destruction-free zone (in response to Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons in the 1980s). In 1995, during the NPT Review Conference, a resolution was adopted supporting the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognising that a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction would contribute to this.⁸⁵ The primary obstacle for creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction was Israel’s refusal to accede to the NPT, to permit the IAEA to monitor its nuclear weapons and ultimately to dismantle them.

The political situation in the Middle East has changed drastically since 1995. The establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction seems to serve Israel’s security interests now more than ever. Three developments are responsible for this:

- the erosion of the non-proliferation regime
- the nebulous intentions behind Iran’s nuclear ambitions
- the irrelevance of nuclear weapons for Israel’s immediate security. Two futures are possible.⁸⁶

In the first, the Middle East becomes a region where several states develop nuclear programmes in response to Israel’s nuclear status and Iran’s ambivalent nuclear ambitions. That would be detrimental to Israel’s security and would erode the NPT. In the second, the states in the Middle East recognise their collective security interests and agree to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and to strengthen the NPT. Now more than ever banning weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons there seem to benefit Israel’s security interest. Israel and the region now face a choice between guaranteed danger of proliferation or the challenge of disarmament. The outcome of this choice will impact on the stability of both the Middle East and the World.

Essential zones

The first steps toward establishing a NWFZ or a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East are:

- having Egypt, Iran and Israel ratify the CTBT
- a collective no first use agreement in which the nations in the region take a confidence-building step toward a weapon-of-mass-destruction-free zone
- freezing and prohibition of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities
- the expansion of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom, see following box) to include the Middle East and providing nuclear fuel via Euratom
- mobilising public support in the countries concerned.

IKV and Pax Christi are ready to help shape political opinion on the need for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and Europe. They are seeking suitable partners for doing this job.

⁸⁵ For a fuller report on the NPT Review Conference see Johnson, R. (1995), *Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Risks and Reckonings*, ACRONYM Report No. 7, London.

⁸⁶ Johnson, R (2007), ‘Rethinking Security Interests for a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in the Middle East’, in: *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue No. 86.

4.3. A Nuclear Weapon-Free Europe

According to various estimates, approx. 350 US nuclear weapons⁸⁷ are still stationed in Europe on bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Turkey and the Netherlands. There is also still a large number of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia many of which are probably stationed in the European part of Russia. In November 2008, Russian President Medvedev threatened to deploy such weapons along the Polish border in response to the US installation of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Unlike the US, Russia has not stationed nuclear weapons outside its own territory. All Russian weapons are within the borders of Russia. The nuclear weapons that once stood in parts of the former Soviet Union have been withdrawn. Moreover, these former Soviet countries have been officially recognised as Nuclear Weapon-Free states. The former Soviet states in central Asia have even decided to create a NWFZ. It would enhance European security when the former Soviet states located in Europe (Georgia, the Ukraine) would join in a European NWFZ. That would require cooperation from the US, NATO and Russia. The US and Russia could then be persuaded to remove their tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and the European part of Russia and provide

Euratom

The European Atomic Energy Community, or Euratom for short, is an international organisation set up to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Euratom membership is made up of EU member countries. The organisation was established on 25 March 1957 in the same Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community (EEC). The European Atomic Energy Community is an independent organisation, but its membership and organisation are fully integrated in the European Union. The Treaty of Rome took effect and the Euratom Commission settled in Brussels on 1 January 1958. When the Merger Treaty took effect in 1967, Euratom, the EEC and the ECSC were given one Commission, one Council and one budget.

a negative security guarantee to members of the new NWFZ. In addition, NATO would have to end any role for nuclear weapons in its security strategy.

Nuclear Umbrella

There are fewer US nuclear weapons in Europe than there were in 1991. Greece withdrew from NATO's Nuclear Strike Mission in 2001 and in 2005 nuclear weapons were removed from Ramstein air force base in Germany. The tacit reduction of the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Germany is consistent with the broad political support in the country for becoming a nuclear weapon free state.⁸⁸ There are also reports that refer to a secret removal of US nuclear weapons from Lakenheath air forces base in the UK.⁸⁹

European countries shelter to various degrees under the US nuclear umbrella. US nuclear weapons are stored in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey and the Netherlands. Some countries, among them the Netherlands, allow their own planes and crews to be available for use of these weapons in time of war.

In the past, Great Britain, Italy, Turkey and Germany also hosted US nuclear bombs that US planes would drop should war break out in Europe. The US holds the view that the NPT ceases to exist as soon as war breaks out. That releases the US and its allies from the obligation of complying with Articles I and II that forbid the transfer of nuclear weapons to other states and obliges non-nuclear weapon states to renounce nuclear weapons. In that case, the US is entitled to make nuclear weapons available to its NATO allies. This view on the role of US nuclear weapons in Europe has no legal basis and should be rejected.⁹⁰

Furthermore, all NATO countries are involved in preparing and planning the use of nuclear weapons in the NATO context. This involvement is channelled via institutions within the NATO structure, like the Nuclear Planning Group. Because of their NATO membership, NATO allies are involved in the US flexible response strategy in which nuclear weapons play an important role. The geographical purview of this strategy grows each time NATO expands. Each expansion makes the distinction between nuclear weapon states and their allies when compared to truly non-nuclear weapon states more glaring. The allies' status (nuclear weapon state or

⁸⁷ Update: Kristensen, in his security blog of June 2008 estimates this number to be 150 – 240 at the moment, <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/us-nuclear-weapons-withdrawn-from-the-united-kingdom.php>.

⁸⁸ Kristensen, H. (2007), 'United States Removes Nuclear Weapons from German Base, Documents Indicate', in *FAS Strategic Security Blog*, 9 July. See also: <http://omaha.craigslist.org/pol/731898966.html>.

⁸⁹ Kristensen, H. (2008), 'US Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn from the United Kingdom', in: *FAS Strategic Security Blog*, 26 June.

⁹⁰ See: Griendt, J. van de (2007), 'De Nederlandse kernwapentaak: Tijd voor afschaffing', in: *International Spectator*, Vol. 61, pp. 240-243; see also: Sijde, B. van der (2008), op. cit., pp. 29-30.

not?) is unclear and can best be described as semi-nuclear weapon states.

A Vague Threat

The arguments used today to legitimate the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe refer i.a. to the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia and Russia’s political repositioning in the world. It is also said that the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe will guarantee the US involvement in NATO and hence in European security. A US argument is that these weapons allow the US to exert an influence on the defence policy of the European countries where they are located. The fact that European semi-nuclear weapon states support the US view that the installation of nuclear weapons in Europe is not a violation of the NPT is also to the US advantage, even in the new post-Cold War situation. After all, the nuclear weapons on European territory, especially those in Italy and Turkey, do play a role: they increase the risk that countries in the near-by Middle East that do not look kindly on the US will develop weapons of mass destruction.

There are good arguments for removing US nuclear weapons from Europe. The weapons have lost their military significance with the end of the Cold War. Even if they would still have military significance, it is technically possible for the US to fire these from its own territory. Moreover, the presence of US nuclear weapons puts a burden on Europe’s and the West’s relations with Russia and inhibits progress in the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, the threat from the Middle East is too vague and indirect to provide a military justification for US weapons in Europe. Furthermore, the removal of US nuclear weapons from Italy and especially Turkey can encourage the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Last but not least, a recent report from the US Air Force (USAF) shows that the security around US nuclear weapons in Europe is not what it should be.⁹¹

Nuclear Weapons in the Netherlands

The presence of nuclear weapons at Volkel AFB in the Netherlands places a heavy burden on decision-making about the Dutch defence expenditures. One example of such is the decision to replace the F-16 by the Joint Strike Fighter. The nuclear tie with the US influences the purchase in the sense that quality level and replacement timing is linked to that of the USAF. The Dutch nuclear task falls under the NATO, but is laid down in several bilateral agreements between the Netherlands and the US. The weapons stationed at Volkel AFB are owned by the US and are guarded by US military personnel. Dutch F-16 pilots are trained to drop them. The replacement of the F-16 would be a suitable moment to do away with this Dutch nuclear task.

In the defence paper prepared by the PvdA (Dutch Labour) party in 2007 places the discussion on the Dutch nuclear task in the broader context of modernising the military. “In practice, the technology involved in free fall bombs is rather obsolete; it does not fit in with the new aircraft’s enhanced capabilities. Participation in a new nuclear role for which new nuclear weapons would have to be developed is also undesirable. For these reasons, we advocate a political discussion on the continuation of this militarily antiquated role.”⁹²

4.4. Nuclear Weapon-Free Africa

The Treaty of Pelindaba was established in 1995; 26 countries have ratified it. It will obtain force of law as soon as two more (African) countries have ratified it.⁹³ Of the nuclear weapon states, the US and Russia have both signed the treaty, but have not ratified it yet. They

U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe 2008						
Country	Air Base	Custodian	Delivery	Deployment		Remarks
				(WS3 vaults)	(Est. Weapons)*	
Belgium	Kleine Brogel	701 MUNSS	Belgian F-16s (10 th Fighter Wing)	11	10-20	Nuclear inspections in 2006 and 2008.
Germany	Büchel	702 MUNSS	German Tornados (33 rd Fighter-Bomber)	11	10-20	Nuclear inspection in 2007.
Holland	Volkel	703 MUNSS	Dutch F-16s (1 st Fighter Wing)	11	10-20	Nuclear inspections in 2006 and 2008.
Italy	Aviano	31 st Fighter Wing	US F-16s	18	50	Nuclear inspection in 2007.
	Gheddi Torre	704 MUNSS	Italian Tornados (6 th Stormo)	11	20-40	Rumored decision to withdraw 704 MUNSS and consolidate weapons at Aviano.
Turkey	Incirk	39 Air Base Wing	Rotational US aircraft from other wings when needed.	25	50-90	Nuclear inspections in 2006 and 2008. No permanent FW at base and no aircraft 'generation.' National Turkish nuclear strike mission in doubt.
United Kingdom	Lakenheath	48 th Fighter Wing	US F-15Es	33	50-110	Nuclear inspection possibly in 2007; another rumored for 2009. Significant changes rumored.
Total				200-350*		

* Previous estimates have been provided in [United States Removes Nuclear Weapons From German Base, Documents Indicate](#) (FAS, July 2007) and [U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe](#) (NIRDC, 2005).
Source: Hans M. Kristensen, "USAF Report: 'Most' Nuclear Weapon Sites in Europe do not Meet DOD Security Requirements," FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 19, 2008.

⁹¹ See: <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/usaf-report-%E2%80%9Cmost%E2%80%9D-nuclear-weapon-sites-in-europe-do-not-meet-us-security-requirements.php>.

⁹² PvdA Defence Brief, November 2007.

⁹³ By the end of August 2008, nearly thirty countries had not yet ratified the treaty. They are: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti; Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Liberia, Malawi, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.

See: Zie: http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/African_Nuclear_Weapon.pdf.

wanted to keep open a possibility to respond to biological or chemical threats from one of the African countries. This reticence in 1996 seemed to arise from the US fear that Libya had a chemical weapons factory. But even after the US and others declared Libya free of weapons of mass destruction and after this African country signed and ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba in 2005, the US and Russia refused to change their minds.⁹⁴ During a conference on the Treaty of Pelindaba in the spring of 2008, the parties to the agreement issued a persuasive appeal to the US and Russia to change their nuclear policy and grant full negative security guarantees.⁹⁵

The treaty's legal force is important for Africa in addition to having great symbolic value. Two members of this NWFZ, South Africa and Libya, used to have nuclear weapons or attempted to obtain them. The ratification of the treaty is also important for the security of Europe and the Middle East, to which the treaty territory is adjacent. It can also contribute to creating NWFZs in these regions.

4.5. A Nuclear Weapon-Free Asia

At present Asia has two NWFZs, one in Southeast Asia and one in Central Asia. We offer a brief description of them below, then go more deeply into the situation around India and Pakistan, the two nuclear weapon states in this region that have been the subject of recent discussion.

*Southeast Asia*⁹⁶

Already since the 1970s the NWFZ in Southeast Asia has been on the agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as part of their 'Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality'. The treaty creating this zone was opened for signing in Bangkok in December 1995. Since then ten countries from the region have signed it⁹⁷; it entered into force on 27 March 1997. The introduction to the treaty states that the region wants to contribute to general and total nuclear disarmament, to regional peace and stability, to nuclear non-

proliferation and to the protection of the region against environmental pollution and the dangers of radioactive waste or other radioactive material.

Since the treaty took effect, a protocol to it has been opened for the five nuclear weapon states (Russia, US, France, Great Britain and China) to sign. In signing this protocol they would undertake "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty". These states have not yet signed.

*Central Asia*⁹⁸

The five Central Asian states⁹⁹ signed a treaty on 8 September 2006 setting up a Central Asian NWFZ. This was the fifth in the world and the second in the northern hemisphere. The treaty was signed in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan), one of the former test sites for Russian nuclear weapons. This happened ten years after the countries ratified the Almaty Declaration on the Creation of a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. The Central Asian treaty has not yet entered into force. Despite opposition from the US, Great Britain and France, many other countries supported the plan to establish a NWFZ in this region. This support was visible in the various UN General Assembly meetings and during the NPT review process. This zone shows a greater level of dedication to nuclear disarmament than similar zones in other parts of the world because these countries have had nuclear weapons on their territory, are surrounded by states with nuclear weapons (Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Israel) and have Russian and US military bases within their territory. The James Martin Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies calls the zone "an important antidote and positive counter-example to Iranian and North Korean nuclear brinkmanship".¹⁰⁰ However, the importance of this treaty reaches further than its direct political impact. The agreement contains specifications that reinforce regional and international non-proliferation. The Central Asian states are the first countries legally bound to expanded IAEA safeguards on their civil nuclear facilities. The treaty also obliges these states to maintain international standards for the physical security of their nuclear material. This

⁹⁴ See: http://cns.miis.edu/stories/080331_pelindaba.htm.

⁹⁵ See: http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/treaty_pelindaba/pdfs/pelindaba_workshop_summary.pdf.

⁹⁶ See: Diamond, H. (1997), *SEANWFZ Enters Into Force; US Considers Signing Protocol*. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_04/seanfzw.

⁹⁷ Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

⁹⁸ See: IAEA (2006), *Central Asia: Towards a Nuclear-Free World*, https://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/central_asia.html. See also: James Martin Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies. *Central Asian States Establish Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone Despite U.S. Opposition*, <https://cns.miis.edu/stories/060905.htm>.

⁹⁹ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

¹⁰⁰ See: <http://cns.miis.edu/stories/060905.htm>.

engagement is an important measure against terrorists' smuggling. The agreement also addresses region-related environmental problems. The presence of nuclear facilities dating from the time of the Soviet Union within the territory of these states and the production and testing of nuclear weapons there has damaged the environment. All signatories to this treaty must therefore fully comply with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

India and Pakistan

Neither Pakistan nor India has signed the NPT or the CTBT. In 1998, both countries carried out nuclear tests and consider their nuclear arsenals as necessary for deterrence. Their distrust of one another runs very deep. Kashmir is the rhetorical nuclear flashpoint. Pakistan felt betrayed when the US and India agreed to cooperate in September 2006. Now that its ally in the war on terror was helping its archenemy regarding nuclear issues, Pakistan decided to turn to China as primary source of its nuclear raw material.¹⁰¹

As long as Pervez Musharraf was both president and general, large sums of money kept Pakistan's nuclear arsenal safe in the hands of the military and the government. The installation of a civilian government after the elections in February 2008 has thus far done little to change the army's strong position, since military power is interwoven in all segments of political and social life.¹⁰² The fear that extremists (Taliban, Al-Qaida) will gain access to nuclear weapons is a nightmare in the West. The current situation in Pakistan and its neighbour is distressing. This is under the control of the Pakistani government and its security service. The heated responses from the governments of India and Pakistan to the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 and the India's serious preparations to carry out air strikes over Pakistan show that the nuclear threat to the region is present even now; there is no need to wait until extremists obtain these weapons.

¹⁰¹ Kernenade, W. van (2007), *Detente between China and India*, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No 16, The Hague (H4); for a summary see: <http://www.clingendael.nl/cdsp/publications/?id=7144&&type=summary>.

¹⁰² Siddiq, A. (2007), *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, London: Pluto Press.

Agenda for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

A realistic strategy is needed to kick-start nuclear disarmament. This strategy must contribute to a feasible change of course that is politically and militarily acceptable. The success of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is highly dependent on political will in the US and Russia and in the other nuclear weapon states. Perkovich and Acton, Daalder and Lodal, and Mendelsohn¹⁰³ have investigated a feasible change of course. We underwrite the results of this research and our proposals are compatible with it and with the proposals from the Middle Powers Initiative (see section 3.4). Many of these propositions can also be found in the proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Convention¹⁰⁴ from which IKV and Pax Christi also drew inspiration.

A realistic strategy for nuclear disarmament is possible, certainly given growing international awareness that the now 15-year old period of inertia must end and that the encouraging journey on the path to a world free of nuclear weapons must be resumed. Two-thirds of all former US secretaries of defence, secretaries of state and national security advisors support the call by the US Gang of Four (George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn) for a radical elimination of nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁵ In Europe, too, many former and current political leaders (there are Gangs of Four in the UK, Germany and Italy as well) support this call, among them is our own Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁶ It would be good were Gangs of Four to be set up in various other European countries so they could join in signing a manifesto for a Europe free of nuclear weapons and then canvass to create the greatest possible support base for this manifesto. It is important that the composition of the Gangs of Four shows the broadest possible political spectrum. Barack Obama's election to the presidency of the US makes this goal seem more

attainable. In an interview on 24 September 2008, he said, "... I will make the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide a central element of U.S. nuclear policy".¹⁰⁷ The Global Zero¹⁰⁸ initiative that has drawn worldwide support also calls for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. IKV and Pax Christi and other civil society organisations can and must add to this momentum by mobilising political and public support. IKV and Pax Christi are convinced that social and public pressure is needed to shake awake governments that still have failed to comply with the obligations they undertook when signing the NPT 40 years ago. That is why these organisations want to help turn on that pressure.

That is why IKV and Pax Christi are working with international networks such as ICAN¹⁰⁹, other peace organisations, churches and activists to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons and why they want support from (former) political leaders. After all, changes can be stimulated from below, but ultimately must be made from above. Appealing political leaders must join forces with civil society organisations to achieve this goal. Such a campaign can achieve political impact by deploying key people that can inspire other prominent policymakers.

IKV and Pax Christi, operating in their joint work organisation IKV Pax Christi, will dedicate themselves to getting nuclear disarmament onto the agenda again. Their campaign will centre on the Netherlands and Europe. Their ultimate goal is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. On this they leave no doubts. The arguments they will convey to achieve this mission are based on:

- *moral and/or religious grounds*: threatening to and use of nuclear weapons is a morally unacceptable

¹⁰³ Perkovich, G., & Acton, J. M. (2008), op. cit., Daalder, I., & Lodal, J. (2008), op. cit., Mendelsohn, J. (2008), op. cit.

¹⁰⁴ International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (2007), *Securing our Survival (SOS): The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention*, Cambridge (Mass.): IPPNW. <http://www.icanw.org/securing-our-survival>.

¹⁰⁵ Verhagen, M. (2008), *Speech Verhagen bij Atlantische Commissie*. [Minister Verhagen's speech to the Atlantic Commission]. See: http://www.minbuza.nl/en/news/speeches_and_articles,2008/03/Speech-Verhagen-at-Atlantische-Commissie.html.

¹⁰⁶ See: *Arms Control Today*, 24 September 2008; <http://www.armscontrol.org/2008election>.

¹⁰⁷ See: www.globalzero.org.

¹⁰⁸ The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) is a worldwide movement that the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) set up during the NPT PrepCom meeting in 2007. See: <http://www.icanw.org/>. Pax Christi Australia and IKV Pax Christi are partners of ICAN. IKV Pax Christi regularly works with Mayors for Peace and supports Dutch mayors who have joined this initiative.

¹⁰⁹ See: Daalder, I., & Lodal, J. (2008), op. cit., p. 81.

breach of the right to live without fear (of extermination) and actually using them is a gross destruction of creation and the right to life that it implies

- *legal grounds*: possessing and using nuclear weapons are inconsistent with the spirit of the NPT, which nearly all the world's states have signed, as well as with the principles of humanitarian law and the law of war
- *political and military considerations*: now that the Cold War is over, the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD) has lost its meaning; the logic of nuclear deterrence does hardly anything to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the risk that state and non-state actors (terrorists) will acquire nuclear weapons has grown. That is why complete nuclear disarmament must be achieved within a foreseeable period and in a careful, transparent, verifiable procedure.

If the world is to be freed of nuclear weapons, political leadership and courage need to be displayed, mainly by the new US president. A spearhead of European countries can take steps that will move nuclear weapon states (primarily the US) to keep their promise to achieve a worldwide reduction and ultimately the abolition of nuclear weapons. In short, European countries, not least of all the Netherlands, must show that they have the political courage to work seriously on a world free of nuclear weapons. European efforts can contribute to ending the inertia that has lasted too long.

IKV Pax Christi wants to harness the present momentum, to call upon governments, religious leaders, social institutions and citizens to support the following appeal for a world free of nuclear weapons. The appeal will serve as starting point for a new IKV Pax Christi campaign for nuclear disarmament.



Henry Kissinger, one of the members of the US Gang of Four. With George S. Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn he calls for a world free of nuclear weapons.

Picture: ANP.

Appeal for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

The world still lives under the threat of nuclear weapons. Despite the end of the Cold War, there are still more than 25,000 nuclear weapons. Thousands of them can be launched within moments. 9 countries now possess nuclear weapons. There is a growing danger that terrorists will obtain nuclear materials.

Today, forty years after the Cold War, the promise that the nuclear powers made in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons has yet to be fulfilled. Their military planning and foreign policies foresee retaining nuclear weapons far into the future. The role of nuclear weapons in tense international situations is again expanding. The costs are enormous, more than 50 billion dollars annually in the United States alone.

We consider continued reliance on the threat of nuclear destruction of human life morally unacceptable. A world free of nuclear-weapons does not lie beyond the politically possible. It is a question of political will. And there are new opportunities. It is heartening to note that, since the end of the Cold War, many nuclear weapons from what used to be much larger arsenals have been dismantled. It is encouraging that the United States and Russia are cooperating on additional reductions. It is significant that they have performed no nuclear tests in recent years.

Former foreign secretaries Kissinger and Shultz now call upon the United States to develop a new policy aimed at freeing the world from all nuclear weapons within the foreseeable future. They have now gained the support of at least two thirds of all former US defence and foreign affairs ministers and national security advisers. Their effort is no longer aimed at reducing nuclear weapons but at eliminating them radically. Moreover, President Obama has made clear that he will put nuclear disarmament high on his agenda. We support the call issued by aforesaid former foreign secretaries and secretaries of defense. We believe that a world free of nuclear weapons is a moral obligation and a political necessity.

We are convinced that we now have a historic opportunity to fulfil the promise of a world free of nuclear weapons, and this no later than 2020. This will be possible if government leaders clearly speak out NOW in no uncertain terms and if they take irrevocable steps in this direction.

We urgently ask our government to take action now by:

1. Declaring officially that it supports the call for a world free of nuclear weapons by 2020 latest.
2. Seeking support for this call from all European countries and NATO allies.
3. Urging at the 2009 NATO summit to end the political and military role of nuclear weapons in NATO's security policy.
4. Speaking out in favour of a Europe that will be free of nuclear weapons no later than 2015, taking steps to achieve this and ending the nuclear task of the Dutch Air Force.
5. Advocating that nuclear warheads no longer be kept on hair-trigger alert but stored safely and apart from their delivery systems.
6. Promoting the entry into force of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
7. Discouraging any further modernisation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
8. Promoting agreement in 2010 on a treaty that forbids production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
9. Promoting supranational control of the entire fissile material cycle of nuclear materials, also as a way to prevent nuclear terrorism.
10. Urging the governments of the United States, Poland and the Czech Republic to refrain from deploying a missile defence shield in Europe.
11. Setting the stage for an independent and authoritative international technical investigation into all aspects relating to the worldwide abolition of all nuclear weapons.

When taken by a resolute vanguard of countries, these steps can move states with nuclear weapons within their own alliance as well as Russia and China to free the world of nuclear weapons by 2020. This can also get the nuclear powers like India, Israel and Pakistan that are not part of the NPT to follow suit. That is why we ask governments, religious leaders, civil society organisations and citizens to support this appeal. The hope for a world free of nuclear weapons will be more than a dream if enough people lend it their support.

IKV and Pax Christi: History, Positions and Strategy

The Dutch peace movements Pax Christi Netherlands and the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) have never adopted one-sided positions in the (inter)church debate or in politics. They did not opt for a pacifist position or for indiscriminate support for NATO, which they preferred to approach critically. Moreover, they linked opposition to the arms race with commitment to human rights in Eastern Europe. Rather than making matters easier, this often led to criticism from various quarters. For some they were Reagan's flunkies for others Moscow's toadies. That Pax Christi and IKV adopt their own characteristic position is particularly evident when it comes to the question of nuclear weapons.

Pax Christi

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the nuclear weapons issue was the main reason why in the 1960s the Dutch branch of Pax Christi shifted from being a spiritual, inward-oriented church-related peace organisation to becoming a modern peace movement. The same discussions on nuclear weapons in which Pax Christi participated lead to the establishment of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council in 1966.

Spearhead

The first steps in Pax Christi's development into a modern peace movement were taken in a 1965 brochure entitled *On the Way with Pacem in Terris*.¹¹⁰ In issuing this publication, the Dutch section of Pax Christi stood in the vanguard of Pax Christi International. The subtitle of this brochure, which drew its inspiration from the papal encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (1963), was "Peace in the Atomic Age". For the first time the authors ask questions that still apply today, such as, "If there is no room in Christian thinking for the notion of total war, is there room for a weapon that, by its nature, makes war total? If traditional teaching views war as justified only when the good to be achieved outweighs the attendant suffering and destruction, what is the good that justifies an atomic war?"¹¹¹

It is telling that to such burning questions no easy answers were found in partisan religious or political perspectives. The final chapters start by outlining the political steps needed to prevent an atomic catastrophe: disarmament, coexistence and strengthening the UN. *On the Way with Pacem in Terris* ended by calling upon Christian responsibility to help find a solution to this world problem. "Wherever a Christian reflects on world peace, he/she stands for the core of the gospel message and for a testimony to the faith".¹¹²

IKV

After fierce debate, the Netherlands Reformed Church published a lengthy pastoral letter entitled *The Nuclear Weapons Issue* (1962). It called its total rejection 'a no without any yes'. That implied that Christians could never participate in a war in which nuclear weapons were used. However, the 'no' was directed more clearly toward the *use* of nuclear weapons than to *possessing* them. The pacifist movement Church and Peace and the so-called historic peace churches objected to this Reformed view and called it ambiguous. All this led to much debate within and between the churches, including – via Pax Christi – the Roman Catholic Church. That resulted in various churches wanting to remain focused on the nuclear weapons issue. The Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) was set up in 1966 for this purpose.

Dutch Campaign

After IKV was established, IKV and Pax Christi – apart and together – continued along this path both in the churches and in the political world. Nuclear weapons remained one of the most central issues, but not as an isolated problem. There was always attention for the broader political and military context, such as the division of Europe. Over the years, IKV developed great expertise in peace and security issues, and more specifically in nuclear weapons. The annual peace week in September was the best opportunity to involve a broader public in the peace movement's activities. As of 1977 this was done as part of

¹¹⁰ Sources for an extensive description of this history are Schennink, B., Becker, M., Bos, H., & Arends, C. (red.) (1998), *In Beweging voor de Vrede - Veertig Jaar Pax Christi: Geschiedenis, Werkwijze, Achterban en Invloed*. Cahier 43. Nijmegen: Studiecentrum voor Vredesvraagstukken; Megens, N., & Reiding, H. (1999), *Bewegen Binnen Smalle Marges. Pax Christi Nederland, 1965-1990*. Cahier 78. Nijmegen: Studiecentrum voor Vredesvraagstukken; Berg, D. van den (ed.) (2006), *IKV 1996-2006. Veertig Jaar Mobiliseren voor Vrede*. Den Haag: IKV.

¹¹¹ Pax Christi Nederland (1965), *Met Pacem in Terris Onderweg: Pax Christi over Vrede in het Atoomtijdperk*.

¹¹² *Ibid*, p. 32.

a national campaign with the slogan ‘Help rid the world of nuclear weapons, let it begin in the Netherlands’. One of the reasons for this campaign was that the much wanted improvement in international relations – and the resulting opportunities for nuclear disarmament – did not materialise. Moreover, nuclear weapons had virtually evaporated from public attention. The campaign contained no ready-to-serve proposal, but did act as stimulus for breaking out of the spiral of continuing arms build-up. IKV drew attention to the fact that the arms build-up was growing ever more dangerous because modernisation continued. And while there were negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons, there were none about the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Moreover, Europe as a battlefield would mean the destruction of Europe: in Europe it made no sense to distinguish between civilian and military targets. IKV’s 1972 policy paper on ‘The Future of Europe’ had already rejected ‘the balance of terror’ as an immoral system. IKV argued for unilateral steps in Europe to get disarmament started and to make the European continent totally free of nuclear weapons.

IKV set to work on real disarmament. It was aware that this could only be achieved gradually. Unilateral Western disarmament steps were to be followed by comparable steps by the Warsaw Pact, the military alliance of communist countries in Eastern Europe and NATO’s counterpart. IKV never lost sight of the political reality, however radical the disarmament proposal sounded. The campaign also served a psychological political objective developed largely by IKV chairman Ben ter Veer. By focusing the campaign on a specific and relatively limited goal, IKV hoped to bring the Dutch population to a point where it (once again) would get a grasp of the nuclear weapons issue. In this way, the issue ceased being the monopoly of defence and foreign affairs specialists. Hundreds of local IKV ‘core groups’ sprung up; they were made up of everyday people who committed themselves to the campaign.

Dissident Organisations

The general secretary of IKV, Mien Jan Faber, was the undisputed leader and ‘face’ of the broad peace

movement. Faber was a realist who kept searching for political compromises. Sometimes radical supporters choked on these compromises. An example was a radio interview in which he said that he could accept temporary deployment of some cruise missiles when this was the only possibility to ultimately reach a political solution.

From the very start the Dutch peace movement linked its activities to international developments and sought to cooperate with similar organisations in other European countries. In addition to other sections of Pax Christi, these were primarily anti-nuclear weapons movements in Western Europe. Among them were the aforesaid British CND and the West German Aktion Sühnezeichen/Friedensdienste. But soon contact was sought with other types of organisations, some of them dissident organisations in Eastern Europe. Examples are Charta 77 and Solidarność

‘Détente from below’ was high on the agenda of those parts of the Western European peace movement that felt akin to IKV and Pax Christi. That was especially the case after Poland declared martial law in December 1981 and Solidarność had to go underground. Many other organisations and even political parties like the West-German Social Democratic Party (SDP) feared that contacts with human rights organisations and dissident groups in Eastern Europe would endanger détente.¹¹³

When the Cold War ended, public interest in the nuclear weapons issue also faded. The main current in the peace movement turned to the all too real wars that broke out in many places, from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait to the wars in the Caucasus, former Yugoslavia and Somalia. IKV and Pax Christi also gave more attention to these conflicts than to nuclear weapons.¹¹⁴ Yet it would not be accurate to say that IKV kept silent about nuclear weapons in the 1990s. It published three brochures (in 1990, 1993 and 1999)¹¹⁵ that served as bases for serious discussions with the Dutch government (1993) and with the Dutch parliament (2000). Pax Christi, too, tried to influence the government, parliament and its own bishops’ conference.¹¹⁶ But public support was gone and did

¹¹³ Pax Christi Nederland (1965), *Met Pacem in Terris Onderweg: Pax Christi over Vrede in het Atoomtijdperk*, p. 94.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Van der Sijde, B. *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

¹¹⁵ These are: *Verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens: Kernprobleem van de negentigerjaren* [The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Nuclear Issue of the 1990s (May 1990), *De geest is nog niet terug in de fles* [The Genie is Not Back in the Bottle] (June 1993) and *Nuclear Arms: From Yes to No and Vice-Versa* (September 1999).

¹¹⁶ See: Pax Christi Netherlands (1995), *Advies van Pax Christi Nederland aan de Rooms-Katholiek bisschoppenconferentie van Nederland ten behoeve van een nieuw herderlijk schrijven over gerechtigheid, vrede en veiligheid* [Pax Christi Netherlands’ Recommendation to the Dutch Roman Catholic Bishops’ Conference on a New Pastoral Letter on Justice, Peace and Security], Utrecht, Pax Christi.

not return. The government and parliament felt no pressure, so did not act.

CHURCHES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Roman Catholic Church

Since the dawn of the atomic age, every pope has spoken about the nuclear weapons issue. Pope Pius XII started from the concept of a 'just war' to pose questions on whether a nuclear war could be controlled and whether the damage that such a war would do was not much greater than the injustice it sought to combat. John XXIII spoke out in *Pacem in Terris* and elsewhere about following the path of peace to remove any chance of a (nuclear) war. In its pastoral constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, the Second Vatican Council for the first time explicitly condemned nuclear war: "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation".¹¹⁷ The Council refrained from a moral judgment on nuclear deterrence, but its scepticism was evident when it wrote, "nor is the so-called balance resulting from this race a sure and authentic peace".¹¹⁸ Pope Paul VI continues in the line of the Council. At the time of the large-scale nuclear weapon debates, Pope John Paul II issued his own statement, "In current conditions "deterrence" based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable".¹¹⁹ This view of an "interim deterrence" is still the official position of the Roman Catholic Church.

Proponents and opponents of nuclear deterrence, inside the church and beyond, have used this last statement by Pope John Paul II to support their own positions. Neither camp could derive from it irrefutable proof that their view was the right one. Yet one may argue that the church's contributions to the nuclear weapons debate were moved more by the 'realistic' and prudent diplomatic approach than by the 'idealistic' doctrinal foundations of the view of the church.

In 1983, the Dutch bishops endorsed the pope's statement. To the disappointment of Pax Christi and others, the bishops also said that they were not competent to speak about unilateral steps toward a world free of nuclear weapons. In doing so, they hid *de facto* behind the space in the pope's statement. US bishops were a good deal more specific. They listed several criteria that had to be satisfied for this to remain considered an acceptable type of deterrent. It became clear that the US strategy of that time did not satisfy those criteria.

Following that line of reasoning, seventy-five US bishops, all members of Pax Christi, in 1998 concluded that the interim acceptance of deterrence was no longer defensible. Indeed, no steps had been taken to get rid of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.¹²⁰ In 1993, the nuncio to the United Nations, archbishop Renato Martino, expressed the view that "the end of the Cold War challenges the world community to adopt a post-nuclear form of security. That security lies in the abolition of nuclear weapons (...)." In 1997, he put it this way, "Nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century. They cannot be justified. They deserve condemnation".¹²¹

The present pope, Benedict XVI, resumed the nuclear weapons theme in his message for the World Day of Peace in 2006, "What can be said, too, about those governments which count on nuclear arms as a means of ensuring the security of their countries? Along with countless persons of good will, one can state that this point of view is not only baneful but also completely fallacious. In a nuclear war there would be no victors, only victims".¹²² He followed this passage with a call "to strive for a progressive and concerted nuclear disarmament". Once again, resolute language in line with Archbishop Martino's statement.

Netherlands Reformed Church ('Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk')

The Netherlands Reformed Church has played a prominent role in the nuclear weapons debate. As noted earlier, the outright rejection of nuclear weapons in

¹¹⁷ Second Vatican Council (1965), Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, par. 80.

http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, par 81.

¹¹⁹ Message to the Second Special Session of the UN for Disarmament (7 June 1982)

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1982/june/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19820607_disarmo-onu_en.html.

¹²⁰ See: http://www.ccnr.org/pax_christi.html. See also: Schennink, B. (1999), 'The Catholic Church and Nuclear Weapons', in: *Nuclear Arms, From Yes To No And Vice-Versa*, Den Haag: IKV. The US Bishops' Conference never endorsed the conclusion of these 75 bishops.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, p. 19.

¹²² Pope Benedict XVI, 1 January 2006 http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/peace/documents/hf_ben-xvi_mes_20051213_xxxix-world-day-peace_en.html.

1962 (elaborated in a new synod report issued in 1964) was more clearly a 'no' to *possessing* nuclear weapons than to *using* them. The reason for this was that nuclear weapons could not simply be dispensed with. Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, the synod did not say that nuclear deterrence was temporarily morally acceptable, on the understanding that certain conditions were satisfied. The Netherlands Reformed Church's outright rejection meant that the period that we are given before it is too late – i.e. the period without a nuclear war – must be seen as a time of God's "gracious patience" (a *Gnadenfrist*). This was a period that had to be used for political activity, from which unilateral steps could not be totally excluded *a priori*.

When IKV resumed the thread in 1977 in its campaign under the slogan 'Help rid the world of nuclear weapons, let it begin in the Netherlands', the discussion started anew in the Netherlands Reformed Church. 1979 witnessed the publication of what would become the famous Reformed 'little blue book', a guideline for discussions on the nuclear weapons issue and on the IKV's proposal to free the world of nuclear weapons. By 1980, the booklet led to the 'Pastoral Letter on Nuclear Armament' – also known as the 'little green book'. The Reformed synod declared that the 'no' also applied in full to the *possession* of nuclear weapons. Unilateral steps were no longer only "not excluded", the synod called for support for the proposal to unilaterally denuclearize the Netherlands. In doing so, the Netherlands Reformed Church sided with IKV's campaign without formally endorsing it.¹²³ In line with the 'little green book', the synod's executive committee notified the congregations about a mass demonstration against new nuclear weapons to be held on 29 October 1983 and the reasons for holding it.

The 'little blue book' was immediately translated into German, as was the 'little green book'. They gave a strong impulse for a new discussion in Eastern and Western Germany, especially in congregations and peace groups in the GDR.

The Reformed Churches in the Netherlands ('Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland')

In 1967, the Reformed Peace Council – a group in the

second-largest Dutch protestant church, called the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands – breathed new life into the discussion on nuclear weapons within this church when it asked for "pressuring the Dutch government to renounce possession and management of nuclear weapons and to refuse to admit them onto its own territory".¹²⁴ At that time the synod abstained from such a position. In 1978, the synod did speak out, calling weapons of mass destruction and methods of mass destruction and the arms race incompatible with God's salvation for this world and thus fundamentally wrong.¹²⁵ This decision was one of the bases for rejecting the neutron bomb. Because the Reformed Churches risked being torn apart into proponents and opponents of nuclear deterrence and the IKV campaign, the synod tried in later years again to reach compromises that all could accept. Yet in 1984 the synod spoke out against placing cruise missiles, although this elicited many negative reactions. At the same time several church members tried make the nuclear weapons issue a question of confession ('status confessionis'): people who are for nuclear weapons are by definition no longer practicing Christians. These proposals – which received no support from IKV or Pax Christi – were never accepted, although they did show how great the polarisation was within the Reformed Churches.

The Smaller Churches

The conflict also reached great heights in several smaller Protestant churches, probably the most in the Evangelical-Lutheran Church. This church was divided about the neutron bomb, but supported the IKV campaign and used the Netherlands Reformed 'little blue book' for its own discussions. In 1983, the synod expressed its great concern for the possible deployment of cruise missiles.

The Remonstrant Brotherhood also used the 'little blue book'. In 1980 it spoke out against mutual deterrence and argued for "unilateral measures in the Netherlands". In so doing, it resumed the line of a statement made in 1957 against "application of nuclear energy as a means of extermination". Despite friction with and about the IKV campaign, the Brotherhood gave its recommendation to the large

¹²³ See: Hogebrink, L. (1999), "The "Gnadenfrist Approach" as a Contribution to Raising the Moral Nuclear Threshold", in *Nuclear Arms, From Yes To No And Vice-Versa*, Den Haag: IKV. One conclusion in this article is that there is a major moral rift between thinking in the Netherlands Reformed Church and the World Council of Churches (see below) on the one side and thinking in the Roman Catholic Church on the other. It is the difference between an unconditional moral rejection and a conditional moral acceptance. Another conclusion, however, is that in practice to a large extent all advocate the same measures.

¹²⁴ Grandia, A. C., & Van der laan, H. (1983), *De gereformeerden en het oorlogsvraagstuk*. Delft: Meinema, p. 90.

¹²⁵ H.B. Gerritsma, J.J. Verdonk, H. Wesseling, H. J. Zeldenrust, (2003), *Geloof niet in oorlog. De discussie in de Gereformeerde Kerken over het oorlogsvraagstuk 1966-1998*, p. 36.

anti-nuclear weapon demonstration in The Hague in 1983. Earlier (1978) it had also supported the position of the Council of Churches in the Netherlands on the neutron bomb.

In 1878, the (Moravian) Evangelical Brotherhood also adopted this position against the neutron bomb. The Brotherhood immediately sent copies to the various Brotherhood congregations in NATO countries. Even though the response of e.g. the Moravian Church in the US was very dismissive, this was an example of how a small church could use its international network. In 1984, the Brotherhood adopted the Council of Churches' letter against modernizing nuclear weapons (see below).

Traditional peace churches like the Mennonite Brotherhood and the Quakers since long supported IKV's campaign. Sometimes they even thought IKV did not go far enough. The rejection of the neutron bomb led to a discussion among Mennonites on whether or not all armaments should be rejected. The Quakers not only spoke out forcefully against modernisation (1983), they also supported a campaign in favour of tax refusal.

The Old-Catholic Church organised a round of discussions on the IKV proposal regarding the nuclear weapons issue. Ultimately, it was decided that each member of the congregation should make his/her own choice. On other occasions the Old-Catholic Church referred, as smaller churches often did, to the statements by the Council of Churches.

The Council of Churches in the Netherlands

The Council of Churches in the Netherlands played a prominent role in church support for the opposition against the neutron bomb in 1978. In the following years, the Council was also frequently the instrument for discussions between the churches and the government. In November 1979, the Council's chairman, Professor Hendrik Berkhof, spoke out forcefully against NATO plans to modernise nuclear weapons. The Council worked keenly on the nuclear weapons issue. Sometimes there was friction with the IKV about strategy and on whether this issue should be linked to the commitment to human rights in Eastern Europe. A letter written by the Council in March 1984 unequivocally rejected any further expansion and development of nuclear armaments. It marked an important moment in the struggle against cruise missiles.

We should also mention that all churches did more than merely discuss and adopt resolutions on the nuclear weapons issue. New study commissions on war and peace were set up nationally and locally. Local discussions addressed the churches' political

responsibility as well as civil disobedience and other themes. Congregations were urged to develop partnerships with local churches in Eastern Europe. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, some eight hundred local congregations had contacts 'on the other side', half of them with the GDR. Many local IKV groups took part. In addition, IKV groups played a very important role in democratising the security debate in the Netherlands. Numerous politicians were invited to local events. Congregations and parishes organised thousands of church meetings on nuclear weapons.

On the other side of the political and the churches' spectrum, criticism aimed at IKV led to a countermovement within the churches in which the Interkerkelijk Comité Tweezijdige Ontwapening (ICTO) [Interchurch Committee for Bilateral Disarmament] played a prominent role. However, this committee lacked the status that IKV enjoyed. The Evangelical Lutheran Church refused a request for this status. The Old-Catholic Church stated that IKV had received a mandate from the churches but that ICTO had not.

World Council of Churches (WCC)

Throughout its history, the World Council of Churches has spoken out frequently about the nuclear weapons issue. The WCC took a long time to reject nuclear deterrence unequivocally. One reason was that at the time of the Cold War it had to take into account the view of the Russian Orthodox Church that could not (or did not wish to) move too distant from the Soviet Union's official position. However, by far the most important reason for the hesitancy was the position of most Western member churches. They rejected nuclear war but continued to see nuclear deterrence as a means to prevent nuclear war. That is why the WCC initially mainly focused on a nuclear test ban and strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

The breakthrough came in 1983 during the WCC's Vancouver Assembly. Under pressure from Europe's large-scale peace movement and the US Nuclear Freeze Movement (that wanted to stop the nuclear arms race by 'freezing' it) the WCC took a stance against nuclear deterrence and any further production and deployment of nuclear weapons.

In 2007, partly in response to North Korea's nuclear test, the WCC repeated, its support for attempts to forbid and abolish nuclear weapons. According to the WCC, all nations should strengthen and implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It criticised the nuclear weapon states for continuing to modernise delivery systems and for planning to modernise their arsenals. Member churches were asked to address their governments on

the immorality of nuclear weapons. The WCC also requested them to help to increase public awareness of the nuclear threat.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ See: <http://www.oikoumene.org/index.php?id=3170>. See also the resolution of the WCC's 2006 assembly held in Porto Alegre, Brazil:
<http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/assembly/porto-alegre-2006/1-statements-documents-adopted/internationalaffairs/report-from-the-public-issues-committee/nuclear-arms.html>.

List of Abbreviations

ABM Treaty	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
AFB	Air Force Base
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCADD	Council on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament
CFA Treaty	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
EEG	European Economic Community
EGKS	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICTO	'Interchurch Committee for Bilateral Disarmament'
IKV	Dutch Interchurch Peace Council
INF Treaty	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty
IPPNW	International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
KNN	Dutch No to Cruise Missile Committee
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PvdA	Dutch Labour Party
RRW	Reliable Replacement Warhead
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (= Moscow Treaty)
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SPD	German Social Democratic Party
USAF	United States Air Force
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDC	Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

